In Defence of Jenny Peto - A letter to Dalton McGuinty

In December 2010, three members of the Ontario legislature, one of them a minister in the provincial government, took the extraordinary step of denouncing a recently accepted University of Toronto Master of Arts thesis in the legislature as being “shockingly antisemitic,” “disgusting,” “hateful and poorly researched,” a “piece of garbage,” and an “attack on Ontario's Jewish community.”

I had read the thesis in question, and had formed a very different opinion of its qualities. I was struck by the indications both in news reports and in their own language that none of the three MPPs had read the thesis—despite which they were willing, under the protection of legislative immunity, to slander the author and the supervisor of the thesis (both of whom happen to be members, if dissident ones, of Ontario's Jewish community).

Taking advantage if the fact that the Liberal Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, had been a student of mine three decades earlier at the University of Ottawa, I addressed this open letter to him. It was published by Independent Jewish Voices/Voix Juives Indépendentes (17 December 2010), http://ijvcanada.org/racism/new-antisemitism/in-defence-of-jenny-peto-a-letter-to-dalton-mcguinty/, and at four other websites, among them PULSE Media, in 2010-11. I was unaware when I published this text that Eric Hoskins, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, is a doctor: I have altered the text, where appropriate, to recognize that title.

 

The Right Honourable Dalton McGuinty, 
Premier of Ontario. 11 December 2010.

 

Dear Mr. McGuinty,

I am writing to you as a senior member of the teaching profession in Ontario’s college and university sector. I began my teaching career at Centennial College in Toronto nearly forty years ago, resigned from my position there in order to pursue doctoral research in England, and returned to Ontario in 1980—where I was taken on by the English Department of the University of Ottawa in time to have the pleasure of being one of your professors there in 1980-81.

I have taught at the University of Guelph since 1990—and have done external work as well, including service for one year as Chair of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s research grants adjudication committee in Literature, and for two years as President of the Association of Canadian College and University Teachers of English.

Please forgive this recitation of ‘street-creds’—but since I'm addressing you on a very serious matter, I would like to hope that this letter may receive your personal attention.

I am prompted to write by an extraordinary episode that occurred in the Ontario Legislature on December 7th. Two MPPs, Mr. Steve Clark and Mr. Peter Shurman, rose in the Legislature with questions addressed to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Honourable Eric Hoskins. Both MPPs denounced, in the most strenuous terms, a Master of Arts thesis recently accepted by the University of Toronto. Mr. Clark called it “shockingly anti-Semitic” and “disgusting,” and asked, “What are you doing as Minister of Citizenship to stop the rising tide of anti-Semitism?” Mr. Shurman called the thesis a “hateful and poorly researched paper,” and invited the Minister to “speak up on behalf of Jewish groups who have been so deeply hurt by this piece of garbage and condemn it not as an academic paper but for the hate that it actually is.”

Responding to his questioners with expressions of appreciation, Dr. Hoskins said, “I join them in condemning this attack on Ontario's Jewish community.” His responses also included a double reference to the pride he felt “earlier this year when the Legislature came together to condemn anti-Semitism on our campuses....”

I would like to draw several issues to your attention.

 

1. Mr. Shurman is reported in the newspapers as acknowledging that he had not himself read the MA thesis that he denounced in such inflammatory terms. Dr. Hoskins appears not to have read it either—and the wording of his first response would suggest that he believed Mr. Clark also derived his opinions about it at second hand: “I too, was greatly disturbed and in fact disgusted when I read the immediate reports as well.”

In contrast to your colleagues in the Legislature, I have read Ms. Jenny Peto’s MA thesis, The Victimhood of the Powerful: White Jews, Zionism and the Racism of Hegemonic Holocaust Education. I believe that the language used by the two MPPs and by the Minister to characterize this thesis is very seriously misleading. It is in my opinion a well-researched study with a clearly-defined ethical focus; it makes thoughtful and interesting use of critical race theory to construct a persuasive interpretive framework, and it arrives through close critical analysis at conclusions that could lead into further productive work at the doctoral level.

 

2. The central argument of Ms. Peto’s thesis—alluded to by Mr. Clark and Mr. Shurman—is that two particular Holocaust education projects, the “March of the Living” and the “March of Remembrance and Hope,” are making instrumental and political use of the appalling history of Jewish martyrdom and suffering in the Shoah, and thereby perpetuating claims to victimhood that, in Ms. Peto’s words, “are no longer based in a reality of oppression,” but rather produce effects that benefit “the organized Jewish community and the Israeli nation-state.”

Harsh though Ms. Peto’s language might seem to some readers, this is in fact an issue that is being vigorously discussed within Israel—perhaps most movingly and brilliantly by the film-maker Yoav Shamir, in his documentary Defamation. In that film’s climactic sequences, Shamir accompanies a group of Israeli teenagers who are being taken to Poland by one of the Holocaust education programs that Ms. Peto’s thesis discusses. There is a sequence in which these adolescents, having toured the site of the death camp at Auschwitz, are overwhelmed by the horror of the place and the appalling scale of the atrocities inflicted there; they huddle together in little groups, weeping. This scene is unforgettable. But scarcely less so is the new hardness that some of the young people then immediately express in relation to the sufferings of the Palestinians living in the territories illegally occupied by their country since 1967.

Shamir’s documentary leaves viewers with a clear sense that this hardness toward the Palestinians is an intended effect of the state-organized program whose workings he has shown us. (I would urge you and your colleagues, Mr. Premier, to watch this film: it is available online at http://www.defamation-thefilm.com/html/home_english.html. Mr. Clark, Mr. Shurman, and Dr. Hoskins may find it instructive that the argument they object to so vehemently in Ms. Peto’s work is unambiguously supported by Yoav Shamir’s documentary footage.)

 

3. Arguments similar to those of Ms. Peto’s MA thesis have recently been made by a distinguished Israeli politician, Avraham Burg, in his book The Holocaust is Over, We Must Rise from its Ashes. For a brief account of this book’s relevance to current political debates in Canada, see Gerald Caplan, “A Mideast reading list for Tories willing to learn,” The Globe and Mail (27 August 2010). Noting that Burg, the son of a prominent Israeli cabinet minister, has himself been “a leader of the Labour Party, speaker of the Knesset, and chairman of the Jewish Agency and the Zionist Executive,” Caplan writes that “From the heart of Israel itself, Mr. Burg has the courage to accuse his fellow Israelis of deliberately exploiting the Holocaust as an excuse to treat Palestinians deplorably.”

 

4. In their remarks in the Legislature on December 7th, the two opposition MPPs and your cabinet colleague agreed that Ms. Peto’s MA thesis is an expression of antisemitic hatred, and an attack on the Jewish community. I would argue that it is crucial for members of the Legislature to recognize that the issue of antisemitism has become heavily politicized in Canada—and that claims made on this subject have with increasing frequency been motivated by a desire to silence legitimate criticism of the actions and policies of the state of Israel by branding them as antisemitism and as hate speech.

Claims motivated in this manner have often taken the form of assertions that Canadian civility and decency are menaced by a “new antisemitism,” in which the traditional antisemitic loathing of Jews and Judaism has mutated into hatred of “the collective Jew” and now takes the form of attempts to demonize and delegitimize the state of Israel.

However, many distinguished contemporary scholars of Judaism and antisemitism have rejected attempts to expand the category of antisemitism by conflating it with criticisms of Israeli state policy and actions. These scholars include the late Raul Hilberg, whose magisterial three-volume work The Destruction of the European Jews (1961) is acknowledged as the seminal study of the Shoah; University of Oxford philosopher Brian Klug, whose writings on antisemitism include “The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism,” Patterns of Prejudice (June 2003), and “The Myth of the New Antisemitism,” The Nation (February 2004); Yakov M. Rabkin, Professor of History at the Université de Montréal, whose book Au nom de la Torah: une histoire de l’opposition juive au sionisme (2004) was shortlisted for a Governor-General’s Award; and Marc H. Ellis, Director of the Center for Jewish Studies at Baylor University, a theologian whose nearly two dozen books include The End of Jewish History: Auschwitz, the Holocaust and Palestine (2005).

Their principal reason for rejecting the conflation of antisemitism with criticism of Israeli policies is that its obvious purpose is to deflect attention away from Israel’s systematic violations of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, in its treatment since 1967 of the people of the Palestinian Occupied Territories.

A secondary reason is that this conflation actually detracts from the struggle against real antisemitism. As Professor Yanis Varoufakis of the University of Athens has written, “[W]hen a worthy cause, like that of ‘zero-tolerance to antisemites’, is appropriated by a regressive campaign whose purpose is, in effect, to terminate any critical engagement with the subjugation, repression and expropriation of another people, the Palestinians, then the worthy cause suffers. Antisemites rejoice when criticism of Israel’s Wall in Palestine is equated with antisemitism. For they are suddenly included in the wider community of fair minded people for whom the collective humiliation, mass harassment and disconnection of a whole people from their own backyards, not to mention the rest of the world, constitutes a hideous state of affairs in need of urgent redress.”

 

5. I have myself published on these subjects. I am the editor and part-author of Antisemitism Real and Imagined: Responses to the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Antisemitism (2010), a book described by Gerald Caplan, in the same Globe and Mail article in which he introduced Avraham Burg to Canadian readers, as “indispensable” and “important.” I would note that two matters raised in the Legislature, the first by the comments of Mr. Clark, and the second by Dr. Hoskins’s responses, are dealt with at some length in my book.

 

6. Mr. Clark asked Dr. Hoskins: “What are you doing as Minister of Citizenship to stop the rising tide of anti-Semitism?” But is there actually, as B’nai Brith Canada has repeatedly asserted, an alarming resurgence of antisemitism in Canada? Recognizing this as an important question, I devoted a long chapter to it in Antisemitism Real and Imagined (“Data and Deception: Quantitative Evidence of Antisemitism,” pp. 165-205). My conclusion, after detailed comparative analysis of the available statistical evidence, was that although Canadian Jews continue to be disproportionately victimized in hate crimes, antisemitic attitudes have declined steadily in recent decades, and Statistics Canada and Toronto Police Service data show declines in antisemitic hate crimes. It would therefore have been appropriate for Dr. Hoskins to reply by expressing a due determination to act firmly against antisemitism and all other forms of racism—and then to have added that according to the best available evidence, there is no “rising tide” of antisemitism in Canada.

 

7. The second of these two matters was evoked by Dr. Hoskins’s double reference to the pride he felt “earlier this year when the Legislature came together to condemn anti-Semitism on our campuses....” He was alluding to the vote taken in the Legislature on February 25th, 2010, in the presence of just thirty MPPs, to condemn Israeli Apartheid Week as “odious.”

It would have been more appropriate for Mr. Hoskins to feel shame over that vote, which revealed a remarkable level of ignorance among members of the Legislature.

The term “apartheid” was applied with clinical accuracy by Marwan Bishara in 2001 to describe what Israel had done in the Occupied Palestinian Territories from the early 1990s onward, “physically and demographically divid[ing] up the West Bank and Gaza into islands of poverty, or bantustans, while maintaining economic domination and direct control over Palestinian land and natural resources” (Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid [2001], p. 4). The term was re-used by former US President Jimmy Carter in 2006 (Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid)—a usage validated in 2007 by Israel Prize laureate and former Israeli Minister of Education Shulamit Aloni (“Yes, There is Apartheid in Israel,” CounterPunch [8 January 2007]). And in January 2010, Henry Seigman, the former Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress and current President of the US/Middle East Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that Israel’s “relentless” construction of new settlements “seems finally to have succeeded in locking in the irreversibility of its colonial project. As a result of that ‘achievement’ [...] Israel has crossed the threshold from ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’ to the only apartheid regime in the western world” (“Imposing Middle East Peace,” The Nation [7 January 2010]).

More conclusively, in May 2009 the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa published a report produced by a team of South African and international jurists and entitled Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?: A Reassessment of Israel's Practices in the Occupied Palestinian Territories Under International Law (http://www.hrsc.ac.za/Document-3227.phtml). This report came to the conclusion that Israel’s rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is “a colonial system that implements a system of apartheid.”

Dr. Hoskins is proud to have condemned as unacceptable and hateful any application of the term “apartheid” to the structures of land theft, cantonment, and racialized subjugation, separation, and oppression of a subject-population that characterize Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians. But South African legal scholars have had direct and bitter experience in their own country of the realities of apartheid. Are we to believe that members of the Ontario Legislature know better than they do what apartheid is?

* * * *

I would propose, in concluding, that the issue at hand is not one of whether we should provide Holocaust education to our children. I have strong feelings on this subject: I have traveled widely in Poland, and during those travels have walked on what I regard as sacred ground—in the vacant spaces that are all that remain of synagogues in Lodz and Lublin, in the surviving Old Synagogue in Kazimierz, in the gas-chamber at Majdanek, and in the hillside monument of shattered gravestones that is Kazimierz Dolny’s only memorial to the fifty percent of the town’s population who were murdered in the Shoah. What is at issue is not the question of whether our children should know this history, so they can dedicate themselves to ensuring that horrors of this kind can never be repeated: all of us, surely, believe this should be the case.

What is at issue, rather, is our right to subject the various representations of and responses to that history to lucid criticism and analysis—and to speak out openly when it appears that they are being used, not to bring young people into a determination to stand up against injustice, but instead to desensitize them to present-day actualities of dispossession, oppression, and suffering.

Ms. Jenny Peto has exercised that right in an MA thesis that in my opinion deals courageously with difficult and painful materials. I honour her for it.

I hope, Mr. Premier, that you and your fellow leaders in the Ontario Legislature—the Speaker of the House, the members of your cabinet, and the leaders of the two opposition parties, Ms. Horwath and Mr. Hudak—may be able to provide the appropriate leadership to bring other MPPs to an understanding of the principles of university autonomy and academic freedom, and the underlying principle that the intellectual work of universities must not be constrained by political interference.

I hope you may be able as well to inculcate a fuller recognition among members of the Legislature of the meaning of parliamentary decorum. Behaviour reminiscent of the denunciatory antics of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the early 1950s does not enhance the dignity of our Legislature—and there is reason to believe that the statements made by Mr. Clark, Mr. Shurman, and Dr. Hoskins amount to an abuse of parliamentary privilege. It would appear that none of the three MPPs had direct knowledge of Ms. Peto’s MA thesis, and Mr. Shurman’s remark, reported by the National Post on December 9th, is particularly shocking in its casualness: “He hasn’t read the paper, but nonetheless owes it to his largely Jewish constituents to defend Israel on their behalf, he said.”

All three MPPs made statements which, if spoken outside the Legislature, without the protection of parliamentary privilege, would be recognized under Canadian law as libelous. I believe there are good grounds for rejecting these statements as irresponsible, ill-informed, and untrue. I would recommend, then, that the Legislature exercise its own collective parliamentary privileges—which include the power to discipline its members—by requiring Mr. Clark, Mr. Shurman, and Mr. Hoskins to withdraw and apologize for their remarks.

Yours sincerely and respectfully,

Michael Keefer
Professor, School of English and Theatre Studies, University of Guelph.  

Desperate Imaginings: Rhetoric and Ideology of the ‘New Antisemitism’

This text was first published as chapter three in Part Three of Antisemitism Real and Imagined. The pagination of this chapter in the book (where it occupies pp. 207-41, with the notes on pp. 241-59) is indicated numbers in square brackets inserted into the text.

 

Antisemitism Real and Imagined (2010), Part 3, Chapter 3

 

This chapter offers an account of the rhetorical turns by means of which supporters of Israeli policies have sought to deflect criticisms of even the most flagrant crimes and illegalities, libeling human rights activists as antisemites and representing victimizers as victims. I begin by drawing upon the work of Norman Finkelstein for a quick outline of the principal means by which this libelous inversion is carried out—the ideology of the so-called “new antisemitism,” which I concur with him in recognizing as fraudulent.1

A related inversion of actuality is apparent in the CPCCA’s claims about the academic victimization of Jews. Stories of Jewish students being subjected to abuse and intimidation on Canadian campuses turn out to be seriously exaggerated: the reality is that critics of Israel in Canadian universities, and in American and Israeli universities as well, are the ones who most commonly have had to face slanders and vituperation—as well as the threat, and sometimes the actuality, of administrative sanctions, expulsion, or loss of employment.

But the CPCCA’s interventions may yet turn out—depending on how we respond to its explicit targeting of free speech and academic freedom, and depending on what the Canadian people make of the issues it has raised—to have been beneficial. This chapter concludes with some remarks about how we might, as a nation, take meaningful action against real—rather than imagined—antisemitism.

 

The “New Antisemitism”

As we have seen, the ideology of the “new antisemitism” rests on a rhetorical strategy that deals with criticisms of Israel by re-describing them as no more than [208] revivals of the traditional tropes of antisemitism. Reports of Israeli war crimes against Palestinian civilians, for example, are transformed into blood libels and denounced as vile and abusive. As in the example of the Community Security Trust’s smearing of Johann Hari, this rhetoric does away with the material evidence, slandering as antisemites those who report and analyze violations of human rights. Moreover, by identifying criticisms of Israel as evidence of a “new antisemitism,” it produces the illusion of a widespread resurgence of Jew-hatred, thereby legitimizing further aggressions as self-defense.

The pattern is one of a perverse feedback loop. Israel is treated as effectively indistinguishable from world Jewry—a point made forcefully when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was introduced at the Jewish Federations of North America General Assembly in Washington, DC in November 2009 as “the leader of Israel and the leader of the Jewish people,”2 and again when he himself declared in January 2010, at a ceremony commemorating the liberation of Auschwitz sixty-five years ago, that “From this place, I swear as the leader of the Jewish people, never again shall we allow evil to hurt our people.”3 (The many Israelis who voted against Netanyahu, and the many diaspora Jews who regard him as a violent and dangerous hypocrite, were not asked what they thought of these Mosaic pretensions.)

How is it possible, within this ideology, to interpret thoroughgoing criticism of the state led by such a politician as anything but antisemitic? Of course, the deeper that state plunges into apartheid policies, the more vocal become the criticisms of its behaviour—and the more persuasive therefore the evidence is that not just Israelis but Jews worldwide are beset by antisemites, whose evil desires “to hurt our people” must be combated by all means available.

Another complementary (and equally perverse) feedback loop is set in motion by this one—a loop in which the vile prejudices of a real if residual antisemitism find confirmation in the lawless violence of a state that the antisemite believes, because ideologues like Netanyahu tell him so, is acting on behalf of Jews worldwide. Of course, this second loop also amplifies the first one: any increase in real, and not just imagined antisemitism that may be prompted by the state of Israel’s words and deeds is grist to the “new antisemitism” propaganda mill.

* * * *

As Norman Finkelstein has remarked, “the allegation of a new anti-Semitism is neither new nor about anti-Semitism.”4 Over the past thirty-five years the term has been persistently advanced in books by national leaders of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL): Arnold Forster’s and Benjamin Epstein’s The New Anti-Semitism (1974), Nathan and Ruth-Ann Perlmutter’s The Real Anti-Semitism in America (1982), and Abraham Foxman’s Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (2003); and their work has been supplemented by a chorus of [209] other writers, among them Phyllis Chesler and Gabriel Schoenfeld, authors, respectively, of The New Anti-Semitism (2003) and The Return of Anti-Semitism (2004).5

Where there is so much smoke, there must be fire—but lit by whom, and for what purposes? Finkelstein argues that the intention of these books, and of the “meticulously orchestrated media extravaganzas” that have accompanied them, “is not to fight anti-Semitism but rather to exploit the historical suffering of Jews in order to immunize Israel against criticism.”6

The principal target of Forster’s and Epstein’s polemic was not the New York Times or the Washington Post, which they castigated for going easy on antisemites; or Norman Jewison, whose film version of Jesus Christ Superstar they attacked. Rather, as Finkelstein shows through extensive quotation, it was “criticism directed at Israel after the October 1973 war, when new pressures were exerted on Israel to withdraw from the Egyptian Sinai and to reach a diplomatic settlement with the Palestinians.” Interpreting this criticism as “hostility” to Israel, Forster and Epstein defined it as “the heart of the new anti-Semitism.”7

In the Perlmutters’ book, the “real” antisemitism is similarly defined, Finkelstein observes, “as any challenge inimical to Jewish interests”:

“Essentially [the Perlmutters write], this book’s thesis is that today the interests of Jews are not so much threatened by their familiar nemesis, crude anti-Semitism, as by a-Semitic government policies, the proponents of which may be free of anti-Semitism and indeed may well—literally—count Jews among some of their best friends.” Practically, this meant pinning the epithet “anti-Semitic” on domestic challenges to Jewish class privilege and political power as well as on global challenges to Israeli hegemony. American Jewish elites were, in effect and in plain sight, cynically appropriating “anti-Semitism”—an historical phenomenon replete with suffering and martyrdom, on the one hand, and hatred and genocide, on the other—as an ideological weapon to defend and facilitate ethnic aggrandizement.8

It is telling that the Perlmutters allied themselves with the openly antisemitic, and yet pro-Israel, ideologues of the religious right, while regarding the liberal Protestants of the National Council of Churches, whose leadership in opposing antisemitism they acknowledged, as opponents because of their criticisms of Israeli violations of international law.9

In Abraham Foxman’s 2003 book, Finkelstein argues, the ideology of the new antisemitism arrived at its mature form and “reveal[ed] its true essence”—for in this book, despite chapters on “The Rift between American Blacks and Jews,” and on the racism of right-wing extremists, “all pretenses were dropped that it was about anything except Israel.” Finkelstein briskly outlines Foxman’s logic:

[210] [T]he reasoning is that, since Israel represents the “Jew among nations,” criticism of Israel springs from the same poisoned well as anti-Semitism and therefore is, by definition, anti-Semitic. And since the last major outbreak of anti-Semitism climaxed in The Holocaust, those currently criticizing Israel are fomenting a new Holocaust. “Very quickly,” Foxman portends in Never Again? “the actual survival of the Jewish people might once again be at risk.” The transparent motive behind these assertions is to taint any criticism of Israel as motivated by anti-Semitism and—inverting reality—to turn Israel (and Jews), not Palestinians, into the victims of the “current siege” (Chesler).10

As can be seen from other recent texts—among them Pierre-André Taguieff’s Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (2004), a translation of his La nouvelle judéophobie (2002); Fiamma Nirenstein’s Terror: The New Anti-Semitism and the War Against the West (2005), translated from her L’Abbandono (2003) and Gli Antisemiti Progressisti (2004); some of the essays collected by David I. Kertzer in Old Demons, New Debates (2005); Alan Dershowitz’s The Case Against Israel’s Enemies (2008); and Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism (2009), by Denis MacShane, the Labour MP who chaired the British All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism—claims about a new antisemitism continue to be vigorously advanced.11 But though each of these texts adds new flourishes and new examples, the basic line of argument remains the one laid out by their ADL precursors.

 

Rhetorical Turns

The tropes of traditional antisemitism that we encountered in the preceding chapter—the conspiracy trope, the trope of dual loyalty, the trope of defilement, and the blood libel—have a degree of rhetorical complexity that may be worth reflecting on.

The conspiracy trope, with roots in New Testament fictions about the behaviour of Caiaphas the High Priest and his Sanhedrin in the trial of Jesus, took shape through the same passion for symmetry that seats an infant Antichrist in the lap of Satan, in direct imitation of the infant Jesus with the Virgin Mary, in the great 12th-century Last Judgment mosaic in the Italian cathedral of Torcello. Antisemites found it tempting to conceive of a demonic Jewish equivalent to the Pope and his College of Cardinals—and what could such a body concern itself with, if not a demonic parody of the papacy’s claim to universal spiritual regency? From here it’s not a great distance to the fantasies elaborated in that grotesque late-19th-century forgery, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.

The same process of mimetic projection and inversion gave rise to that most revolting of antisemitic tropes, the blood libel, which evidently stemmed from reflection on the image of the Christ child, the future crucified Redeemer [211] whose blood would be shed to atone for human sins.12 The disbelief of Jews in this Messiah was generally thought to exclude them from the community for whom Christ’s blood was spilled; through a sick projection and inversion, this conviction prompted accusations of ritual murder involving the crucifixion of a Christian child in a demonic parody of the Christian narrative of redemption.13 Further extensions of the same process led to elaborations including a parodic kosher butchery of the victim, whose blood would then be incorporated into Passover matzohs in a blasphemous mockery of the Mass.14

The conspiracy trope and the blood libel represent the obviously dominant Christian community as victimized—and the blood libel was clearly aimed at inciting the ‘victims’ to take revenge, in the form of judicial and mob violence against Jews. The full pattern, then, is one in which mimetic projection and inversion produce an illusion of victimization and consequently an incitement to persecution and violence.

While these antisemitic tropes displace structures of Christian belief into forms that provoke persecutory social action, the rhetoric developed by the ideologues of the “new antisemitism” involves a further act of displacement—one in which the antisemitic tropes are used as an overlay or re-description that serves to occult or erase actual present-day social actions.

The material reality may be that AIPAC, with an estimated budget of $40 to $60 million, is indeed the most powerful and most effective lobby on Capitol Hill;15 and that, as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter as written, “Under AIPAC pressure, there are few significant countervailing voices in the public arena, and any balanced debate is still practically nonexistent in the U.S. Congress or among presidential hopefuls.”16 But when such perceptions as Carter’s are re-described as mere revivals of the trope of a Jewish world conspiracy, the putative material reality becomes unspeakable—except by those willing to court being branded as antisemites.

Accusations, however well substantiated, of Israeli atrocities against Palestinian civilians, can similarly be re-described as no more than a renewal of the ancient and despicable blood libel. Thus in March 2009 Jonathan Kay of the National Post complained that “From the opening days of the Gaza campaign, the blood-libels of ‘massacre’ and ‘genocide’ have flown thick and fast”; and on the same day, his English counterpart in unwavering support for Israel, Melanie Phillips, went so far as to accuse the Israeli newspaper Haaretz of a blood libel for having reported the testimony of Israeli soldiers that they had witnessed and participated in war crimes against Gaza civilians.17 In August 2009 a Human Rights Watch report that documented the murder during Operation Cast Lead of eleven Palestinian civilians holding white flags was dismissed by an American pro-Israel blog as “a blood libel disguised as an investigative report.”18

But by mid-September 2009, when the Goldstone Report, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, was released, with its meticulous and [212] scrupulous documenting of war crimes, the blood-libel tactic seemed to be losing its effectiveness.

Harvard law professor and Israel apologist Alan Dershowitz let out all the stops in denouncing Richard Goldstone, the principal author of the UN report, as “a full-fledged member of the international bash-Israel chorus” whose name “will forever be linked in infamy with such distorters of history and truth as Noam Chomsky, Norman Finkelstein and Jimmy Carter. The so-called report commissioned by the notorious United Nations Human Rights Council and issued under his name is so filled with lies, distortions and blood libels that it could have been drafted by Hamas extremists.” 19

In the extremity of his rage, Dershowitz is unwilling to concede even that the “so-called” report is a report.

There are multiple ironies here: Goldstone is, like Dershowitz, a very senior member of the legal profession, a Jew, and a lifelong Zionist. The difference between them would appear to reside in the fact that Goldstone’s personal and judicial integrity has led him to face up to realities—in the case of the attack on Gaza, appalling realities—of a kind that Dershowitz has spent most of his adult life concealing, distorting, or defending.

* * * *

One of the more influential voices among what I have called the ideologues of the new antisemitism is that of Irwin Cotler, Professor of Law at McGill University, former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, and co-founder of the Inter-Parliamentary Coalition for Combating Antisemitism, at whose February 2009 meeting the Canadian delegation of which Cotler was the co-leader decided to form a Canadian branch of this international body, and to follow the British example of conducting a parliamentary inquiry into antisemitism.

In the presentation he made to a conference in Jerusalem in 1999, Professor Cotler expressed his outrage over international condemnations of Israel for human rights violations. He identified some poignant ironies in this situation, writing that

there is a clear symbolic—if not symbiotic—relationship between Israel, the United Nations, and human rights. For if the commitment underpinning the Genocide Convention is “never again,” then Israel is a state born of that commitment; and if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was designed to be the Magna Carta of humankind, Israel was to be, in the words of its founders, “a light unto the nations”; if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were to be commemorative of international humanitarian law, the genocide of European Jewry was the paradigmatic basis for the “grave breaches” of the laws of war as set forth in the Geneva Convention.20

[213] Cotler found it paradoxical, to say the least, that

a state which advocated fifty years ago for the establishment of an international criminal court to bring war criminals to justice—and pioneered in the development of international criminal law—now finds its settlement policy characterized as a serious war crime under the draft Treaty to establish an International Criminal Court; and a state committed to the pursuit of peace becomes the only state singled out for condemnation as a “non-peace loving nation” by two Emergency Sessions of the UN General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolutions.21

One might expect some recourse to historical evidence on the part of a writer interested in challenging condemnations of Israel’s human rights record—but it is clear that Cotler is not interested in historical actualities. No responsible scholar approaching the issues on which he was touching could fail to have been aware that the myth of the untarnished, heroic birth of the state of Israel as “a light unto the nations” had been effectively demolished by historians like Michael Palumbo and Benny Morris, whose books documented the atrocities involved in the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians in 1948.22 And the bland description of Israel as “a state committed to the pursuit of peace” appears more metaphysical than historical in character: for the period since 1971 especially, its falsity is quickly exposed by any honest recourse to the historical record.23

Cotler’s wording suggests, moreover, that this expert in human rights law does not recognize the international consensus according to which it is clear from Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, together with UN Security Council Resolutions 446, 452, 465, 471, and 476, that Israel’s settlements are indeed serious and flagrant violations of international law.24

Cotler takes it as axiomatic that criticisms of Israel must be false. On the basis of this dogma, his paper defines and distinguishes between old and new antisemitisms, analyzes the identifying features of the “New Anti-Jewishness,” and proceeds to a “case-study” of its operations in the UN, in the course of which he offers the striking image of Israel as being, in UN representations, the international “poisoner of the wells.” This is, by now, a familiar rhetorical turn: if we know a priori that UN condemnations of Israel’s behaviour are simply revivals of a disgraceful antisemitic trope, then there is no need to bother with any of the evidence on which they might be based.

Cotler is effectively extending the peculiar doctrine of American exceptionalism to cover the state of Israel as well. Most Americans have imbibed from childhood a mythic, religiously-inflected representation of their country as the culmination of a world-historical story of human liberation and material progress. And since to be the end-point, the goal or telos of a story of such grandeur is also in a sense to escape from the story—the New Jerusalem or [214] the City on a Hill is not a city like any other, merely historical one—they have found it easy to believe that their own uniquely virtuous country somehow stands outside the structures of socio-economic causality and grubby Realpolitik that motivate other nation-states.25

Not surprisingly, exceptionalism gives free play to hypocrisy and self-deception. As Lewis Lapham has put it, “The doctrines of American exceptionalism forbid American politicians to see any contradiction between what they practice and what they preach. America is always and everywhere innocent, a country so favored by fortune that its cause is always just.”26

Exceptionalism amounts to a form of American civic religion. And as Cotler made clear in a widely-cited version of this paper that he published in the Jerusalem Post in 2004, it is in similarly quasi-religious terms that he sees the conflict between Israel and the United Nations. One manifestation of political antisemitism, he says, is

discrimination against, denial of, or assault upon the Jewish people’s right to self-determination […]. To the extent that Israel has emerged as the “civil religion” of world Jewry—the organizing idiom of Jewish self-determination—this new anti-Semitism is a per se assault, in contemporary terms, on the religious and national sensibility of the Jewish people.27

Cotler proposes that another manifestation of political antisemitism, “the ‘demonizing’ of Israel,” needs to be understood in relation to a different form of secularized religion:

This [“demonizing”] is the contemporary analogue to the medieval indictment of the Jew as the “poisoner of the wells.” In other words, in a world in which human rights has emerged as the new secular religion of our time, the portrayal of Israel as the metaphor for a human rights violator is an indictment of Israel as the “new anti-Christ”—as the “poisoner of the international wells” […].28

Two comments are called for here. First, the criticisms of Israel’s human rights record in UN forums have been based, not on metaphor, but on considerations of legality and of material evidence. It is Cotler, and not the UN, who wants to reconfigure this issue as a problem of rhetoric, rather than a matter of persistently illegal actions that have caused irreparable harm to large numbers of people.

Indeed, his evocation of “new-antisemitism” tropes of metaphorical well-poisoning and of Israel as a “new anti-Christ” looks uncommonly like shadow-boxing. Since it is Cotler, and no-one else, who produces these tropes, and since he gives no evidence that they have actually figured in UN deliberations, one may be tempted to conclude that any injury resulting from their use is self-inflicted.

[215] Secondly, Cotler’s framing of the matter in terms of a sacralized Israeli state facing off against a secular religion of human rights is in several respects unfortunate. If his remarks on Jewish self-determination are meant to imply that there exists any real threat to the continued existence of Israel as a state, they are a serious exaggeration.29 If, on the other hand, Cotler wishes to imply that a Jewish right to self-determination extinguishes, a priori and forever, the right of Palestinians to a parallel self-determination,30 then he is putting his own reputation as an upholder of human rights at risk.

And what of Cotler’s claims on behalf of “world Jewry”? Setting aside the fact that for some communities of orthodox Jews a concession of religious value to any state is blasphemous, many Jews worldwide regard a commitment to debate, vigorous dissent, and dissidence as a central feature of their culture and their spirituality: the very name of Israel was conferred upon the patriarch Jacob for wrestling with his God.

Large numbers of such people, while feeling a deep and abiding affection for the country, Israel, are vehemently opposed to the policies into which that nation’s ruling elites, aided and abetted by American Zionism,31 have led it. They would object to any even implicit sacralizing of those policies, and would resent any insinuation, however indirect, that their sensibility as Jews—whether religious, national, or bound up with ethical, familial, and ethnic-cultural traditions—could be “assaulted” by the universally binding principles of human rights, even if Professor Cotler wants to represent these as having become conflated with a “new antisemitism.”32

 

How Episodes of Academic Antisemitism Have Been Invented

During the early and mid-1990s, the North American news media were awash with scandalous stories about an alarming and systematic suppression of academic and intellectual freedoms in American and Canadian universities: sane and decent academics and students alike were being terrorized by radical “politically correct” literary scholars—feminists, Foucauldians, deconstructionists, new historicists, cultural materialists—and their student acolytes, who together made up a rampaging horde denounced by right-wing pundits as “cultural storm troopers,” “moral vigilantes,” “Red guards,” “academic Brownshirts,” “new puritans,” and “PC thought police.”

Scholarly analysis of the evidence revealed, however, that in the vast majority of cases, the abusive behaviour so noisily denounced in the media was either fabricated wholesale or else a product of grotesque and malicious exaggeration. The real problem was that a coalition of powerful forces in government, in right-wing corporate-funded think-tanks, and in the corporate media had discovered (somewhat belatedly) that wide-ranging forms of ethically oriented cultural criticism were gaining a foothold, not just in literary studies [216] but throughout the human sciences, with the result that academic disciplines which had formerly been reliable upholders of the status quo were becoming places where critical analyses based on issues of colonization, settlement, gender, race, and social class were widely approved.

The so-called “political correctness debates”—more accurately referred to as the “culture wars,” because they produced more vituperation than debate, more heat than light—were primarily an attempt by these powerful forces to tame and purge dissident elements within the academy. The rhetoric with which “anti-PC” polemicists sought to drum up public support for this project by creating a state of moral panic made heavy use of lurid narratives of victimization. Where such narratives were not available—and they very seldom were—polemicists simply made them up wholesale.33

There is good reason to think that contemporary accusations of a widespread “new antisemitism” within North American universities—which an article in the National Post devoted to recent events at York University suggested can only be cured by a systematic purging of “hateful elements”34—are an attempt to repeat this pattern.

In 2002 Todd Gitlin, professor of journalism at Columbia University, expressed dismay over an apparent return of the “rough beast” of antisemitism. His primary evidence was a widely-circulated email message from Laurie Zoloth, then-director of Jewish Studies at San Francisco State University. Zoloth denounced her own university as “the Weimar Republic with brown shirts it cannot control”—the purported neo-Nazis being “an angry crowd of Palestinians,” an “out of control mob” who launched a “raw, physical assault” on “praying students, and the elderly women who are our college participants, who survived the Holocaust,” while the police looked on and did nothing.35

Had Gitlin taken the trouble to check his source (as he presumably teaches journalism students to do), he might have discovered, Norman Finkelstein writes, that

the consensus among Jewish spokespersons in the Bay Area, including Dr. Fred Astren, current director of Jewish Studies at SFSU (and a personal witness to the alleged incident), was that Zoloth had a penchant for “wild exaggeration,” born of a mindset nurtured in “Marxist-Leninist” politics—except that she’s in thrall not, as in bygone days, to the Soviet Union, but to “the Jewish State of Israel, a state that I cherish.” The police didn’t intervene because nothing happened warranting their intervention.36

Other similar stories—a claim in late 2003 that “A Jewish student wearing a yarmulke at Yale University” had been “attacked in his dormitory by a Palestinian,” and a report in 2004 that at the University of Chicago “a university-appointed preceptor told a Jewish student he would not read her BA paper because it focused on topics related to Judaism and Zionism”37—turned out to be groundless fictions.38

[217] Three recent episodes, one at UCLA and two at Toronto’s York University, invite more extended consideration. In all three cases distortions and falsifications can be traced, and all three were marked by interventions from member organizations of the very powerful Israel on Campus Coalition (ICC), which gathers together thirty American pro-Israel organizations, among them AIPAC, the American Jewish Committee (AJC), the American Jewish Congress, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), CAMERA, The David Project, Aish HaTorah/Hasbara Fellowships, Hillel/The Foundation for Jewish Campus Life, the Jewish National Fund (JNF), Media Watch International, StandWithUs, the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), as well as five affiliate members, including Simon Wiesenthal Center Campus Outreach. At York University there have also been interventions from member organizations of a proportionately no less powerful Canadian umbrella organization, the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA),39 as well as from B’nai Brith Canada and, more disturbingly, from the terrorist-vigilante Jewish Defence League.

* * * *

Professors David Theo Goldberg and Saree Makdisi have written at some length about the consequences of interventions on California university campuses of the Israel on Campus Coalition—most particularly in relation to a January 2009 panel discussion on “Human Rights and Gaza” hosted by UCLA’s Center for Near Eastern Studies in which they took part, Makdisi as a panelist and Goldberg as a member of the audience.40 They describe an academic event marked throughout by civility, even by occasional applause and laughter from the audience, despite a somewhat “heated and contentious” question and discussion period.

However, on February 1, 2009 Roberta Seid, the research director of StandWithUs, published an article entitled “Reviving 1920’s Munich’s Beer Halls at UCLA” which was laced with malicious falsehoods,41 and which set off an ascending spiral of further distortions. Seid said that the four panelists “expressed hope that Israel would lose against Hamas,” and claimed that in response to one panelist’s answer to a question, “The audience roared with laughter and some began chanting ‘Zionism is racism’ and ‘Free Free Palestine’.”

Two days later, ardently pro-Israel UCLA professor Judea Pearl, writing in the Wall Street Journal, described the panel as “a Hamas recruitment rally” conducted by “terrorist sympathizers.”42 This motif was picked up by Tom Tugend, who wrote in the Jewish Journal of Los Angeles on February 11 that “outraged critics across the country” were characterizing the symposium as an “‘academic lynching,’ a ‘one-sided witch hunt of Israel,’ a ‘Hamas recruiting rally’”; at the same time he inflated Seid’s account of the discussion period by saying that the panelist’s answer “was met by audience cheers and chants [218] of ‘Zionism is racism,’ ‘Zionism is Nazism,’ ‘Free, Free Palestine’ and ‘F…, f… Israel’.”43

A week later Judea Pearl wrote in the same journal that “the panelists […] bashed Israel, her motives, her character, her birth and conception and led the excited audience into chanting ‘Zionism is Nazism,’ ‘F---, f--- Israel’ […].”44 In this article, Pearl expressed outrage that “the word ‘terror’ and the genocidal agenda of Hamas were conspicuously absent” from an account of the panel discussion, entitled “Scholars Say Attack on Gaza an Abuse of Human Rights,” that had been published by the campus newspaper, the UCLA Daily Bruin. One might wonder why a news report should focus on matters that appear to have been conspicuously absent from the event itself. But Pearl’s complaint is simply an extension of the slanders of his Wall Street Journal article: from the notion that “terrorist sympathizers” were taking part in “a Hamas recruitment rally,” he draws the insinuation that they must also have been engaged in incitements to genocide.45

Of course, neither Tugend nor Pearl had been present at the UCLA event. Goldberg and Makdisi, who were there, insist that there was no chanting, and no invective directed by audience members or panelists “at Israel or at any other state.” They invite readers to compare podcast recordings of the panel with the claims made by hostile interpreters—at the same time regretting that distortions and fabrications “have become the public record of note, the ‘truth’ of the matter.”46

By the time Pearl returned for a third time to the attack, writing in mid-March in the Los Angeles Times that the event was a “hate-fest” in which “the excited audience reportedly chanted ‘Zionism is Nazism’ and worse,”47 the subject had indeed been successfully changed. The questions of human rights law and human rights abuses analyzed by the panelists had largely disappeared from public discussion; the issue instead had become one of whether or not the panelists and their audience were guilty of disgraceful outbursts of antisemitism.

* * * *

As Dan Freeman-Maloy has shown in a carefully documented essay, somewhat less civil student-organized events at Toronto’s York University in February 2009 were subjected to a similarly cynical process of falsification.48 On February 11, 2009, the Jewish student organization Hillel and the Israel advocacy group Hasbara Fellowships (both of them well-funded members of the ICC) called a press conference to publicize their campaign to impeach the leadership of the York Federation of Students (YFS), which in January had passed a resolution condemning Israeli attacks on educational institutions in Gaza. There are competing accounts as to whether pro-YFS students were deliberately barred from the press conference or excluded because of the size of the room that had been booked. Believing the former to be the case, [219] supporters of YFS demonstrated noisily outside the press conference room, with chants including “Shame on Hillel,” “Zionism is racism,” and “Racists off campus”—“Not messaging everyone can get behind,” as Freeman-Maloy comments, “but hardly anti-Semitic.”

Accounts of this student confrontation were published by York’s student newspaper, the Excalibur, by an alternative left campus newspaper, the YU Free Press, and by the Globe and Mail, all of which had reporters on hand; another response by a Jewish student who had attended the press conference was published online by Jonathan Kay at the National Post. The sheer numbers of students outside the press-conference room (and subsequently the Hillel office) alarmed Hillel members, and the author of the National Post article records having been frightened by the stare of a pro-Palestinian student wearing a Kaffeiyah scarf over part of his face. But as Freeman-Maloy remarks, “No quotes from Hillel spokespeople are relayed in any of these stories alleging specifically anti-Semitic statements.”

On the next day, February 12, 2009, a demonstration of some 150 students condemning Israeli attacks on Gaza in York University’s Vari Hall was confronted by a Hillel counter-demonstration of equal or larger size—whose participants included Frank Dimant, the leader of B’nai Brith Canada, together with some of his colleagues, and reportedly also Bernie Farber, the head of the Canadian Jewish Congress. If the aim of this counter-demonstration was to disrupt the pro-Palestinian event and drown out its would-be speakers with counter-chanting, it appears to have succeeded. Freeman-Maloy writes that he was present at this event, and is not aware “of one half-credible allegation of anti-Semitism relating to it.”

A viewing of the seven distinct videotapes of this demonstration and counter-demonstration listed by Independent Jewish Voices in the first of their contributions to this book is instructive.49 These videotapes show that two banner-carrying Jewish groups took part in the demonstration against Israel’s behaviour in Gaza, and that the participants in that demonstration apparently ignored provocative behaviour by some of the counter-demonstrators (no responses to their shouted taunts are audible, and the Jewish pro-Palestinian demonstrators turned their banners away from the counter-demonstration). The counter-demonstration included one potentially intimidating feature: a line of young men in black T-shirts with the slogan “Jews Need Not Fear Here” in large block letters on their chests. Decent people would agree that Jews should not suffer intimidation on campuses, or anywhere else, but the primary message projected by such uniforms in a confrontational demonstration might well be that people—including pro-Palestinian Jews—with views opposed to those of the counter-demonstrators should themselves be fearful, especially if, as seems possible, the men were members of the Jewish Defence League Canada, an extremist vigilante organization with a terrorist past and an ongoing commitment to violence.50

[220] On February 13, 2009 the National Post carried a story in which Hillel@York president Daniel Ferman claimed that demonstrators on February 11 had called him a “dirty Jew” and “f---ing Jew.” Though unsubstantiated, as well as politically convenient, the claim is not implausible. But on the same day, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), followed on February 15 by the Jerusalem Post, added “a new pair of alleged (and unattributed) quotes: ‘Die bitch, go back to Israel’; ‘Die Jew, get the hell off campus’.” As Freeman-Maloy notes, these death threats were not reported to the police who were on campus on February 11, nor witnessed by any of the reporters present, “nor accompanied by any effort to determine who said these things or to whom the threatening comments were directed.”51 They would appear to belong to the same category as the nasty chanting that never occurred at the UCLA panel discussion on “Human Rights and Gaza.”

The drift from a confrontational but non-violent pair of encounters between opposing groups of students on the York campus, during which no antisemitic statements or gestures were detected by any of the reporters in attendance, to a fiction that could be summed up on February 15 by a columnist in the Jerusalem Post as “violent anti-Jewish riots at York University in Toronto, Canada,”52 was rapid and seemingly effortless. By late February Frank Dimant of B’nai Brith had embellished the story further, claiming to the Ottawa Citizen that “People were banging on walls and screaming things like ‘death to the Jews’.”53

Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism Minister Jason Kenney weighed in as well, declaring on February 23, 2009 that “This stuff is getting out of control,” and blaming the Ontario branch of the Canadian Union of Public Employees, which represents graduate teaching assistants and contract faculty at Ontario universities and has been urging boycott action against Israel, for “creat[ing] an opinion environment which makes it acceptable to start shouting at Jewish kids who probably also happen to support Israel.”54 In September 2009, speaking in Thornhill, Ontario, Kenney charged that “Israel Apartheid Days on university campuses like York sometimes begin to resemble pogroms”—a remark that journalist Linda McQuaig has challenged, noting that to compare “intense debate” and “heated exchanges to pogroms—organized campaigns of slaughter and pillage of European Jews—is absurd.”55

* * * *

A more recent event at York University initially followed a similar trajectory, but then took a surprising turn. Tyler Golden, Co-President of Hasbara Fellowships at York University,56 informed the news website Shalom Life that when on February 1, 2010 he and other members of Hasbara were distributing information about the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and about their “Free Palestinians from Hamas” campaign from a table in Vari Hall, “several anti-Israel known faces on campus” came to question and debate with them—a [221] group that quickly swelled, in the Shalom Life journalist’s words, “into an angry mob of around 50 students, who surrounded [Golden’s] group and chanted anti-Israel and anti-Semitic slurs.” When Hasbara students began to videotape this behaviour, Golden said, some students on the other side “were upset that there were cameras in their faces, so they started yelling and screaming. As they were trying to push cameras out of the way, they actually hit two students.”57 Hasbara Fellowships Co-President Marlee Mozeson, who claimed to have been one of the victims of assault—she had been slapped and had her camera knocked out of her hand—declared that “The University’s steps to ensure a safe campus for all have been proven unsuccessful and ineffective. We call on the University to take immediate action to restore order and safety for all students on campus.”58

By February 3 Meir Weinstein, head of the JDL in Canada, had signaled his organization’s intention of taking vigilante action by offering a reward for information that would enable the JDL to track down the supposed perpetrators. Here is the text of his reward notice, in the form in which he posted it on February 5:

Two Jewish Students were the victims of hate crimes and assaults at York University Monday February 1

The Jewish Defence League of Canada is offering a $500.00 reward for the assailants identities, names, alias, phone numbers and addresses (work and home)

Contact the Jewish Defence League of Canada at 416-736-7000 or www.jdl-canada.com [….]

Meir Weinstein, Toronto (02/05/10)59

The story of Jewish students being assaulted at York quickly went international, with an account published by the news service JTA on February 7 that was reproduced in the Jerusalem Post the following day.60 But on February 8 the story unraveled: CCTV surveillance video from Vari Hall, the site of the incident, revealed that the Hasbara students’ claims to have been assaulted were false. As Elad Benari of Shalom Life wrote in a follow-up article,

At one point, it can be seen that an argument may have taken place; however, at no point during the video is there any evidence of a brawl, nor can a shouting match be evident from the students’ body language. At several points, cameras are being used by the students, and at one point a female student who obviously does not take well to being on camera tries to reach for the camera, but the male student holding it lifts it up so it is out of her reach. No evidence of students being physically assaulted can be found during the video.61

[222] The student newspaper Excalibur interviewed Jesse Zimmerman, a pro-Palestinian student activist who had been among the group that approached the Hasbara table:

“There was never a mob,” he said. “There were four of us, and they [Hasbara] were surrounding us and making personal attacks on us and yelling shit at me.”

Surveillance footage made available to Excalibur shows no evidence of a physical brawl. While the footage lacks audio, it does clearly show that no one physically touched another person or invaded anyone’s space in a threatening manner.

Body language is exuberant, at most, but never aggressive. No more than 20 to 30 people can be seen around the table in the video, including both parties and bystanders. Two visible handheld cameras can be seen on screen, none of which is smacked to the ground.62

Zimmerman’s account of the number of pro-Palestinian students involved in the incident is supported by the JTA report of February 7 (republished in the Jerusalem Post), which notes that the alleged assaults “occurred when about 20 Jewish members of the on-campus group Hasbara Fellowships at York University gathered, with permission from the university, to raise awareness of captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and terrorist acts committed by Hamas.”63 The approach of Zimmerman and his three companions would bring the number of students present to about two dozen; add in some bystanders, and we have the full number visible in the CCTV videotape.

The claim that fifty or so activists “surrounded the Jewish students and began chanting anti-Israel and anti-Semitic slurs” was, then, no less a fabrication than the assaults.

It appears that Jesse Zimmerman and his companions are the ones who were surrounded, and that Golden, having perhaps taken part in some less than civil behaviour, promptly inverted the reality to make himself and his friends into victims. Zimmerman, who evidently told the truth about the numbers involved in the tabling incident, also told the Excalibur reporter that his Palestinian activism “has made him the target of non-stop harassment by pro-Israel students. ‘They have harassed me online and in person […] I don’t feel safe on campus,’ said Zimmerman.”64

York University’s handling of these two episodes, in February 2009 and February 2010, seems oddly unbalanced. Students Against Israeli Apartheid, the group that organized the demonstration in Vari Hall on February 12, 2009, was fined $1,000 by the university for making noise that disturbed classes being held in the same building; an additional fine of $250 was levied on the leader of the group. No fine was imposed on Hillel.

[223] York University has to date made no public reference to the fact that the falsehoods disseminated by the campus leaders of Hasbara Fellowships in February 2010 were not just damaging to the university’s reputation, but also exposed other students to a serious risk of stalking, harassment, and violence at the hands of a dangerous extremist group, the JDL.

B’nai Brith’s weekly journal, the Jewish Tribune, published an article on February 10, 2010 praising York University for “taking complaints about anti-Semitism seriously during this school year […].” The article quotes from a press release issued by Hasbara Fellowships in which “the group ‘commends York University for their swift investigation into … [an] incident where [allegedly] two Jewish students were assaulted in Vari Hall on Feb. 1, 2010.’”65

Hasbara Fellowships makes no acknowledgment of or apology for the fact that its allegations had been exposed as fraudulent—even the bracketed word “allegedly” appears to have been supplied by the Jewish Tribune—but it now patronizingly commends security arrangements it had a week previously denounced as “unsuccessful and ineffective.” This press release seems an instance not so much of hasbara (the Hebrew word means “explanation” or, more accurately, “propaganda”), as of chutzpah (the primary meaning of which in Hebrew is “shamelessness”).66

The university, for its part, has avoided any hint of reproach. The Jewish Tribune quotes York’s director of media relations, Alex Bilyk, as saying, with some delicacy, “that although Hasbara did not wish to involve the police when filing its initial complaint, ‘we viewed [a tape of the incident] for our own peace of mind. If we had felt there was a physical safety issue, we would have filed a police report.’”67

What, then, of the JDL’s clear and very public threat of violence against members of the university community? Mr. Bilyk did not say whether he thought this raised a physical safety issue that might justify dropping a line to the Toronto police.

 

Academic Terror’

In the second of his three articles dealing, at greater or lesser length, with the UCLA panel on “Human Rights and Gaza,” Professor Judea Pearl denounced the “academic terror” to which he claimed pro-Israel academics in the U.S. are being subjected. Colleagues have told him, he says, “about lecturers whose appointments were terminated, professors whose promotion committees received ‘incriminating’ letters, and about the impossibility of revealing one’s pro-Israel convictions without losing grants, editorial board memberships, or invitations to panels or conferences.”

Should we find this all a bit vague, Pearl explains the absence of detail: “all, literally all” of his terrorized colleagues “swore [him] into strict secrecy”—a fact, for anyone gullible enough to accept it as such, that seems designed to reinforce Pearl’s claim that “we have entered the era of ‘the new Marranos.’”68 [224] But once we move beyond unsubstantiated rumours such as this, the available evidence indicates, on the contrary, that the academics whose reputations and careers have been placed at risk in the U.S. and Canada are those who have been bold enough to criticize the geopolitics of the American empire—and, in particular, the behaviour of the state of Israel toward the Palestinians of the occupied territories, as well as the comportment of Israel’s passionate and uncritical North American supporters.

Thus, for example, Dr. Joseph Massad of Columbia University’s Department of Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures (MEALAC) was the object of a three-year witch-hunt between 2002 and 2005. Massad’s persecution may have been prompted by his articles on Palestine, published in scholarly journals like Social Text, Middle East Journal, Critique, and the Journal of Palestine Studies, and perhaps also by the incisive and much more widely circulated essays he has contributed to Al Ahram Weekly.69 It was initiated by faculty members of Columbia’s medical school, who sought to co-opt students into working toward his dismissal; it was taken up by the Columbia Spectator, whose misquotations of Massad’s words, though quickly corrected, were maliciously reproduced by the pro-Israel propagandists Martin Kramer of Tel Aviv University and Daniel Pipes, originator of the neo-McCarthyite Campus Watch. The campaign was joined by New York Democratic congressman Anthony Weiner, and amplified by the New York Sun and the New York Post; it was taken to a new height by The David Project, which circulated to university administrators and journalists a film, Columbia Unbecoming, in which students and non-students complained of supposed instances of antisemitic intimidation; and, finally, it was given added impetus by Columbia’s president Lee Bollinger, who in public statements shamefully accepted easily disproven allegations as facts.70

Despite the best efforts of the Anti-Defamation League, The David Project, the New York tabloid press, Columbia medical school colleagues who circulated racist and threatening emails, Daniel Pipes’ Campus Watch (with the tag-team work of Pipes’ Tel Aviv friend Martin Kramer), as well as Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz, who felt called upon to intervene,71 Massad remains a faculty member—now tenured—at Columbia. The reasons for his survival include an outstanding teaching record and obvious brilliance as a scholar,72 the international support he received from defenders of academic freedom, and the simple fact that, as a New York Times editorial observed, there was no evidence “that anyone’s grade suffered for challenging the pro-Palestinian views of any teacher or that [MEALAC] professors made anti-Semitic statements.” Indeed, the editorial acknowledged, “the professors who were targeted have legitimate complaints themselves. Their classes were infiltrated by hecklers and surreptitious monitors, and they received hate mail and death threats.”73

The New York Times was itself far from innocent in this affair: rather, as University of Michigan Middle East scholar Juan Cole noted, it “slammed” [225] the university committee that investigated Massad “for not being inquisitorial enough,” thereby lending its support to a “witch hunt” that Cole thought, in the spring of 2005, represented “the gravest threat to academic freedom in decades.”74

* * * *

Dr. Norman Finkelstein, a political scientist who came up for tenure at DePaul University in 2007, was less fortunate than Mossad, possibly because his major publications had in a more particular way exposed and embarrassed powerful pro-Zionist institutions and individuals.

Finkelstein first gained wide public notice, and some influential enemies, by revealing the fraudulence of Joan Peters’ From Time Immemorial: The Origins of the Arab-Jewish Conflict over Palestine (1984), a best-seller that sought through demographic analysis to revive the Zionist myth of Palestine as a land without people awaiting the return of a people without land, and that had been acclaimed by Daniel Pipes, Martin Peretz, Lucy Dawidowicz, Barbara Tuchman, and Nobel Laureates Saul Bellow and Elie Wiesel. In the wake of a devastating review by demographer Yehoshua Porath, and of Finkelstein’s analysis, published as a long essay and then as a chapter in his first book, From Time Immemorial has been recognized by historians as worthless.75

Finkelstein’s critique of another widely praised book, Daniel Goldhagen’s prize-winning Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (1996), was first published as a review essay in New Left Review. But on this occasion plans to republish the analysis, together with another review essay by historian Ruth Bettina Birn that had appeared in the Cambridge Historical Journal, were met with a concerted campaign by mainstream Jewish organizations to strangle the project in its cradle.

Abraham Foxman of the ADL wrote to Finkelstein’s editor at Metropolitan Books, an imprint of Holt, calling his opinions “beyond the pale”; and Leon Weseltier, literary editor of the New Republic, denounced Finkelstein to Holt’s publisher, Michael Naumann, as “poison,” “a self-hating Jew, […] something you find under a rock.”76

The pressures against Birn were if anything more extreme. Goldhagen threatened her with legal action, and the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC) warned Birn, who was chief historian in the War Crimes section of Canada’s Ministry of Justice, to drop the book project: “‘Publish,’ sniff[ed] CJC spokesman Bernie Farber, ‘but don’t publish with someone who’s loathed and despised by the Jewish community.’” When Birn, in response, complained of intimidation, saying that “the real story for Canadians [….] is a question of the attempted suppression of fair comment through the exertion of political influence,”77 she was accused by CJC president Goldie Herson of “what some might consider an anti-Semitic canard,” and the Justice Department was pressured into launching an investigation. In the mean time, Mordecai Briemberg writes, “Irving Abella, [226] incoming president of the Canadian Historical Association and past president of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC), pronounced Finkelstein ‘an enemy of the Jewish people’ and said that for Dr. Birn to publish with him is ‘like being published with someone from the Ku Klux Klan’.”78

This campaign struck a number of observers as outrageous: Israeli historian and journalist Tom Segev described it as “bordering on cultural terrorism.”79 Equally peculiar was the asymmetry, no less marked in the case of Hitler’s Willing Executioners than in that of From Time Immemorial, between the reception of these books (and Finkelstein’s refutations of them) by the corporate media and mainstream Jewish organizations, and their reception by scholars and historians with expertise in the field.

The criticisms of Goldhagen by Finkelstein and by Birn in their book A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1998), were endorsed by distinguished historians80—most devastatingly by Raul Hilberg, the leading Holocaust scholar, who has declared Goldhagen’s book to be “totally wrong about everything [….] I mean, totally off the wall, you know, and factually without any basis,”81 and by Yehuda Bauer, Professor Emeritus of Holocaust Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who acidly remarked that “I have yet to read of a single historian who has publicly expressed agreement [with Goldhagen]. Not one, and that is a very rare unanimity. In my university, this book would never have passed as a Ph.D. dissertation.”82

Irving Abella stands out as an exception to the consensus claimed by Bauer—for unless his remarks about Finkelstein were intended as a gratuitous insult, they would seem to imply an endorsement of Goldhagen. But if Abella’s branding of Finkelstein as “an enemy of the Jewish people” invites questions about his own ethics as an historian, it also betrays an embarrassing degree of literary ignorance: the protagonist of Henrik Ibsen’s classic play An Enemy of the People (1882) is a man of integrity and courage, who incurs the hatred of dishonest elites and a deluded public through his exposure of a threat to public health.

Finkelstein’s two best-known books, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (2001, expanded second edition, 2003), and Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (2005), exposed more serious and more damaging forms of dishonesty and hypocrisy within mainstream American institutions and discourses. As Ibsen might have predicted, they earned him honour (not unmixed, sometimes, with criticism) among those able to recognize their scholarly integrity and profoundly ethical orientation—and, from ideologues, an increased level of hatred.

The Holocaust Industry contains, in its third and perhaps most notable chapter, a powerful exposé of the diversion of funds provided by the German government, and more recently by the major Swiss Banks, as indemnifications for the crimes of the Holocaust and reparations to surviving victims.

[227] Finkelstein notes that $120 million (worth about a billion present-day dollars) was paid by the German government between 1952 and 1964 to the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (or Claims Conference), an umbrella group of major Jewish organizations, for distribution to Holocaust survivors who had not otherwise received compensation for their sufferings under Nazi persecution. In what he calls a “flagrant breach” of the “letter and spirit” of the agreement, the Claims Conference diverted all but about 15 percent of the money from the victims who should have been the beneficiaries to its own constituent organizations, which used the money to finance projects such as Holocaust Museums, university chairs in Holocaust studies, Yad Vashem pensions to “righteous Gentiles,” subsidies to Jewish communities in Arab countries, projects to encourage immigration to Israel from eastern Europe, and payments to “outstanding Jewish leaders.”83

Finkelstein also documents what he calls the “double shake-down” of the Swiss banking system during the late 1990s by the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and other U.S.-based Jewish organizations, purportedly on behalf of Holocaust survivors. What was supposedly being recovered, even though indemnities had been agreed on and paid by the early 1950s, was money from dormant bank accounts of Holocaust victims, the value of “Nazi gold” acquired by the Swiss banks during or after the Nazi period, and the estimated accumulated value of deposits earned from slave labour in the Nazi camps. But as Neve Gordon observed in a review of the book, Finkelstein demonstrated “how Jewish organizations […] consistently exaggerated numbers—of slave laborers or the amount of ‘victim gold’ purchased by the banks—in order to secure more money.”84

The sums amassed by the WJC through what Finkelstein terms “an extortion racket” come to a total of at least $1.25 billion.85 While the lawyers negotiated, Gordon remarks, “the Jewish lobby launched an extensive campaign” which “included the publication of studies—supported by the Simon Wiesenthal Center—that accused Switzerland of ‘knowingly profiting from blood money’ and committing ‘unprecedented theft,’ and claimed that ‘dishonesty was a cultural code that individual Swiss have mastered to protect the nation’s image and prosperity.’” Pressing these allegations in the House and Senate banking committees, the lobby simultaneously “convinced officials in a number of states, including New York, New Jersey and Illinois, to threaten the Swiss banks with economic boycott. Finally, the banks bent in response.” 86

As before, only a fraction of the money obtained was passed on to the heirs of Holocaust victims, or to Holocaust survivors and their families. Angelo Codevila concluded from his own study of the matter that a “coalition of powerful Americans” had used “the power and prestige of the United States government to funnel money into its own hands.”87

Finkelstein was firmly supported by Raul Hilberg, who declared him to be “one hundred percent correct” in his analysis of the WJC and the Swiss [228] banks: it “was not only coercive on the part of the Jews who mobilized, but also on the part of all the insurance commissioners, the Senate, the House, and the critical committees. [….] The claims lawyers, joined by the World Jewish Congress, made an incredible display of totally inappropriate behavior.”88 But in a defensive flourish of a kind that is by now familiar, Omar Bartov denounced The Holocaust Industry as “a novel variation on […] The Protocols of the Elders of Zion”; Alan Dershowitz, preferring what Shakespeare’s clown Touchstone called “the Lie Direct,” has smeared it as “a screed against Holocaust survivors.”89

Dershowitz, of course, has particular reasons for his hatred of Finkelstein. In 2005 Beyond Chutzpah (a book whose publication Dershowitz had frantically sought to obstruct) substantiated at length Finkelstein’s charge that Dershowitz had plagiarized extensively in The Case for Israel from Joan Peters’ discredited book; and in the course of a scrupulously scholarly and very thorough analysis of the state of Israel’s violations of Palestinians’ human rights, Beyond Chutzpah demolished with equal thoroughness Dershowitz’s claims to be regarded as in any serious sense a defender of human rights.90

Finkelstein’s tenure at DePaul University was, as Amy Goodman wrote, “overwhelmingly approved at the departmental and college level,” but opposed by the dean of DePaul’s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences,91 and finally rejected by the university—thanks in large part to a campaign of vilification led by Dershowitz, who wrote to DePaul faculty members demanding Finkelstein’s dismissal, and denounced him in The Wall Street Journal as an antisemite who “does not do ‘scholarship’ in any meaningful sense.”92 StandWithUs and the Jewish Defense Organization (a successor to the JDL in the U.S.) took part in the campaign, and when the denial of tenure was announced, the Anti-Defamation League declared that “To the extent that DePaul’s decision […] is intended as a repudiation of his hateful and bigoted ideas, we applaud the University […].”93

We should perhaps give the last word on this case to Raul Hilberg, who in scholarship and Mentschlekhkeyt stands high above any of Finkelstein’s detractors: “I would say that [Finkelstein’s] place in the whole history of writing history is assured, and that those who in the end are proven right triumph, and he will be among those who will have triumphed, albeit, it so seems, at great cost.”94

* * * *

In both Canada and the United States there have been other vigorous, if perhaps less widely known, attempts to suppress academic criticism of Israel. Here are several instances.

In 2002, the distinguished sociologist Sherene Razack,95 who participated in a session on Israel’s military assault on Jenin at that year’s Canadian Critical Race Studies Conference, circulated a resolution agreed on at the conference [229] condemning Israel’s actions. She was subjected to sustained attacks by the National Post and B’nai Brith, which called on her university to discipline or dismiss her for having supposedly misused her university email account, and also to an organized campaign of hate mail and threats. Although the University of Toronto defended her academic freedom, Razack has recently remarked that “informal ‘sanctions’ against her continue to this day (with speaking invitations and grants disappearing without explanation) […].”96

Three years later another CanWest Global newspaper, the Ottawa Citizen, joined B’nai Brith in smearing Michel Chossudovsky, a prominent economist, political analyst, and human rights advocate,97 as an antisemite, and in demanding that the University of Ottawa take action (as Anita Bromberg of B’nai Brith put it) “to hold him to a certain standard of acceptable civil discourse.”98 The pretext for this attack was B’nai Brith’s discovery that real antisemites had managed briefly to insert their noxious drivel into discussion threads hosted by Chossudovsky’s website, the Centre for Research on Globalization—but its evident motivation, as I observed at the time, was the fact that articles published on his website, his own among them, have offered well-researched critiques of a wide range of injustices, including “the state of Israel’s shameless violations of human rights, international law and common decency in its treatment of the Palestinians.”99

A related case is that of the University of Ottawa’s Denis Rancourt, a tenured full professor of physics and a highly regarded researcher, who in 2001, after he won a prestigious Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) research grant, was featured in full-page newspaper advertisements in which his university boasted of its prowess as a research institution. Rancourt was fired in March 2009, and his research laboratory (for which he had recently won ongoing funding) was unceremoniously shut down. The pretext for this action was his radical pedagogy—in particular, his assignment of A+ grades to all of the students who completed one of his courses in the Winter 2008 semester. But Rancourt has plausibly suggested that “the real reasons for the university’s attempts to discipline me since September 2005 and for recent more harsh actions against me […] might be the administration’s opposition to my political views about the Palestine-Israel conflict, which, starting in 2005, I have expressed in articles, on radio, in my blog postings, at public venues, and in my classes.”100

In 2005 a complaint from the Jewish Student Association against an invited speaker in Rancourt’s “Physics and the Environment” course—Professor Michel Chossudovsky, “who spoke about Middle East geopolitics”—gave rise to “a sustained but failed” attempt to discipline Rancourt. In the autumn of 2006, his invitation to two Canadian-Palestinian speakers to address his “Science in Society” course led to an editorial attack in the Ottawa Citizen and to his removal from this and other first-year courses he had developed. In 2007, Rancourt criticized the University of Ottawa’s official position on the [230] academic boycott of Israel on his blog, and was punished by being suspended without pay from his academic duties.101

Rancourt provides evidence that he was denied due process in the proceedings that led to his dismissal; more scandalous still is the copious documentation he has published in support of his allegation that from 2006 to 2008 the University of Ottawa hired an undergraduate student journalist, as an agent of the university’s legal counsel, to spy on and make covert recordings of him and of students with whom he associated. Even in “the dark period of McCarthyism in North America,” Rancourt comments, “one does not find abuses comparable to a university practicing covert surveillance of its own professors and students.”102

At much the same time as Professor Rancourt’s case was coming to a head, the University of California at Santa Barbara was in turmoil over accusations of antisemitism leveled against Professor William I. Robinson, a highly respected sociologist and political theorist, and one of the leading figures in critical globalization studies.103 In January 2009, Robinson had circulated internet material to the students in his course on global affairs which “included an article critical of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and a photo essay that juxtaposed graphic images of Nazi atrocities against Jews and Israeli atrocities against Palestinians in Gaza.” Two students out of the eighty in the class withdrew from the course, and, with assistance from the Anti-Defamation League and the Simon Wiesenthal Center, lodged a grievance with the Academic Senate claiming that the material was antisemitic and unrelated to the course.104

The ADL pursued this matter very actively: its first letter to the UCSB administration demanding an investigation was received before the students’ complaints (which echoed its claims and rationales) had actually been made, and ADL National Director Abraham Foxman’s on-campus meeting with senior university officials was no doubt a factor in the launching of an investigation a fortnight later. Despite continued pressure from the ADL and a letter-writing campaign organized by StandWithUs, the investigation—which involved an uninterrupted sequence of procedural improprieties—collapsed. On June 4, 2009, the UCSB Academic Senate initiated a counter-investigation of the mismanagement of the student complaints; and when on June 25 UCSB officials rather belatedly announced that no charges would after all be laid against Robinson, the American Association of University Professors, which had already written “querying the initiation of potential disciplinary action,” promptly wrote again to UCSB Chancellor Henry T. Yang, urging him to “cooperate fully” with the Academic Senate in its inquiry into the matter.105

* * * *

Other cases could also be cited, ranging in seriousness from the threat of disciplinary action made by the senior administration of York University [231] against Professor David McNally, Chair of the Political Science Department, after he gave a speech in support of Palestinian human rights in May 2008, to the appalling treatment of Sami Al-Arian, a Palestinian-American University of South Florida computer science professor, whose persecution since 2001 has involved not just smearing and dismissal, but a trial for terrorism, and, despite the embarrassing failure of the prosecution, continued imprisonment. (According to human rights lawyer Scott Horton, the recent convolutions of Al Arian’s case “should be studied as a textbook case of prosecutorial abuse.”)106

But more is involved than attacks upon individuals. Jason Kunin notes in his contribution to this book that in Ontario (as elsewhere) there have been sustained attempts by university administrations to suppress human rights discourse about the worsening plight of the Palestinians: among them McMaster University’s attempt in 2008 to ban the use of the term “Israeli apartheid,” University of Toronto President David Naylor’s maneuverings “to block the event Standing Against Israeli Apartheid in October 2008,” and in 2009 the banning of Israeli Apartheid Week posters “at Carleton, the University of Ottawa, Trent University, and Wilfrid Laurier University.”107

How strange: the term “apartheid” was applied with clinical accuracy by Marwan Bishara in 2001 to describe what Israel has done in the occupied territories from the early 1990s onward, “physically and demographically divid[ing] up the West Bank and Gaza into islands of poverty, or bantustans, while maintaining economic domination and direct control over Palestinian land and natural resources.”108 It was re-used by Jimmy Carter in 2006—a usage validated in 2007 by Israel Prize laureate and former Minister of Education Shulamit Aloni.109 And in January 2010, Henry Siegman, the former Executive Director of the American Jewish Congress and current President of the US/Middle East Project of the Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that Israel’s “relentless” construction of new settlements “seems finally to have succeeded in locking in the irreversibility of its colonial project. As a result of that ‘achievement,’ one that successive Israeli governments have long sought in order to preclude the possibility of a two-state solution, Israel has crossed the threshold from ‘the only democracy in the Middle East’ to the only apartheid regime in the western world.” 110

There is, as Jason Kunin remarks, a pungent irony to the fact that while Canadian university administrators—not to mention politicians111—denounce as unacceptable any application of the term “apartheid” to the structures of land theft, cantonment, and racialized subjugation, separation, and oppression of a subject-population that characterize Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, “South African legal scholars, who might be expected to have a more immediate understanding of the nature of apartheid, have not hesitated to describe the state of Israel’s behaviour in the occupied Palestinian territories as ‘a colonial system that implements a system of apartheid.’”112

Margaret Aziza Pappano asks, very pertinently, of the opposition to Israeli Apartheid Week: “What justification can be found to block an event in which [232] scholars and activists speak about the history of the region, with a focus on the illegal occupation of Palestinian territory, information that is taught in history and political science classes and available in books published by university presses?” It is a sad fact, she suggests, that “A pattern of intolerance for speech about Palestinian human rights appears to have established itself in Canadian universities.”113

As Meron Benvenisti wrote in Haaretz in April 2009, “there is a growing realization” in Israel and internationally “that the chances of establishing an independent, viable Palestinian state no longer exist,” and that the two-state solution is now a “fictitious option.”114 It is all the more interesting, in this light, to reflect on the noisy campaign conducted in the spring of 2009 against an academic conference jointly organized by York University and Queen’s University, and scheduled for June 22-24, 2009, with the aim of mapping different models of statehood and corresponding paths to peace for Israel and Palestine.115

As Professor Dorit Naaman of Queen’s University has noted, B’nai Brith denounced the conference in a full-page ad in the National Post on June 11, 2009, and on the following day “issued a press release attacking conference presenters.” Other organizations joined in: the Canadian Council for Israel and Jewish Advocacy (CIJA), the United Jewish Appeal Federation of Greater Toronto, and the “avowedly racist and violent” Jewish Defence League.116 At the same time, Minister of State for Science and Technology Gary Goodyear made an unprecedented attempt to intervene in the peer-review adjudication process of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council by asking the Council to re-examine its funding support for the conference—a request his office backed up with a threat of withholding federal budget funding for SSHRC.117

One of the complaints made against the conference was a supposed one-sidedness—though more than one-fifth of the conference’s nearly sixty presenters were Israeli scholars, and many more were North American or European Jews. The conference organizers also made attempts to encourage community participation—though when one of them spoke with officials of the Canadian Jewish Congress, she was advised, in all seriousness, to meet with the Jewish Defence League. The abusive attacks on this conference were, Naaman says, “an attempt to silence discussion of [a] critical debate, which—ironically—is already taking place within Israel,” and “a disgraceful act meant to prevent Israelis, Jews, Arabs, Palestinians and others from speaking with one another in a serious academic forum.”118

 

The War on Truth

In one example after another, we have observed a pattern of what David Theo Goldberg and Saree Makdisi describe as “disproportionate and unbalanced intervention on campuses […] by a coalition of well-funded organizations, [233] who have no time for—and even less interest in—the niceties of intellectual exchange and academic process.” Their tactics are, to put it mildly, unpleasant: “Insinuation, accusation, and defamation have become the weapons of first resort to respond to argument and criticism directed at Israeli policies.”119

It is not just the decorum of intellectual exchange that apologists for the Israeli state and polemicists against its critics are attempting to subvert, but the very processes by which the academy structures itself. Joseph Massad has remarked in one of his essays that people like Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes

are angry that the academy still allows democratic procedure in the expression of political views and has an institutionalized meritocratic system of judgment […] to evaluate its members. Their goal is to destroy any semblance of either in favour of subjecting democracy and academic life to an incendiary jingoism and to the exigencies of the national security state with the express aim of imploding freedom.120

Minister of State Gary Goodyear is likewise angry121 with another aspect of the academic merit system, the process of peer-reviewed research funding.

What is under attack in all of these instances is something quite fundamental. The first and highest value of academic life is the notion that truth—however differently we may construe it or understand it to be configured, however discordantly we may dispute over the appropriate means of access to it, however harshly we may debate with one another over the appropriate methods of separating it from dogma, delusion, or deception, and however pessimistic we might sometimes feel about its prospects of prevailing over even the most arid of established ideologies—truth remains, beyond all these doubts and differences, the professed goal of the human sciences, no less than of the mathematically based or natural sciences.

Yet as we have seen in one example after another, this central value of the academy is treated with open contempt by the apologists and polemicists whose tracks we have been following. The reason is simple enough: the truth about what they are defending puts them to shame.

In the preceding chapter, I showed that the claims made by the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Antisemitism about a terrifying resurgence of antisemitism in Canada and elsewhere are not supported by the available evidence. Attempts to push Canadians into a state of moral panic over the issue should be rejected with indignation—as they have been, surprisingly enough, by the National Post. In a recent editorial criticizing B’nai Brith’s 2009 Audit of Antisemitic Incidents, the Post declares that it “flies in the face of reality” to claim “that anti-Semitism in this country is a widespread and rising problem”: Canada “is probably the least anti-Semitic country in the entire world—including Israel—and it becomes more tolerant, not less, with [234] every passing year.”122 Setting aside the note of self-congratulation in this last sentence, and the comparison with Israel—why try to be more Catholic than the Pope?—the refusal to be panicked is well taken.

In this chapter, I have proposed that what the CPCCA would like us to believe about threats to civility on Canadian campuses is equally bogus. Where there have been such threats, they seem in most cases to have come not from faculty and students who are trying to make known the truth about the state of Israel’s treatment of the people of the occupied Palestinian territories, but rather from polemicists and apologists for Israel who are trying either to conceal these truths, or else, by invoking the rhetorical maneuvers of the “new antisemitism,” to change the subject, and thereby to transform themselves from allies of the victimizers into victims.

 

Opposition Is True Friendship

As we have seen, the Israel-Palestine conflict is a recurrent point of reference in contemporary discussions of antisemitism. In moving toward an assessment of the implications for Canada of these discussions, we need to have some understanding of the full horror of what Israel, with the eager support of Canada’s government and the governments of other western nations, is inflicting upon the people of the occupied territories.

The conclusions of Kathleen and Bill Christison, whose book Palestine in Pieces is a model of humane and respectful reportage, are worth listening to on this subject:

There are hardly words to describe the human suffering and degradation deliberately imposed on Palestinians by Israel’s occupation. The Israeli threat to Palestinian lives and livelihood, individually and collectively—indeed to Palestinian national existence—through theft of land and the sieges of towns and villages, through walls and roads and blockades that strangle, through the crippling of economic opportunity, through deliberate large-scale killing, together resemble a hunting expedition designed to cage and ultimately eliminate animals from a natural habitat. Israeli leaders, Israeli settlers, Israeli soldiers treat Palestinians not as a collective of human beings, but as trapped animals whose fate is of little or no concern.123

The Christisons quote legal scholar and U.N. Rapporteur Richard Falk’s wrestlings in 2007 with the question of whether it would be “an irresponsible overstatement to associate the treatment of Palestinians with [the] criminalized Nazi record of collective atrocity”:

Answering his own question, he asserted, “I think not.” His attention was focused primarily on Gaza, struggling under an international [235] embargo, and he warned that Israel’s “abuse of the Palestinian people” there vividly expressed “a deliberate intention on the part of Israel and its allies to subject an entire human community to life-endangering conditions of utmost cruelty.”124

Writing more than a year later, the Christisons both endorse and supplement this judgment:

It takes but a few visits to towns and villages around the West Bank to conclude that, although Gaza’s suffering places it farther along the path toward a holocaust, conditions in the West Bank clearly constitute a “holocaust-in-the-making.”125

The judgments of these observers—a very distinguished legal scholar, author and co-author of some three dozen books, and two former CIA political analysts whose interest in and experience of Middle East affairs goes back forty years—are disturbingly supported by what seems a recent drift in Israel toward openly genocidal language. Racist references to Palestinians have long been commonplace in Israel, but took a stronger turn in 2003 when Avigdor Lieberman, now Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, said in a Knesset debate that Palestinian prisoners “should be drowned in the Dead Sea” and that he—one must presume in his capacity as Transport Minister, the post he then occupied—“would provide the buses to take them there.”126 In May 2004 Lieberman proposed deporting 90 percent of Israel’s 1.2 million Palestinian citizens (“They have no place here. They can take their bundles and get lost”)—a proposal extended in September 2006 by former cabinet minister Effi Eitam’s declaration that “The vast majority of West Bank Arabs must be deported […].”127 What had been a taboo on expressions of explicitly genocidal intentions was broken at the end of February 2008, when Deputy Defence Minister Matan Vilnai threatened Gaza in an IDF radio interview with “a bigger shoah” if Gaza militants continued to fire rockets into adjoining areas of Israel.128 The word he used, meaning literally “catastrophe,” has since World War II been used primarily to refer to the Holocaust (the word by which it is translated into English). Although Vilnai’s aides issued statements insisting that the minister was not referring to that Shoah, it is impossible not to hear a threat of genocide in his statement.129

Martin Kramer, a long-time faculty member at Tel Aviv University, the President-designate of the new right-wing Shalem College in Jerusalem, an associate both of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (AIPAC’s Washington think-tank) and of Daniel Pipes’ Middle East Forum, a visiting scholar at Harvard University’s Weatherhead Center for International Affairs—and also, as Juan Cole writes, “a notorious anti-intellectual opposed to the mainstream academic study of the Middle East”—made a more explicitly genocidal proposal in his presentation to the 10th annual Herzliya Conference in early February 2010.

[236] Starting with the claim that “Aging populations reject radical agendas” (a clear mark of ignorance, Cole observes, since the notion is amply refuted by historical evidence),130 Kramer argued that a decline in Palestinian radicalism

will happen faster if the West stops providing pro-natal subsidies for Palestinians with refugee status. [….] Israel’s present sanctions on Gaza have a political aim—undermine the Hamas regime—but they also break Gaza’s runaway population growth and there is some evidence that they have. That may begin to crack the culture of martyrdom, which demands a constant supply of superfluous young men. That is rising to the real challenge of radical indoctrination and treating it at its root.131

The genocidal implication of this is clear: Kramer informs us that Israel’s blockade of Gaza—thanks to which, according to the World Health Organization and UNICEF, 35 percent of pregnant women and 65 percent of children aged 9-12 months are anaemic, and more than 10 percent of children under five are stunted through chronic malnourishment132—has slowed down Gaza’s population growth. (How, one must ask, does he imagine this could have happened, unless through increased levels of miscarriages and of infant mortality?) And he has made clear, in responding to critics of his Herzliya speech,133 that what he means by “pro-natal subsidies” is, in his own words, the assurance of UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) “that every child with ‘refugee’ status will be fed and schooled regardless of the parents’ own resources […].”134 Kramer is recommending, in short, that the population of Gaza be reduced to starvation through a withdrawal of support for UNRWA.

Significant mortality might indeed by produced by the means Kramer recommends. By 2007, according to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Israeli blockade had produced a ten percent decline from the 2005 level of “food acquisition and energy consumption” in Gaza; in the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported that two-thirds of Gaza’s population was “deemed food insecure.”135 In January 2010 Akiva Eldar wrote in Haaretz that “Ninety-seven percent of Gaza’s factories are idle due to Israeli government restrictions on the import of raw materials for industry,” while “Israel’s ban on bringing in building materials” has made it impossible to repair or rebuild the “nearly 60,000 homes and factories” damaged or destroyed in Operation Cast Lead, leaving “10,000 people […] without running water, 40,000 without electricity.”136 It has likewise been impossible, as the World Health Organization noted in a fact sheet published in January 2010, to repair the damage caused to 15 of Gaza’s 27 hospitals and 43 of its 110 primary health care clinics, or to alter the fact that Gaza’s children are at risk due to the “increasing salinity and high levels of nitrates in water supplies.”137

[237] The collective punishment being inflicted on Gaza is already a war crime, a flagrant violation of Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.138 But as M. J. Rosenberg has noted, Kramer’s proposal directly contravenes the Geneva Convention on Genocide, signed by Israel and nearly every other country in the world, which bans

killing of members of any racial, ethnic, national or religious group because of their membership in that group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, inflicting on members of the group conditions of life intended to destroy them, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, and taking members’ children away from them and giving them to members of another group.139

With every additional explanation of what precisely he meant, Kramer has succeeded only in making it clearer that Israel’s existing policies toward Gaza are as genocidal in their implications as the intensification of them he is arguing for:

I didn’t propose that Israel take a single additional measure beyond the sanctions it now imposes with the political aim of undermining Hamas. And I didn’t call on the West to “deliberately curb the births of Palestinians.” I called on it to desist from deliberately encouraging births through pro-natal subsidies for Palestinian “refugees,” which guarantee that Gazans will remain both radicalized and dependent.140

Whatever wriggle room he may think terms like “pro-natal subsidies” give him, Kramer is proposing to take food out of the mouths of women and children—whose communities are to a very large degree “dependent” upon external aid only because of the policies that Kramer and people like him support, and “radicalized” by their resistance to those policies.

* * * *

Canadians need to think deeply about the very disquieting implications of the Harper government’s withdrawal of funding from UNRWA, which was announced by Treasury Board Minister Vic Toews—in Jerusalem141—just over a week before Martin Kramer’s Herzliya speech. Speculations as to whether Toews or other members of the Harper government had been influenced by Kramer, or by the German, Gunnar Heinsohn, from whom Kramer derived his proposal, do not interest me.142 The unpleasant fact is that Canada was the first country in 2006 to join the Israeli blockade in Gaza—and now it has become the first country to participate in what is evidently designed (by Kramer at least) as an intensification, with genocidal intent, of the cruel effects of that blockade.

[238] Kathleen and Bill Christison inform us that “In early 2008, UNRWA Commissioner General Karen Koning AbuZayd harshly condemned the international embargo of Gaza. The territory, she said, ‘is on the threshold of becoming the first territory to be internationally reduced to a state of abject destitution, with the knowledge, acquiescence and—some would say—encouragement of the international community.’”143

The situation in Gaza has now passed that threshold—and the Canadian government has been participating in the project with open eyes. It has made us complicit in the war crime of the embargo or blockade of Gaza, and, through its support for Operation Cast Lead, in further war crimes against Gaza’s people and their life-supporting infrastructures. It is now seeking to make us complicit in actions that, with Martin Kramer’s unwitting help, we can recognize as genocidal in intention.

The choice Canadians must make is one of whether we are willing to accept this complicity, or whether we will take a stand against these actions, and in solidarity with their victims.

* * * *

One of the ways we can take such a stand is by demanding Canada’s immediate withdrawal from the blockade of Gaza, and an immediate restoration of Canada’s financial support for UNRWA.

Another is by demanding that Canada participate in a measured and carefully calibrated program of boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) against Israel, until such time as Israel complies with international law and the universal principles of human rights.

As has been explained by Neve Gordon, Chair of the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, the ten-point boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign formulated in 2008 in Bilbao, Spain by a coalition of organizations from around the world is designed “to pressure Israel in a ‘gradual, sustainable manner that is sensitive to context and capacity.’ For example, the effort begins with sanctions on and divestment from Israeli firms operating in the occupied territories, followed by actions against those that help sustain and reinforce the occupation in a visible manner.”144

A program of this kind would involve an academic boycott—directed, one must emphasize, not against individual scholars, but rather against government-supported institutional contacts.145 It would involve a rejection of Israeli state involvement in events like the Toronto International Film Festival (which as the “Toronto Declaration” of September 2009 made clear would not affect the inclusion at such events of Israeli films and of individual Israeli filmmakers).146 It would involve careful consideration of whether fundraising in Canada that goes into support for programs of ethnic discrimination and property theft in Israel can continue to enjoy tax-exempt status as a “charitable” endeavour. It would involve an immediate revision of the Canada-Israel Free [239] Trade Agreement (CIFTA) to exclude all products emanating from Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, and a withdrawal from all aspects of the Canada-Israel Industrial Research and Development Fund (CIIRDF) that involve support for the infrastructure of the occupation.

Many of the people who most strenuously oppose campaigns for boycott, divestment, and sanctions directed at Israel are not opposed on principle to such tactics. Professor (and former IDF paratrooper) Neve Gordon’s article calling for a boycott, on the grounds that “Putting massive external pressure on Israel is the only way to guarantee that the next generation of Israelis and Palestinians—my two boys included—does not grow up in an apartheid regime,”147 evoked, as Gideon Levy remarks, a “mini-maelstrom” the timing of which “was somewhat grotesque”:

Hardly have the throats dried of those calling for his dismissal, for his citizenship to be revoked, for his expulsion and, if all else fails, his stoning, when another petition has surfaced on the Internet, this one calling for a boycott of Ikea. A bad article on the back page of a Swedish tabloid is enough to produce a call here for a consumer boycott to which thousands sign their names. Turkey has barely recovered from the boycott that our package tourers imposed on it because its prime minister had the gall to attack our president, and already we are cruising toward our next boycott target.148

On a similar note, the neo-McCarthyist Israeli watchdog groups IsraCampus and Israel Academia Monitor are calling for potential donors to boycott universities that employ professors who, like Gordon, advocate a boycott of Israel.149 And in August 2009 Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called for “crippling sanctions” against Iran—the kind of blockade, as Paul Craig Roberts commented, that “qualifies as an act of war.”150 As Levy writes, “A country that constantly demands boycott from the world and also imposes boycotts itself, cannot play the victim when the same weapon is turned against it. If the election of Hamas is cause for boycott, then occupation is a more potent cause.”151

* * * *

This issue is, most immediately, about protecting the lives of Palestinians, and doing what lies within our power to do in restoring to them their right to political self-determination, political independence, and full self-governance within the territories occupied by Israel since 1967.152 At the same time, it is about restoring to Israelis their lost honour as a nation, and doing what can be done with what remains of Canada’s tattered reputation as a peacemaker to help bring about a lasting peace between Israel and its neighbours, so as to lift from Israelis the burden of anxiety and fear that has afflicted them for at least two generations, and that has deformed and polluted their political discourse.

[240] In this regard, it must be insisted that what is at issue, in Canada at least, is not primarily, or to any significant degree, antisemitism. Exponents of the ideology of the “new antisemitism” will of course say otherwise, but they are mistaken. Their governing assumption appears to be that people will not make profound, serious and systematic criticisms of the state of Israel unless they are impelled, perhaps knowingly, or possibly at some deep level of a feral goyisch unconscious, by hatred of Jews. I believe that Canadians are, by and large, more complicated than this, and less hypocritical or evil. I believe we are perfectly capable of combining, without cognitive dissonance, an amicable sense of Israel as a place inhabited by interesting, attractive, creative people, and a lively curiosity about their spiritual traditions and their culture—and at the same time a sense of dismay and even horror at this people’s growing entanglement in a mesh of injustice and violence that to a very considerable degree is the creation of their own political leaders.

If there is hypocrisy here, or unconscious self-deception, I would suggest that it is to be found most often among the ideologues of the “new antisemitism.” We have seen good reason in this book to find their ethics dubious, and their explanations unsatisfactory. I would suggest substituting for those often laboured and usually libellous explanations an aphorism of the great English poet William Blake:

“Opposition is true friendship.”153

* * * *

But this issue is also, as we have seen recurrently from the beginning of this book, one of domestic Canadian politics. The questions of antisemitism and of the domestic relevance of the Israel-Palestine conflict have been foregrounded for us by the actions of our own political leaders. The questions raised by the Canadian Parliamentary Coalition to Combat Antisemitism are also, more distinctly, questions about the instrumental use of false charges of antisemitism as a means of delimiting political discourse and of making a whole domain of critical discourse literally unspeakable.

Judith Butler, one of the leading literary and cultural theorists in the U.S., has written with characteristic lucidity about how a distinction between Israel and Jews helps one to oppose “anti-Semitic reductions of Jewishness to Israeli interests,” and to begin “an intellectual discussion of both Zionism and anti-Semitism.” Having insisted that a “progressive Jewish stance” will “refuse to brand as anti-Semitic the critical impulse or to accept anti-Semitic discourse as an acceptable substitute for critique,” Butler turns to consider the problems that arise when the charge of antisemitism is used to stigmatize “those who voice opposition to Israeli policy or to its founding ideology,” to discredit their “point of view as hatred or, indeed, hate speech, and to put into question its permissibility as protected speech or, indeed, valued political commentary.” The charge of antisemitism, she says,

[241] works to circumscribe the publicly acceptable domain of speech. It also works to immunize Israeli violence against critique by refusing to countenance the integrity of the claims made against that violence. One is threatened with the label, “anti-Semitic,” in the same way that within the US, to oppose the most recent US wars earns one the label of “traitor,” or “terrorist sympathizer” or, indeed, “treasonous.” These are threats with profound psychological consequence. They seek to control political behavior by imposing unbearable, stigmatized modes of identification which most people will want more than anything to avoid identification with.154

Those who perform this labelling know very well how powerfully it can work, in Butler’s words, “to circumscribe what can and cannot be permissibly spoken out loud in the public sphere,” and to “decide the defining limits of the public sphere through setting limits on the speakable.” The consequences of a shrinkage of the public sphere through an exclusion of critical perspectives are potentially dire:

The exclusion of those criticisms will effectively establish the boundaries of the public itself, and the public will come to understand itself as one that does not speak out, critically, in the face of obvious and illegitimate violence—unless, of course, a certain collective courage takes hold.155

That collective courage exists in this country, as does a generously shared fund of common decency. This book goes out to the public in the hope that what it offers in the way of critical analysis may help to facilitate an increasingly full and well-articulated expression of that decency and courage.

 

 

NOTES

1  Some historians and sociologists have used the term “new antisemitism” in scholarly studies of the receptions and mutations of traditional Christian and European antisemitism in other parts of the world. My critique applies to their writings only to the degree that they deploy this same rhetoric, and thereby participate in this strategy of deception.

2  James D. Besser, “A Chill in the D.C. Air as Obama, Netanyahu Meet,” The Jewish Week (10 November 2009), http://www.thejewishweek.com/viewArticle/c39_a17230/News/International.html.

3  “Survivors, liberators, leaders mark Auschwitz liberation,” Channelnewsasia.com (28 January 2010), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1033527/1/.html. By way of contrast, on a similar occasion four years previously, Netanyahu’s predecessor Ehud Olmert described himself as “prime minister of the state of Israel and the leader of the Jewish people here” (my emphasis); see “Remarks by Ehud Olmert, Acting Prime Minister, State of Israel [speaking from Israel by video link] to the Anti-Defamation League Shana Amy Glass National Leadership Conference, April 25, 2006, Washington, DC,” http://www.adl.org/Israel/olmert_speech.asp.

4  Norman G. Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah: On the Misuse of Anti-Semitism and the Abuse of History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 21.

5  Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, The New Anti-Semitism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974); Nathan Perlmutter and Ruth-Ann Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism in America (New York: Arbor House, 1982); Abraham H. Foxman, Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (2003; rpt. New York: HarperCollins, 2004); Phyllis Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism: The Current Crisis and What We Must Do about It (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2003); Gabriel Schoenfeld, The Return of Anti-Semitism (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2004).

6  Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, p. 22.

7  Ibid., p. 24; and Forster and Epstein, The New Anti-Semitism, pp. 323-24 (quoted by Finkelstein).

8  Ibid., p. 27 (quoting Nathan and Ruth-Ann Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism in America, p. 9).

9  Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, pp. 30-31.

10  Ibid., p. 33 (quoting Foxman, Never Again? p. 39; and Chesler, The New Anti-Semitism, p. 180).

11  Pierre-André Taguieff, La nouvelle judéophobie (Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits, 2002), translated by Patrick Camiller as Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004)—and see also Taguieff’s more recent Prêcheurs de haine: Traversée de la judéophobie planétaire (Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits, 2004); Fiamma Nirenstein, L’Abbandono: Come l’Occidente ha tradito gli ebrei (Milan: Rizzoli, 2003), Gli Antisemiti Progressisti: la forma nova di un odio antico (Milan: Rizzoli, 2004), translated together by Anne Milano Appel as Terror: The New Anti-Semitism and the War Against the West (Manchester, NH: Smith & Kraus, 2005); David I. Kertzer, ed., Old Demons, New Debates: Anti-Semitism in the West (Aachen: Meyer & Meyer Verlag, 2005); Alan Dershowitz, The Case Against Israel’s Enemies: Exposing Jimmy Carter and Others Who Stand in the Way of Peace (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008); Denis MacShane, Globalising Hatred: The New Antisemitism (London: Orion Books, 2009).

12  So-called Infancy Gospels like the Protevangelium Jacobi, dating from the early centuries of the Common Era and designed to satisfy curiosity about the childhood of the Son of God, were widely circulated and commented on during the medieval period. The key elements of the medieval blood libel, as it emerged in the mid twelfth century, were the slaughter of a Christian child and a parody of some key element of Christian narrative or doctrine—initially, the crucifixion. (The inventors of this fantasy may have been aware of the accusation of Apion, refuted by the first-century C.E. Jewish historian Josephus in Against Apion, Book II, that the Jews made an annual sacrifice of a Greek man in their temple; or of claims by Roman writers of the early centuries C.E. that Christians drank the blood and ate the flesh of human victims. I regard these anticipations as related but separate phenomena.)

13  This is the form the blood libel took in the mid 13th-century episode of Little Saint Hugh of Lincoln. The Prioress’s Tale in Geoffrey Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales (late 14th century) alludes to the Lincoln blood libel, but in the Prioress’s own blood-libel narrative the crucifixion motif is missing (the Christian boy is murdered because Satan and the Jews dislike his habit of singing the hymn “Alma Redemptoris Mater” in a piercing soprano while strolling through the Jewish quarter).

14  These blood-libel motifs appear in dispersed and ironic form in a less centrally canonical literary text, Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller (1594). For details, see my essay “Violence and Extremity: Nashe’s Unfortunate Traveller as an Anatomy of Abjection,” in Donald Beecher, ed., Critical Approaches to English Prose Fiction 1520-1640 (Ottawa: Dovehouse Editions, 1998), pp. 183-218. The point of the host-matzoh blasphemy is that during the Roman Catholic Mass the host-bread blessed by the priest is supposedly converted in substance, by the miracle of transubstantiation, into the flesh of Christ (while remaining unaltered in ‘accidents’ such as appearance and taste). The murdered child’s blood would be concealed in the matzoh in a manner parodically analogous to the concealment of Christ’s flesh in the host.

15  For the estimate of AIPAC’s current budget, see Mearsheimer and Walt, The Israel Lobby, p. 119. On p. 117 of this book former Congressman Mervyn Dymally is quoted as calling AIPAC “without question the most important lobby in Congress,” and Lee Hamilton, former chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, is quoted as having said in 1991 that “There’s no lobby group that matches it….” Nineteen articles assessing AIPAC are collected at “Perspectives on AIPAC & its Role in Helping to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East,” STOP AIPAC, http://www.stopaipac.org/perspectives.htm#aipacnorth.

16  Jimmy Carter, Palestine: Peace not Apartheid (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), pp. 253-54.

17  Jonathan Kay, “Here is the difference between Israel and its Arab enemies,” National Post (22 March 2009), http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/03-kay-here-is-the-difference-between-israel-and-its-arab-enemies.aspx; Melanie Phillips, “The Ha’aretz Blood Libel,” Spectator (22 March 2009), http://www.spectator.co.uk/melaniephillips/3464331/the-haaretz-blood-libel.thtml.

18  “A Blood libel disguised as an investigative report,” FresnoZionism.org (15 August 2009), http://fresnozionism.org/2009/08a-blood-libel-disguised-as-an-investigative-report. The report in question is White Flag Deaths: Killing of Palestinian Civilians during Operation Cast Lead (Human Rights Watch, 13 August 2009), http://www.hrw.org/node/85014.

19  Alan Dershowitz, “UN Investigation of Israel Discredits Itself and Undercuts Human Rights,” Hudson New York (16 September 2009), http://www.hudsonny.org/2009/09/un-investigation-of-israel-discredits-itself-and-undercuts-human-rights.php.

20  Irwin Cotler, “The United Nations, Israel, Human Rights, and the New Anti-Jewishness,” abstract of a paper delivered at the International Conference on The Dynamics of Antisemitism in the Second Half of the 20th Century (SICSA: The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 13-16 June 1999), http://sicsa.huji.ac.il/absdynam.html.

21  Ibid.

22  By 1999, Cotler could have read Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe: The 1948 Expulsion of a People from Their Homeland (London: Faber & Faber, 1987); Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), and 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); he could also have read Christopher Hitchens’ essay “Broadcasts,” in Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 73-83.

23  For the period to which Cotler’s 1999 statement would have been referring, see Noam Chomsky, Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), pp. 64-88, 181-328, 333-75, 455-69, 515-32. Chomsky tellingly quotes the Israeli writer Amos Elon’s comment, published in Haaretz on November 13, 1981, that Anwar Sadat’s peace proposal in April 1971 had caused “panic and unease among our political leadership,” while the Israeli government’s reaction to the Saudi peace plan of August 1981 had been “emotional and angry”—a response Elon found “shocking, frightening, if not downright despair-producing” (quoted on p. 75).

24  A clear statement of that consensus is provided in Amnesty International’s recent report, Troubled Waters—Palestinians Denied Fair Access to Water (27 October 2009), p. 81:

International humanitarian law: While recognizing the de jure applicability of the Hague Regulations, which it has not signed, Israel has consistently rejected the applicability to the OPT [Occupied Palestinian Territories] of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which it is a party. Nevertheless, Israel maintains that, in practice, it applies what it has termed ‘humanitarian provisions’ of the Geneva Convention to the OPT, though without ever specifying what it deems the ‘humanitarian provisions’ of the Convention to comprise. Israel stands alone in contending that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply to its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which works to ensure the application of international humanitarian law (including as set out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols), as well as the other states that are party to this treaty (known as High Contracting Parties), fundamentally reject the Israeli government’s view. The most recent Conference of the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention in December 2001 reaffirmed ‘the applicability of the [Fourth Geneva] Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem’ and reiterated the need for full respect of its provisions. This position of the ICRC and the High Contracting Parties of the Geneva Conventions on the applicability of Israel’s obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT has been supported by numerous resolutions of the UN Security Council [e.g. Resolutions 465, 681, 799].

International human rights law: Israel has never recognized its obligation to abide by the international human rights treaties to which it is a state party in the OPT, and contends that under international law it is not required to apply these treaties to areas that are not part of its sovereign territory. It argues that limited provisions of humanitarian law should be applied in the OPT to the exclusion of international human rights law. However, all of the UN bodies entrusted with monitoring adherence by Israel to the treaties it has ratified have categorically rejected Israel’s contention that its human rights obligations do not apply in the OPT.”

25  I am borrowing here from the brief discussion of exceptionalism in my book Lunar Perspectives: Field Notes from the Culture Wars (Toronto: Anansi, 1996), pp. 14-16. For an approach to specifically Zionist exceptionalism, see Shahid Alam, Israeli Exceptionalism: The Destabilizing Logic of Zionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

26  Lewis Lapham, “Déjà Vu,” Harper’s Magazine (March 1990), rpt. in Lapham, Hotel America: Scenes in the Lobby of the Fin-de-Siècle (London: Verso, 1995), p. 30.

27  Irwin Cotler, “Human Rights and the New Anti-Jewishness,” Jerusalem Post (5 February 2004), available at SPME: Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=128.

28  Ibid. For Cotler’s most recent re-working of these motifs, see his essay Global Antisemitism: Assault on Human Rights, Working Paper #3, The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism (2009), http://www.yale.edu/yiisa/irwincotlerworkingpaper10209.pdf.

29  Iran has repeatedly been identified, by American and Israeli politicians and propagandists, as just such a threat. Setting aside the fact that Israel possesses an estimated 100-200 nuclear warheads, and multiple means of delivering them, as well as firm promises of diplomatic and military support from the US, there is strong evidence that Iran has no nuclear weapons program. In early 2006, when an American-Israeli aerial attack on Iran seemed imminent (despite the statement of the August 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate that Iran was a full decade away from having the capacity to manufacture “the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon”), I analyzed some of this evidence in “Petrodollars and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Understanding the Planned Assault on Iran,” Centre for Research on Globalization (10 February 2006), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1936. While Iran has since moved closer to activating a civil nuclear electricity-generation program, claims that the country has a nuclear weapons program remain wholly unsubstantiated.

30  For an important argument against doctrines of ethnic (as opposed to civic) self-determination, see Michael Neumann, The Case Against Israel (Petrolia, CA and Oakland, CA: CounterPunch and AK Press, 2005), pp. 12-23. Neumann remarks that “The ideal known as ‘the self-determination of peoples’ is built on myths of unanimity” (p. 14); that in cases often perceived as legitimate exercises of a people’s right to self-determination (e.g. Vietnamese resistance to occupation, or the Cuban revolution), “their justifications rest on non-ethnic rights—the rights, for instance, of those who happened to inhabit those countries—not on a supposed right of a supposed ethnic or cultural entity to determine its destiny” (p. 19); and that the violation and attempted extinguishing of the civic rights of non-Jewish Palestinians has been an inescapable consequence of the Zionist project of implementing a Jewish “right to self-determination” (pp. 23-40).

31  Edward Said commented in 2001 on the “brazen arrogance, moral preachiness, and […] hypocrisy” with which Zionists like Norman Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer and William Kristol instructed Israel to conform to their political dictates. “American Zionism,” he remarked, “has now reached the level of almost pure fantasy in which what is good for American Zionists in their fiefdom and their mostly fictional discourse is good for America and Israel […]. Anyone who defies or dares to challenge them (especially if he/she is either an Arab or a Jew critical of Zionism) is subject to the most awful abuse and vituperation, all of it personal, racist and ideological.” Said, “American Zionism—The Real Problem (2),” Al-Ahram Weekly; reproduced online at Media Monitors Network (14 March 2001), http://www.mediamonitors.net/edward13.html.

32  See, for example, Marc H. Ellis, Toward a Jewish Theology of Liberation (3rd ed., Waco: Baylor University Press, 2004), and Judaism Does Not Equal Israel (New York: New Press, 2009); Jacqueline Rose, The Question of Zion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), and The Last Resistance (London: Verso, 2007); Judith Butler, “No, it’s not anti-semitic,” London Review of Books 25.16 (21 August 2003): 19-21, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v25/n16/judith-butler/no-its-not-anti-semitic, and Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009); Naomi Klein, “Israel: Boycott, Divest, Sanction,” The Nation (26 January 2009), http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090126/klein, and “The Tel Aviv Party Stops Here,” The Nation (28 September 2009), http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090928/klein/print; Shlomo Sand, The Invention of the Jewish People (London: Verso, 2009); Philip Weiss, “At NYU, devilish Shlomo Sand predicts the Jewish past and pastes the Zionists,” Mondoweiss: The War of Ideas in the Middle East (17 October 2009), http://modoweiss.net/2009/10/at-nyu-devilish-shlomo-sand-predicts-the-jewish-past-and-pastes-the-zionists.html.

33  In my book Lunar Perspectives: Field Notes from the Culture Wars I offered an extended analysis of these matters; see especially pp. 2-17, 21-38, 67-86, 121-24, 135-40, 183-99. Earlier collections of essays on the same issues include Darryl J. Gless and Barbara Herrnstein Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992); Phyllis Artiss, ed., Political Correctness, special double issue of Philosophy and Social Action 19.1-2 (January-June 1993); Michael Bérubé and Cary Nelson, eds., Higher Education Under Fire: Politics, Economics, and the Crisis of the Humanities (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); Jeffrey Williams, ed., PC Wars: Politics and Theory in the Academy (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); and Stephen Richer and Lorna Weir, eds., Beyond Political Correctness: Toward the Inclusive University (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995).

34  Matt Gurney, “Anti-semitism at York University,” National Post (13 February 2009), http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/02/13/matt-gurney-anti-semitism-at-york-university.aspx.

35  See Todd Gitlin, “The Rough Beast Returns,” Mother Jones (May-June 2002), rpt. in Ron Rosenbaum, ed., Those Who Forget the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism (New York: Random House, 2004), pp. 263-66; quoted by Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, pp. 67-68 (whose account I am paraphrasing).

36  Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, p. 68.

37  Miriam Greenspan, “The New Anti-Semitism,” Tikkun (November-December 2003), http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/Greenspan-the-new-antisemitism; Gabriel Schoenfeld, The Return of Anti-Semitism, p. 121; quoted by Finkelstein, Beyond Chutzpah, p. 68.

38  Of the first incident Norman Finkelstein writes that “no one at Yale’s Center for Jewish Life or the university administration had ever heard of such an assault”; the second incident (Schoenfeld’s source for which was Campus Watch, an organ of opinion specializing in rumour-mongering and campaigns of defamation) was never reported to the University of Chicago’s Center for Jewish Life, and was investigated by the university administration, which “found no evidence to substantiate it” (Beyond Chutzpah, p. 68).

39  The processes through which the CIJA was launched in 2002 have been studied in three linked articles by Dan Freeman-Maloy, “AIPAC North: ‘Israel Advocacy’ in Canada, Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3” ZNet (26 June 2006), http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3659, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3660, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/3661. In the second article, he writes that in late 2002, the United Israel Appeal Federations Canada (UIAFC) brought together “leading tycoons,” among them Israel Asper, CEO of CanWest Global; Gerry Schwartz, co-founder of CanWest Global and CEO of Onex Corporation; Heather Reisman, CEO of Indigo/Chapters Books; and Sylvain Abitbol, CEO of NHC Communications, as “the Israel Emergency Cabinet.” This group planned “a new ‘functional framework’ for Jewish establishment advocacy and governance” centred on the CIJA. In the first article, Freeman-Maloy remarks that the CIJA has converted mainstream Canadian Jewish organizations into “a streamlined ‘Israel advocacy’ apparatus” whose principal aim is “to weaken solidarity with the Palestinian people and solidify Canadian rejection of basic Palestinian rights.” CIJA supported the invasion of Iraq, and has “help[ed] to lay the political groundwork for possible aggression against Iran, and oppos[ed] progressive social movements at the grassroots level (particularly on campuses).” See also Ben Saifer, “Shalom-Salaam? Campus Israel advocacy and the politics of ‘dialogue’,” Upping the Anti 9 (November 2009), pp. 73-90, especially pp. 79-82.

40  David Theo Goldberg and Saree Makdisi, “The Trial of Israel’s Campus Critics,” Tikkun (September-October 2009), http://www.tikkun.org/article.php/sept_oct_09_goldberg_makdisi. It is relevant to note that David Theo Goldberg is a major figure in critical race studies, whose books include Racist Culture: Philosophy and The Politics of Meaning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), Racial Subjects: Writing on Race in America (New York and London: Routledge, 1997), The Racial State (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), and The Threat of Race: Reflections on Racial Neoliberalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009). Saree Makdisi’s publications include Romantic Imperialism: Universal Empire and the Culture of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), and Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation (New York: Norton, 2008).

41  Roberta P. Seid, “Reviving 1920’s Munich’s Beer Halls at UCLA, Courtesy of California Taxpayers,” SPME: Scholars for Peace in the Middle East (1 February 2009), http://www.spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=5054. Even if recordings and alternative accounts of the event were not available, Seid’s malicious falsehoods would be evident. Her own tendentious accounts of what each panelist said do not begin to justify her claims that “they seemed to be enacting a burlesque of the anti-Semitic rabble rousing in Munich’s 1920’s beer halls,” that “Israel was painted precisely as Nazis used to paint the Jews,” that the panelists “produc[ed] a cartoon image divorced from all reality of an unfettered, demonic Israel—not unlike the Nazi cartoons of Jews holding the globe and pulling all the strings of history,” and that “the speakers indulged in repeated blood libel.”

42  Judea Pearl, “Daniel Pearl and the Normalization of Evil,” Wall Street Journal (3 February 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123362422088941893.html. Professor Pearl’s son Daniel was the journalist kidnapped and brutally murdered by extremists in Pakistan in 2002.

43  Tom Tugend, “UCLA Symposium on Gaza Ignites Strong Criticism,” JewishJournal.com (11 February 2009), http://www.jewishjournal.com/community/article/ucla_symposium_on_gaza_ignites_strong_criticism_20090211/.

44  Judea Pearl, “Dust Over Campus Life: UCLA at a Crossroad,” JewishJournal.com (18 February 2009), http://www.jewishjournal.com/opinion/article/dust_over_campus_life_ucla_at_a_crossroad_20090218/.

45  Pearl’s assertions about Hamas can be compared with an article by Bassem Naseem, Minister of Health and Information in the Hamas administration in Gaza, “Hamas condemns the Holocaust: We are not engaged in a religious conflict with Jews; this is a political struggle to free ourselves from occupation and oppression,” The Guardian (12 May 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/12/hamascondemnstheholocaust.

46  Goldberg and Makdisi, “The Trial of Israel’s Campus Critics.”

47  Judea Pearl, “Is anti-Zionism hate?” Los Angeles Times (15 March 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-pearl15-2009mar15,0,6323783.story.

48  Dan Freeman-Maloy, “The Israel advocacy push to ‘reclaim’ York University,” ZNet (2 March 2009), http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/20755; reproduced online at The Bullet, E-Bulletin No. 191 (3 March 2009), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet191.html.

49  See Independent Jewish Voices, “Submission to the CPCCA,” note 4, in Antisemitism Real and Imagined, p. 110.

50  The JDL has taken an active interest in events at York University; there have been recurrent student complaints during the past year about JDL intimidation on the York campus. If these men were JDL members, they were restrained by Hillel: the JDL of Canada’s “Parsha of The Week” for February 14, 2009 includes a complaint that “It is a shame that the Hillel Jewish Student leadership prevent proper aggressive counter measures to be taken” on the York campus (http://www.jdlcanada.ca/reference/Parsha-Feb_14_2009.htm. The Jewish Defense League was founded by Rabbi Meir Kahane, as was the political party Kach (also known since Kahane’s death in 1990 as Kahane Chai, meaning “Kahane lives”). In 1994 the Israeli government declared Kahane Chai a terrorist organization, and in October 2006 a U.S. federal appeals court ruled that the State Department was correct in labeling Kach and Kahane Chai as terrorist organizations (see Neil A. Lewis, “Appeal Court Upholds Terrorist Label for a Jewish Group,” New York Times [18 October 2006], http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/us/18kahane.html?_r=1). Meir Weinstein, the leader of the Canadian JDL since the late 1970s, has also concurrently been Canadian spokesperson for Kach. In the latter capacity, he refused to condemn Kach and JDL member Baruch Goldstein’s 1994 machine-gun attack on the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron (see “Meir Weinstein,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meir_Weinstein), in which Goldstein murdered at least 29 worshippers and wounded another 150. Giving proud emphasis to the fact that Goldstein was a “charter member,” the JDL’s website defends him “as a martyr in Judaism’s protracted struggle against Arab terrorism” (“About JDL: FAQs,” Jewish Defense League, http://www.jdl.org/index.php/about-jdl/faqs/). Another “martyr” is JDL Chairman Irving Rubin, who died in prison in 2002 after being arrested by the FBI for preparing bombing attacks on a California mosque and the office of an Arab-American congressman. (See Terrorism 2000/2001 [FBI Publication #0308], http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.htm, where the JDL is described as “a violent extremist Jewish organization.”)

51  Freeman-Maloy, “The Israel advocacy push.”

52  Isi Leibler, “Candidly Speaking: Zionism and the global anti-Semitic frenzy,” Jerusalem Post (15 February 2009), available online at SPME: Scholars for Peace in the Middle East, http://spme.net/cgi-bin/articles.cgi?ID=5140; quoted by Freeman-Maloy, “The Israel advocacy push.”

53  Quoted by Freeman-Maloy, “The Israel advocacy push.”

54  Kenney’s statements were reported by the Canadian Press on February 23 and by the Belleville Intelligencer on February 24; see YFile: York’s Daily Bulletin (25 February 2009), http://www.yorku.ca/yfile/archive/index.asp?IssueDate=2/25/2009&section=York%20in%20the%20Media.

55  Linda McQuaig, “Harper’s extremism is showing,” Rabble.ca (3 November 2009), http://www.rabble.ca/columnists/2009/11/harpers-extremism-showing; McQuaig is quoting Kenney’s words reported by the Thornhill Liberal (11 September 2009).

56  Hasbara Fellowships was formed in 2001 by the Israeli Foreign Ministry and AishHaTorah, a right-wing fundamentalist organization associated with the Israeli settler movement.

57  Elad Benari, “Two Jewish Students Assaulted in York University,” Shalom Life (3 February 2010), http://www.shalomlife.com/eng/4737/Two_Jewish_Students_Assaulted_in_York_University/.

58  Benari, “Two Jewish Students Assaulted.” Mozeson’s claim to have been assaulted is reported by Yuni Kim, “Security footage debunks assault allegations,” Excalibur (10 February 2010), http://www.excal.on.ca/cms2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7979&Itemid=2.

59  Gil Ronen, “Toronto: Jewish Students Attacked,” Arutz Sheva: IsraelNationalNews.com (4 February 2010), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/135873, Talkback comment #7. Weinstein’s offer of a $500 reward was noted by Elad Benari in the February 3 Shalom Life article (whose text Ronen reproduces, with minor changes, as his own); this posting provides Weinstein’s own words.

60  “University investigating assault on Jewish students,” JTA: The Global News Service of the Jewish People (7 February 2010), http://jta.org/news/article/2010/02/07/1010495/university-investigating-assault-on-jewish-students; also published in the Jerusalem Post (8 February 2010), http://www.jpost.com/JewishWorld/JewishNews/Article.aspx?id=168116.

61  Elad Benari, “‘York University is a Safe Place for Students,’” Shalom Life (8 February 2010), http://www.shalomlife.com/eng/5021/York_University_is_a_Safe_Place_for_Students/. See also Yuni Kim, “Security footage debunks assault allegations,” Excalibur (10 February 2010), http://www.excal.on.ca/cms2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7979&Itemid=2.

62  Kim, “Security footage debunks assault allegations.”

63  “University investigating assault on Jewish students,” JTA (7 February 2010), Jerusalem Post (8 February 2010).

64  Kim, “Security footage debunks assault allegations.”

65  “York, U of T act promptly on anti-Semitism complaints,” Jewish Tribune (10 February 2010), http://www.jewishtribune.ca/TribuneV2/index.php/201002102634/York-U-of-T-act-promptly-on-antisemitism-complaints.html.

66  In Yiddish and in English usage, this word carries a definite hint of admiration for boldness or audacity, an overtone that is apparently absent in Hebrew.

67  “York, U of T act promptly.”

68  Pearl, “Dust Over Campus Life.” “Marrano” was a derogatory term applied in late 15th and 16th century Spain to Jews who had (under compulsion) converted to Christianity, but who were suspected of continuing to practice Jewish rites in secret.

69  For a list of Massad’s publications to 2007, see http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mealac/faculty/massad/.

70  See Joseph Massad, “Response to the Ad Hoc Grievance Committee” (4 April 2005), and “Statement to the Ad Hoc Committee (14 March 2005), Columbia University Middle East and Asian Languages and Cultures, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mealac/faculty/massad/.

71  Dershowitz published a St. Valentine’s Day essay attacking Massad, “At Columbia, fairness is job one,” New York Daily News (14 February 2005), http://www.alandershowitz.com/publications/docs/columbia.html. The piece includes a sentence that might be mistaken for an unwitting self-description: “I am told that he is a mediocre scholar whose main claim to fame is his vocal extremism.”

72  In 2000, Massad was one of two finalists for Columbia’s Van Doren teaching award; his publications include Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), The Persistence of the Palestinian Question: Essays on Zionism and the Palestinians (London: Routledge, 2006), and Desiring Arabs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), which won Columbia University’s 2008 Lionel Trilling Book Award.

73  “Intimidation at Columbia,” New York Times (7 April 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/07/opinion/07thu1.html?_r=1; see also Karen W. Arenson, “Columbia Panel Clears Professors of Anti-Semitism,” New York Times (31 March 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/31/education/31columbia.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=1&adxnnlx=1256680833-FB9PGOce/hv0Y/D0lo8+cA. The Columbia ad hoc committee reprimanded Massad for a single incident in which three students attested that he made a testy answer to a question from one of them; Massad’s Columbia University website reproduces a letter in which twenty other students deny that the alleged incident ever occurred.

74  Juan Cole, “The New McCarthyism: A witch hunt against a Columbia professor, and the New York Times’ disgraceful support for it, represent the gravest threat to academic freedom in decades,” Salon.com (22 April 2005), http://dir.salon.com/story/opinion/feature/2005/04/22/mccarthy/index.html.

75  See Yehoshua Porath, “Mrs. Peters’s Palestine,” New York Review of Books 32: 21-22 (16 January 1986), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/5249; and “Mrs. Peters’s Palestine: An Exchange” (letters by Daniel Pipes and Ronald Sanders, reply by Yehoshua Porath), New York Review of Books 33: 5 (27 March 1986), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/5172. Finkelstein’s analysis of Peters’ book was first published as “Disinformation and the Palestine Question: The Not-So-Strange Case of Joan Peters’ From Time Immemorial,” in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestine Question (London: Verso, 1988), pp. 33-69; it reappears as a chapter in Finkelstein’s Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (London: Verso, 1995).

76  Adam Shatz, “Goldhagen’s Willing Executioners,” Slate (8 April 1998), http://www.slate.com/id/3143/. (See also Finkelstein’s response to Shatz’s essay, at http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=2&ar=8.) The opinions of Foxman and Weseltier, and of Bernie Farber and Irving Abella (cited below), no doubt reflect an awareness of Finkelstein’s second book, The Rise and Fall of Palestine: A Personal Account of the Intifada Years (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

77  Sean Fine, “Nazi-hunting scholar under fire for views: Link with anti-Zionist enrages CJC,” Globe and Mail (26 January 1998). See also Tim Cornwell, “Daniel in the lions’ den,” Times Higher Education Supplement (20 February 1998), http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=105936&sectioncode=26.

78  Mordecai Briemberg, “Holocaust Scholarship, Zionism and Political Orthodoxy,” Outlook 36.3 (1 April-15 May 1998), available online at http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=2&ar=6. Briemberg quotes Abella’s words from a report in the Canadian Jewish News (29 January 1998).

79  Tom Segev, Haaretz (15 May 1998), quoted by Dominique Vidal, “From ‘Mein Kampf’ to Auschwitz: Holocaust book sparks fresh controversy,” Le Monde diplomatique (October 1998), http://mondediplo.com/1998/10/14vidal; Segev’s article is reproduced online at http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=2&ar=3.

80  Several statements by historians of international reputation are quoted by Shatz in “Goldhagen’s Willing Executioners.” Arno Mayer wrote that Finkelstein and Birn “raise hard questions about the political reasons for the inordinate promotion and reception of Goldhagen’s book. No serious student of history can afford to ignore these well-reasoned and withering reflections on the perils of pseudo-scholarship.” Eric Hobsbawm urged that “All readers of Goldhagen’s controversial book should take note of these much-needed studies, which, in line with serious historians, convincingly and authoritatively dismantle its arguments.” And according to Ian Kershaw, “Finkelstein and Birn provide a devastating critique of Daniel Goldhagen’s simplistic and misleading interpretation of the Holocaust. Their contribution to the debate is, in my view, indispensable.”

81  “Is There a New Anti-Semitism? A Conversation with Raul Hilberg,” Logos 6.1-2 (Winter-Spring 2007), http://www.logosjournal.com/issue_6.1-2/hilberg.htm.

82  Bauer is quoted by Mordecai Briemberg, “Holocaust Research and Intellectual Freedom,” Peace Magazine 14.3 (May-June 1998), http://cache.zoominfo.com/CachedPage/?archive_id=0&page_id=487983492&page_url=%2f%2fwww.peacemagazine.org%2ffulltext%2fall-vol14no3.html&page_last_updated=8%f22%2f2003+8%3a42%3a18+PM&firstName=Ruth&lateName=Birn.

83  Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (2nd ed., London: Verso, 2003), pp. 86-87.

84  Neve Gordon, “Cloud After Auschwitz,” The Nation (13 November 2000): 28-34, available online at http://www.israelsoccupation.info/files/Cloud%20After%20Auschwitz.pdf.

85  Finkelstein quotes WJC president Edgar J.Bronfman as giving a total figure more than five times higher, but it is not clear than Bronfman can be trusted in this: Raul Hilberg remarked that this tycoon (who headed the WJC from 1979 until his resignation in 2007, amid a cloud of scandal over mismanagement and peculation in the WJC’s senior management) appeared “from his own autobiographical statements to be totally, not even average, but like a child almost” (“Is There a New Anti-Semitism? A Conversation with Raul Hilberg”).

86  Ibid.

87  Angelo M. Codevilla, Between the Alps and a Hard Place: Switzerland in World War II and Moral Blackmail Today (Washington DC: Regnery, 2000), p. 4.

88  “Is There a New Anti-Semitism? A Conversation with Raul Hilberg.” See also Amy Goodman, “‘It Takes an Enormous Amount of Courage to Speak the Truth When No One Else is Out There’—World-Renowned Holocaust, Israel Scholars Defend DePaul Professor Norman Finkelstein as He Fights for Tenure,” Democracy NOW! (9 May 2007), http://www.democracynow.org/2007/5/9/it_takes_an_enormous_amount_of#at. In this interview, Hilberg makes it clear that his endorsement was based on research into “the same territory that Professor Finkelstein was covering [….] rel[ying] upon the same sources that Professor Finkelstein used, perhaps in addition some Swiss items.”

89  Alan Dershowitz, “Norman Finkelstein: the case against,” The Guardian (14 June 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/jun/14/finkelsteinthecaseagainst. In this article, and in an earlier version of it published as “Finkelstein’s Bigotry,” The Wall Street Journal (4 May 2007), Dershowitz quotes from Bartov’s New York Times review of The Holocaust Industry. Finkelstein's book is suffused with outrage over the postwar treatment of Holocaust survivors—among them his mother, who after six years of suffering in the Warsaw Ghetto, in two slave-labour camps, and in the Majdanek death camp, received $3,500 in compensation; Dershowitz’s offhand inversion of this is thus an instance of giving “the Lie Direct” (for which see Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act 5, scene 4.)

90  For assessments of Finkelstein’s analysis and Dershowitz’s counter-claims, see Matthew Abraham, “The Case for Norman Finkelstein,” The Electronic Intifada 15 June 2007), http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article7029.shtml; Michael C. Desch, “The Chutzpah of Alan Dershowitz,” The American Conservative (5 December 2005), 30-33, http://normanfinkelstein.com/article.php?pg=11&ar=98; and Frank Menetrez, “Dershowitz v. Finkelstein: Who’s Right and Who’s Wrong?” CounterPunch (30 April 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/menetrez04302007.html.

91  Amy Goodman, “‘It Takes an Enormous Amount of Courage’.”

92  See note 89 above.

93  “ADL Reacts to DePaul’s Denial of Tenure to Prof. Norman Finkelstein,” Anti-Defamation League (11 June 2007), http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Mise_00/5071_00.htm. Links to the JDO and StandWithUs interventions can be found at http://www.normanfinkelstein.com/finkelstein-tenure-denied-2/.

94  Amy Goodman, “It Takes an Enormous Amount of Courage.” (Like the German “Menschlichkeit,” the Yiddish word used here means rectitude and nobility of character.)

95  Razack’s publications include Canadian Feminism and the Law (Toronto: Second Story, 1991), Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), the edited collection Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affair, Peacekeeping and the New Imperialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), and Casting Out: Race and the Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).

96  Justin Podur, “For Free Expression on Palestine,” The Bullet: Socialist Project, E-Bulletin No. 211 (28 April 2009), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet211.html.

97  My article “Resisting the Post-National: Canadian Critiques of the Geo-Cultural Politics of Globalization,” in Gunilla Florby, Mark Shackleton, and Katri Suhonen, eds., Canada: Images of a Post/National Society (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 39-54, includes a brief assessment of Chossudovsky’s scholarly and political work; an earlier version of this essay is available as “Canada’s Thinker-Activists and Critics of Globalization,” Centre for Research on Globalization (27 December 2005), http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=1595. Chossudovsky’s books include Capital Accumulation in Chile and Latin America (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1977), Towards Capitalist Restoration? Chinese Socialism After Mao (London: Macmillan, 1986), Exporting Apartheid to Sub-Saharan Africa (New Delhi: Madhyam, 1997), The Globalization of Poverty and the New World Order (Shanty Bay, Ontario: Global Outlook, 2003), and America’s ‘War on Terrorism’ (Pincourt, Québec: Global Research, 2005).

98  See my article “Unspeakable Truths: CanWest Global Defines ‘Acceptable Civil Discourse’. In Defence of Michel Chossudovsky,” Peace, Earth and Justice News (11 September 2005), http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=3274&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.

99  Ibid.

100  “Statement By Denis Rancourt Regarding His Dismissal By The University Of Ottawa,” available at “Canadian University Professor Fired for Criticising Israel,” Palestinian Mothers (24 April 2009), http://palestinian.ning.com/profiles/blogs/canadian-university-professor.

101  Ibid.

102  Denis Rancourt, “University of Ottawa’s Covert Surveillance of a Professor and Several Students (2006-2008),” January 2010, http://rancourt.academicfreedom.ca/Data/Documents/covertsurveillance/covert-surveillance=UofO=pbl-1.pdf, p. 3.

103  His books include Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), Transnational Conflicts: Central America, Social Change and Globalization (London: Verso, 2003), A Theory of Global Capitalism: Transnational Production, Transnational Capitalists, and the Transnational State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), and Latin America and Global Capitalism: A Critical Globalization Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

104  “Santa Barbara News Press—Prof. Robinson’s Op-ed Letter—May 31, 2009,” Committee to Defend Academic Freedom at UCSB, http://sb4af.wordpress.com/2009/06/08/santa-barbara-news-press-prof-robinsons-op-ed-letter-may-31-2009/.

105  The documents referred to in this paragraph are all available at the Committee to Defend Academic Freedom at UCSB website, http://sb4af.wordpress.com/.

106  Scott Horton, “More Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Al-Arian Case,” Harper’s Magazine (11 March 2009), http://www.harpers.org/archive/2009/03/hbc-90004539. For links to many further documents, see the website Free Sami Al-Arian: Political Prisoner Since Feb. 20, 2003, http://www.freesamialarian.com/.

107  Jason Kunin, “Freedom to Teach, Freedom of Speech: Israel-Palestine.” Naylor’s behaviour was revealed by Liisa Schofield, “Exposed: University of Toronto suppresses pro-Palestinian activism,” Rabble.ca (18 February 2009), http://www.rabble.ca/news/exposed-university-toronto-suppressed-pro-palestinian-activism. For a thorough discussion of the resources marshalled “to silence criticism of the Canadian government’s unwavering support for Israel,” see Rafeef Ziadah, “Freedom of Expression and Palestine Advocacy,” The Bullet: Socialist Project, E-Bulletin No. 219 (19 May 2009), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet219.html.

108  Marwan Bishara, Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid (2001; 2nd ed., London and New York: Zed Books, 2002), p. 4.

109  Jimmy Carter, Palestine Peace Not Apartheid (2006; rpt. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), and “Canada’s withholding funds from Palestinians ‘criminal’: Carter,” CBC News (9 December 2006), http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/12/08/carter-israel.html; Shulamit Aloni, “Yes, There is Apartheid in Israel,” CounterPunch (8 January 2007), http://www.counterpunch.org/aloni01082007.html. Aloni is also the author of Demokratia ba’azikim [Democracy or Ethnocracy] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 2010).

110  Henry Siegman, “Imposing Middle East Peace,” The Nation (7 January 2010), http://www.thenation.com/doc/20100125/siegman. See also Siegman, “For Israel, defiance comes at the cost of legitimacy,” Financial Times (23 February 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/48a4a5e6-20b2-11df-9775-00144feab49a.html, in which he remarks that “The democracy Israel provides for its (mostly) Jewish citizens cannot hide its changed character. A democracy reserved for privileged citizens while all others are denied individual and national rights and kept behind checkpoints, barbed wire fences and separation walls manned by Israel’s military, is not democracy.”

111  See Michael Ignatieff, “Israel Apartheid Week and CUPE Ontario’s anti-Israel posturing should be condemned,” National Post (5 March 2009), http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2009/03/05/michael-ignatieff-israel-apartheid-week-and-cupe-ontario-s-anti-israel-posturing-should-be-condemned.aspx. Ignatieff writes: “International law defines ‘apartheid’ as a crime against humanity. Labelling Israel as an ‘apartheid’ state is a deliberate attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Jewish state itself. Criticism of Israel is legitimate. Attempting to describe its very existence as a crime against humanity is not.” (The sophism is obvious: What is actually being objected to is the fact, not of Israel’s existence, but of its behaviour. South Africa did not cease to exist when it ceased to be an apartheid state; neither will Israel when it either returns to its pre-1967 borders or else offers recompense and full citizenship rights to the people of Palestine.) See also Robert Benzie, “MPPs unite to condemn ‘odious’ Israeli Apartheid Week,” Toronto Star (25 February 2010), http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/article/771524--mpps-unite-to-condemn-israeli-apartheid-week.

112  Kunin, note 2. Karin Brothers also draws attention to the same study: Virginia Tilley, ed., Occupation, colonialism, apartheid?: a reassessment of Israel’s practices in the occupied Palestinian territories under international law (Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa, May 2009), http://www.hrsc.ac.za/Document-3227.phtml.

113  Margaret Aziza Pappano, “Academic Freedom Threatened in Ontario Universities,” The Bullet: Socialist Project, E-Bulletin No. 187 (18 February 2009), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet187.html#continue.

114  Meron Benvenisti, “The binationalism vogue,” Haaretz (30 April 2009), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1081978.html. See also Benvenisti, “The Inevitable Bi-national Regime,” Haaretz (22 January 2010 [Hebrew]), English translation by Zalman Amit and Daphna Levitt available at Israeli Occupation Archive (26 January 2010), http://www.israeli-occupation.org/2010-01-26/meron-benvenisti-the-inevitable-bi-national-regime/.

115  For information about the conference, see Israel/Palestine: Mapping Models of Statehood and Paths to Peace (June 22-24, 2009 / York University, Toronto), http://www.yorku.ca/ipconf/.

116  Dorit Naaman, “Coordinated Campaign Aimed to Stifle Academic Discussion about Israel Raises Critical Questions,” CAUT/ACPPU Bulletin 56.8 (October 2009), p. A4.

117  See “Minister’s Office Threatens SSHRC’s Federal Budget Funding: Internal Email,” CAUT/ACPPU Bulletin 56.8 (October 2009), pp. A1, 9; and “Gary Goodyear’s attempted blackmail,” Dawg’s Blawg (28 September 2009), http://drdawgsblawg.blogspot.com/2009/09/gary-goodyears-attempted-blackmail.html.

118  Naaman, “Coordinated Campaign.”

119  Goldberg and Makdisi, “The Trial of Israel’s Campus Critics.”

120  Massad, “Policing the academy,” Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 633 (10-16 April 2003), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/633/op2.htm.

121  Goodyear does in fact have a well-earned reputation for being foul-tempered; see “Researchers fear ‘stagnation’ under Tories,” The Globe and Mail (2 March 2009, updated 10 April 2009), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/article975257ece; and “Maybe a ‘time out,’ Minister?” Dawg’s Blawg (2 March 2009), http://drdawgsblawg.blogspot.com/2009/03/maybe-time-out-minister.html.

122  “One size doesn’t fit all,” National Post (25 February 2010), http://www.nationalpost.com/todays-paper/story.html?id=2609507.

123  Kathleen and Bill Christison, Palestine in Pieces: Graphic Perspectives on the Israeli Occupation (London: Pluto Press, 2009), pp. 136-37.

124  Ibid., p. 137, quoting Richard Falk, “Slouching Toward a Palestinian Holocaust,” ZNet (5 July 2007), http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectonID=107&ItemID=134226.

125  Ibid., p. 137.

126  Gideon Alon, “Lieberman blasted for suggesting drowning Palestinian prisoners,” Haaretz (8 July 2003), http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=315541.

127  “LIEBERMAN, Avigdor—Israeli Politician and deputy prime minister,” Electronic Intifada, http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/people/658.shtml; Jonathan Cook, “Israel’s Dark Future,” Electronic Intifada (20 January 2007), http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article6411.shtml.

128  Tim Butcher, “Israeli minister vows Palestinian ‘holocaust’,” The Telegraph (29 February 2008), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1580339/israeli-minister-vows-Palestinian-holocaust.html; “Israel warns Gaza of ‘shoah’,” Reuters (29 February 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2868601720080229; James Hider, “Israel threatens to unleash ‘holocaust’ in Gaza,” Times Online (1 March 2008), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article3459144.ece.

129  It does not seem likely that Vilnai thought of the preceding days’ events, in which one Israeli was killed by rocket fire, and thirty Palestinians by Israeli attacks, as a “shoah.” Perhaps he was using “shoah” to translate the Arab work “nakba,” which also means “catastrophe,” and also has a specific historical reference—to the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians which accompanied the founding of the state of Israel in 1948. But a “greater nakba” would also be a genocidal act.

130  Juan Cole, “Harvard Professor’s Modest Proposal: Starve the Gazans into Having Fewer Babies,” Informed Comment (24 February 2010), http://www.juancole.com/2010/02/harvard-professors-modest-proposal.html.

131  Martin Kramer, “Superfluous young men,” Sandbox (7 February 2010), http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2010/02/superfluous-young-men/.

132  “OPT: Signs of worsening malnutrition among children,” UNISPAL (21 April 2009), http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/CB9A27EF05BB52408525759F0061B366.

133  See, for example, M. J. Rosenberg, “Is Harvard Prof Advocating Palestinian Genocide?” The Huffington Post (22 February 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/harvard-prof-urges-popula_b_472191.html; and “Harvard center condemns, then defends, fellow’s pro-genocide statements,” Electronic Intifada (23 February 2010), http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article11097.shtml.

134  Kramer, “Smear intifada,” Sandbox (22 February 2010), http://www.martinkramer.org/sandbox/2010/02/smear-intifada/.

135  “OPT: Signs of worsening malnutrition.”

136  Akiva Eldar, “Israel’s compassion in Haiti can’t hide our ugly face in Gaza,” Haaretz (18 January 2010), http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1143313.html.

137  “Gaza Health Fact Sheet,” World Health Organization (20 January 2010), http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/80e8238d765e5fb7852576b1004ec498?OpenDocument.

138  See International Humanitarian Law—Treaties & Documents, ICRC, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/380?OpenDocument.

139  M. J. Rosenberg, “Yes, Kramer Did Advocate Palestinian Genocide,” The Huffington Post (24 February 2010), http://huffingtonpost.com/mj-rosenberg/yes-kramer-did-advocate-p_b_475350.html.

140  Kramer, “Smear intifada.”

141  Bahija Réghaï, “Canadian Policy: The Jerusalem Effect,” OpEd News (26 January 2010), http://www.opednews.com/articles/1/Canadian-Policy-The-Jerus-by-Bahija-Reghai-100125-265.html.

142  In his “Smear Intifada” posting, Kramer protests that the ideas he presented were derived from Gunnar Heinsohn, “Ending the West’s Proxy War Against Israel,” Wall Street Journal Europe (12 January 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123171179743471961.html. Heinsohn’s argument is just as de-historicized as Kramer’s—and also more grotesquely genocidal, because more detailed in its attack on UNRWA’s contribution to what Heinsohn calls “Gaza’s extreme demographic armament.” Heinsohn, who the Wall Street Journal tells us “heads the Raphael Lemkin Institute at the University of Bremen, Europe’s first institute devoted to comparative genocide research,” appears not to understand the difference between researching genocide and helping to provoke it. (His publications include extensive and disastrously incompetent attempts to revise ancient Near Eastern chronology, as well as equally incompetent applications of demographic analysis to contemporary situations.) Kramer might also have given some credit for his ideas to Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, who as Jonathan Cook notes boasted in January 2007, when he was leader of the opposition, “that child allowance cuts he imposed as finance minister in 2002 had had a ‘positive’ demographic effect by reducing the birth rate of Palestinian citizens.” See Cook, “Israel’s Dark Future.”

143  Kathleen and Bill Christison, Palestine in Pieces, p. 161; quoting from Care International UK, Oxfam, Trocaire, Save the Children UK, et al., The Gaza Strip: A Humanitarian Implosion (March 2008), http://www.carewbg.org/Reports/Gaza-A-Humanitarian-Implosion.pdf.

144  Neve Gordon, “Boycott Israel: Stopping the Apartheid State,” CounterPunch (24 August 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/gordon08242009.html#at.

145  See “PACBI Issues Guidelines for Applying Academic Boycott,” Global BDS Movement (6 October 2009), http://www.bdsmovement.net/?q=node/566.

146  “The Toronto Declaration: No Celebration of Occupation. An Open Letter to the Toronto International Film Festival” (9 September 2009), http://torontodeclaration.blogspot.com/2009/09/toronto-declaration-no-celebration-of.html; see also Ken Loach, Rebecca O’Brien and Paul Laverty, “Boycotts don’t equal censorship,” The Guardian (1 September 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/sep/01/israel-palestine-boycott-film; and Eric Walberg, “The Battle in Canada: ‘Brand Israel’ Teflon v. Palestinian Reality,” CounterPunch (19 October 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/walberg10192009html#at.

147  Gordon, “Boycott Israel.”

148  Gideon Levy, “The Last Refuge: Neve Gordon and the Boycott of Israel,” CounterPunch (27 August 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/levy08272009.html#at.

149  Jonathan Cook, “Campus Watch Copycats Close In On Israeli Professors,” Countercurrents.org (16 November 2009), http://www.countercurrents.org/cook161109.htm.

150  Paul Craig Roberts, “Why Not Sanctions for Israel? Gross Violations of Human Rights,” CounterPunch (1 September 2009), http://www.counterpunch.org/roberts09012009.html#at.

151  Levy, “The Last Refuge.”

152  I do not mean to dismiss other issues at stake, most importantly the right of return of people expelled from Israel in 1948. But diplomatic miracles cannot be expected to come all at once.

153  William Blake, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in Mary Lynn Johnson and John E. Grant, eds., Blake’s Poetry and Designs (New York: Norton, 1979), p. 98.

154  Judith Butler, “The Charge of Anti-Semitism: Jews, Israel, and the Risks of Public Critique,” in Precious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004; rpt. London and New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 126-27.

155  Ibid., p. 127. 

In Defence of Michel Chossudovsky: A Cup of Cool Reason for the Ottawa Citizen's Fevered Brow

This essay was first published at the now-defunct website of the Canadian Action Party (10 September 2005); it was also published online at eight other websites in 2005.


During the past two weeks Professor Michel Chossudovsky, an economist, political analyst and human rights advocate of international reputation who teaches at the University of Ottawa and directs his own Centre for Research on Globalization and its widely admired website www.globalresearch.ca, has become the object of a strange campaign of defamation.

Chossudovsky's website makes available writings on worldwide political issues by a wide range of academics and journalists. It also offers open forums on which members of the public can discuss and debate the issues raised by the scores of articles published each week.

But that, it seems, can be a risky business.

Discovering recently that anti-semites had managed to insert their noxious drivel into a discussion thread hosted by Chossudovsky's website, B'nai Brith Canada did not simply alert him to the fact, so that he could take the obvious step of removing the hateful messages. Rather, with the eager assistance of the Ottawa Citizen, this once universally-respected organization made the event a pretext for a campaign of character assassination.

On August 20, the Citizen published an article (Pauline Tam, “U of O Professor accused of hosting anti-Semitic website”) the tone of which can best be described as scurrilous. Conflating the toxic invasion of his website with Chossudovsky's own editorial work and with his own writings, the article insinuated that anti-semitism and denial of the Shoah feature prominently in both of them. A follow-up article (Alex Hutchinson, “Controversial site 'not an issue' for university,” August 21, 2005) wondered at the University of Ottawa's failure to take disciplinary action.

There are some obvious ironies here. Michel Chossudovsky is widely regarded as a leading interpreter and critic both of globalization and of the structural violence and military aggressions it has entailed. His life's work as an economist and political analyst has been a finely articulated series of reproaches to injustices of all kinds, including the foulness of racism. And as it happens, members of his immediate family died at Auschwitz.

By a further irony, the best brief introduction to his work is a profile published some years ago by none other than the Ottawa Citizen (Juliet O'Neill, “Battling mainstream economics,” January 5, 1998). This article offered a sympathetic account of Chossudovsky's “defiance of mainstream economic scholarship in which 'critical analysis is strongly discouraged',” and also of his studies of “the purposeful impoverishment of people in dozens of countries” through IMF/World Bank interventions. It mentioned in addition his criticisms of major financial institutions for a “hidden agenda” involving criminal complicity in drug-money laundering as well as in the social and economic collapses prompted by the IMF—criticisms that have since been confirmed by the revelations of former “economic hit-man” John Perkins and of Nobel prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz.

But B'nai Brith and the Citizen now want this distinguished public intellectual to carry the leper's rattle of the anti-semite. The August 20 article quotes Frank Dimant, executive vice-president of B'nai Brith Canada, as complaining that the website's materials are “full of wild conspiracy theories that go so far as to accuse Israel, America and Britain of being behind the recent terrorist bombings in London. They echo the age-old anti-Semitic expressions that abound in the Arab world....” A second-year University of Ottawa student worries “other students will stumble on the site,” where they presumably risk contamination by Chossudovsky's ideas. B'nai Brith's human rights lawyer Anita Bromberg is quoted as piously hoping that pressure can be exerted on his university “to hold him to a certain standard of acceptable civil discourse.”

And finally, a purportedly sympathetic political scientist who specializes on the use of the internet by terrorists declares himself disturbed by “a conspiratorial element” in Chossudovsky's writings, and finds “not much that resembles” them in recent work on retail or anti-state terrorism.

This dismissive conclusion is not quite the coup de grâce the author of this article evidently meant it to be. Political scientists who have some acquaintanceship with current scholarship on development economics and on state (as opposed to retail) terrorism might be less likely to think Chossudovsky's work marginal or eccentric.

And while the weather-beaten axiom that power elites would never dream of engaging in conspiratorial behaviour may still hold a certain faded charm for journalistic Howdie Doodies and pundits of all kinds, the clear function of the taboo against “conspiracy theory” in present-day public discourse is to shut down critical inquiry into matters of what Gore Vidal has called “unspeakable truth.”

What, one wonders, did the seven leaked “Downing Street memos” reveal, if not that the American and British governments conspired between 2001 and 2003 to launch what they knew to be a criminal war of aggression against Iraq? And what did Congressman John Conyers' minority judiciary committee report on electoral irregularities in Ohio reveal, if not that the Bush Republicans conspired in 2004 to steal the presidential election?

Michel Chossudovsky has shown courageous persistence in exposing zones of unspeakable truth to principled analysis. Ironically again, his chief offence against orthodoxy appears to have been his refusal to racially delimit his opposition to human rights abuses. Articles published on his website have criticized not just the horrors of the Iraq occupation, and Canada's and the UN's grotesquely hypocritical participation in the overthrow of democracy in Haiti, but also the state of Israel's shameless violations of human rights, international law and common decency in its treatment of the Palestinians.

B'nai Brith and CanWestGlobal (which owns and controls the Ottawa Citizen) would like to enforce “a standard of acceptable civil discourse” that effaces any distinction between criticism of Israel and anti-semitism. But as is made clear by an editorial in which the Citizen returns to the attack (“The right to be wrong,” August 26, 2005), they want not merely to silence critics of Israel, but also to regulate and restrain free critical thought in a much wider sense.

Behind a pallid pretence of defending Chossudovsky's academic freedom, this editorial sets about ensuring that his exercise of it will, as the Citizen charmingly says, “have consequences.” His “exotic opinions” are mocked as arising from a procedure of “throw[ing] facts into a pot and hop[ing] conspiracies boil out.” The editorial describes as particularly absurd one of his recent articles, which drew attention to parallels between an anti-terrorism exercise run in London on the morning of July 7 that scripted bombings in the same three underground stations that were actually attacked, and CIA and military anti-terrorism exercises in the US that shortly preceded or coincided with the 9/11 attacks. We are told that B'nai Brith shares this view, objecting not just to the discussion-thread postings inserted by anti-semites into Chossudovsky's website, but also “to the tone of the site more generally. One of the scraps Mr. Chossudovsky's piece on terrorism exercises throws into the cauldron is that Israel's former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in London during the July 7 attacks.”

The editorial's tactic of ridiculing Chossudovsky by attributing to him its own feeble treatment of facts and arguments as disconnected bits and pieces is childishly obvious. But any chain of discourse can be made to seem silly if one snips it into bits and shakes them in a hat. (If I sang it badly enough, I do believe I could make “God Save the Weasel” sound like “Pop Goes the Queen.”)

The Citizen's editorial urges Chossudovsky's “colleagues and bosses” to “make a point of explaining why he's wrong.” Let's pause for a moment, then, over the article that has aroused such a flurry of contempt (Michel Chossudovsky, “7/7 Mock Terror Drill: What Relationship to the Real Time Terror Attacks?” Centre for Research on Globalization, www.globalresearch.ca, August 8, 2005).

Readers of the Citizen who take the trouble to look up this article may be surprised to discover that it is cautious and tentative rather than accusatory in tone. It confines itself to a sober gathering of information from mainstream media sources. And it concludes by recommending against the drawing of “hasty conclusions” and by calling for “an independent public inquiry into the London bomb attacks.”

So why the complaints? Bibi Netanyahu indeed gets a mention: Chossudovsky quotes from that wild and exotic source, the Associated Press, a report from Jerusalem according to which Scotland Yard gave the Israeli Embassy in London advance warning of a bombing attack, thanks to which Netanyahu was able to cancel a meeting scheduled in a venue close to the site of one of the bomb blasts.

Does that sound troubling to you? Do you think Michel Chossudovsky may have been right to suggest that “The issue of foreknowledge raised in the Associated Press report also requires investigation”? Or should we just shoot the messenger and be done with it?

There is, to conclude, one point at which I find myself in agreement with the Ottawa Citizen's editorial writer: I think a controversy of this sort should indeed “have consequences.”

I believe the Citizen's editorial team, together with Frank Dimant and Anita Bromberg of B'nai Brith, should bow their heads in shame.

I think they should offer a public apology to Michel Chossudovsky and make a serious effort to avoid disgracing themselves in future by any repetition of this kind of sordid campaign of defamation.

Forging Freedom: Critical Humanist Strategies of Resistance to Corporatism, the Munro Beattie Lecture, 1999-2000, Carleton University

[This essay was delivered on 11 February 2000 as the invited Munro Beattie Lecture, 1999-2000 at Carleton University. The version that appears here incorporates revisions made in 2003 for a projected volume, to be published by Carleton University Press, that was to have brought together the four most recent Munro Beattie lectures, but that never appeared. Abbreviated versions of this paper were delivered as invited lectures to the Miedzywydzialowy Zaklad Studiow Amerykanskich of the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland (18 April 2000), and at the conference on Italy and Canadian Culture: Nationalisms in the New Millennium at the University of Udine, Italy (18-20 May 2000), but it has not previously been published.]

 

1. Inventing crises

I wonder whether the widespread failure of North Americans to notice that we are living in the midst of a social and political revolution stems more distinctly from inattention, from diffidence, or from incredulity. In the United States, one might incline toward the former explanation: our southern neighbours have a well-nurtured capacity (not seriously dented by the events of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath) for remaining sublimely unaware of much that goes on in the world. Diffidence, on the other hand, is supposed to be a national characteristic of Canadians: have we perhaps noticed the transformations taking place all around us, but all-too-tactfully refrained from giving them a name? Or have we simply been unable to credit what is happening, either because we think of revolutions as events that occur, by definition, elsewhere and in other times, or else because the very notion of a revolution has been so debased by its application in advertising to everything from automotive styling to men's toiletries that we greet fresh deployments of the term with a yawn?

Whatever else we might fault them for, the corporatist revolutionaries of our time cannot be accused of having failed to disclose their intentions—and their strategies as well. Ronald Reagan campaigned for the American presidency in 1980 as the bringer of something he called “the Reagan Revolution”; a year into his first term his budget director, David Stockman, revealed with surprising candour the way in which Reagan’s handlers (if not the president himself) understood what they were up to. All the talk about balanced budgets and prosperity through “trickle-down” economics was hot air, Stockman confessed. The real goal was a radical redirection of resources away from social spending, and a deliberate amassing of huge budget deficits that would make this redirection irreversible by depriving future governments of the wherewithal to restore the welfare and civil rights entitlements cut away by the Reaganites.1 A liberal welfare-state future, should the opposition to this radical conservatism ever sufficiently reassert itself to the point of contemplating such a thing, would be discovered to have been pre-emptively, already and for ever, bankrupted.

The anxiously proleptic temporality disclosed by Stockman’s indiscretions, this desire to constrain succeeding generations by bankrupting any possible alternative to the future that is being envisioned and announced, is one early sign—despite all the obvious continuities with prior forms of capitalist governance—of the radically transformative nature of what I will be calling the corporatist revolution. There is, of course, a large disjunction between the Reaganite rhetoric of economic and military rejuvenation, which implied the opening out of an expanding field of choices for the American polity, and the force of negation revealed in this desire for a foreclosure of all futures but one—beneath which may be detectable a more deeply rooted readiness to cancel human futures altogether. It was, after all, a colleague of David Stockman in Reagan’s first cabinet, Environment Secretary James Watt, who justified the issuing of mining permits in national parks by remarking that Jesus expects us to have exhausted all of the planet’s resources before he returns to earth.2 The strip-mining of national parks would, in this view, accelerate the Second Coming, the end of time, the cancellation of futurity in a blessed eternal present.

Brian Mulroney, Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, Preston Manning, Stockwell Day, Stephen Harper, and the other politicians who since 1984 have collaborated in hitching the Canadian caboose ever more tightly onto the tail end of the Reagan-Bush-Clinton-Bush Express have, on the whole, been less forthcoming about their motives than David Stockman was. But the inhabitants of Ontario, our most populous and economically most powerful province, have had in Premier Mike Harris another self-proclaimed revolutionary—and in the figure of John Snobelen, Harris’s first Education Minister, one of the philosophers not just of Harris’s “Common Sense Revolution,” but also of the larger corporatist revolution of which it was a part. Shortly after taking office in 1995, Snobelen had himself videotaped explaining his plans for change to senior education ministry bureaucrats—one of whom had the decency to share a copy with the media. Despite the informal looseness of his syntax, Snobelen’s meaning is clear:

“[We must] bankrupt the actions and activities that aren’t consistent with the future we’re committed to. But there are a couple of things we need to get done properly along the way. One of those is ... to declare the future.

“.... It’s not a very collaborative process. That needs to be done before what needs bankrupting and how to bankrupt it occurs.

“I like to think of it as creating a useful crisis.... Creating a useful crisis is what part of this will be about. So the first bunch of communications that the public might hear might be more negative than I might be inclined to talk about [otherwise].

“Yeah, we need to invent a crisis. And that’s not an act just of courage—there’s some skill involved.”3

Snobelen’s words were dismissed by some commentators as mere “bafflegab”—an interpretation he encouraged when he responded to calls for his resignation by claiming that he did not mean to “invent a crisis” in any normal sense, but had been using a management-consultant jargon in which these plain words signified something else altogether. But with due allowances made for differences in historical context and in the scale of the bankrupting at hand, Snobelen’s project is quite obviously a development of the Reagan Revolution, and his posturings provide a glimpse of the mental workings that underlie and correspond to the radical material transformations being organized by contemporary capitalist corporatism.4 The strategy Snobelen enunciated was promptly followed by the Harris government, with invented crises in public housing, welfare, environmental regulation, labour legislation, municipal restructuring, primary and secondary education, health care, urban transportation, and public utilities, including water supply and the generation and distribution of electricity. Higher education has also come in for its share of attention.

 

2. Defunding criticism

With cuts of 25 percent during the 1990s to university budgets that in the late 1980s stood at little more than two-thirds of the funding per student provided to equivalent state universities in the northern United States, Ontario had by the beginning of the new millennium sunk to a level of per capita funding of post-secondary education that put the province last or second-last among the sixty jurisdictions with post-secondary systems north of the Rio Grande. But in this case the invented crisis is being compounded by demographic factors. University administrations have belatedly woken up to the fact that the demographic bulge known as the “baby-boom echo,” which will produce a ten to fifteen percent increase in the annual student cohort, is currently moving up through the Canadian school system, and will arrive at the college and university level at approximately the same time as the “double cohort” that Ontario’s elimination of Grade 13, the final year of secondary school, will produce in 2003.5 In anticipation of an overall enrollment increase of forty percent by 2010, the Council of Ontario Universities in October 1999 urgently requested the commitment of at least $1 billion per year in additional base funding, in addition to the $742 million that the government had announced would be allocated to capital funding.6 The Harris government promptly slapped the universities away from the cookie-jar with a further $30-million cut, and then in February 2000 initiated a reduced $660-million program of capital spending on universities and community colleges. Targeting this funding to such areas as information technology, engineering and the health sciences, the Ontario government also made it available only in cases where matching funds could be raised from outside sources, thus ensuring corporate control of a remodeled higher education infrastructure. As finance minister Ernie Eves declared, “The private sector ... believes it’s best to have some input on the ground floor of the postsecondary education system.... They know what skills are required in the marketplace.”7 Any shortfall in the capacity of the post-secondary education system is to be met by recourse to this same private sector, through an invitation to private degree-granting institutions to establish themselves in the province—presumably in the form of what historian David Noble has called “digital diploma mills”: low-overhead distance education operations employing ill-paid faculty on revolving door contracts to provide job-market training to large numbers of students in a manner that maximizes the institution’s profits.8

Having informed Ontario’s universities that capital funding could be requested from the provincial government only for expanded programs in the applied sciences, Premier Harris subsequently declared that the universities’ proposals for funding showed there to be student demand and institutional need for new money in these areas alone, and not in the humanities and social sciences: “The demand for new programs is not in liberal arts. The demand is in the areas where the universities have made applications for significant expansion [to prepare students] for jobs in the future.”9 When the Ontario university chancellors reacted to this maneuver by issuing a statement defending liberal arts programs, Harris simply repeated his claim: “We haven’t had very many universities saying they need to expand history and Latin and English departments. We have a lot of universities saying they have a huge demand for engineering, for mathematics, for a lot of these new programs. So we’re responding to their requests.”10

The deception is childishly transparent. As the premier and his policy advisers must have been aware, there had in fact been “a significant increase” since 1998 in student applications to Bachelor of Arts programs in Ontario universities, and at the same time “a decrease in applications to professional programs such as Engineering, and a slight decrease in applications to the sciences.”11 Setting aside the premier’s evident contempt for facts, it is interesting to see a discourse of “free-market” supply and demand applied to a policy system that more closely resembles a Stalinist command economy.

As with the invented crisis that our federal government has created by its withdrawal of support for the Canadian health care system, the current crisis in higher education seems designed to convince the public that a once very satisfactory arrangement—a publicly-funded sector that has fulfilled an essential social function with (in comparison to the American parallels) high efficiency, high quality and low cost—needs to be replaced by an increasingly privatized system run by private corporations for private profit.12 In this light the Ontario Conservative government’s deep tax cuts—44 percent between 1995 and 2000, with further cuts enacted in 2001,13 and additional corporate tax cuts promised for 2002-03—can be seen to have served the double function of rewarding the high-income supporters whom they disproportionately favour, and of preventing the economic boom of the late 1990s from pushing the government into budget surpluses that would have made it hard to justify continued cuts to essential public services in the name of deficit reduction.14

It would be naïve to suppose that Premier Harris’s repeated dismissals of the human sciences as useless and unwanted implied any claim to knowledge of some actual state of affairs. What these speech acts displayed was rather an ideologically formed intention, a will to bring about irrevocable change. Despite its grammatical form, Harris’s declaration that there is no new public demand for liberal arts programs was performative rather than constative in nature: a statement not of what he took to be the case but of what he intended should become the case.15 The agenda of the Ontario Conservative government, and of its imitators in British Columbia and elsewhere, involves a systematic defunding of those sectors of the universities and colleges within which a critical understanding of sociocultural structures and forces can be produced, and a transfer of resources to those sectors that are most purely instrumental in orientation and most clearly aligned with the profit nexus of corporate interests.

Harris’s sneering anti-intellectualism—“We seem to be graduating more people who are great thinkers,” he declared in February 2000, “but they know nothing about math or science or engineering or the skill sets that are needed”16—earned him an editorial cartoon in The Globe and Mail which revised Jacques-Louis David’s painting of “The Death of Socrates” to show a blandly smiling Ontario Premier handing Socrates the cup of hemlock.17 But Harris’s attitudes seem in fact to be widely shared among Canada’s political elites, for although the Ontario government has been more vociferous than its federal counterpart in valuing “skill sets” above critical intelligence, its instrumentalism and its drive towards privatization dovetail neatly with the higher education agenda of Jean Chrétien’s neo-Liberal national government.

In October 1998, federal Trade Minister Sergio Marchi took part in the Second Annual Canadian Education Industry Summit, a conference which energetically promotes privatization at all levels of the education system and enthuses over the huge profits available within the “education for profit industry.” The Summit’s aim, according to its own promotional literature, is “to create a platform for the education industry leaders and the investment community to discuss the unique opportunities in this new .... $700 billion growth industry.” Marchi’s participation in the event signalled, in the words of Summit organizer Charles Ivey, the “clear support and involvement of Canada’s Federal Government.”18

This and similar signals have been accompanied by action. Federal finance minister Paul Martin’s February 28, 2000 budget denied any funding increase to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council and the Medical Research Council, while lavishing $900-million (a fraction of the sum withdrawn by the federal government from higher education funding since 1993) upon the recently established Canadian Foundation for Innovation. Louise Forsyth, president of the Humanities and Social Science Federation of Canada, noted that because CFI funding is restricted to the areas of technology and applied science, and because the federal government made no provision for the infrastructures needed to support a revival of research activity, this initiative can “only exacerbate the pressures on universities to sacrifice humanities and social sciences scholarship.”19 To obtain CFI funding, moreover, researchers must be able to match each forty cents of public money with sixty cents from other sources. Jim Turk, the executive director of the Canadian Association of University Teachers, noted that this “partnership” arrangement (which closely parallels the Ontario government’s provisions for capital funding) gives the corporate sector “effective veto power over who gets public money, renewing ongoing questions about the implications for the integrity and independence of university research.”20

It may be naïve to think that debate over such issues is still “ongoing,” when for corporatist organizations like the Canadian Agri-Food Research Council the matter is already settled. That body’s “national strategy” for 1997-2002 declares that Canada must focus research funding on

those areas with highest value and return on investment.... Priorities for applied research are set by the marketplace via partnerships, e.g., industry funds research that fits their priorities.... Augmented private-sector participation in research priority-setting will ... ensure scientists have access to the appropriate market signals, are aware of the technology requirements of industry and can focus their research appropriately.21

Scientific researchers who fail to focus their work “appropriately,” who work on subjects that do not hold out the prospect of a quick return on investment, or who adhere to antiquated notions of a public good that may not in every case be congruent with the maximizing of profits for Monsanto, Nortel, Microsoft, or General Foods, will have increasing difficulty in obtaining research funding. While their more compliant colleagues publish, they will perish.

Thus, while underfunded liberal arts faculties are exposed ever more completely to the proletarianizing processes acerbically analyzed by Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt in Academic Keywords, the sciences and applied sciences are ever more completely handed over to corporate interests and to a wholesale instrumentalizing that reduces scientific inquiry to what Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie call “academic capitalism.”22 As Bill Readings noted in The University in Ruins, the corporatist university defines and assesses itself in terms of “excellence,” a notion which “is like the cash-nexus in that it has no content….” The vacuous appeal to “excellence” at one and the same time “exposes the pre-modern traditions of the University to the force of market capitalism” and “marks the fact that there is no longer any idea of the University, or rather that the idea has now lost all content.”23

But we need to understand these developments in their widest (shall we say their global?) context.

 

3. Global corporatism

Beyond the domestic boundaries of its Reaganite or Harrisite manifestations, and beyond the confines of the higher education sector, the most conspicuous effects of the widely celebrated process of “globalization” include an accelerating transfer of wealth from already desperately poor countries in Africa, Central and South America, and southern Asia to the “developed” economies of North America, Europe and Japan. This transfer was already well under way by the 1960s and 70s, thanks to neocolonial political and economic relations that involved the routine subversion of democratic governments and their replacement by dictatorships which fostered high levels of corruption and bribery, cut labour standards and gave transnational corporations unfettered access to natural resources.24 At the same time, existing agricultural economies were being displaced by the “Green Revolution,” with an ensuing pattern of mono-crop export, concentration of land ownership and dependence on first-world loans.25

In recent decades the transfer of wealth and the ruination of traditional agriculture have been accelerated by the widespread imposition of World Bank and International Monetary Fund loan-repayment austerity plans, which dismantle any structures within debtor nations that might impede the maximizing and repatriation of the profits of transnational corporations, and at the same time accentuate social class divisions by reducing the infrastructures of civil society to a skeletal remnant. The concurrent imposition of an international trade regime that gives unprecedented global mobility to finance capital has made possible such events as the 1995 devastation of the Mexican economy and the so-called “meltdown” of East Asian economies two years later. A recognition that these developments have produced monstrous injustices has not been confined to thinkers on the left: Michel Camdessus, who as Managing Director of the IMF contributed in no small way to the internationalizing of the corporatist revolution, declared recently that “the widening gaps between rich and poor within nations, and the gulf between the most affluent and most impoverished nations, are morally outrageous, economically wasteful, and potentially socially explosive.”26

Within the “developed” countries—especially those that have most completely followed the recipes of Chicago School economics—there has been a correspondingly relentless transfer of wealth from poor to rich, with a resulting surge in immiseration and homelessness. Skilled (and once well-paying) jobs have been exported to foreign low-wage autocracies, or else have disappeared in a frenzy of down-sizing, the CEO instigators of which are rewarded with salaries that may be hundreds of times those of their remaining shop-floor employees.27 Once-progressive personal taxation structures have come increasingly to favour the rich; and U.S. Republicans, followed by their Canadian clones in the Reform and Alliance parties, have pressed for a truly regressive “flat” income tax and for further reductions of corporate tax rates, even though these have already shrunk to a fraction of their 1950s levels.

Growing disparities in wealth have been accompanied by an escalation of political corruption. Episodes such as the kickback scandals of the Mulroney era, the Reaganite Savings and Loan scandal (involving the transfer of approximately one trillion dollars from the public purse into private pockets), or the still-unfolding Enron scandal may invite one to suspect a shift from something distantly resembling democracy, government by the people, to kleptocracy, government by thieves. But the context of systemic corruption out of which these scandals have arisen is still more disquieting. International business deals resting on public-sector purchases commonly involve bribery and kickbacks of the kind that ex-Prime Minister Mulroney’s associate Karl-Heinz Schreiber has been accused of, and it has become generally accepted that corporate interests should be able to shape legislative agendas through campaign financing and through a lobbying industry whose sole purpose, as John Ralston Saul notes, is that of converting “elected representatives and senior civil servants to the particular interest of the lobbyist”—or in other words, “corrupting the people’s representatives and servants away from the public good.”28

The so-called “liberalizing” of trade which is the most conspicuous feature of the movement towards a “globalized” economy might be more accurately described as a formalizing and legitimizing of the power of corporate capital to maximize transnational profits at the expense not just of democratic governance, but also, more directly, of labour rights and environmental protection. Jeff Faux has written of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that

If the leaders of the United States, Canada, and Mexico wanted simply to lower tariffs, the agreement could have been written on one page. Instead, it is one thousand pages of detailed rules, most of which are aimed at protecting the interests of U.S. and Canadian investors seeking cheap Mexican labor. Intellectual property rights for corporations, repatriation of capital, and deregulation of foreign business are not only spelled out, specific punishments and penalties are described. In contrast, the protections for labor and the environment—core elements in any modern social contract—are for all practical purposes non-existent....29

The basic asymmetry of NAFTA—as also of the World Trade Organization’s adjudication panels and the temporarily defeated Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)—is explained by Tony Clarke and Maude Barlow as stemming from an extension into international law of the U.S. constitutional principle known as the “takings” rule, which prohibits governments “from taking private property ‘without adequate compensation’ and ‘valid public purpose’.” This principle,

used to protect transnational corporations from any government intervention or regulation that inhibits the free flow of capital and profitable investment, ... has the effect of “taking” away the power of governments to serve and protect the democratic rights of their citizens. There are no corresponding rules to protect governments from the takings of transnational corporations.30

Transnational corporations thus emerge as strangely hybrid—or protean—entities. They have all the legal rights of human personhood (including, astonishingly, the right to free speech, which was the basis of the tobacco industry’s successful appeal in the Canadian Supreme Court against the federal law banning tobacco advertising). And yet they manage to evade most of the human condition's liabilities, remaining largely immune, it would seem, to those two fixities of human experience, death and taxes.

Should the clauses of the MAI become law, whether through inclusion in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) or through some more devious means, transnational corporations would also acquire the status of nationhood, though in a similarly hybrid or doubled manner. They would be the equals in law of the nation-states that make up the membership of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), while at the same time enjoying free access to signatory countries for their key personnel, treatment no less favourable than that accorded to domestic companies, and exemption from labour and environmental standards.31 And since the new international trade regime enshrined in the regulations of NAFTA, the WTO and the MAI prohibits nation-states from considering “extra-jurisdictional” matters in relation to trade—that is to say, from discriminating in any way against imports produced (for example) by child labour, slave labour, or under conditions of systematic torture or mass-murder—transnational corporations are already effectively exempted from compliance with international law on human rights.32

Although the protean corporate entity has at once no fixed address and many shifting addresses, it thus claims equality with the spatially delimited nation-state—and indeed establishes itself within its household, claiming a key to the front door, the same (or better) rights of bed, board and access to the house’s contents that its citizen-residents enjoy, the right to bring in material of whatever kind obtained by whatever means, and finally the right to depart unmolested with whatever portion of the household goods it has been able to appropriate.

The extension and legitimizing of corporate power through what amounts to a slow-motion global coup d’état has of course had political as well as economic repercussions. John Ralston Saul argued in 1995 that contemporary corporatism is well on the way to fulfilling the primary aspirations of the fascist corporatism of the early twentieth century: these were to transfer political power from elected parliamentary bodies to hierarchically and corporately-organized socio-economic interest groups, to intrude entrepreneurship into previously public domains, and to “obliterate the boundaries between public and private interest....”33 A parallel recognition of a threat to the structures of representative democracy is evident in billionaire currency speculator George Soros's 1997 expression of his “fear that the untrammelled intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of life is endangering our open and democratic society. The main enemy of the open society,” he went on to propose, “is no longer the communist but the capitalist threat.”34

 

4. The “civil commons” and “the tragedy of the commons”

The nature of the threat perceived by Saul and by Soros can be readily defined. The corporatist revolution operates through a diversion of professedly democratic state power into ever more complete subservience to the interests of transnational corporations—thereby making any claim of governments to be (in Lincoln’s words) “by the people” and “for the people” seem increasingly fraudulent. What is occurring, philosopher John McMurtry has argued, is a mutation of governments “to become more and more dominantly coercive debt collectors on behalf of banks and foreign bond-holders from citizens who have received little or no benefit from the debts, and international trade agents and deal-makers for transnational corporations against the most basic interests of domestic workers and businesses....”35

If we remind ourselves that one of the goals of transnationals is unrestrained access not just to the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf and the Caspian basin, but also to resources like the forests of the Lubicon Cree or the Coast Salish and the Nis’gah, or, on a larger scale, to the diminishing remains of the Amazonian rainforest and to the fresh water of the Great Lakes and the Canadian Shield, it will be evident that something more significant even than political freedoms is at stake. What governments are collaborating in is, in McMurtry’s words, a “stripping of society’s shared life-ground,”36 an attack upon what he calls the “civil commons,” and defines as “human agency in personal, collective or institutional form which protects and enables the access of all members of a community to basic life goods.” This “civil commons” includes, at the same time, those aspects of our life-ground in nature which we can work to preserve through “conscious human acts and social constructions (for example, effective laws against environmental pollutants that destroy the ‘global commons’ of the atmosphere or oceans)”37—but which under unregulated market conditions are subject to what Garrett Hardin in a famous essay, first published in 1968, called “the tragedy of the commons.”38

McMurtry’s concept of the civil commons differs significantly from Hardin’s much more limited understanding of the commons. The things we define as “commons”—including, for example, the Grand Banks cod fishery, the “crown land” rain forests of the Pacific coast, or the St. Lawrence River, in its capacity as an open sewer—are all finite in nature. Hardin’s view of unrestrained freedom in a commons as tragic, in the sense of resulting in inexorable degradation, stems from this recognition. However, McMurtry finds reason for a more hopeful analysis in the fact that many different cultures have articulated their sense of interdependence with the natural life-ground in the form of a practical and institutionally embodied social ethic that offers alternatives to Hardin’s grim conclusions. 

Taking the example of common grazing land, Hardin argues that in conditions of social stability (which rule out wars or cattle-raids) its destruction is inevitable. For if the marginal benefit of adding an additional animal to each cattleherd’s share of a herd supported by common land accrues to the single owner alone, while the marginal deficit caused by overgrazing is communally shared among all users of the common land, it will always be in the private interest of every cattleherd to increase the number of grazing animals he or she owns. Claiming that each cattleherd “is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited,” Hardin declares that “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”39

I have italicized the word “compels” because it so conspicuously does not follow from any of the stated assumptions of this case. If Hardin’s logic of marginal private advantage had occurred to medieval English cattleherds, it would have done so in the form of temptation rather than compulsion, because their common land was in fact regulated—and protected—by the requirement that each commoner could graze only as many animals on it as could be fed in his or her own corral over the winter.40 Only when the economic agencies in question are behaving in the same way as capitalized corporate bodies—operating, that is, in accordance with the demands of modern equity and commodity markets—can it be said that participants in a commons are compelled, on penalty of loss of market share, reduced equity value, and absorption by competing corporations, to maximize profits by following the logic of marginal private advantage (and marginal communal disadvantage) in relation to whatever in the commons can be appropriated for productive use or employed for the disposal of wastes. Hardin acknowledges this to be his guiding assumption when, in writing of waste disposal, or of what he called “the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool,” he remarks that “The rational man [sic] finds that his share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ for so long as we behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprisers.”41

Hardin’s analysis of the commons is thus premised upon a quite specific economic logic, that of “free enterprise.” This makes it all the more compelling as a refutation of the claims made in support of deregulation and market “liberalization” by the ideologues of the corporatist revolution. Whether we think of the commons in terms of production, as the natural basis of all life-sustaining activities, or in terms of waste disposal, as providing sites for the absorption and dispersal of human wastes, Hardin argues that it is only through one or another form of social regulation that the tragedy of freedom in a commons can be averted. He proposes, for example, that “our particular concept of private property” contributed, as one such form of regulation, to a closing of the commons in relation to productive land use. However, he is at the same time aware that the rule of private property obstructs contemporary struggles to “close the commons to pollution by automobiles, factories, insecticide sprayers, fertilizing operations, and atomic energy installations.”42

The apologists of corporatism are seeking, in Hardin’s sense, to “re-open” the commons—for this is what it means to insist on the abolition of environmental regulation, and on unconstrained access by transnational corporations to natural resources. Corporatist attacks on labour legislation, union rights, welfare entitlements, public education and medicare add up to a parallel attempt to return human labour to the status—closely resembling that of an unregulated commons—that it occupied in the slums of the industrial revolution and in the thought of “classical” political economists like Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

In the rhetoric of the corporatist revolution, “free competition” is described as the model and the basis of all other human freedoms. But this hoary orthodoxy is no truer now than it was a century and a half ago, when Karl Marx proposed that “The analysis of what free competition really is, is the only rational reply to the middle-class prophets who laud it to the skies or to the socialists who damn it to hell”—and when, having made such an analysis, he heaped scorn on the insipid view “that free competition is the ultimate development of human freedom,” concluding rather that “It is not individuals who are set free by free competition; it is, rather, capital which is set free.”43 Contemporary evidence of the continuing validity of this conclusion (and, at the same time, of the corporatist perversion of governments noted by McMurtry) is provided by Shell Oil’s unconstrained polluting of Ogoniland, aided and abetted by the Nigerian government's violent repression of the Ogoni people and judicial murder of their leaders; by the ecological and behavioural sinks of the maquiladora wastelands along the Mexico-U.S. border, constructed in collaboration with a Mexican government that has routinely stolen elections and collaborated in the elimination of opposition journalists by death squads; and, in Canada, by Daishowa Corporation’s ongoing despoliation of the homeland of the Lubicon Cree, a process enabled and facilitated by the Alberta and federal governments.

In these cases, and many others, one might respond to the rhetoric of the free marketers with Garrett Hardin’s observation that “Individuals locked into the logic of the commons are free only to bring on universal ruin....”44 In their rush to re-open the commons, the ideologues of the corporatist revolution may be drawing us into a more radical bankrupting of future possibilities than even they intend.

What Hardin calls “the logic of the commons”—a logic of marginal private advantage and communal disadvantage most evident at present in the operations of transnational corporations—is diametrically opposed to the ethics and to the actuality of the “civil commons” as these are analyzed by John McMurtry. Let us consider the implications of this opposition. I have compared the labour market of the industrial revolution to an unregulated commons—one that might appropriately be called tragic, since it engulfed innumerable human lives in misery and despair. This unregulated commons developed in England as a direct consequence of the appropriation and enclosure of communally regulated village common-land for use as sheep-pasture by the landlords and merchants who participated in the emergent international wool-trade. Village commons seized for use as private pasture were simultaneously opened to exploitation as part of a nascent capitalist system of cloth-manufacture, and closed to use by the community, a large proportion of whose members were thereby driven off the land. Toward the end of the first great wave of enclosures, Thomas More wrote with bitter irony in his Utopia (1516) that English sheep, “that were wont to be so meek and tame, and so small eaters, now, as I hear say, be become so great devourers and so wild, that they eat up and swallow down the very men themselves.” Rural people began to drift into the cities, deprived, More says, by “fraud, or by violent oppression…, or by wrongs and injustices”45 both of their own small-holdings and of access to lands which for centuries they had communally shared.

There were currents of resistance: around 1549 the anonymous author of “Jack of the North” declared his intention to restore common land to the common people “[w]herever it hath been yet common before”; a century later, Gerard Winstanley’s Diggers denounced the gentry with “their wisdoms so profound, to cheat us of our ground.”46 But by the early nineteenth century, after subsequent waves of enclosures, the once numerous class of yeoman freeholders had effectively disappeared from England, and a new urban industrial working class was beginning its long struggle to organize itself against unconstrained exploitation by employers in an “open” labour market.47

Historians have long recognized connections between the enclosure movement, which reached its height in England during the late eighteenth century, and the developing corporate organization of trade and manufacture.48 John McMurtry follows them in seeing a historical continuity between the privatizing tendency launched in England by the international wool trade, “the progenitor of the global market from the fifteenth century on,” and the movement towards the “clearance and appropriation of communal lands,” with a concomitant production of a landless urban labouring class and a growing “assault on the environment,” that has subsequently swept across the world.49

Central to McMurtry’s concept of the “civil commons” is its incorporation both of the natural life-ground that sustains human society, and also of the human institutions and the web of social and discursive interactions by which this natural life-ground is itself preserved and sustained.50 Insofar as this concept proposes an understanding of nature as suffused with and sustained by discursive terms that appear also in political, ethical and other discourses, it might be said to resemble traditional doctrines of “natural law” enunciated by thinkers like St. Thomas Aquinas and Richard Hooker.51 However, McMurtry’s view of the civil commons differs from these in its recognition that the interactive co-dependence of social life and its basis in nature is the expression of human rather than of divine agency, that it is the product and material embodiment of human histories, and that it is a matter of the utmost importance to any human future. As he argues,

the progression or decline of the civil commons is the most fundamental social fact there is, though like the sea to the fish not recognized…. [T]he question of whether a society's civil commons is intact, falling or gaining in the life goods all its members have access to, is a real-world issue and of life-and-death reality for all on a practical level.52

 

5. Critical humanism and the civil commons

I have argued that we are living through a corporatist social and political revolution whose goal is the destruction, through strategies of deliberate bankrupting and invented crises, of what John McMurtry calls the civil commons. (Consider again the objects of the corporate revolutionaries’ attack: progressive labour codes, environmental regulations, redistributive taxation of private income and corporate profits, international law governing human rights, laws restricting the movement of corporate capital, civil rights entitlements, welfare and public housing programs, state-owned corporations and utilities, public non-profit health care, public education and, in particular, the potentially critical as opposed to instrumental functions of public higher education. The list amounts to a good first approximation of the institutional embodiments of the civil commons.)

Certain aspects of the corporatist attack on public higher education have been emphasized here: first, because this sector’s role in the reproduction, re-creation and transformation of the social order makes it an important part of the civil commons; and secondly, because this is a sector in which there has recently been a growing awareness of the need to defend the human values, institutional structures and forms of life threatened by the corporatist revolution. Public higher education is a strategic (if already seriously compromised) site in the defence of the civil commons and the resistance to corporatism.53

But what does it mean to speak of “critical humanism” as one way of defining the forms such resistance might take in my own discipline of literary studies, and possibly more widely across the human sciences? The term may well seem an oxymoron. Many of the self-identified humanists of the past century, in addition to leaning more in the direction of dogmatism than of an open or unconstrained criticism, were also dubiously, if at all, interested in formulating or supporting projects of a democratic tendency (it should suffice to name Irving Babbitt, B. F. Skinner and H. J. Eysenck as examples)54—while on the other hand, some of the most strenuous and most influential critical thinkers of the late twentieth century (among them Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida) defined themselves as anti-humanists. But although any deployment of “humanism” might seem controversial (not least one that would take the critical and emancipatory orientation of much of Renaissance humanism as exemplary for our time), outright dismissal of the term entails another kind of risk. Such at least is implied by Robert Young’s reflections on the dilemma faced by literary theorists who sought to resist the “‘technologico-Thatcherite’ assault on the humanities,” the British form of the corporatist attack on the critical functions of higher education:

[T]he terms by which their subject was established historically, and the only effective terms with which it could still be defended, were those of the cultural conservatism and humanist belief in literature and philosophy that ‘literary theory’ has, broadly speaking, been attacking since the 1970s. When theorists found themselves wanting to defend their discipline against successive government cuts they discovered that the only view with which they could vindicate themselves was the very one which, in intellectual terms, they wanted to attack…. In short, for theorists the problem has been that in attacking humanism they have found themselves actually in consort with government policy.55

A brief glance at the history of the term “humanism,” and at the cultural phenomena it was coined to describe, may help to dissipate confusions of this sort. Among cultural historians of early modern Europe, the word usually refers to a particular phase in the development of what we now call the humanities—that surge of critical, scholarly and creative energies that shaped the cultural forms of the western European Renaissance of the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries. Late fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italians had a word, umanista, for those who were engaged in restoring or emulating the textual remains of ancient Greece and Rome; this word passed into French (1552), English (1589), and Spanish (1614) usages.56 But rather surprisingly, the abstract noun dates only from early nineteenth-century Germany, where Humanismus was coined as the name of a traditional or conservative theory of education in the classics and Christian doctrine which opposed itself both to progressive Rousseauistic or Enlightenment pedagogies, and also to practical or utilitarian tendencies.57 The teaching practices of what we would now call Renaissance humanism were no doubt the source of this German pedagogical Humanismus,58 and yet the new term seems to have referred to current practices rather than to those of the Renaissance.

Subsequent appropriations of the term have likewise often been both ‘presentist’ and politically conservative in nature, even when professedly referring to the humanism of Renaissance scholars and writers. Detailed analysis would be required to show that this was the case in Jacob Burckhardt’s influential 1860 interpretation of the Italian Renaissance as the moment at which “man became a spiritual individual, and recognized himself as such,” and of Renaissance humanism as the ideology of autonomous selfhood;59 but a reactionary ‘presentism’ is clearly evident in Douglas Bush’s claim, first published in 1939, that sixteenth-century humanism amounted to a proleptic echo of Matthew Arnold’s conservative mid-Victorian “orthodoxy of sweetness and light.”60

More recent and more historically adequate interpretations of Renaissance humanism include Hiram Haydn’s recognition of an antagonism in Renaissance Europe between divergent strains of Christian and “naturalistic” humanism;61 Michel Foucault’s proposal that humanism invented what he called “subjected sovereignties,” structures within which human subjectivity claims a restricted, usually internal rule or control, at the cost of a fuller subjection to external powers, both social and metaphysical;62 Anthony Grafton’s and Lisa Jardine’s argument that humanist pedagogy, “foster[ing] in all its initiates a properly docile attitude towards authority,” served the needs of an emergent Europe of “closed governing élites, hereditary offices and strenuous efforts to close off debate on vital political and social questions”;63 Donald Kelley’s analysis of Renaissance humanism as embodying complementary motifs of institutio (individual and collective self-fashioning) and restitutio (the recovery, encyclopedic reintegration, and reanimation of antiquity);64 and Charles Nauert’s argument that whatever Renaissance humanists may have thought themselves to be doing, humanism’s historical function was “to act as an intellectual solvent, striking at traditional beliefs of all kinds.”65

Lest we fall ourselves into the ‘presentism’ of supposing that recent writers on the subject, despite the fault lines that separate some of them, might be approaching a consensual understanding of the diverse tendencies that together constituted Renaissance humanism, let us end this brief list of interpretations with a mention of John Carroll’s neoconservative sermonizing in a book whose subtitle indicates with sufficient clarity the nature of its argument: Humanism: The Wreck of Western Culture.66

The “ism” termination of “humanism,” which would seem to identify it as the name of an ideology, may be one source of the debates that have swirled around this term. Yet the tendencies in early modern culture to which “humanism” refers are perhaps better described, in the manner of contemporary scholars like Kelley and Nauert, in terms of the cultural practices they involved. (As they are both aware, Paul Oskar Kristeller insisted that umanista carried no specific doctrinal or ideological sense, but referred simply to a professor or student of the studia humanitatis, “a well-defined cycle of teaching subjects listed as grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy.…”)67

Renaissance exponents of the studia humanitatis, obsessed with what Donald Kelley calls restitutio, the project of giving a “re-naissance” to the discursive, artistic, architectural and social forms of the cultures of ancient Rome and Greece, coined the term “Middle Ages” to speak of that which stood between them and the forms they wanted to re-vivify. The nineteenth-century term “humanism” likewise came to confer upon a previous age meanings that it did not find in itself: as Burckhardt’s classic study makes evident, this later restitutio developed into an appropriation of early modern traditions in the service of a Romantic ideology of essentialist autonomous subjectivity.68 But if, setting aside this and subsequent primarily ideological deployments of the term, we focus instead on Renaissance humanism as a set of cultural practices rooted in a particular sequence of western European social contexts, it may be possible to draw different consequences from the emergence of humanism out of the interactions of a nascent (or re-nascent) Italian civic culture with the remains of ancient Roman and Hellenistic literary, rhetorical, juristic, philosophical, and historiographic writings.

Social practices, even without constituting a coherent ideology, can have large transformative effects, at once discursive and material. The crucial contribution of the humanist practices of the Italian Renaissance, as I proposed in Lunar Perspectives, was that they opened out within the civic culture of cities like Florence and Venice

a discursive space, which the advent of printing subsequently made accessible across Western Europe under the name of “the republic of letters.” Within this space various forms of writing (among them the highly wrought epistles with which humanists flattered, cajoled, and bombarded one another) could acquire a previously unknown degree of autonomy, and thoroughgoing critiques of constituted authority and authoritative dogma could be envisaged and undertaken.69

While conceding to Michel Foucault that humanist subjectivities commonly incorporated a duplicitous conflation of supposed autonomy and actual subjection, we may perhaps uncover a deeper historical significance to humanism if, focusing on the literary and critical productions of humanists, we understand the movement out of which these texts emerged as

a collection of enabling strategies, which is also to say, a rhetoric (Renaissance humanism was, if anything, rhetorical)—but a rhetoric whose general tendency and function was to bring into being and to sustain a discursive space, a public sphere, within which the power of established authority no longer retained its previously overwhelming position as a criterion of judgment, and within which the goal of legitimizing established authority no longer exercised a determinative influence upon the various forms of writing which at one and the same time constituted and were enabled by this newly opened discursive space or public sphere.70

In this emergence of a public sphere we can identify an essential precondition for the fully conscious development of the civil commons. John McMurtry makes a point of distinguishing “between ‘the commons’ as nature-given land or resource and ‘the civil commons’ which effectively protects it, and ensures access of all members of the community to its continuing means of existence.” The latter “is ‘civil’ insofar as the common life-good it embodies is protected by conscious and co-operative human agency,” and “what was once the ‘commons’ of nature becomes ‘civil commons’ as it is preserved by conscious human acts and social construction….”71

In reconstituting the republic of letters, a res publica or “public thing” that had been a distinctive feature of certain phases of classical culture but had wholly disappeared after the collapse of the western Roman empire, Renaissance humanism reinvented, as a social possibility, public debate about a public good. The respublica litterarum of the humanists amounts therefore to the social space within which a reflexive awareness of the common good could develop. It would not be an exaggeration to describe it as the emergent—if also fragile and perpetually endangered—matrix of the civil commons in its modern form.

Satirical discourses flourished within this social space, many of them belonging to the mixed genre or anti-genre of Menippean satire or anatomy that was epitomized for Renaissance readers by the second-century writings of Lucian of Samosata: More’s Utopia, Erasmus’s Praise of Folly, and Cornelius Agrippa’s Of the Vanity and Uncertainty of All Arts and Sciences are prominent examples of the type. These works contain wide-ranging critiques of social injustice, misgovernment, corruption, religious dogmatism and clerical tyranny—and display, in addition, a very interesting willingness to contemplate alternative arrangements. Within the humanist public sphere to which they contributed it became possible to undertake, as Machiavelli did in The Prince and The Discourses, a wholly disabused analysis of political power; to declare, as Agrippa did in his Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex, that the inferior social status of women results from masculine bad faith and violence, “without reason or necessity natural or divine, but under the pressure of custom, education, chance, or some occasion favorable to tyranny”;72 and to offer unstinted praise to fearless social critics, as Thomas Nashe did to the memory of Pietro Aretino in a text that has been described as an important late work of “humanist poetics”:

If out of so base a thing as ink there may be extracted a spirit, he writ with nought but the spirit of ink, and his style was the spirituality of arts, and nothing else; whereas all others of his age were but the lay temporalty of inkhorn terms. For indeed they were mere temporizers, and no better. His pen was sharp pointed like a poinyard; no leaf he wrote on but was like a burning glass to set on fire all his readers.… No hour but he sent a full legion of devils into some herd of swine or other.... He was no timorous servile flatterer of the commonwealth wherein he lived. His tongue and his invention were foreborne; what they thought, they would confidently utter. Princes he spared not, that in the least point transgressed. His life he contemned in comparison of the liberty of speech. 73

 

6. Exposing forgery, forging freedom

In what ways, then, might a contemporary critical humanism affiliated to certain practices of Renaissance humanists and, more widely, to the social function of Renaissance humanism as the emergent matrix of the civil commons, be of strategic relevance to the multiple invented crises brought on us by the corporatist revolution?

Etymology may provide one clue. I am thinking of the cognate Greek and Latin verbs krino and cerno and their declinations and derivatives. The Greek krino (meaning “to separate, distinguish, choose, or pick out”) is part of a semantic field that includes the adjective kritikos (“able to discern”), which moved into Latin as criticus (“critic”), as well as the nouns kriterion (“a tribunal, standard or test”) and krisis (“a choice, separating, a power of distinguishing, or the result of a trial or contest, a decision or judgment”). The Latin cerno (meaning “to sift, separate, distinguish, to decide or determine, and also to see distinctly or perceive”) is the root both of the English verb “to discern” and also, through the past participle certus, of our adjective “certain.”

With this semantic field in mind, Glyn P. Norton has understood Renaissance humanism as showing that “Criticism and crisis are etymological friends”:

Throughout history, literary criticism and cultural crisis have tended to follow convergent trajectories. Renaissance humanism, above all, was responsible for generating a language that would not only reflect the cultural crisis at hand, but base that crisis in its own distinctiveness as a period. The deepest, most central impulses of humanism are thus critical.... The critical temper, in its cultural as well as literary dimension, fixes the Renaissance view of time squarely within the Greek concept of krisis as designating a moment both of separation and of decision.74

Taking a hint from these etymologies, I would propose that a contemporary critical humanism should understand the present crisis or crises as a trial or contest that calls upon us to exercise our powers of distinguishing across the whole field of the civil commons, and in so doing to separate ourselves decisively from the business-as-usual of placid orthodoxy.

Let me be explicit. I am talking about taking sides against corporatism, and repelling its incursions with all the resources of critical analysis, rhetoric and public mobilization that may be at our command.

If such language seems hortatory beyond the norms of academic discourse, then it may be time we subjected those norms as well to thorough criticism. For those who value intellectual freedom, there is not, I think, any large choice to be made: when the whole system of the civil commons is at stake, so also is the free critical thinking that is one of its constituent parts.

But what particular forms of discernment could a critical humanism, as opposed to other kinds of critical thinking, contribute to this struggle? Anthony Grafton has argued persuasively that the critical methods of humanist scholars in the Renaissance, based on a growing awareness both of historical contexts and of dialectal differences and changes in linguistic usage within the texts they studied, arose out of the need to distinguish between genuinely ancient texts and documents and the large numbers of pseudepigraphic writings and outright forgeries that had accompanied them in ancient Greece and Rome and in early Judaeo-Christian traditions—as well as the vast quantity of more recent forgeries.75 As Grafton writes,

Forgery and philology fell and rose together, in the Renaissance as in Hellenistic Alexandria…. And in all cases criticism has been dependent for its development on the stimulus that forgers have provided. Criticism does not exist simply because the condition of the sources creates a need for it. The existence of so many sources created with a conscious intention to deceive, and the cleverness of so many of the deceptions, played a vital role in bringing criticism into being.76

One of the most celebrated humanist exposures of forgery was Lorenzo Valla’s demonstration in 1440 that the Donation of Constantine, which documented the Emperor Constantine’s supposed transfer of the western half of his empire to the papacy, contained “elements that are contradictory, impossible, foolish, strange, and ridiculous….” When Valla at the same time criticized this text as having fraudulently legitimized papal corruption, war-making, and “spiritual wickedness in high places,”77 he knew very well that he was not just correcting a false understanding of the past, but was also, at serious risk to his own safety, delegitimizing a contemporary structure of political power.78

Grafton’s reference to “the existence of so many sources created with a conscious intention to deceive” may strike one as evoking a not unfamiliar contemporary situation. Any critical watcher of CNN or Fox News, or any critical reader of the corporate press, cannot help but be aware of some of the principal causes of that widespread American ignorance of the world at large to which I alluded at the outset—and of course the structures of deception and mystification by means of which news media under highly concentrated corporate ownership induce the population to acquiesce in policies which are manifestly against its interests have been lucidly analyzed by (among others) Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky.79 The processes by which governments and the media collaborate in the manufacture of consent commonly involve fabricated evidence: it would, for example, be difficult to find any recent publicly acknowledged act of war on the part of the United States that was not accompanied and justified by a cloud of deliberate falsehoods.80 In this context, the metaphor of “mind-forged manacles”81 by which William Blake explained the perpetuation of bondage and oppression can be understood as carrying a double sense.

The primary purposes of the critical work I am proposing—to unmask and discredit falsehoods circulated by the apologists of corporate power and to delegitimize the agencies responsible for them—resemble those of Lorenzo Valla’s critical labours. Yet what is involved, I would emphasize, is not just the philological detective work required to expose forgeries, plagiarisms, or impostures, but also, perhaps more importantly, a critical deployment of contextual and historical analyses capable of showing up those larger processes of distortion-through-selective-omission that I have elsewhere termed “subtractive politicizing.”82

Beyond this defensive work there lies the further constructive labour of what I would call forging freedom: the consolidation of our civil commons, and the extension of the civil commons into domains where the necessity of preservation through public stewardship has not previously been acknowledged. If in the present political climate such a project seems utopian, I can only say in response that utopianism is one of the native dialects of critical humanism.

Let me admit that the key question of how to get there from here is not going to be answered in this paper. I am inclined to agree with Noam Chomsky’s off-the-cuff remark, when asked what might be a good strategy for organizing against the harm caused by imperialism and such international agencies as the World Trade Organization, that “Everything is a good strategy.”83 Within my own sphere of work, I would therefore support any movement towards a de-corporatizing of universities, and towards a corresponding enhancement of the emancipatory potential of their social function as institutions of social reproduction; more widely, I would support any movement towards restoring the primacy of human and life values over money values and profits.84

I want to conclude, however, with a reminder of the odds which any project of taking past practices and traditions as a guide to present struggles must face. Sixty years ago, in 1940, the year of his death, Walter Benjamin wrote in his great meditation on history that

Articulating the past historically does not mean recognizing it “the way it really was.” It means appropriating a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger.... The danger threatens both the content of the tradition and those who inherit it. For both, it is one and the same thing: the danger of becoming a tool of the ruling classes.... The only historian capable of fanning the spark of hope in the past is the one who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he is victorious.85

 

 

NOTES

1  See Stockman’s interview with William Greider in the Atlantic Monthly (November 1981). As George Clark has observed, “Stockman's candour cost him his job, but mentioning his name in the mainstream media is politically and journalistically incorrect” (“Brian Segal on the University: A Response,” ACCUTE Newsletter [June 1994]: 8).

2  Astonishingly, this statement did not cost Watt his job; only after he had scornfully summed up a congressional committee to which he had to report as consisting of a black, a woman, a Jew and a cripple (the latter being Senator Daniel Inouye, who lost a leg in military service) was President Reagan persuaded to replace him.

3  These excerpts from Snobelen’s talk are derived from the linked quotations given by Richard Brennan, “Minister plotted ‘to invent a crisis’,” The Toronto Star (September 13, 1995): A3; Lisa Wright, “Apologize for remarks Harris tells Snobelen,” and Thomas Walkom, “Snobelen scales windy heights of bafflegab,” The Toronto Star (September 14, 1995): A3, A25. A slightly different transcription of the concluding sentences quoted here appeared in an unsigned article, “Harris Mainly Mum on Plans for Post-Secondary Education in Ontario,” in the CAUT/ACPPU Bulletin (November 1995): 6.

4  James Watts’s apocalyptic ramblings deserve our close attention for the same reason; however bizarre they may seem, similar forms of thought appear both among the leaders of the Canadian Reform/Alliance Party and among the members of George Bush Jr.’s cabinet.

5  The “baby boom” was a dramatic and sustained rise in birth rates in Canada from the years immediately following World War Two until the end of the 1950s. Demographic statistics revealing a significant surge in numbers among the offspring of the baby boomers, available since the early 1990s, and showed that in 2006-07, at a time when the postsecondary education system would still be coping with the “double cohort,” the number of Canadian students graduating from secondary school would be about ten percent higher than in the preceding year.

6  “Multi-Year Commitment Needed, Says COU,” At Guelph (October 13, 1999): 1, 5.

7  John Ibbitson, “Universities and colleges get big boost from Ontario,” The Globe and Mail (February 23, 2000): A1, A7.

8  See David Noble, “Digital Diploma Mills: The Automation of Higher Education,” Toronto: distributed by OCUFA, October 1997; and “Digital Diploma Mills, Part II: The Coming Battle Over Online Instruction,” Toronto: distributed by OCUFA, March 1998. For some historical context to the developments outlined here, see Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder, The University Means Business (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); and Neil Tudiver, Universities for Sale: Resisting Corporate Control over Canadian Higher Education (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1999). Parallel developments in the U.S. have been analyzed by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).

9  Richard Mackie, “Postsecondary-education reforms support job-related courses,” The Globe and Mail (February 24, 2000): A9. In the same press conference Harris declared, no less disingenuously, that “We’re very supportive of liberal arts and continue to fund them to the same levels that students wish to take those programs and the same levels as they have been in the past.” The guiding assumption of such statements as this is clearly that the electorate has a very short memory.

10  See Chris Wattie, “University chancellors back liberal arts studies,” National Post (March 1, 2000): A21; and Richard Mackie, “Harris denies bias against liberal arts: Universities sought science funds, Premier says,” The Globe and Mail (March 2, 2000): A6.

11  Communication from Charles Cunningham, Registrar of the University of Guelph, March 2000.

12  This agenda has been pressed with increasing insistence over the past two decades. In a 1992 address to the Canadian Corporate Higher Education Forum, John H. Panabaker, former CEO of the Mutual Life Assurance Company of Canada and former Chancellor of McMaster University, advocated the development of “alternative privately-financed and customer-driven institutions,” but felt that although “individual programmes and functions” might be privatized, it would not yet be “possible to ‘privatize’ a major Canadian university.” See Panabaker, “The University for Tomorrow,” Canadian Federation for the Humanities Bulletin 15.2 (Autumn 1992): 4-5, and my comments in Lunar Perspectives: Field Notes from the Culture Wars (Toronto: Anansi, 1996), pp. 34-35.

13  See Richard Mackie, “Harris ponders steeper tax cuts,” The Globe and Mail (February 7, 2001): A6.

14  The recession of 2001 may in this sense have been welcome to the provincial government, as helping to push any question of substantial social reinvestment beyond the horizon of acknowledged possibilities. The manipulative use of budget deficits is of course a well-established feature of recent attacks upon social programs. In 1995 Dean Neu and David Cooper (professors of accountancy at the University of Calgary and the University of Alberta) analyzed the Klein government’s calculations of debt and deficit and argued that “the provincial Conservatives [had] inflated deficit figures by about 30 per cent to justify deep cuts in program spending....” See Linda Goyette, “We Don’t Want Cheeky Professors Questioning Our Oil Barons, Do We?” CAUT/ACPPU Bulletin (March 1996): 9. The political economy of deficit hysteria has been lucidly analyzed by Linda McQuaig in Shooting the Hippo: Death by Deficit and Other Canadian Myths (Toronto: Viking, 1995).

15  The Council of Ontario Universities’ attempts to inform Premier Harris of (for example) the evidence that humanities and social sciences graduates do as well on the job market as the graduates of job-oriented programs were consistently futile. The performative nature of his statements shows him to have been interested not in such facts, but rather in establishing a new set of facts.

16  Richard Mackie, “Ontario’s colleges get more cash to cope with growing enrollment,” The Globe and Mail (February 22, 2000): A7.

17  The Globe and Mail (March 3, 2000).

18  I am quoting from a press release, “The Canadian Education Industry” (October 7, 1998), issued by a coalition including the Canadian Association of University Teachers, the Canadian Federation of Students, the Canadian Health Coalition, the Canadian Teachers’ Federation, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the National Anti-Poverty Organization, the Ontario Federation of Labour, and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union.

19  Quoted in Perspectives 3.7, ed. Wayne Kondro (7 March 2000), http://www.hssfc.ca/Pub/PublicationsEng.html).

20  Virginia Galt, “Students, faculty worry that private sector's campus presence tainting the ivy,” The Globe and Mail (March 2, 2000): A3.

21  Quoted by John McMurtry, “Accountability and openness to whom?”, At Guelph (November 24, 1999): 4. For an account of the bizarre inefficiencies as well as the alarming epidemiological consequences of agri-business pseudo-science, as applied to cattle-raising, see Edward Luttwak, “Sane Cows, or BSE isn’t the worst of it,” London Review of Books (8 February 2001): 26-27.

22  See Nelson and Watt, Academic Keywords: A Devil’s Dictionary for Higher Education (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), and Slaughter and Leslie, Academic Capitalism: Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). Nelson and Watt observe that under this regime, scientific departments commonly become no more than product-testing laboratories: “The most thoroughly degraded corporatized university program is one that no longer does any original thinking; it simply tests products developed elsewhere by the corporation” (p. 87).

23  Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 13, 38, 39.

24  See Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, The Political Economy of Human Rights, vol. 1: The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979).

25  Essential reading on this subject is still Susan George’s How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger (1976; 2nd ed., Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977).

26  This statement by Camdessus, made at the Tenth UN Conference on Trade and Development in Bangkok, February 13, 2000, is quoted by Immanuel Wallerstein, “The Head of the IMF: A Secret Radical?” Comment, 34 (February 15, 2000; email forwarded by the Council of Canadians). For analysis of the issues noted in this paragraph, see Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith, eds., The Case Against the Global Economy (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1996); Paul Smith, Millennial Dreams: Contemporary Culture and Capital in the North (London and New York: Verso, 1997); Graham Dunkley, The Free Trade Adventure: The WTO, the Uruguay Round and Globalism—A Critique (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997); Biplab Dasgupta, Structural Adjustment, Global Trade and the New Political Economy of Development (London and New York:Zed Books, 1998); Ronaldo Munck and Denis O’Hearn, eds., Critical Development Theory: Contributions to a New Paradigm (London and New York: Zed Books, 1999); Jim Yong Kim, Joyce V. Mullen, Alec Irwin, and John Gershman, eds., Dying for Growth: Global Inequality and the Health of the Poor (Lonroe, Maine: Common Courage, 2000); Sarah Anderson, ed., Views from the South: The Effects of Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries (Chicago: Food First Books and International Forum on Globalization, 2000); and Linda McQuaig, All You Can Eat: Greed, Lust, and the New Capitalism (Toronto: Penguin, 2001), pp. 40-93.

27  The previous business strategy of “vertical integration” (in which corporations sought control-through-ownership of as many levels as possible of the processes of production, distribution and sales) has been supplanted by a strategy of “branding” and “out-sourcing” (which depends on saturation advertizing of brand-name goods which are manufactured under contract, and at a small fraction of the final sales price, in off-shore free-trade zones where working conditions are no less brutal and destructive than those of the early nineteenth-century industrial revolution). For a brilliant analysis of this pattern, see Naomi Klein, No logo: taking aim at the brand bullies (Toronto: Knopf, 2000), pp. 195-229.

28  John Ralston Saul, The Unconscious Civilization (Toronto: Anansi, 1995), p. 93.

29  Jeff Faux, “Jeff Faux Replies” [“Jay Mandle and Jeff Faux on free trade and the left”], Dissent 45.2 (Spring 1998): 81.

30  Tony Clarke and Maude Barlowe, MAI: The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart, 1997), pp. 32-33.

31  Clarke and Barlow, pp. 33-38.

32  John McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 1999), pp. 232-37.

33  Saul, p. 87. Saul here acknowledges Traute Rafalski, “Social Planning and Corporatism; Modernization Tendencies in Italian Fascism,” International Journal of Political Science 18 (1988):10; Rafalski is in turn quoting from Paolo Ungari, Alfredo Rocca e l'ideologia giuridica des fascismo (Brescia, 1963).

34  George Soros, “The Capitalist Threat,” Atlantic Monthly (February 1997): 45, quoted by McMurtry, Cancer, p. 202.

35  McMurtry, Cancer, p. 219. See Eduardo Galeano’s acerbic discussion of “the power of kidnappers” and of what he calls “globalitarian power” in Upside Down: A Primer for the Looking-Glass World, trans. Mark Fried (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), pp. 148-56.

36  Ibid., p. 192.

37  McMurtry, Cancer, pp. 204-5.

38  Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (December 13, 1968); rpt. in Mary Elizabeth Bowen and Joseph A. Mazzeo, eds., Writing About Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 331-48. I am concerned here only with Hardin’s analysis of the logic of the commons; the principal argument of his essay, a neo-Malthusian proposal of a need for coercive population-control measures, does not interest me; it rests upon sociological and anthropological assumptions that are naive in the extreme.

39  Hardin, p. 336.

40  See Gary Snyder, “Understanding the Commons,” in Susan J. Armstrong and Richard G. Botzler, eds., Environmental Ethics: Convergence and Divergence (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 227-30 (cited by John McMurtry in Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System [Toronto: Garamond Press, 1998], p. 399).

41  Ibid., p. 338.

42  Ibid., pp. 338, 347.

43  Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft), trans. Martin Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 651-52, 650.

44  Ibid., p. 347.

45  Sir Thomas More, Utopia, trans. Ralph Robinson, ed. Edward Arber (London: Murray, 1869), pp. 40-41. (I have modernized Robinson’s mid sixteenth-century spelling and punctuation.) For a summary account of changes to the landscapes of England, Wales and Scotland brought about by enclosures during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Michael Reed, The Age of Exuberance 1500-1700 (1986; rpt. London: Paladin, 1987), pp. 69-98.

46  David Norbrook and W.R. Woudhuysen, eds., The Penguin Book of Renaissance Verse (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 389, 465. (I have modernized the spelling.)

47  Linda McQuaig offers a lucid analysis both of the enclosure movement and also of the popular resistance to it in All You Can Eat: Greed, Lust, and the New Capitalism, pp. 161-93.

48  In the early 1920s, for example, Arthur J. Ireland noted that the enclosure movement of the late eighteenth century “marked the appearance of the trust system in operation, although it was still in the embryo stage” (“English Life in the Eighteenth Century,” in J. A. Hammerton, ed., Universal History of the World [10 vols.; London: Educational Book Co., c. 1925], vol. 7, p. 4219). See also G. M. Trevelyan, English Social History (1942; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 391-95.

49  McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms, p. 399.

50  In this he differs from Hardin, who assumes human society to be an aggregate of atomistic individuals motivated by considerations of immediate self-interest, and gives no consideration to the social and discursive interactions (themselves constitutive of the complex subjectivities of members of the society) which in any functional social order also include countervailing suasions and sanctions that have the effect of subordinating private to public interest. For detailed expositions of the civil commons, and its rootedness in communal discursive practice, see McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms, pp. 368-95, and Cancer, pp. 190-254.

51  See, for example, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 94, art. 1-6, in Anton C. Pegis, ed., Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (2 vols.; New York: Random House, 1945), vol. 2, pp. 772-81; and Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. Christopher Morris (2 vols.; 1907; rpt. London: Dent, 1963), Book I. iii, vol. 1, pp. 154-61.

52  McMurtry, Cancer, p. 212.

53  The public status of Canadian public universities has been compromised by the government policies described above—which, as David Noble writes, have resulted in “an intensified web of interlocking directorates between the boards of universities and private corporations, a plethora of largely secret contracts with private companies, and the establishment of an intellectual property regime throughout the institutions, which include[s] unprecedented emphasis on confidentiality and non-disclosure…” (“How Public Are Our Public Universities?” CAUT/ACPPU Bulletin [January 2003]: A3). Noble also exposes at his own institution, York University, moves by the administration to re-define it as “a private, charitable corporation, which is ‘publicly assisted’”—while at the same time withholding from public disclosure “any information regarding student enrollment, which is the chief criterion for government funding, and course offerings, the educational grounds for charitable status,” by declaring these matters to be “commercial” in nature (ibid., A13).

54  For a brief indication of the reactionary and anti-Enlightenment orientation of Babbitt’s “New Humanism,” see William V. Spanos, The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. 79-93, and my Lunar Perspectives, pp. 146-47. Skinner and Eysenck were both involved with the British Humanist Association (see their essays in A.J. Ayer, ed., The Humanist Outlook [London, 1968]); Kate Soper has described their behaviourist stance as a “'technical fix' humanism” which “approaches human affairs on the model of the industrial enterprise, where all can be set to rights provided we adopt the more efficient management techniques afforded by scientific and technological development” (Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism [London: Hutchinson, 1986], p. 14).

55  Robert Young, “The Idea of a Chrestomathic University,” in Richard Rand, ed., Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992), p. 113.

56  See Nicolas Walter, Humanism: What’s in the Word (London: Rationalist Press Association, 1997), pp. 13-14.

57  Walter briefly discusses Friedrich Niethammer’s Der Streit des Philanthropinismus und Humanismus in der Theorie des Erziehungs-Unterrichts unsrer Zeit (1808) in Humanism, pp. 17-19.

58  See Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986). On the basis of a fascinating study of Renaissance humanist pedagogy, Grafton and Jardine make what seem to me unacceptable generalizations about the orientation of humanism as a whole.

59  Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy [1860], trans . S.G.C. Middlemore (2 vols., 1958; rpt. New York: Harper & Row, 1965), vol. 1, p. 143; Burckhardt characterizes the exponents of humanism as “the advance guard of an unbridled individualism” (vol. 2, p. 479).

60  Douglas Bush, The Renaissance and English Humanism (1939; rpt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 83. Bush argued that the biblical, patristic and classical texts with which Erasmus and his predecessors worked were seen by them as offering “a working ideal of a universal state in which reason and the will of God should prevail” (p. 65). “Sweetness and light” and “making reason and the will of God prevail” are Arnoldian catch-phrases: see Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Samuel Lipman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 31-32, 37-39, and my comments in Lunar Perspectives, pp. 203-07. Bush maintained that “sceptical and naturalistic doctrines” were the “two great philosophic enemies of religion and morality, and hence of Christian humanism” (p. 85)—thus with the stroke of a pen banishing from the ambit of humanism such figures as Valla, Agrippa, Rabelais and Montaigne, not to mention Erasmus himself. He claimed that, like “the great body of continental humanists,” English humanists were “unanimous in their defence of established authority”—a defence which appears, however, to have been an anxious matter. For as Bush immediately added, “this solid, all-embracing orthodoxy is a dyke which the smallest stream of water may undermine, and every hole must be stopped.” But reinforcements are available: Shakespeare himself “is no less attached than the most orthodox humanist to constituted authority, is no less scornful of the mob” (pp. 88-89, 95).

61  Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance (1950; rpt. New York: Grove Press, 1960), pp. 27-67.

62  Michel Foucault, “Revolutionary Action: ‘Until Now’,” Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, ed. Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 221-22.

63  Grafton and Jardine, From Humanism to the Humanities, p. xiv.

64  Donald R. Kelley, Renaissance Humanism (Boston: Twayne, 1991), pp. 23-33.

65  Charles G. Nauert, Jr., Humanism and the Culture of Renaissance Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 197.

66  Carroll, Humanism: The Wreck of Western Culture (London: Fontana, 1993). For other more responsible contemporary interpretations, see the essays assembled in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

67  Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 3.

68  For an argument to this effect, see Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (2nd ed., 1989; rpt. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993). As Dollimore notes, one famous Renaissance text, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the Dignity of Man, does assert a radical human autonomy—while at the same time inverting the traditional relationship between being and acting: in Pico’s rewriting of the creation myth, Adam has the freedom to fashion his own nature into a vegetative, animalistic, angelic, or divine nature. Dollimore (p. 169) quotes Ernst Cassirer’s recognition that this text is existentialist rather than essentialist in implication: “It is not being that prescribes once and for all the lasting direction which the mode of action will take; rather, the original direction of action determines and places being” (Cassirer, The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, trans. Mario Domandi [1963; rpt. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972], p. 84). While Burckhardt’s study gave a particular view of humanist subjectivity its canonical late-nineteenth-century form, it seems no accident that the coinage of Humanismus in the early nineteenth century coincided with von Humboldt’s formation, in Berlin, of the first modern university, an institution dedicated to the producing of autonomous subjectivities—or perhaps, as Foucault would say, of “subjected sovereignties.” See Readings, The University in Ruins, pp. 7, 46, 66-69; and Walter, Humanism, pp. 17-20.

69  Lunar Perspectives, p. 148. Major contributions to an understanding of the cultural impact of printing include Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), and The Printing Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), and Adrian Johns, The Nature of the Book: Print and Knowledge in the Making (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

70  Ibid., pp. 148-49. Jürgen Habermas identified the development of the public sphere of civil society as an eighteenth-century phenomenon; see his classic study The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society [1962], trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (1989; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991). More recent scholarship has shown that various forms of public sphere were decisively active at least a century earlier; see for example David Zaret, “Religion, Science, and Printing in the Public Spheres of Seventeenth-Century England,” in Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 212-35. Emergent forms of a public sphere are evident in the humanist mobilization during the Reuchlin affair (1510-20) as well as in subsequent Reformation controversies.

71  McMurtry, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism, p. 205.

72  Henricus Cornelius Agrippa, Declamation on the Nobility and Preeminence of the Female Sex, trans. and ed. Arthur Rabil, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 95. As I noted in Lunar Perspectives, Agrippa’s feminism was not merely theoretical: “At a time when such interventions were dangerous, he mocked the theological faculty of the University of Cologne for having given its approval to that notorious handbook of witch-hunters, the brutally misogynist Malleus maleficarum. And when in 1518 he served as municipal advocate in the city of Metz, he put his life and career on the line by intervening in the case of a woman who had been arrested and tortured by the inquisition on a charge of witchcraft. Agrippa secured her release and the return of her property—and made the inquisitor answer to a charge of heresy” (pp. 145-46).

73  Thomas Nashe, The Unfortunate Traveller, in The Works of Thomas Nashe, ed. R. B. McKerrow, revised by F. P. Wilson (5 vols., 1957; rpt. Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 264-65. I have modernized Nashe’s spelling. The identification of this fiction as an important late statement of humanist poetics is Arthur F. Kinney’s, in Humanist Poetics: Thought, Rhetoric, and Fiction in Sixteenth-Century England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), p. 329. Aretino was not quite the sixteenth-century Noam Chomsky that Nashe makes him seem—but Nashe, whose books were burned and banned by the Bishop of London five years after he wrote this passage, and who subsequently disappears from history, had good reason to admire Aretino’s success in negotiating the literary patronage systems of the period.

74  The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, vol. 3: The Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1.

75  Ancient forgeries and pseudepigrapha include at least thirteen of the forty-six surviving works ascribed to Aristotle, most of the Hippocratic canon, the complete works of the Egyptian sage Hermes Trismegistus, several of the canonical letters of the apostle Paul and his entire correspondence with Seneca, all of the writings of Paul’s disciple Dionysius the Areopagite, and large numbers of other literary, historical, medical and religious texts. The scale of more recent forgeries, many of them in the domain of law, is indicated by Grafton’s remark that “perhaps half the legal documents we possess from Merovingian times, and perhaps two-thirds of all documents issued to ecclesiastics before A.D. 1100, are fakes. And the volume swelled enormously as scientific jurisprudence established itself firmly in the West, and every practice and possession needed written documentation; the basic code of canon law, Gratian’s Decretum, contained some five hundred forged legal texts” (Grafton, Forgers and Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990], pp. 24-25).

76  Grafton, p. 123.

77  The Falsely-Believed and Forged Donation of Constantine, ii.6 and xxii.19; quoted from Lorenzo Valla, The Profession of the Religious and the principal arguments from The Falsely-Believed and Forged Donation of Constantine, ed. and trans. Olga Zorzi Pugliese (Toronto: Centre for Reformation and Renaissance Studies, 1985), pp. 65, 71. In the second passage Valla is quoting Ephesians 6:12.

78  See Valla, i.1, p. 63: “… how eagerly and hastily would they drag me off to torture, if they only could, now that I am writing not just against the dead but against the living too, not just against this or that individual but against a multitude of men, not merely private citizens but even public officials? And which officials? Why, even the Supreme Pontiff who is armed not only with a temporal sword, like kings and rulers, but with a spiritual one too….”

79  See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988), and also, as samples of other critical perspectives on the media, Joyce Nelson, The Perfect Machine: TV in the Nuclear Age (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1987), and Linda McQuaig, Shooting the Hippo: Death by Deficit and Other Canadian Myths (Toronto: Penguin, 1995).

80  Some salient examples: the American invasion of Vietnam was justified by fraudulent claims of a North Vietnamese invasion of the south and by the fabricated Gulf of Tonkin naval incident; U.S. aggression against Nicaragua in the 1980s (condemned by a judgment of the World Court) was justified by fraudulent claims of Sandinista subversion of neighbouring countries; the U.S. refusal to contemplate a negotiated withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 was supported by fabricated atrocity claims and the lie that Iraq was preparing to invade Saudi Arabia; in 1993, a cruise missile attack on Baghdad was justified by fraudulent claims that the Iraqi dictatorship had attempted to assassinate ex-President George Bush; in 1999, the NATO attack on Serbia was justified by false claims of massacres in Kosovo; and finally, in 2003 the U.S./U.K. invasion of Iraq was justified by multiple falsehoods, including outright forgeries and plagiarisms, which were exposed by critical analysts almost as quickly as they were launched (for evidence, see Michael Keefer, ed., War on Iraq: Critical Resources, available at this website.

81  The Poems of William Blake, ed. W. B. Yeats (London: Lawrence & Bullen; N.Y: Scribner’s, 1893), “London,” p. 77.

82  See Lunar Perspectives, pp. 86-95, 122-24, 205-06. Since subtractive politicizing is a practice thoroughly embedded in the formative history of my own discipline of English Literature, my closest colleagues and I may have a head start in work of this kind.

83  Quoted by Milan Rai, Chomsky’s Politics (London: Verso, 1995), p. 121.

84  See John McMurtry, Unequal Freedoms, pp. 330-31.

85  Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History,” VI, in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings, ed. Michael W. Jennings et al. (4 vols.; Cambridge. Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996-2003), vol. 4, p. 391.   

“Political Correctness”: An Annotated List of Readings

[First published in a special issue on “Political Correctness,” edited by Phyllis Artiss, of Philosophy and Social Action 19.1-2 (January-June 1993): 85-109. An earlier version of this annotated bibliography appeared in the Supplement on the “Political Correctness” Controversy, ACCUTE Newsletter (March 1992): 2-13, where it followed my essay “'Outside Agitators,' Inside Activists.”]


A previous version of this list appeared in March 1992 as a Supplement to the Newsletter of the Association of Canadian College and University Teachers of English. Like that version, the present list contains books as well as newspaper and journal articles; annotations have for the most part been confined to texts of the latter category. A number of items relating to Paul de Man's wartime writings have been included, in the grounds that the de Man scandal appears to have suggested to neoconservative polemicists the possibility of demonizing a wide variety of new developments in the humanities by associating them with anti-democratic and authoritarian ideologies.


Abella, Rosalie. “Equality and human rights in Canada: Coping with the new Isms.” University Affairs/Affaires universitaires (June-July 1991): 21-22. Distinguishing between civil liberties and human rights, Abella argues that “There is absolutely nothing to apologize for in giving the arbitrarily disadvantaged a prior claim in remedial responses.


----. “The new Isms and universities.” University Affairs/Affaires universitaires (Aug.-Sept. 1991): 17. In this sequel, Abella defends strategies of employment equity, remarking that it is insulting “to suggest to women and minorities that their increased participation is an invitation to violate the merit principle, rather than an attempt to acknowledge it.”


Abramowitz, Lenny. “Why it isn't wrong to be correct.” The Globe and Mail (30 Dec. 1991). An analysis of the “political correctness” debate in terms of Isaiah Berlin's distinction between negative and positive liberty. This application of Berlin is contested in a letter by Josef Skvorecky, “Deadly Correctness (9 Jan. 1992): A14.


Adler, Jerry, et al. “Taking Offence: Is This the New Enlightenment on Campus or the New McCarthyism?” Newsweek (24 Dec. 1990): 48-54. This anecdotal survey of speech codes and of curriculum developments in the humanities includes interviews with Stanley Fish at Duke University and with a National Association of Scholars organizer at the University of Wisconsin. According to this article, “PC is, strictly speaking, a totalitarian philosophy.”


Allemang, John. “The Rise of the New Puritanism.” The Globe and Mail (national edn., 2 Feb. 1991): D1, D4.


Amiel, Barbara. “A challenge to the new chancellors.” Maclean's (24 June 1991): 11. After suggesting that Oscar Peterson and Rose Wolfe owe their appointments as chancellors of York University and the University of Toronto to the fact that one is black and the other a Jewish woman, Amiel invites them to take a public stand against “political correctness.”


Aronowitz, Stanley, and Henry A. Giroux. Postmodern Education: Politics, Culture, and Social Criticism. Minneapolis and Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.


Artiss, Phyliss. “The real threat to academic freedom is those who feel threatened by change.” St John's Evening Telegraph (29 June 1991): 5. A response to Peter Boswell's column of 15 June 1991.


Asante, Molefi Kete. “Multiculturalism: An Exchange.” The American Scholar (Spring 1991); rpt. In Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 299-311. A defense of multiculturalist education and Afrocentrist scholarship in response to Diane Ravitch's “Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures,” which appeared in The American Scholar (Summer 1990) and is rpt. in Berman, pp. 271-98.


Atlas, James. “On Campus: The Battle of the Books.” The New York Times Magazine (5 June 1988): 24-27, 72-74, 95, 94. A survey of debates over the literary canon, based largely on interviews with members of Duke University's English department.


Bate, Walter Jackson. “The Crisis in English Studies.” First published in Harvard Magazine (Sept.-Oct. 1982). Rpt. in Scholarly Publishing 14 (1983): 195-212.


Beers, David. “PC? B.S. Behind the hysteria: how the Right invented victims of PC police.” Mother Jones (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 34-35, 64-65. This essay contains a detailed account of the manner in which a single student's interruption of a lecture for some four minutes at SUNY-Binghamton in March 1991 became, in the hands of National Association of Scholars publicists and unscrupulous journalists, something comparable to “the Nazis' heyday,” “Stalin's reign of terror,” and Mao's cultural revolution.”


Bennett, William J. To Reclaim a Legacy: A Report on the Humanities in Higher Education. Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Humanities, 1984.


Berger, Joseph. “Conservative Scholars Attack 'Radicalization' of Universities.” The New York Times (15 Nov. 1988). This article describes a conference attended by some 300 conservative academics concerned to 'reclaim' the universities from leftist scholars described by one of them as “the barbarians in our midst.”


Berman, Paul, ed. Debating PC: The Controversy Over Political Correctness on College Campuses. New York: Dell, 1992. The contents of this book (many of the essays are reprinted from other sources) are separately itemized in this list.


Bernal, Martin, and Michael E. Dyson. “On Black Athena: An Interview with Martin Bernal.” Z Magazine (Jan. 1992): 56-60. Bernal argues that his book “undermines the crusade against political correctness” by documenting the influence of racism and anti-Semitism on modern interpretations of ancient history, and thereby exposing as false the claim that Afrocentrists and others are politicizing a previously “objective” domain.


Bernstein, Richard. “The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct.” The New York Times (28 Oct. 1990): section 4: 1, 4. The author is alarmed by statements made at a meeting of the Western Humanities Conference at Berkeley on “'Political Correctness' and Cultural Studies.”


Bérubé, Michael. “Public Image Limited: Political Correctness and the Media's Big Lie.” The Village Voice (18 June 1991): 31-37. Rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 124-49. A lively analysis of Allan Bloom's “unfathomable lapses,” Roger Kimball's “vast array of dismissive Edwardian interjections,” John Taylor's “innuendo and confusion,” and Dinesh D'Souza's “inanities.”


Blattberg, Charles, et al. “The constructive challenge of feminism.” University of Toronto Bulletin (20 Jan. 1990): 16. In the wake of the murder of 14 women as “feminists” at the École Polytechnique de Montréal on December 6, 1989, a group of men at the University of Toronto produced this meditation on the need for men in the universities to support a feminist agenda and “to come to terms with the extent to which they contribute to a climate in which being a woman is uncomfortable or unsafe.”


Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.


----. Giants and Dwarfs: Essays 1960-1990. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990.


Boswell, Peter. “Political correctness: the bane of academic freedom.” St John's Evening Telegraph (15 June 1991): 5. In an article largely derived from the 27 May 1991 issue of Maclean's (see Fennell), Boswell cites the Cannizzo and Rushton cases as evidence of “a potential threat to free speech and independent thought,” and worries about hiring quotas and curriculum changes. Response by Artiss.


Brantlinger, Patrick. Crusoe's Footprints: Cultural Studies in Britain and America. New York and London: Routledge, 1990. An introduction to a scholarly project that has been demonized by polemicists like Roger Kimball.


Brodkey, Linda, and Sheila Fowler. “Political Suspects.” The Village Voice (23 Apr. 1991). This account of the controversy over English 306, a proposed writing course at the University of Texas at Austin which was withdrawn after widely publicized accusations by members of the National Association of Scholars and others that it amounted to “indoctrination,” was written by two members of the committee which created the new syllabus.


Brooks, Peter. “Western Civ at Bay.” Review of Allan Bloom, Giants and Dwarfs, and Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals. Times Literary Supplement (25 Jan. 1991): 5-6.


Bruning, Fred. “Playing politics with political correctness.” Maclean's (10 June 1991): 11. Bruning suggests that the Bush Republicans intended to make “political correctness” the Willie Horton issue of the 1992 presidential campaign.


Burd, Stephen. “Chairman of Humanities Fund Has Politicized Grants Process, Critics Charge.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (22 Apr. 1992): A1, A32-33. This article documents claims that under its present chair, Lynne V. Cheney, the National Endowment for the Humanities in the U.S. has routinely rejected grant applications which are judged excellent by peer reviewers but which do not conform to Cheney's political and methodological conservatism.


Bygrave, Mike. “Mind Your Language.” Weekend Guardian (11-12 May 1991): 14-15. Rpt. in Guardian Weekly (26 May 1991): 22. Initially patronizing ('PC' is identified with “the loony left”—“only, being Americans, they're twice as loony”), this article also outlines the context (of privatization, systemic racism, and the “secession” of the wealthy) within which American universities have been trying “to meet minority demands that the rest of society now routinely rejects.”


Cheney, Lynne V. Humanities in America: A Report to the President, the Congress, and the American People. Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Humanities, 1988.


Christensen, Jerome. “From Rhetoric to Corporate Populism: A Romantic Critique of the Academy in an Age of High Gossip.” Critical Inquiry 16 (1990): 438-65.


Clark, George. “Upholders of 'political rightness' are the ones stifling debate.” The Globe and Mail (10 July 1991). Clark argues that “The much repeated dogma that 'political correctness' threatens intellectual freedom is a bogus claim to justify suppression of dissent, another version of McCarthyism.”


“Concern for Arts, Research Funding Follows Rust.” Academe: Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 5-6. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision that the government can withhold funding from family clinics that provide information in any instance about abortion has direct implications for U.S. government funding of university research.


Conlogue, Ray. “How long might it take to repair the damage wrought by the PC movement?” The Globe and Mail (11 June 1991): C1. Conlogue suggests a comparison between “the PC movement” and the Red Guards of Mao's Cultural Revolution.


Cordes, Helen. “Oh No! I'm PC! But can we still be friends anyway?” Utne Reader (July-Aug. 1991): 50-56. A lighthearted survey of journalistic writings on both sides of the issue.


Corn, David. “Beltway Bandits.” The Nation (13 May 1991): 6-20. Corn remembers Dinesh D'Souza boasting at a conference for conservative students in 1982 that the Dartmouth Review had printed material stolen from Dartmouth's Gay Student Alliance. D'Souza's denials of the charge are shown by further investigation to be untrue (see “Letters,” 24 June and 8 July 1991).


Culler, Jonathan. “The Humanities Tomorrow.” Framing the Sign: Criticism and Its Institutions. Oxford: Blackwell, 1988. 41-56.


Davidson, Cathy N. “'PH' Stands for Political Hypocrisy.” Academe: Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 8-14. Rpt. in CAUT/ACPU Bulletin 39.4 (Apr. 1992): 18-19. In the course of a wide-ranging analysis of the “PC” debate, Davidson remarks that the media have “done little to examine connections between seemingly moderate aspects of the PC controversy (such as the demand that courses in Western civilization be restored to the general curriculum) and the ultra-right hate rags springing up on campuses all across the nation. This is hardly surprising considering the interconnections between the hate rags, mega-corporations, the government, conservative policy institutions, and the national media.”


Davis, Lennard J., and M. Bella Mirabella, eds. Left Politics and the Literary Profession. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.


“Decline and fall of the North American educational system.” Taipan (Mar. 1992): 6-7. This article blames the inadequacies of American secondary and university education upon a “rewriting of history by 'politically correct' academics” which “threatens to have a negative effect” on the “progress-oriented work ethic” of the U.S., and could “result in the redistribution of property rather than the creation of new wealth.” The solution proposed is a continued privatizing of the educational system: “If just 15% of the government's education budget ends up in private hands by the year 2010, it will mean billions of profits for the savvy entrepreneurs who act now.”


DePalma, Anthony. “In Battle on Political Correctness, Scholars Begin a Counteroffensive.” The New York Times (25 Sept. 1991): A1, B8. This article reports the founding of Teachers for a Democratic Culture by “30 notable scholars,” among them Stanley Fish, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and Gerald Graff, who “condemn the storm over political correctness ... as an attempt to derail affirmative action and legitimate attempts to revise curriculum.”


“The Derisory Tower.” The New Republic (18 Feb. 1991): 5-6. According to this editorial, “multiculturalists” in American universities are attempting to replace pluralist thought with “one of the most destructive and demeaning orthodoxies of our time,” according to which “race is the determinant of a human being's mind,” which is therefore unable “to wrest itself from its biological or sociological origins.”


Diamond, Sara. “Readin', Writin', and Repressin'.” Z Magazine (Feb. 1991): 45-48. This essay contains information about the network of American corporate foundations (among them Coors, Mobil, Smith-Richardson, Earhart, Scaife, and Olin) which provide generous funding to the National Association of Scholars and the affiliated Madison Center for Educational Affairs (which in turn funds some 60 right-wing campus newspapers, among them the notorious Dartmouth Review).


Doyle, John. “A new dogmatism is taking hold in Canadian universities.” The Globe and Mail (29 Apr. 1991). Alluding to controversies at several Canadian universities over material published in student newspapers, Doyle argues that “What is happening is a cultural revolution that has chilling echoes of the fanaticism that decimated intellectual life in China two decades ago.”


Drainie, Bronwyn. “Food for thought or anorexia of the mind?” The Globe and Mail (29 Dec. 1990): C1. Anxious reflections on literacy, multiculturalism, and “traditional Western thought.”


D'Souza, Dinesh. Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus. New York: Free Press, 1991.


----. “Illiberal Education.” The Atlantic Monthly (Mar. 1991): 51-79. Writing here for a liberal audience, D'Souza represents himself as a would-be occupant of the “middle ground” who finds that “It is not always possible in such disputes for a reasonable person, in good conscience, to take any side....”


----. “The New Segregation on Campus.” The American Scholar (Winter 1991): 17-30. D'Souza argues that affirmative action admission policies and the encouragement of minority separatism by university administrations are to blame for racist backlashes on American campuses.


----. “The Visigoths in Tweed.” Forbes (1 Apr. 1991): 81-84. Claiming that “the propaganda of the new barbarians” threatens “to do us in,” D'Souza urges his corporate readers to de-fund the humanities. “Resistance on campus to the academic revolution is outgunned,” he adds, “and sorely needs outside reinforcements.”


----, and Robert MacNeil. “The Big Chill? Interview with Dinesh D'Souza.” In Paul Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 29-39. A transcript of D'Souza's interview on The MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour (18 June 1991).


Duster, Troy. “They're Taking Over! and other myths about race on campus.” Mother Jones (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 30-33, 63-64. Challenging claims that “multiculturalism” and affirmative action programs are responsible for campus conflict and a lowering of standards, Duster also quotes the findings of a poll of 35,478 professors at 392 institutions, according to which 4.9% described themselves as “far left,” 36.8% as “liberal,” 40.2% as “moderate,” and 17.8% as “conservative.”


Ehrenreich, Barbara. “The Challenge for the Left.” Democratic Left (July-Aug. 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 333-38. Remarking that “The American new right is becoming more and more like the new right in Europe—which has always focused on nativist and racist issues,” Ehrenreich proposes that a leftist defense of multiculturalism must also address its tendencies towards relativism and identity politics: “There can't be a left if there's no basis for moral judgment, including judgments that will cut across group or gender or ethnic lines.”


Ehrenreich, Rosa. “What Campus Radicals? The PC undergrad is a useful specter.” Harper's (Dec. 1991): 57-61. According to Ehrenreich's experience as a student at Harvard, American campuses “are no more under siege by radicals than is the society at large. It has been clever of the Kimballs and D'Souzas to write as if it were so. It is always clever of those in ascendance to masquerade as victims.”


Ellis, John. “Radical Literary Theory.” Review of Peter Washington, Fraud: Literary Theory and the End of English. London Review of Books (8 Feb. 1990): 7-8. While criticizing his “slash-and-burn mode of argument,” Ellis shares Washington's hostility to the politics of “Radical Literary Theory.”


Elson, John. “Academics in Opposition.” Time (1 Apr. 1991): 64. A sympathetic account of the National Association of Scholars as “the cutting edge” of opposition to multiculturalist, feminist, and minority curricula. “The N.A.S. Is funded in part by four conservative foundations, but [N.A.S. President Stephen] Balch insists, 'We follow our own lights.'”


Epstein, Joseph. “The Academic Zoo: Theory—in Practice.” The Hudson Review 44.1 (Spring 1991): 9-30. An attack on recent developments in English studies. Response in Hudson Review 44.3.


Faludi, Susan. Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women. New York: Crown, 1991.


Farrell, Lennox. “Power and 'political correctness'.” The Toronto Star (6 June 1991): A25. Farrell turns the tables on “anti-PC” polemicists by inviting his readers to imagine how they would respond to a world governed by a repressive “Afro-centric matriarchy.”


Fennell, Tom. “The Silencers: A New Wave of Repression is Sweeping Through the Universities.” Maclean's (27 May 1991): 40-43. The evidence of “repression” adduced in this article is slender in the extreme. (No mention is made of the murder of fourteen women at the École Polytechnique de Montréal in 1989.)


Fernéndez, Enrique. “P.C. Rider.” The Village Voice (18 June 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 322-25. Reminding us that “Whatever 'Western' means, one thing should be obvious: Latin-American and Anglo-American letters are either in it or out of it together,” Fernéndez advocates an “integrationist” multiculturalism: “If it's human, it's yours. Take it. Share it. Mix it. Rock it.”


Fish, Stanley. “The Common Touch, or, One Size Fits All.” In Gless and Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education, pp. 241-66. A strenuous and witty analysis of the “ethicist” assumptions and the “classically fissured” paranoia of conservative interventions in debates over literary canons and academic politics.


----. “There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too.” in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 231-45. Arguing against First Amendment objections to academic speech codes, Fish maintains that “there is no class of utterances separable from the world of conduct,” and that the category “free expression” is therefore an empty one; it follows that “because everything we say impinges on the world in ways indistinguishable from the effects of physical action, we must take responsibility for our verbal performances....” Citing the Keegstra case, Fish contrasts the sensible “contextualism” of the Canadian Criminal Code and Charter of Rights with “the categorical absolutism of American First Amendment law.”


Fraser, Laura. “The right's new boogeyman.” New York Daily News (1 Sept. 1991): 3. Reflections on a survey of college administrators which suggests that “the idea that the Politically Correct are taking over universities and the world is, well, incorrect.”


Gates, Henry Louis, Jr. “The Master's Pieces: On Canon Formation and the African-American Tradition.” In Gless and Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education, pp. 95-117. Refusing to assign “a celebrated face to the forces of reaction” and thereby give “too much credit to a few men who are really symptomatic of a larger political current,” Gates outlines an answer to the question of how “the debate over canon formation affect[s] the development of African-American literature as a subject of instruction in the American academy.”


----. “Whose Canon Is It, Anyway?” The New York Times Book Review (26 Feb. 1989); rpt. In Berman, ed. Debating PC, pp. 190-200. A shorter version of “The Master's Pieces.”


----. “It's Not Just Anglo-Saxon.” The New York Times (4 May 1991): Op-ed section, 15. One of two articles (the other by Donald Kagan) published under the heading “Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?” Gates argues that “it's only when we're free to explore the complexities of our hyphenated culture that we can discover what a genuinely common American culture might actually look like.”


----. Loose Canons: Notes on the Culture Wars. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.


Genovese, Eugene D. “Heresy, Yes—Sensitivity, No: An argument for counter-terrorism in the academy.” Review of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. The New Republic (15 Apr. 1991): 30-35. While critical both of D'Souza's condemnation of black studies and women's studies programs and of his attack on black separatism, Genovese accepts his case studies at face value, and calls in violent language for “a coalition that cuts across all the lines of politics, race, and gender” to “close ranks” in defense of academic freedom against “atrocities” like those documented by D'Souza.


Gibbs, Nancy. “The War Against Feminism.” Time (9 Mar. 1992): 38-43. An extended discussion of Susan Faludi's Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women.


Gilbert, Sandra M., and Susan Gubar. “Masterpiece Theater: An Academic Melodrama.” Critical Inquiry 17 (1991): 693-717. When an undescribed text is found chained to the railroad tracks in Boondocks, Indiana, a large cast of critics and cultural theorists—from Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese to William J. Bennett—assembles at the scene of the crime.


Gitlin, Todd. “Incorrect Call.” The Village Voice (23 Apr. 1991). While critical both of the “illiberalism” of academic leftists and of the right's “panicky” reaction, Gitlin argues that “Authentic liberals have good reason to worry that the elevation of 'difference' to a first principle is undermining everyone's capacity to see, or change, the world as a whole.”


Glazer, Nathan. “Point.” One of two reviews (under the heading of “That D'Souza Book: Two Views”) of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. Change (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 56-58. Glazer praises the book as “a balanced, well-researched meticulously documented account of disputes around race in a number of major American universities....”


Gless, Darry L., and Barbara Herrnstein Smith, eds. The Politics of Liberal Education. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1992. These essays (except for the contributions of Stanley Fish and Francis Oakley and the introduction by Barbara Herrnstein Smith) are reprinted from a special issue of The South Atlantic Quarterly 89.1 (Winer 1990). A number of the essays are listed separately here.


Gordon, Ted, and Wahneema Lubiano. “The Statement of the Black Faculty Caucus.” In Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 249-57. (A version of this text appeared in the Daily Texan [3 May 1990].) Gordon and Lubiano offer an agenda for “transforming the University into a center of multicultural learning: anything less constitutes a system of education that ultimately reproduces racism and racists.”


Gray, Mary W., et al. “Statement on the 'Political Correctness' Controversy.” Academe: Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 48. This statement was issued in July 1991 by a special committee appointed by the president of the AAUP.


Greenblatt, Stephen. “The Best Way to Kill Our Literary Inheritance Is to Turn It Into a Decorous Celebration of the New World Order.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (12 June 1991): B1, B3. Rpt. in The Council Chronicle: The National Council of Teachers of English (Nov. 1991): 16. A response to George F. Will's Newsweek column of 22 Apr. 1991.


Hairston, Maxine C. “Required Writing Courses Should Not Focus on Politically Charged Social Issues.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (23 Jan, 1991): B1, B3. A writing specialist and professor of English at the University of Texas at Austin outlines her objections, both pedagogical and ethical, to the controversial English 306 writing course.


Hamacher, Werner, Neil Hertz, and Thomas Kennan, eds. Responses: On Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.


Heller, Scott. “Scholars Form Group to Combat 'Malicious Distortions' by Conservatives.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (18 Sept. 1991): A19, A21. Gerald Graff, Houston Baker, Jr., Jane Gallop, Wayne Booth, Henry Louis Gates, and Stanley Fish are named as founding members of the Teachers for a Democratic Culture, an organization which wants “to set the record straight about such incendiary issues as 'political correctness' and free speech on campus,” and which criticizes “what it calls the 'blatant hypocrisy' of 'right-wing ideologues' such as [Dinesh] D'Souza and Lynne V. Cheney, chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.”


Henry, William A, III. “Upside Down in the Groves of Academe.” Time (1 Apr. 1991): 62-64. Henry claims that in the “upside-down world” of many U.S. campuses, “Obfuscatory course titles and eccentric reading lists are frequently wedded to a combative political agenda or outlandish views of U.S. culture.” He criticizes new “Afrocentric” curriculums and developments in feminist and gay studies.


Hentoff, Nat. “'Speech Codes' on the Campus and Problems of Free Speech.” Dissent (Fall 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 215-24. Hentoff sides with Yale President Benno Schmidt, according to whom the idea that “values of civility and community” should be allowed to supersede freedom of expression is “wrong in principle, and, if extended, is disastrous to freedom of thought....”


Hill, Patrick J. “Multiculturalism: The Crucial Philosophical and Organizational Issues.” Change (July-Aug. 1991): 38-47. A discussion of four frameworks for explaining diversity—relativism, universalism, hierarchism, and democratic pluralism—leads into an argument for a new curriculum that would incorporate “the currently marginalized.”


Hirsch, E.D. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Need to Know. Boston: Houghton, 1987.


Hirschman, Albert O. The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Of direct relevance to the 'PC' debate.


Hollander, John. “Reading as Was Never Read.” ADE Bulletin 98 (Spring 1991): 7-13.


Howe, Irving. “The Value of the Canon.” The New Republic (18 Feb. 1991): 40-47. Rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 153-71. In reasserting the value of a traditional literary canon, Howe deploys Lukács, Trotsky, and Gramsci against the contemporary “cultural left.”


Hughes, Robert. “The Fraying of America.” Time (3 Feb. 1992): 44-49. Defining America as “a construction of mind, not of race or inherited class or ancestral territory,” this article blames the “fraying” of a “sense of collectivity and mutual respect” upon right-wing “demagogues” as well as upon “pushers of political correctness who would like to see grievance elevated into automatic sanctity.” While criticizing “cultural separatism” and Afrocentrism, Hughes also denounces “the ongoing frenzy about political correctness, whose object is to create the belief, or illusion, that a new and sinister McCarthyism, this time of the left, has taken over American universities and is bringing free thought to a stop. This is flatly absurd.”


Hurst, Lynda. “'Politically correct'? Think before you speak: New watchwords 'politically correct' cause controversy.” The Toronto Star (2 June 1991): A1, A12. A balanced discussion, focussed principally on the University of Toronto, of debates and disputes over issues of gender and of race (“the Cannizzo incident”).


Jayne, E. “Academic jeremiad: The neoconservative view of American higher education.” Change (May-June 1991): 30-41.


Jenish, D'Arcy. “A War of Words: Academics Clash Over 'Correctness'.” Maclean's (27 May 1991): 44-45. Recycling anecdotes from Taylor and D'Souza, this article also quotes opinions of people on both sides of the curriculum debate in the U.S. (apportioning space to opponents and supporters of new developments in a ratio of about 8 to 1).


Jonas, George. Politically Incorrect. Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1991. A collection of journalistic essays by a writer who, as David Olive rather cruelly suggests, is unlikely ever “to rise above the status of tabloid philosopher” (Olive, “Rants unworthy of raves,” The Globe and Mail [21 Dec. 1991]).


Jouzaitis, Carol. “Scholars stand up for colleges: Political-correctness charges a bum rap, they say.” Chicago Tribune (2 Oct. 1991): 1, 10. This article reports the founding of Teachers for a Democratic Culture by Gerald Graff and others. “Rather than choking debate, as their critics claim they have, members of the new organization say they are trying to open the discussion on campuses and educate the public about new literary theories and teaching approaches.”


Kagan, Donald. “Western Values Are Central.” The New York Times (4 May 1991): Op-ed section, 15. One of two articles (the other by Henry Louis Gates) published under the heading “Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?” Kagan writes that “Western culture and institutions are the most powerful paradigm in the world. As they increasingly become the objects of emulation by peoples elsewhere, their study becomes essential for those of all nations who wish to understand their nature and origins.”


Keefer, Michael. “Political Correctness.” Canadian Federation for the Humanities Bulletin 14.2 (Summer 1991): 7-8. This article attacks the “frothy denunciations of 'political correctness'” by such writers as Dinesh D'Souza, Tom Fennell, Claude Rawson, and George F. Will.


----. “Ellis on Deconstruction: A Second Opinion.” English Studies in Canada 18.1 (Mar. 1992): 83-103. An analysis of the 'PC' furore forms part of a critique of the scholarship and politics of an opponent of deconstruction.


Kimball, Roger. Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education. New York: Harper & Row, 1990.


----. “The Periphery v. The Center: The MLA in Chicago.” In Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 61-84. (A version of this essay appeared in The New Criterion [Feb. 1991].) Finding much to displease him in the papers presented at the MLA conference, Kimball argues that “the substitution of certain political causes for disinterested appreciation may be said to have become the raison d'être of the Modern Language Association.”


King, Nina. “Classroom Notes: A Controversial English Department Deserves High Marks for Teaching.” The Washington Post (7 Apr. 1991): Educational review section 12-13. An account of Duke University's English program by one of the few journalists who has made any attempt to witness what supposedly “PC” academics do in the classroom.


Kingwell, Mark. “Enter the campus thought police.” The Globe and Mail (15 Apr. 1991). Repeating (though with ironic overtones) claims that “north America's colleges” are ruled by “the PC police,” Kingwell contrasts the radical insights of Marxist critique to the “superficial” relativism of “PC thinking.” Response by Ripstein.


Kinsley, Michael. “Hysteria Over 'Political Correctness': Where's this left-wing reign of terror on campus?” The Washington Post (3 May 1991): A25. A comparison of attacks on the “leftism” of the academy in 1951 and 1991. Kinsley remarks that the academic speech codes now excoriated as “politically correct” were in many cases instituted in the early 1970s by academic conservatives in response to left-wing student activism.


Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. “Pedagogy in the Context of an Antihomophobic Project.” In Gless and Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education, pp. 145-62. This essay offers an analysis (by a former student) of Allan Bloom's protectiveness of “the canonical culture of the closet,” and at the same time of “the homophobia uniformly enjoined on teachers throughout the primary and secondary levels of public school”; it argues that “The invaluable forms of critique and dismantlement within the official tradition, the naming as what it is of a hegemonic, homoerotic/homophobic male canon of cultural mastery and coercive erotic double binding, can only be part of the strategy of an antihomophobic project.”


Kramer, Hilton. “The Prospect Before Us.” The New Criterion (Sept. 1990); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 315-21. Kramer complains of the imposition of “politics—above all, the politics of race, gender, and multiculturalism—as the only acceptable criterion of value in every realm of culture and life”; this “liberal McCarthyism” is the work of what he calls the “barbarian element.”


Krauthammer, Charles. “Hail Columbus, Dead White Male.” Time (27 May 1991): 61. For Krauthammer, the destruction of Inca civilization is outweighed by the consideration that its destroyers represented “a culture of liberty that endowed the individual human being with dignity and sovereignty.”


----. “Clarence Thomas and Liberal Orthodoxy.” The Washington Post (12 July 1991). Making it appear that effective power is in the hands of “the liberal establishment” and “the civil rights establishment,” Krauthammer insinuates that for the Senate to make an issue of the qualifications of opinions of presidential appointees like Carol Iannone and Clarence Thomas is improper.


Lazere, Donald. “Conservative Critics Have a Distorted View of What Constitutes Ideological Bias in Academe.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (9 Nov. 1988): A52.


Leahy, David. “Au diable l'hétérogène: les attaques contre le 'correction politique'.” Spirale [Montréal] (Feb. 1992): 13. Dans cette introduction “aux mythes hystériques anti-'PC',” et aux débats qui entourent la question “PC,” Leahy suggère que le “Nouvel Ordre mondial” est incapable de tolérer, “même au nom de la différence symbolique,” “des universitaires qui aimeraient voir leurs institutions contribuer au renouvellement et à la transformation sociale.”


Lehman, David. “Deconstructing de Man's Life: An Academic Idol Falls into Disgrace.” Newsweek (15 Feb. 1988): 63.


----. Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man. New York: Poseidon Press, 1991. Reviewed by John Sturrock, “Alarms off-campus,” Times Literary Supplement (25 Oct. 1991): 22.


Levine, Gerge, et al. Speaking for the Humanities. American Council of Learned Societies Occasional Paper No. 7, 1989. A rejoinder to William Bennett's To Reclaim a Legacy.


Lindenberger, Herbert. “The Western Culture debate at Stanford University.” Comparative Criticism 11 (1989): 225-34. A brief account of Stanford's “Western Civilization” (1935-c.1968), “Western Culture” (1980-88), and “Cultures, Ideas, Values” courses.


Mangan, Katherine S. “Entire Writing-Course Panel Quits at U. Of Texas.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (13 Feb. 1991): A16. An account of the controversy over English 306 at the University of Texas at Austin.


McCormack, Thelma. “The counterattack against feminism: How Maclean's helped promote a media backlash.” Canadian Forum (Sept. 1991): 8-10. Rpt. as “Politically Correct” in CAUT/ACPU Bulletin (Apr. 1992): 17-18. A critique of D'Souza and other polemicists, and a defence of curriculum reform and of Women's Studies programs.


McIntyre, Sheila. “The Campaign Against Political Correctness.” Symposium: A Student Arts Magazine [University of Western Ontario] (Dec. 1991): 6-7, 20. This abridged transcription of a lecture delivered at UWO offers an analysis of the philosophical differences underlying debates over “PC” and “merit,” and points to inconsistencies and hypocrisy in the position of 'anti-PC' polemicists (who, McIntyre argues, “have never operated according to their own first principle” of formal equality).


Menand, Louis. “Illiberalisms.” Review of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. The New Yorker (20 May 1991): 101-07. An analysis of inconsistencies and errors in D'Souza's book (among them a wildly incompetent potted history of literary criticism), supplemented by a brief account of his previous career as an opponent of minority rights. While agreeing with some of D'Souza's arguments, Menand remarks that “It is not pleasant to see a man who did so much to poison the wells turning up dressed as the water commissioner....”


----. “What Are Universities For? The real crisis on campus is one of identity.” Harper's (Dec. 1991): 47-56. Menand argues that right and left are alike misguided in seeing the university as a social microcosm; the university should “renounce the role of model community and arbiter of social disputes that it has assumed,” and “stop trying to set up academic housing for every intellectual and political interest group that comes along....”


“MLA Survey Casts Light on Canon Debate.” MLA Newsletter 23.4 (Winter 1991): 12-14. This survey suggests that the traditional literary canon is far from having been displaced or usurped by matters related to new “isms” or to “political correctness.”


“The Modern Language Association's Statement on the Curriculum Debate.” MLA Newsletter 23.3 (Fall 1991): 5-6. Rpt. in the Supplement to the ACCUTE Newsletter (Mar. 1992): 16-18.


Morrison, Paul. “Paul de man: Resistance and Collaboration.” Representations 32 (1990): 50-74.


Munroe, George B. “The Case Against the Dartmouth Review.” Wall Street Journal (22 Oct. 1990): A14. An exposé of the backing of the Dartmouth Review and other off-campus newspapers by right-wing foundations, and an account of the network of government agencies and public-policy institutes which have fostered neoconservative polemicists like Dinesh D'Souza.


Nightingale, Kevyn D.I. “Why being 'correct' isn't right.” The Globe and Mail (20 Jan. 1992): A16. Offering (in response to Abramowicz) a wildly garbled account of Isaiah Berlin's two freedoms, this article denounces affirmative action and claims that progressive change will come through “economic pressure levied by the 'invisible hand' of Adam Smith.”


Nodelman, Perry. “Is 'beauty' in the eye of the politically correct?” The Globe and Mail (25 June 1991): C1. Challenging the rhetoric of Ray Conlogue's article of 11 June 1991, Nodelman argues that “Calling Shakespeare 'beautiful' is merely an unscrupulous way of reinforcing a particular faction's power by denying that it is factional....”


Olivas, Michael A. “Counterpoint.” One of two reviews (under the heading “That D'Souza Book: Two Views”) of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. Change (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 58-60. Olivas argues that D'Souza “often gets his facts wrong,” and that his slanted analysis “resembles a debater's brief.”


Paglia, Camille. “Ninnies, Pedants, Tyrants and Other Academics.” New York Times Book Review (5 May 1991): 1, 29, 33. In characteristically overheated language, Paglia claims that a comparison with 1960s American popular culture exposes the “followers of Lacan, Derrida and Foucault” as “the real fossilized reactionaries of our time.”


----. “Academe Has to Recover Its Spiritual Roots and Overthrow the Ossified Political Establishment of Invested Self-Interest.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (8 May 1991): B1-B2.


----. “The nursery-school campus: The corrupting of the humanities in the US.” Times Literary Supplement (22 May 1992): 19. Arguing that Roger Kimball's “tenured radicals” are not authentic leftists at all, Paglia also proposes that “Leftists have damaged their own cause, with whose basic principles I as a 1960s libertarian generally agree, by their indifference to fact, their carelessness and sloth, their unforgivable lack of professionalism as scholars.”


Perry, Richard, and Patricia Williams. “Freedom of Hate Speech.” Tikkun (July-Aug. 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 225-30. Commenting on certain “ironies of free-speech opportunism” in the reporting in the U.S. of campus speech codes prohibiting verbal harassment and hate speech, the authors suggest that “One might instructively compare this situation with the new Canadian constitution, which specifically limits the protection of certain kinds of hate speech, without much evidence that this provision has started Canada down the slippery slope towards being a Stalinist police state.”


Pfaff, William. “Universities burdened with pressures of changing values: Well-meaning people are promoting a new form of academic repression.” London Free Press (28 May 1991): A7. No such people are identified in this article.


Pollitt, Katha. “Why Do We Read?” The Nation (23 Sept. 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 201-11. “In America today,” Pollitt argues, “the underlying assumption behind the canon debate is that the books on the list are the only books that are going to be read....” She resists the “medicinal” assumption she find shared by both sides in the debate: the view that “the chief end of reading is to produce a desirable kind of person and a desirable kind of society....”


Poston, Lawrence S. Review of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. Academe: Bulletin of the American Association of University Professors (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 53-56. A careful, balanced, and finally rather devastating analysis of D'Souza's arguments.


“President Bush Names 8 Scholars to Sit on Humanities Board.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (22 Apr. 1992): A25. According to this article, four at least of Bush's eight nominees to the National Council on Humanities, the advisory board to the National Endowment for the Humanities, are members of the neoconservative National Association of Scholars. Liberal academics are reported to have criticized what they see as an ongoing 'packing' of the council (at least four of whose 27 members are already members of NAS) with opponents of multiculturalism and women's studies.


Raskin, Jamin. “The Fallacies of 'Political Correctness'.” Z Magazine (Jan. 1992): 31-37. Raskin argues that “while 'political correctness' purports to describe censorious language or policies, it is in fact intended to render unspeakable or unthinkable whole categories of belief about power.” This article, which refutes four recurrent fallacies of 'anti-PC' polemics, is to be followed by a sequel entitled “PC Sophistry and Do Conservatives Really Support Free Speech?”


Ravitch, Diane. “Multiculturalism: E Pluribus Plures.” The American Scholar (Summer 1990); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 271-98. A critique of “particularist,” as opposed to pluralist multiculturalism. A response by Molefi Kete Asante (“Multiculturalism: An Exchange”) appeared in The American Scholar (Spring 1991) and is rpt. in Berman, pp. 299-311.


Rawson, Claude. “Old Literature and its Enemies.” Review of Alvin Kernan, The Death of Literature; Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry; and David Lehman, Signs of the Times. London Review of Books (25 Apr. 1991): 11-15. According to Rawson, the rise of theory in literary studies has resulted in “professional misconduct, bordering on intellectual terrorism in extreme cases,” and “a hijacking of the classroom by militant proponents of special-interest groups.”


Ripstein, Arthur. “In defence of shedding our blinkers.” The Globe and Mail (22 Apr. 1991. Dismissing Mark Kingwell's talk of relativism, Ripstein argues that while study of “the works of dead European men” is “crucial to understanding the way our culture views the world,” there are reasons to doubt that 'the classics' provide “an appropriate vocabulary for groups that have been historically mistreated and marginalized to voice their concerns.”


Robbins, Bruce. “Tenured Radicals, the New McCarthyism, and 'PC'.” New Left Review 188 (July-Aug. 1991): 151-57. Robbins' survey of the controversy includes the suggestion that “the whole purpose of the PC assault is to extend the Reagan/Bush agenda, taking over or silencing institutions like the National Endowment for the Humanities that fund and therefore set research agendas, and above all preparing the public for a cut in federal funding of higher education.”


Rothenberg, Paula. “Critics of Attempts to Democratize the Curriculum are Waging a Campaign to Misrepresent the Work of Responsible Professors.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (10 Apr. 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed, Debating PC, pp. 262-68. The editor of a book widely denounced as a “primer of politically correct thought” (Newsweek [24 Dec. 1990]) criticizes misrepresentations of it by journalists and by the neoconservative National Association of Scholars.


Said, Edward W. “The Politics of Knowledge.” Raritan 11.1 (Summer 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 172-89. Said follows Frantz Fanon in offering “a critique of the separatism and mock autonomy achieved by a pure politics of identity that has lasted too long and been made to serve in situations where it has become simply inadequate.” With respect to the canon debate, he suggests that it may not “finally matter who wrote what, but rather how a work is written and how it is read.”


Schorow, Stephanie. “Tyranny of the Left: Freedom of speech under fire.” London Free Press (22 June 1991): E1. Based on material provided by the neoconservative National Association of Scholars, this article claims that “A McCarthyism of the left has arisen on U.S. campuses....”


Schrecker, Ellen W. No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. A detailed and chilling account of the purges of the late 40s and 50s which will challenge those who give credence to current claims about 'political correctness' as a 'new McCarthyism.'


Scott, Ian. “Feminist paper's editors receive death threats.” The Halifax Mail-Star (8 Nov. 1991): A3. This article reports death threats received by the editors of Pandora in Halifax, and a separate incident in which the editors of a bimonthly newspaper at Queen's University received the following message in a newsprint collage: “Congratulations! Here's your politically correct death notices ... we're gunna rape u dykes. In fact, we will kill any and all feminists slowly.”


Scott, Joan Wallach. “The Campaign Against Political Correctness: What's Really at Stake?” Change (Nov.-Dec. 1991): 30-43. Scott argues that in the campaign against 'political correctness,' “the entire enterprise of the university has come under attack, and with it that aspect that intellectuals most value and that the humanities most typically represent: a critical, sceptical approach to all that a society takes most for granted.... We are experiencing another phase of the ongoing Reagan-Bush revolution which, having packed the courts and privatized the economy, now seeks to neutralize the space of ideological and cultural nonconformity by discrediting it.” She analyzes the 'PC' debate in relation to a tradition of American anti-intellectualism, and comments on the manner in which “The logic of individualism has structured the approach to multiculturalism within the university—on many sides of the question.”


Searle, John. “The Storm Over the University.” Review of Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals; Darryl Gless and Barbara Herrnstein Smith, eds., The Politics of Liberal Education; and Timothy Fuller, ed., The Voice of Liberal Leraning: Michael Oakeshott on Education. The New York Review of Books (6 Dec. 1990): 34-42. Rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 85-123. Searle deplores what he sees as the politicizing of the humanities by the “cultural left”; while sympathetic to Kimball, he notes the “thinness” of his analysis.


“Senate Committee Rejects NEH Council Nominee.” MLA Newsletter 23.3 (Fall 1991): 1-4. A brief report on the Carol Iannone affair, in which the MLA, having opposed the nomination to the advisory council of the National Endowment for the Humanities of a scholar who had published only three refereed articles, was widely denounced in the American press.


Siegel, Fred. “The Cult of Multiculturalism.” The New Republic (18 Feb. 1991): 34-40. An attack on the “academic cultism, paranoia and power-mongering” which Siegel identifies as features of a “multiculturalist” orthodoxy derived from Foucault, from “deconstructionism,” and from “black and feminist agendas.”


Sinfield, Alan. Letter to the London Review of Books (23 May 1991): 4. A response to Claude Rawson, “Old Literature and its Enemies.” On the same page a letter by Penny McCarthy defends Sinfield against the charge of indoctrinating students.


Singer, Peter. “On Being Silenced in Germany.” The New York Review of Books (15 Aug. 1991): 36-42. Of relevance to the 'PC' debate on this continent.


Smith, Doug. “The 'new McCarthyism'.” Canadian Dimension (Sept. 1991): 8-13. A detailed analysis of the biased and duplicitous coverage of the 'political correctness' debate in the 27 May 1991 issue of Maclean's.


Smith, Jean Edward. “The dangerous new puritans.” The Globe and Mail (21 Oct. 1991): A15. A political science professor who believes that Milton wrote Areopagitica to protest “the censorship policies of King Charles I,” and that Princeton, where he studied during the McCarthy era, “did not knuckle under to the pressures of the moment” (for another view, see Schrecker), attacks the “storm-trooper tactics” of the “moral vigilantes” and “purveyors of sensitivity” who make up the 'political correctness' movement.


Stimpson, Catharine R. “Is There a Core in This Curriculum? And is it Really Necessary?” Change (Mar.-Apr. 1988): 27-31. An analysis of four competing attitudes towards cultural literacy is followed by an outline of a syllabus which would “show culture, not as a static and immobile structure, but as a kinetic series of processes, in which various forces often compete and clash.”


----. “New 'Politically Correct' Metaphors Insult History and Our Campuses.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (29 May 1991): A10. Challenging claims about a 'new McCarthyism,' Stimpson remarks that “No US senator has stood up holding a list of 'racists' and 'sexists' in higher education.”


----. “Big Man on Campus.” Review of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. The Nation (30 Sept. 1991): 78-84. While conceding that “the curricular and intellectual movements that have grown since the 1960s provide their share of silliness, folly, rigidity and blather,” Stimpson argues that D'Souza's book “saturates educational debate with slippery rhetoric, inconsistency and falsehood.”


----. “On Differences: Modern Language Association Presidential Address 1990.” PMLA 106 (1991); rpt. in Berman, ed. Debating PC, pp. 40-60.


Sutherland, John. “Down with DWEMs.” Review of Charles Sykes, ProfScam; and of Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals. London Review of Books (15 Aug. 1991): 17-18. Commenting that “The American press is waging a campaign against American universities, assisted by a barrage of muckraking books,” Sutherland argues that “The basic problem is much the same as it was in the Eisenhower years.” His review offers a brief but well-informed analysis of the “body-snatcher paranoia” at work in much of the 'PC' furore.


Sykes, Charles. ProfScam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education. New York: St Martin's Press, 1989.


Taylor, John. “Are You Politically Correct?” New York (21 Jan. 1991): 32-40. A collection of anecdotes designed to show that American universities have succumbed to a “fascism of the left,” and have substituted political indoctrination for education. (The sensational account of the Stephan Thernstrom case with which this article begins can be compared with Jon Wiener's discussion of the same episode.)


Tight, Malcolm, ed. Academic Freedom and Responsibility. Milton Keynes: Society for Research into Higher Education/Open University Press, 1988.


Valdés, Mario. “Answering Back.” MLA Newsletter 23.3 (Fall 1991): 4-5. Comments by the President of the MLA on the gross misrepresentations of the MLA by American editorialists and op-ed writers over the issue of Carol Iannone's nomination to the advisory council of the National Endowment for the Humanities.


Washington, Peter. Fraud: Literary Theory and the End of English. London: Fontana, 1989.


West, Cornel. “Diverse New World.” Democratic Left (July-Aug. 1991); rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 326-32. Commenting on the multiculturalism debate in the U.S., West argues that “The political challenge is to articulate universality in a way that is not a mere smokescreen for someone else's particularity.”


Wiener, Jon. “Deconstructing De Man.” The Nation (9 Jan. 1988): 22-24.


----. “Dollars for Neocon Scholars.” The Nation (1 Jan. 1990): 12-14. A detailed account of the large sums ($55 million in 1988) being spent in American universities by the John M. Olin Foundation “in an effort to reshape the curriculums, take the intellectual initiative away from the academic left and give scholarly legitimacy to Reaganite social and economic policies.”


----. “What Happened at Harvard.” The Nation (30 Sept. 1991): 384-88. On the basis of interviews with the people involved in what Dinesh D'Souza represented as an attack on the free speech of Harvard historian Stephan Thernstrom by black students and by administrators, Wiener concludes that “almost every element of the story D'Souza tells in erroneous.”


Will, George F. “Radical English.” This nationally syndicated column was published on 16 Sept. 1990, and rpt. in Berman, ed., Debating PC, pp. 258-61. Reporting on debates over curriculum at the University of Texas, Will claims that there and elsewhere “political indoctrination [is] supplanting education.”


----. “Literary Politics. 'The Tempest'? It's 'really' about imperialism. Emily Dickinson's poetry. Masturbation.” Newsweek (22 Apr. 1991): 72. An attack on the MLA's opposition to Carol Iannone's nomination to the NEH Advisory Council. Will describes Lynne Cheney, the Chairman of the NEH, as “secretary of domestic defence,” and declares that “The foreign adversaries her husband, Dick, must keep at bay are less dangerous, in the long run, than the domestic forces with which she must deal.”


----. Curdled Politics on Campus.” Newsweek (6 May 1991): 72. Will speaks of “a war of aggression against the Western political tradition and the ideas that animate it.”


Winkler, Karen J. “Proponents of 'Multicultural' Humanities Research Call for a Critical Look at Its Achievements.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (28 Nov. 1990): A5, A8-9. Scholars like Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Cornel West are quoted as expressing concern over some of the directions taken by multicultural research.


----. “A Conservative Plans to 'Sound the Guns' at NEH.” The Chronicle of Higher Education (22 Apr. 1992): A33. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., a recent appointee to the advisory council of the National Endowment for the humanities who opposes multicultural curricula, affirmative action programs, women's studies and Afro-American studies, is quoted as claiming that the Constitutional principles that shape American politics have “lately come to be menaced by the increasing democratization of politics.” He adds that “It's ironic that conservatives have to use politics to rid the campus of politics, but we do.”


Wong, Frank F. “Diversity & Community: Right Objectives and Wrong Arguments.” Change (July-Aug. 1991): 48-54. An attempt to mediate between advocates of cultural diversity (amongst whom Wong counts himself) and the views of academic neoconservatives like Allan Bloom.


Woodward, C. Vann. “Freedom & the Universities.” Review of Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education. The New York Review of Books (18 July 1991): 32-37. Judging D'Souza's investigation to be “reasonably thorough” and his documentation to be “fairly detailed, if sometimes very selective,” Woodward concludes that “there is reason to hope that the current aberration in the academy may be halted before it is too late.” Several responses appeared in the NYRB (26 Sept. 1991): 74-75.


“Yale Scholar Wrote for Pro-Nazi Newspaper.” The New York Times (1 Dec. 1987, late ed.): B1.


Zuckerman, M.B. “The professoriate of fear.” US News and World Report (29 July 1991): 64.

The Function of English Studies at the Present Time

This short paper was presented for a discussion session on English Studies at the End of the Millennium, which formed part of a symposium, What is the Future of English Studies?, organized by Douglas Freake and Faye Pickrem of York University's Department of English and held in York University's Bethune College Gallery on February 1, 1996. The keynote speakers were Linda Hutcheon and Christopher Dewdney; I was joined in the discussion session by Arun Mukherjee, Christie Carlson, and Diana Brydon. This paper has not previously been published.

 

Douglas Freake has asked us to be concise. If as a result some of what I have to say seems either elliptical or insufficiently nuanced, I hope there may be a chance to unfold some of the pleats during the discussion period.

I would like to begin by complicating my title, with the addition of a subtitle: “Cultural Politics as Palimpsest.” Let me remind you that a palimpsest is a piece of parchment or vellum on which an original text has been erased, and a secondary text overwritten; under certain conditions the reinscription can itself fade, and the original text again become legible.

I want to say something today about the cultural politics of English studies, in the context of the cultural politics of what surrounds us. I want to raise the question—as a question—of strategies of resistance to the implementation and the imposition on us of a corporate agenda. And I want to suggest that one of the shapes that agenda takes is a haunting of the academy by a paradigm out of our own disciplinary past.

My Arnoldian title is meant as a reminder of the logic of cultural legitimation on which the discipline of English studies was founded. That logic, I would argue, was one which combined deliberate mystification with something I would like to call “subtractive politicizing.” By “subtractive politicizing” I mean a kind of metonymy-in-bad-faith, in which a part is made to stand for the whole—but with tendentious results. E. M. W. Tillyard's The Elizabethan World Picture can serve as a familiar example. Subtracting from his image of early modern England all expressions of dissent, heterodoxy, or subversion, Tillyard was left with a chorus of voices praising hierarchy, order, degree, and due subordination: he had subtracted from the whole a large part of what the textual archive contains, and his representation of Elizabethan literary culture was thus heavily politicized—but subtractively politicized.

Matthew Arnold's true importance is as an ideologue, the inventor of a mode of argument that subtractively politicizes literary culture by separating it from the categories of the “practical” and the “political” while at the same time mobilizing it, in an eminently practical manner, in support of a cultural politics defined for him by such thinkers as Edmund Burke, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, and Joseph Joubert. This, in brief, is the argument of Arnold's most famous essay, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.”

At a key moment in that essay, Arnold reveals in its full perversity the logic of cultural justification that impels his argument: “Joubert has said beautifully: 'C'est la force et le droit qui règlent toutes choses dans le monde; la force en attendant le droit.' (Force and right are the governors of this world; force till right is ready.) Force till right is ready; and till right is ready, force, the existing order of things, is justified, is the legitimate ruler.”

Joubert's epigram is elegantly Machiavellian in its suggestion that “right”—the whole array of legal, legislative, and cultural institutions and persuasions in terms of which the legitimacy of a governing order is constituted—is in effect the continuation, the consummation of a regime of governance based on brute force. But Arnold coarsens the thought through his addition of the harshly paradoxical notion that force is legitimate, both before and after it has been legitimized. Through this addition, “right” becomes not merely a supplement to force, but a superfluity. (When, let us ask, will right be ready? If that which has not been legitimized is in fact always already legitimate, is there any reason why its legitimation should not be indefinitely deferred, leaving us forever, like the tramps in Beckett's play, en attendant Godot?)

I think that the Arnoldian logic of cultural legitimation is doubly pernicious. Insofar as it has been accepted, in one or another form, by practitioners of literary studies within the academy, it has in the past blinded us to the significance of our own practices. And insofar as it has become common currency among those outside the academy who would advocate a monologic and repressive “common culture” as a means of fending off the canonical redefinitions that result from transcultural exchanges and the minglings of populations, and as a means of resisting the claims of women and of minorities of all kinds, it has provided neoconservatives like Allan Bloom, Dinesh D'Souza, Roger Kimball, William Bennett, Christina Hoff Sommers—and in Canada, John Fekete and Neil Bissoondath—with a repertoire of maneuvers, hallowed by custom, that they have not hesitated to deploy in their defences of what Fekete calls the “body of culture,” once “robust,” but now, alas, “infected with the viral cancer of half truths.” (What a remarkable statement that is: Fekete seems not to have absorbed Susan Sontag's observation that the application of disease metaphors to socio-political debates is an invitation to violence. A cancer, left unchecked, will kill the host organism. And how do we deal with cancers? We cut them out with a scalpel, or we seek to kill the cancerous cells with radiation or chemotherapy.)

During the past half-dozen years our profession has been subjected to virulent attacks of an unprecedented intensity, the cumulative (and intended) effect of which has been to make the public feel that people who devote themselves to training up new generations of “cultural storm troopers,” “moral vigilantes,” “Red guards,” “new puritans,” “PC thought police,” and “neo-McCarthyists” can make no very strong claim for public support.

The PC furore and a longer-term withdrawal of public support from institutions of higher learning are together aspects of a larger cultural and political crisis—the most notable signs of which include an ever more overwhelming dominance of narrowly economic, corporatist, utilitarian, and instrumentalist habits of mind, and a correspondingly steady shrinkage of the public space within which genuinely critical analysis of the present state of affairs is possible.

How are we to respond to this depressing situation? Well, in one sense—his activities and his commitments as a public intellectual—Matthew Arnold provides us with a useful example. We must, in brief, take up our responsibilities not just as scholars and teachers, but as public intellectuals. And one of the first questions we need to confront is that of developing strategies of oppositional engagement—of resistance, in the first instance, to hypocrites, buffoons, and liars of the type that presently adorn the Cabinet of the government of Ontario. (This may seem strong language, but what else is one to say of people like our Education Minister John Snobelen, who came into office proclaiming his intention to “invent” or “create” a crisis in our education system, and to mislead the public as to the state of that system—and who then, when these remarks were made public, retreated into the pathetic pretence that in the jargon of corporate consultants, “create a crisis” means something altogether different than what ordinary humans might understand by the words?)

We need, then, to defend our interpretive and teaching practices—no-one else is going to do it for us—within what remains to us of a public sphere, or within what we can reconstruct of a public sphere, an oppositional critical space. We need to be aware that part of what we will have to confront is a palimpsestic re-emergence, in the hands of contemporary neoconservatives and other courtiers of corporatism, of an Arnoldian paradigm of literary, cultural, and political legitimation that once animated our own discipline.

In confronting this ghost, it may help us to remember two lines from a poem written a millennium ago to commemorate a battle in which people whose distant ancestors had been raiders and looters found themselves obliged to take up arms against invaders who continued to follow these ancient professions—in effect, against practitioners of a paradigm that the defenders had long since abandoned. I am referring, of course, to the anonymous Old English poem The Battle of Maldon, and in particular to those lines in which, as the Anglo-Saxon shield-wall crumbles, one of the older warriors expresses his devotion to the cause:

Hige sceal thé heardra, heorte thé cenre, 
Mod sceal thé mare, thé ure maegen lytlath.

(Thought shall be firmer, heart keener, 
Courage shall be greater, as our might lessens.)

 

 

Cornelius Agrippa’s Double Presence in the Faustian Century

Exponents of the current of thought and interpretation that for present purposes I have labeled the "Faustian paradigm" were [largely] excluded from positions in the institutions of higher learning. [....] Surprisingly, perhaps, analogous patterns of exclusion persist within contemporary scholarship. Historians of humanism, for example, have tended to exclude "speculative humanists" like Reuchlin and Agrippa from full membership in the tribe, while confessional and disciplinary boundaries have produced similar deflections within the historiography of the Reformation [...]. 

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Humanism, Theory, the Humanities: The (Dis)function of Criticism at the Present Time

[This text was presented as an invited paper at the Calgary Humanities Institute Research Network on the Justification of the Humanities, University of Calgary (10-11 March 1995). The organizers had made it clear that their own orientation was conservative or neoconservative; this paper proposed to upset their applecart. Plans to publish the proceedings of the conference fell through by early 1996: by that time, my book Lunar Perspectives: Field Notes from the Culture Wars had appeared, and due to overlaps between this piece and several sections of that book, I left this text unpublished. Some parts of its argument, however, may retain a separate interest.]

 

 

To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it “the way it really was” (Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger. Historical materialism wishes to retain that image of the past which unexpectedly appears to man singled out by history at a moment of danger. The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers. The same threat hangs over both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. In every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it.

Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” VI

 

I

We are here to discuss the justification of the humanities. But what meanings does this phrase carry? Let us ignore, for the moment at least, the earliest attested (and now long obsolete) sense of “justification”—a word which in the legal discourse of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries denoted the execution of a sentence, or capital punishment. We are engaged, I take it, in something diametrically opposed to stringing up or beheading the humanities: an exercise, rather, of exculpation or of apologetics, of vindication, defence, and legitimation.

But should we perhaps also admit, in a figurative sense, that further meaning which “justification” carried in printing shops—the adjustment or alignment of the borders of a type-face within the printer's forme, bringing (as Moxon wrote in his 1683 disquisition on printing) “the Right and left-sides of a Matrice to an exact thickness”?1

Though the allegory may be blatant, it is not frivolous. For in undertaking to justify the humanities, we are very clearly entering the domain of cultural politics. Whether we acknowledge the fact or try to conceal it from ourselves, we are by implication embarking on a process of alignment and adjustment, of definition and delimitation, one result of which will be a determination of what is to count as belonging to the “text” of the humanities, and where precisely the discursive space assigned to this category will end, giving way on the right and on the left to the blank margins that constitute its boundaries.

“Justification,” then, implies a politics of delimitation, of adjustment and alignment, as well as a politics of legitimation. And there may well arise within this cultural politics of delimitation, which operates as an inescapable counterpoint to the politics of legitimation, some shadow of that earliest attested meaning of “justification.” For if certain notions of what belongs within the humanities are to be consigned to the margins, either quietly or by main force, then they are in effect being “justified”—given the chop—in something like that archaic sense.

If time permitted, I would want to pose in the main body of this paper a number of linked questions about what precisely is to be justified, in the sense of vindication or legitimation—and to whom, and for what purposes. As it is, I will be able only to touch upon these areas of inquiry. But before doing so, I would like briefly to consider the context within which any attempt at a justification of the humanities must now be situated. The fact that current work in certain areas of the humanities has during the past five years become the object of a sustained campaign of vilification—one might almost say of demonization—is not something that any serious discussion of the justification of the humanities can evade.

 

II

The great game of PC-bashing began in 1990. According to the NEXIS database, the term “political correctness,” which did not so much as appear in the American print media in 1985, was mentioned by a total of thirty-six articles during the next four years, and by sixty-six articles, some of them very widely noticed, in 1990. Then came the explosion. The number of articles referring to this term rose to 1,553 in 1991, to 2,672 in 1992, and to 4,643 in 1993, with a further 1,427 in the first quarter of 1994.2 A large proportion of these references have occurred in the course of attacks upon university scholars in the humanities (most especially in the fields of literary and cultural studies), who have thus for half a decade been on the receiving end of a rising chorus of criticism and abuse from neoconservative journalists, think-tankers, government officials, and fellow academics in the United States and Canada. (And then there are the radio talk-show hosts.)

The flow of brickbats has of course not been entirely one-way. But as Ellen Messer-Davidow has shown in her exhaustively documented study of the institutional framework of the attack on what she calls “liberalized higher education,” the resources available to neoconservative participants in the debate have been of a different order of magnitude than those accessible to their opponents.3

The situation in Canada is in at least three respects crucially different from that in the United States. For example, in 1987 conservative academics in the U.S. formed the National Association of Scholars; between 1989 and 1991-92, NAS's support in grants from conservative foundations (including Olin, Scaife, Coors, and Smith-Richardson) and other donors rose from $611,000 per year to almost $683,000—substantial subsidies for an organization which by 1993 claimed some 3,000 members. Thanks to this support, to its affiliation with the Madison Center for Educational Affairs, and to its close ties with conservative think-tanks like the Hudson Institute and the Heritage Foundation, NAS has been able to exercise a significant influence upon the unfolding of the “political correctness” controversy.4 NAS's Canadian equivalent, the Society for Academic Freedom and Scholarship, was founded in 1992 and held its first conference in March 1993, under the auspices of the Fraser Institute and with financial support from NAS.5 Although its more than 200 members include some distinguished (and some very vocal) scholars, SAFS has not had a comparable influence upon public discourse in Canada—in part because there is not as yet a comparable infrastructure of right-wing foundations and think-tanks in this country.

Another significant difference between our situation and that of our American colleagues resides in the fact that research funding in Canada has not been politicized to anything like the degree it has in the United States. The “arms' length” principle that has prevailed in Canadian governmental funding for cultural production and humanities research appears to have protected our Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, up to the present, from the blatantly political manipulation to which the American National Endowment for the Humanities has been subjected.

Like the members of SSHRC's governing Council, members of NEH's National Council on Humanities are supposed to be appointed on the basis of their scholarly qualifications: the Council is congressionally mandated to “provide a comprehensive representation of the views of scholars and professional practitioners in the humanities.” But by 1991, when at least four of the Council's twenty-seven members were also members of NAS, fears arose that Lynne Cheney, the Chairman of NEH, was seeking to stack the Council with scholars who shared her adamant opposition to non-traditional methodologies in the humanities. When in that year the nomination of Carol Iannone, another prominent NAS activist, was opposed by the Modern Language Association on the grounds that she had published less than a handful of scholarly articles, a noisy controversy ensued, one of the highlights of which was Newsweek columnist George F. Will's labelling of the MLA's more than 30,000 members as enemies of the people. Claiming that “MLA hostility is nearly necessary for creating confidence in anyone proposed for a position of cultural importance,” Will described Lynne Cheney as “secretary of domestic defense” in a “low-visibility, high-intensity” cultural war—and compared her role to that of her husband Richard, George H. W. Bush's Secretary of Defense. But according to Will, “The foreign adversaries her husband, Dick, must keep at bay are less dangerous, in the long run, than the domestic forces with which she must deal.”6

Fears of a politicized stacking of the NEH Council were revived in 1992, when at least half of a slate of eight new nominees turned out to be NAS members.7 In the same year, scholars from several disciplines, supported by former NEH staff members, presented evidence to show that under the chairmanship of Lynne Cheney, research applications “from controversial scholars and from those who use non-traditional approaches are routinely rejected ... even when the proposals get top ratings from the agency's own peer reviewers.” According to one former NEH staff member, “Projects dealing with Latin America, the Caribbean, some women's studies, and anything appearing as vaguely left wing are seen as suspect”; another claimed that applicants are warned away from certain “buzz words,” such as “social history,” “deconstruction,” or “feminism.”8 Nor were concerns about the integrity of the NEH calmed when Harvey C. Mansfield, one of the 1991 nominees to the Council whose confirmation had gone unopposed, declared his intention “to adopt a West Point approach and sound the guns against those in the humanities who want to destroy the greatness of our intellectual past.” In an interview with The Chronicle of Higher Education, Mansfield made clear his agenda as an opponent of multicultural curricula, affirmative action programs, women's studies, and African-American studies. Remarking that the Constitutional principles which shape American political life have “lately come to be menaced by the increasing democratization of politics,” he added: “It's ironic that conservatives have to use politics to rid the campus of politics, but we do.”9

A third difference between the Canadian and American scenes is a matter of the extent to which the latter has become pervaded by what might be called organized incivility. For example, on June 12, 1994 the New York Times Book Review ran a critical review by Nina Auerbach of Christina Hoff Sommers' book Who Stole Feminism? On the following Monday the paper's phone lines were jammed by callers angrily urging the editor to disavow the review. With the help of an advance copy of the review and the willing collaboration of conservative journalists, Sommers herself subjected Auerbach to a campaign of vilification, based upon the claim that Auerbach, recognizing herself as a teacher of Sommers' nephew at the University of Pennsylvania who had been criticized in the book, had in an act of “professional malfeasance” used the review to “settle scores.” By June 14, Auerbach had been denounced by Jim Sleeper in the New York Daily News as a liar, and her review had been described by Hilton Kramer in the New York Post as “a major intellectual scandal.” Within days, Rush Limbaugh was informing his radio audience of some twenty million Americans “that 'militant gender feminazi feminism' and the New York Times were trying 'to kill this book' by 'reacting hysterically.'”10 As Auerbach herself writes,

The issue to Sleeper and to subsequent columnists became, not politics, scholarship, feminism, her book, or my review, but their attempts to get me to acknowledge an anonymous comment Christina Sommers claimed was on a term paper no one in the press ever asked her to produce.... Had Sommers lied less stupidly, bringing in larger, more important issues than my own self-interest; had I not had a twelve-year association with the Book Review; had the pressure on the Times been less boorish—I might have fallen into the abyss reserved for those whose book reviews are disclaimed and their authority taken away.11

There has as yet been no equivalent episode on this side of the border. However, the temperature of debate on such issues as multiculturalism and gender appears to be rising, as may be instanced by some of the more regrettable lapses in John Fekete's recent book Moral Panic. Fekete declares, for example, that “two decades of biofeminism [have] succeeded in infecting our thoughts and feelings with the viral cancer of half truths and the emotional tyranny of false appeals”—thereby uncritically succumbing, I would suggest, to the very condition named in the title of his book.12

The foregoing glimpses of the “political correctness” controversy should not be allowed to obscure the fact that, as Wayne Booth has suggested, “the PC ploy” has on occasion been used “to attack something that actually deserves attack: self-righteous, smug or repressive (and thus morally inconsistent) impositions of 'tolerance' or 'civility.'”13 I hope they may suffice to show that whatever attempts at a justification of the humanities we engage in here must be understood within a larger context, which in recent years has been characterized by determined and well-funded attempts to justify—to re-align, to legitimize—the discourses which inhabit the area bordering on the right margin of the humanities, while at the same time subjecting those towards the left margin to a more summary kind of justification—to something very much resembling a sentence of obliteration.

 

III

One of the most commonly repeated charges levelled by neoconservative polemicists against contemporary scholarship and teaching in the humanities appears in what might be called its canonical form in Roger Kimball's book Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education. According to Kimball,

Proponents of deconstruction, feminist studies, and other politically motivated challenges to the traditional tenets of humanistic study have by now become the dominant voice in the humanities departments of many of our best colleges and universities. And while there are differences and even struggles among these various groups, when seen from the perspective of the tradition they are seeking to subvert—the tradition of high culture embodied in the classics of Western art and thought—they exhibit a remarkable unity of purpose. Their object is nothing less than the destruction of the values, methods and goals of traditional humanistic study.14

This passage deploys the first three terms of my title—“humanism,” “theory,” “the humanities”—in a pattern whose classic paranoia mirrors the conclusion of my last paragraph: the “politically motivated” discourses collectively referred to as “theory,” and seen by Kimball as antithetical to “the values, methods and goals” of humanistic study or humanism, are in the process of taking over the humanities. (As may already be evident, I disagree with Kimball's diagnosis, which combines unrelenting hostility towards new currents of interpretation with a very partial and sadly limited understanding of the traditions he so earnestly wishes to defend.)

The mere mention of “theory” seems to be enough to trigger an aggressive reflex on the part of some neoconservative polemicists: it is presumably on account of the first word in the title of their book Theory of Literature (1949) that Austin Warren and René Wellek earned the disapprobation of Dinesh D'Souza, who in one of the more idiotically off-target broadsides of his bestseller Illiberal Education owlishly reproaches them for having disseminated the notion “that the definition of literature was problematic and posited circumstances under which Shakespeare might be displaced by the Manhattan phone book or by graffiti.”15 Yet while reductive caricatures of “theory” have become the special property of neoconservative participants in recent debates over the orientation of liberal education, “humanism” appears to be more generally misunderstood—by the theorists who typically attack it, by the traditionalists who defend it, and of course by the public, whom one could hardly expect to make sense of a matter that has been so thoroughly obfuscated by the experts.

 

IV

The related term “humanities” is sometimes also misunderstood. Two years ago in the Château Laurier in Ottawa, I had the pleasure of attending the Corporate Humanist Awards banquet organized by the Canadian Federation for the Humanities as a means of enlisting support within the private sector for humanities research and teaching.16 Mingled and yet wholly distinct, like the droplets of oil and vinegar in an ill-shaken salad dressing, business people and the representatives of some fifty-odd scholarly associations made hesitant conversation under the glittering chandeliers of the banqueting hall. Yet it was after the salad course—and after the rubber chicken and scarcely less rubbery dessert as well—that I was made aware by the gentleman on my right, a senior executive and a nominee for a Corporate Humanist award, of how perplexing he found the whole occasion. What, he asked me, did all this chatter about scholarship—about history, philosophy, musicology, classics, and literary theory—have to do with the Federation for the Humanities' humanitarian goals?

I am not going to tell you what I said in response. The genre of my anecdote must by now be clear: in Vladimir Propp's taxonomy of folk tales there are no doubt analogues to it among the stories told by braggarts and tricksters. This may be enough to suggest that the probability of you being naive enough to believe any conclusion to this tale that flatters its teller is no larger than the probability of my being modest enough to recount one that doesn't.

Turning therefore from a narrative to an interrogative mode, let me ask you for advice. How should I have responded? Would it have been appropriate to make a learned allusion to the Noctes atticae of the second century A.D. grammarian Aulus Gellius? He explains that

Those who have spoken Latin and have used the language correctly, do not give to the word humanitas the meaning it is commonly thought to have, namely, what the Greeks call philanthropia, signifying a kind of friendly spirit and good feeling toward all men without distinction. Rather they give to humanitas about the force of the Greek paideia, that is, what we call “learning and instruction in good or liberal arts.” Those who earnestly desire and seek after these are most highly humanized.17

It might have been undiplomatic to reveal to my dinner companion that he shared with the corporate humanists of Nero's and Caligula's time a very basic misapprehension about the nature of the humanities. (I can imagine his face assuming the thoughtful expression of one who has found a scorpion in the pocket that he thought contained his billfold.)

Or should I have confronted more directly the much larger question which underlies the naive one of my dinner companion—and which has very appropriately been made the theme of this conference? What benefit is there, and to whom, in all our chatter within and about the humanities? How are we to legitimize what we do?

 

V

One problem with the question in this form is that it presupposes a belief that we are all doing much the same thing. But is it not the case, in the field of literary and cultural studies at least, that a number of very different and mutually incompatible things are being done? Is there not, for example, a radical incompatibility between those of us who would describe themselves as humanists, guardians of a traditional literary canon and of traditionalist canons of interpretation, and those whose interpretive practices are inflected rather by post-Heideggerian hermeneutics, deconstruction, discourse theory, feminism, cultural materialism, or (one of the most recent developments) queer theory? Perhaps so, since some of the tendencies in that second list are programmatically “anti-humanist,” in the sense of rejecting claims about human autonomy and selfhood that are widely assumed to be implied by humanism.

And yet even the most preliminary gesture in the direction of historicizing these terms leads to unsettling results. Take, for example, the first and last of the terms I have mentioned: “humanist” and “queer theory.” In what appears to be the earliest occurrence of the word umanista in Italian literature, Ariosto wrote:

Senza quel vizio son pochi umanisti
che fe' a Dio forza, non che persüase, 
di far Gomorra e i suoi vicini tristi...

Ride il volgo, se sente un ch'abbia vena
di poesia, e poi dice:—E gran periglio
a dormir seco e volgierli la sciena.

[Few humanists are without that vice which did not so much persuade, as forced, God to render Gomorrah and her neighbour wretched .... The vulgar laugh when they hear of someone who possesses a vein of poetry, and then they say, “it is a great peril to turn your back if you sleep next to him.”]18

This is satire, to be sure. Yet writings of Erasmus and other centrally canonical humanists could be adduced in support of the view that there are important intersections between the cultural practices of Renaissance humanism and the territory marked out by queer theory as its own. To what extent, then, does “humanism,” once we choose to remember the term's historical dimensions, remain antithetical to some of the other labels in that list of contemporary modes of interpretation?

Consider for a moment the case of Henricus Cornelius Agrippa, whose participation in the early sixteenth-century humanist republic of letters included active correspondence with Reuchlin, Trithemius, Erasmus, Lefèvre d'Étaples, Capito, and Melanchthon. Agrippa's most frequently reprinted book, translated into English as Of the Vanities and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, offers a radically sceptical challenge to the first principles of scholastic logic, and in a parodic recapitulation of the labours of Hercules proposes a sequence of serio-comic refutations—I nearly said deconstructions—of all human knowledge. There is indeed a sense in which Agrippa's writings could be described as participating in a proto-deconstructive countercurrent to the orthodoxies of his age. Resonances with deconstruction will be obvious to any reader of the philosopher Jacques Derrida's essay “La pharmacie de Platon” who considers Agrippa's suggestion that his book De occulta philosophia is of quasi-medicinal value (“nam & medicorum volumina inspicientibus contingit cum antidotis & pharmacis simul etiam venena legere”: “for they that look into the books of physicians, do together with antidotes and medicines, read also poisons”)19—together with the vehement opinion of orthodox polemicists that Agrippa's textual pharmakon was not medicine but, as the late-sixteenth-century chronicler André Thevet wrote, “[la] regorge de sa mortelle poison,” and that Agrippa himself was a witch-doctor or pharmakeus—in the words of the contemporaneous political theorist Jean Bodin, “le plus grand Sorcier qui fut oncques de son aage”—rather than a doctor of souls.20

This embattled humanist also stands out, no less clearly, as a male feminist. In one of his earlier writings, De nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus, he argues (I quote from a mid-sixteenth century translation) that

betwene man and woman by substance of the soule, one hath no higher pre-emynence of nobylytye above the other, but both of them naturally have equall libertie of dignitie and worthynesse. But all other thynges, the which be in a man, besydes the dyvyne substance of the soule, in those thynges the excellente and noble womanheed in a manner infynytely dothe excell the rude grosse kynd of men....21

Some of the arguments with which Agrippa develops this claim are deliberately frivolous, and yet he insistently challenges the misogynist and patriarchal legal culture by which women, “being subdewed as it were by force of armes, are constrained to give place to men, and to obeye theyr subdewers, not by no naturall no[r] divyne necessitie or reason, but by custome, education, fortune, and a certayne tyrannical occasion.”22

Nor was his feminism merely theoretical. At a time when such interventions were dangerous, he mocked the theological faculty of the University of Cologne for having given its approval to that notorious handbook of witch-hunters, the brutally misogynist Malleus maleficarum; and when in 1518 he served as municipal advocate in the city of Metz, he put his life and career on the line by intervening in the case of a woman who had been arrested and tortured by the inquisition on a charge of witchcraft: Agrippa secured her release and the return of her property—and made the inquisitor who was persecuting her answer to a charge of heresy.23

 

VI

The point of these examples is not to suggest that some clearly definable ideology called “Renaissance humanism” can be identified as congruent with or ancestral to such contemporary tendencies as feminism, deconstruction, and queer theory. As is widely known, the cultural practices associated with humanism arose out of the interactions of a nascent (or re-nascent) Italian civic culture with the remains of ancient Roman and Hellenistic literary, rhetorical, juristic, philosophical, and historiographical writings; and as Paul Oskar Kristeller has rightly insisted, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the term “humanist” carried no specific doctrinal or ideological sense, but referred simply to a professor or student of the studia humanitatis, which was “a well defined cycle of teaching subjects listed as grammar, rhetoric, poetry, history and moral philosophy....”24

However, I want to emphasize one crucial feature of this development: namely, that humanism opened out within that civic culture a discursive space, which the advent of printing subsequently made accessible across western Europe under the name of “the republic of letters”—a space within which various forms of writing (among them the highly wrought epistles with which humanists flattered, cajoled and bombarded one another) could acquire a previously unknown degree of autonomy, and within which thoroughgoing critiques of constituted authority and of authoritative dogma could be envisaged and undertaken.

I am thus not seeking to identify Renaissance or early modern humanism with any particular collection of ideological currents. The ideological and discursive complexion of humanism can be more adequately appreciated if humanism is conceived rather as a collection of enabling strategies, which is also to say, a rhetoric (Renaissance humanism was, if anything, rhetorical)—but a rhetoric whose general tendency and function was to bring into being and to sustain a discursive space, a public sphere, within which the power of established authority could no longer sustain its previously overwhelming position as a criterion of judgment, and within which the goal of legitimizing established authority no longer exercised a determinative influence upon the various forms of writing which at one and the same time constituted and were enabled by this newly opened discursive space or public sphere.

Thus, for example, Johannes Reuchlin's struggle against the theologians of the mendicant orders in support of the right of Jews within the Holy Roman Empire to retain their own books and practise their religion, which opened up a ten-year struggle, likened at the time to another siege of Troy, was supported by a chorus of humanist writers, among them Ulrich von Hutten with his brilliantly acerbic collections of Epistolae obscurorum virorum. In a similar sense, the old claim that Luther hatched the egg Erasmus laid has this much truth to it: first, that Luther took on, though with very different inflections, a humanist project of return ad fontes; and secondly, that what saved Luther from the fate of Jan Hus during the crucial years from 1517 to 1521 may very well have been the fact that many participants in that humanist culture which Erasmus can metonymically be taken to represent identified “Eleutherius” (the humanist cognomen with which Luther signed some of his early writings, and a name that humanists evidently felt to resonate with their discursive projects) as one of their own.25

One can hardly mention Erasmus and Luther in the same breath without remembering that in 1524-25 their controversy over free-will established a clear line of demarcation between a Platonizing humanist theology and the theology of Reformation Neo-Augustinianism. But as I have already proposed, the most helpful way of delimiting Renaissance humanism may be through an analysis of discursive function rather than of ideological or doctrinal content. To take just one example, Cornelius Agrippa was active in disseminating Luther's writings in the early 1520s, and his De vanitate (written in 1526, printed 1530) appears to contain strong echoes of Luther's doctrines, among them the catchword sola fide, “by faith alone.” At the same time, however, this book has strong affinities with Erasmus' Praise of Folly. Is De vanitate Lutheran in tendency, as some of its less careful readers have asserted, or is it expressive rather of a radical Erasmianism? Neither alternative is adequate, although the second may be closer to the mark. A consideration of discursive function would show that for all its piety and its apparent biblicism, De vanitate is engaged in the same project of a dispersal of originary authority that is more clearly evident in De occulta philosophia;26 its rhetoric operates quite clearly to open up a space within which something resembling a genuinely critical discourse becomes possible—and, not at all surprisingly, its early reception history is marked by attempts to close down such a space.27

 

VII

In this light, the history of twentieth-century appropriations of the term “humanism” is a melancholy one. One example will suffice: Douglas Bush's classic study The Renaissance and English Humanism (1939). Bush makes clear his desire, “without denying the importance, the necessity, of the rebellious side of the Renaissance ... to emphasize the more neglected and, I think, more truly representative elements of orthodox conservatism.”28 In what I would call a subtractive politicizing of his subject matter, Bush identifies humanism with this tendency. Erasmus, for example, is proleptically transformed into a follower avant la lettre of that great Victorian Matthew Arnold: his humanism is aligned with the ideal of a universal state “in which reason and the will of God should prevail,” and with “the ideal of a liberal, aristocratic, and international orthodoxy of sweetness and light.” Bush insists that “The two great philosophic enemies of religion and morality, and hence of Christian humanism, were sceptical and naturalistic doctrines”29—thus with the stroke of a pen banishing from the ambit of humanism such figures as Lorenzo Valla, Gianfrancesco Pico, Cornelius Agrippa, François Rabelais, and Michel de Montaigne, not to mention Erasmus himself, whose contributions to the development of a revived sixteenth-century scepticism have been lucidly analyzed by Richard Popkin.30 After this, one learns without surprise that, like “the great body of continental humanists,” English humanists were “unanimous in the defence of established authority”—a defence which appears, however, to have been an anxious matter. For as Bush immediately adds, “this solid, all-embracing orthodoxy is a dyke which the smallest stream of water may undermine and every hole must be stopped.” But reinforcements are available: Shakespeare himself, we are informed, “is no less attached than the most orthodox humanist to constituted authority, is no less scornful of the mob.”31

The image of Shakespeare in the role of the boy in the Dutch folk-tale, earnestly pressing his finger into a hole in the dyke, is idiotic. But what is more substantially wrong with this is its partiality, in both senses of the word—its tendentious and transparently politically motivated erasure of much that belongs within English Renaissance humanism. Bush is engaged in what I have termed a subtractive politicizing of humanism—or what might also be called, in some or all of the senses discussed in my opening paragraphs, a “justification” of humanism.

 

VIII

In concluding, I would like to make explicit a number of points that have only been lightly touched on in the course of these remarks. I have suggested that humanism has been grievously misunderstood, not just by those who have subjected the term to orthodox misappropriations, but also by those who, in the name of “theory,” have criticized or dismissed it altogether. Such dismissals commonly allude to something called “essentialist humanism,” which I agree deserves criticism, but which appears to be more distinctly a nineteenth- and twentieth-century invention, the result of reading the history of the constitution of subjectivities through lenses tinted by post-Cartesian ideologies of human autonomy, than anything that would arise out of a scrupulous consideration of humanist texts of the Renaissance.32

Without pretending to diminish or obscure the ideological faultlines that traverse this area of the humanities, I have suggested that the apparent bifurcation of the field of literary and cultural studies between “theory” and “humanism” may rest upon a number of insufficiently examined premises. One might add that “theory,” no less than “humanism,” is a term that demands critical scrutiny—not least because the word implies an optical relation between knower and known of a kind that seems incommensurate with the forms of intricately reflexive analysis developed by thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Luce Irigaray.33

And finally, let me confront the ghost of Matthew Arnold, who has haunted this paper from the beginning (and the title of whose best-known essay is echoed in my subtitle). Arnold's reputation as a critic and cultural theorist in the English-speaking world has never been easy to explain to outsiders. Do we value him as a reasoner? As Gerald Graff observes, “Arnold's idea of defending reason in Culture and Anarchy amounts to repeating catchphrases like 'reason and the will of God' with such mind-numbing frequency that we overlook the fact that Arnold never precisely defines these terms—indeed, he actively opposes such definition....”34

Or do we value him as someone who expands our mental horizons? To quote Graff again:

Insofar as reason implies the extension of the boundaries of consciousness as far as they can reach, Arnold is eager to curtail it. He inherits the romantic fear that increasing self-consciousness means the decline of cultural health, yet missing from his constitution is any of the romantic compulsion to stretch the limits of self-consciousness regardless of the consequences.35

It is certainly not as a spokesman for a democratic understanding of culture that we read Arnold. When in 1866 a crowd demonstrating in support of extending the franchise pushed down some wrought-iron railings in what became known as the Hyde Park riots, Arnold quoted his father's opinion: “'As for rioting, the old Roman way of dealing with that is always the right one; flog the rank and file, and fling the ringleaders from the Tarpeian Rock!' And this opinion we can never forsake, however our Liberal friends may think a little rioting, and what they call popular demonstrations, useful sometimes to their own interests....”36

Arnold's true importance is an an ideologue, the inventor of a mode of argument which subtractively politicizes culture by separating it from the categories of the “practical” and the “political” while at the same time mobilizing it, in an eminently practical manner, in support of a conservative and anti-democratic cultural politics defined for Arnold by such thinkers as Burke, Coleridge, and Joubert. This, in brief, is the argument of Arnold's most famous essay, “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time.”

At a key moment of that essay, Arnold reveals in its full perversity the logic of cultural justification which impels his argument:

Joubert has said beautifully: “C'est la force et le droit qui règlent toutes choses dans le monde; la force en attendant le droit.” (Force and right are the governors of this world; force till right is ready.) Force till right is ready; and till right is ready, force, the existing order of things, is justified, is the legitimate ruler.37

Which is to say that force is legitimate, both before and after it has been legitimized. And when will right be ready? If that which has not yet been legitimized is in fact always already legitimate, then is there any reason why its legitimation should not be indefinitely deferred?

In the opening sections of this paper, I suggested a model of “justification” in which the humanities were subject to the deforming influence of forces imagined as external—whether in my image of writers like Roger Kimball or Dinesh D'Souza as malicious and ill-informed ideologues, or in their image of scholars like me as, in D'Souza's memorable phrase, “Visigoths in Tweed.”38 In Arnold's quotation from Joubert, another closely-related model is evident, one in which the domain of culture (let us say the humanities) is made to function as a means of legitimizing or justifying “the existing order of things.”

But from my brief account of humanism another possibility emerges. It is commonplace enough to suggest, as I have done, that the activities of Renaissance humanists opened out and sustained a discursive space or public sphere within which real movement towards a freedom at once social and individual became conceivable. (This notion is of course no novelty: it has been extensively discussed by thinkers as diverse as Jürgen Habermas and Terry Eagleton.)

From the same text of Walter Benjamin's which gave me the epigraph to this paper a phrase with which to describe that movement towards and into freedom comes suddenly into mind: a “leap in the open air of history.”39

I close with two questions. Are such leaps ever possible? Would human life be endurable under the presupposition that they were not?

 

NOTES

1  Oxford English Dictionary, “Justify,” 9.

2  The NEXIS database figures are quoted from Democratic Culture 3.1 (Spring 1994): 2.

3  Ellen Messer-Davidow, “Manufacturing the Attack on Liberalized Higher Education,” Social Text 36 (Fall 1993): 40-80.

4  Messer-Davidow, 49, 60, 63-64; see also Jon Wiener, “Dollars for Neocon Scholars,” The Nation (1 January 1990): 12-14; Sara Diamond, “Readin', Writin', and Repressin',” Z Magazine (February 1991): 45-48; and Michael Keefer, “'Outside Agitators,' Inside Activists: Who's Paying for What?”, Philosophy and Social Action 19.1-2 (January-June 1993): 18-23.

5  The program of the “University in Jeopardy” conference, held on March 12, 1993 at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto, acknowledged financial support from NAS in bringing in the conference's principal speaker, Dinesh D'Souza (who was accompanied at the conference by Barry Gross, the treasurer of NAS).

6  George F. Will, “Literary Politics,” Newsweek (22 April 1991): 72.

7  “President Bush Names 8 Scholars to Sit on Humanities Board,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (8 April 1992): A25.

8  Stephen Burd, “Chairman of Humanities Fund Has Politicized Grants Process, Critics Charge,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (22 April 1992): A1, A32-33.

9  Karen J. Winkler, “A Conservative Plans to 'Sound the Guns' at NEH,” The Chronicle of Higher Education (22 April 1992): A33.

10  John K. Wilson, “Sommers and Her Conspiracies,” Democratic Culture 3.2 (Fall 1994): 9.

11  Nina Auerbach, “Christina's World,” Democratic Culture 3.2 (Fall 1994): 12.

12  John Fekete, Moral Panic: Biopolitics Rising (Montréal and Toronto: Robert Davies Publishing, 1994), p. 345 n.4. Do we need to be reminded that, as Susan Sontag has observed, the social application of disease metaphors of this kind is very commonly an invitation to social surgery—that is, to violence? Fekete's book merits close reading and commentary, but while his arguments are in some places forceful, they are elsewhere not sufficiently cogent to support his conclusions.

13  Wayne Booth, “A Politically Correct Letter to the Newspaper,” Democratic Culture 3.1 (Spring 1994): 2. More often, Booth adds, references to “political correctness” serve as “a mere coverup for positions authors prefer not to express openly”—such as mockery of “(1) decency; (2) legality; (3) moral or ethical standards; (4) justice, fairness, equality of opportunity; (5) tact, courtesy, concern about hurting people's feelings unnecessarily; (6) generosity; (7) kindness; (8) courage in defending the underdog; (9) anti-bigotry; (10) anti-racism; (11) anti-anti-Semitism; (12) anti-fascism; (13) anti-sexism; (14) refusal to kneel to mammon; (15) sympathetic support for the jobless, the homeless, the impoverished, or the abused; (16) preservation of an environment in which human life might survive; (17) openness to the possibility that certain popular right-wing dogmas just might be erroneous.”

14  Roger Kimball, Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education (1990; rpt. New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. xi.

15  Dinesh D'Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 177. The joke resides in the fact that Wellek and Warren were principal theorists of the New Criticism, which during the 1940s and 1950s became the dominant interpretive tendency within English departments in the North American academy, and remains the basis of what is now thought of as “traditional” literary interpretation—even though in 1948 the New Criticism was denounced by Douglas Bush, then president of the Modern Language Association, for its “aloof intellectuality” and “avoidance of moral values” (see Gerald Graff, Professing Literature [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987], p. 248). Criticizing the New Critics' “appalling professional jargon,” which makes reading “a science for experts,” G. B. Harrison, another pre-New Critical traditionalist, proposed that “There is a great danger that the study of English literature may be destroyed by the new critics...” (Profession of English [1962; rpt. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967], pp. 64-65).

16  An initiative of Professor Roseann Runte during her tenure as President of the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, the Corporate Humanist Awards were intended to encourage members of Canada's corporate elite to provide financial and political support to humanities scholarship, teaching and research in Canadian universities. In this the awards were an abject failure: the derisory total of corporate donations received in 1993 came to substantially less than the CFH's disbursements in awards to various Corporate Humanists.

17  Aulus Gellius, Noctes atticae, xvii, translation quoted from Donald R. Kelley, Renaissance Humanism (Boston: Twayne, 1991), p. 2.

18  The Satires of Ludovico Ariosto, trans. Peter DeSa Wiggins (Athens, Ohio University Press, 1976), pp. 152-53; qtd. from William Kerrigan and Gordon Braden, The Idea of the Renaissance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 29-30.

19  See Agrippa, Opera, ed. R.H. Popkin (2 vols.; Lyon, c. 1600; facsimile rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1970), vol. 1, sig. A2v; the translation is that of J.F. (1651), cited from Three Books of Occult Philosophy written by Henry Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim, ed. Donald Tyson (St. Paul, Minnesota: Llewellyn Publications, 1993), p. li.

20  Thevet, Les vrais pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres (2 vols.; Paris, 1584), vol. 2, fol. 544; Bodin, De la démonomanie des sorciers (Paris, 1581), fol. 219v.

21  Henry Cornelius Agrippa, Of the nobilitie and excellencie of womankynde (London, 1542), sigs. A2v-A3.

22  Ibid., sig. G.

23  See Charles G. Nauert, Jr., Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1965), pp. 59-61. The inquisitor had charged that the woman must be a witch because her mother had likewise been accused of sorcery: Agrippa responded that this was evidence of heresy, in the form of a flat denial of the efficacy of the sacrament of baptism.

24  P. O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and the Arts: Collected Essays (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 3.

25  For a convenient outline of the issue, see Alistair McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), ch. 2. “Eleutherius” in a latinized form of the Greek word for “freedom” or “liberty”: eleutheria.

26  See my article “Agrippa's Dilemma: Hermetic 'Rebirth' and the Ambivalences of De vanitate and De occulta philosophia,” Renaissance Quarterly 41.4 (Winter 1988): 614-53.

27  The book was promptly condemned by the theological faculties of Paris and Louvain, and subsequently by the privy council of the Emperor Charles V.

28  Douglas Bush, The Renaissance and English Humanism (1939; rpt. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), p. 33.

29  Bush, pp. 65, 83, 85. “Sweetness and light” and “reason and the will of God” are Arnoldian phrases which recur throughout his most famous book, Culture and Anarchy (1869).

30  See Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

31  Bush, pp. 88-89, 95.

32  What is needed in this respect are readings of, for example, Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico that could be more attentive than past readings to the constitution of subjectivity in their writings—and, on the other hand, readings of Descartes that would attend more closely to the manner in which his discursive itineraries rest upon appropriations of specifically Renaissance materials. (For an attempt at the latter, see my article “The Dreamer's Path: Descartes and the Sixteenth Century,” Renaissance Quarterly 49 [1996], forthcoming.)

33  The Greek word theoria refers primarily to an act of looking at, viewing or beholding, and only by extension to a process of contemplation or speculation.

34  Gerald Graff, “Arnold, Reason, and Common Culture,” in Matthew Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Samuel Lipman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 189.

35  Ibid.

36  Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, ed. Lipman, p. 135.

37  “The Function of Criticism at the Present Time,” in Arnold, Essays in Criticism (London: Macmillan, 1904), p. 12.

38  See Dinesh D'Souza, “The Visigoths in Tweed,” Forbes (1 April 1991): 81-86; rpt. in Beyond PC: Towards a Politics of Understanding, ed. Patricia Aufderheide (St. Paul, Minnesota: Graywolf Press, 1992), pp. 11-22.

39  Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” XIV, in Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (1970; rpt. London: Fontana, 1973), p. 263.