Right Eye and Left Heel: Ideological Origins of the Legend of Faustus

[This essay was first presented at the conference on CONTEXTS: The Interdisciplinary Study of Literature, University of Manitoba (13-16 May 1987); a revised version was read the Renaissance Seminar, University of Sussex, 25 October 1988. It was first published in Mosaic 22.2 (Spring 1989): 79-94.]

 

The old is dying, and the new cannot be born. In this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms.

(Antonio Gramsci, qtd. in Marzani 296)

 

My subject is the sixteenth-century legend of Doctor Faustus, the protagonist of which is a university scholar in full rebellion against the received system of knowledge. I shall argue that the early forms of this legend both participate in and record the orthodox suppression of an actual challenge to this system; the legend may therefore speak to us with renewed relevance at a time when the current organization of the field of textual studies is again being challenged, in the name this time of “comparatist” or “interdisciplinary” modes of analysis.

The words of Gramsci which I used as an epigraph might with equal validity be applied to both situations. The very familiarity of this dictum, however, permits the reader all too easily to forget its figurative nature. Consider then, a more recent development of the same allegory, drawn from a well-known essay by Jacques Derrida:

Here there is a kind of question, let us still call it historical, whose conception, formation, gestation, and labor we are only catching a glimpse of today. I employ these words, I admit, with a glance toward the operations of childbearing—but also with a glance toward those who, in a society from which I do not exclude myself, turn their eyes away when faced by the as yet unnamable which is proclaiming itself and which can do so, as is necessary whenever a birth is in the offing, only under the species of the nonspecies, in the formless, mute, infant, and terrifying form of monstrosity. (293)

Ripped untimely from their contexts and superimposed in this manner, as variations on a theme, the words of Gramsci and Derrida seems to coalesce into a single grotesque image—grotesque, in the first instance, because Gramsci's words evoke, though without laughter, that bizarre image of the senile hag in childbirth which Mikhail Bakhtin identifies as a recurrent, perhaps an organizing feature of the Renaissance counterworld of carnival; and in the second grotesque, not just because what is at issue is emphatically paradoxical, but also because of the way in which the reader's glance is made to flicker between the unnameable birth in progress and the unnamed ones whose averted eyes certify it as monstrous. Yet while the superimposed layers of this image may appear to coalesce, there remains an obvious and powerful tension between them. The monstrosity that is no more than implicit in Gramsci's words becomes inescapable in Derrida's—which, if their perhaps disingenuous ambivalence be counted as morbid, may themselves be taken to exemplify at least one of the symptoms alluded to by Gramsci.

One subsidiary function of this essay will be to pose the question of whether, or to what degree, this conflated image of a laboring expectancy, of a monstrous birth in the offing, of the old struggling to deliver or miscarry the new, can convey what is at stake in the turn to an interdisciplinary mode in literary studies. This interdisciplinary turn might by the cynical be seen as an attempt to generate new and productive forms of intellectual practice out of the interstices between disciplines, some of which have themselves been described by their more searching practitioners as played-out and sterile. (One thinks, for example, of Richard Rorty's remarks to the effect that “that literary genre we call 'philosophy'” has “outlived its usefulness” [xiv], or of Terry Eagleton's recent study of literary theory, which begins by recognizing literature as an illusion and ends by identifying literary theory as another one and proposing that the best possible thing for it to do would be to argue itself out of existence [204].) Indeed, an ambivalence comparable to that of this grotesque compound image appears to traverse the very notion of an interdisciplinary approach to literature—for to speak in such terms is at one and the same time to transgress disciplinary boundaries and to re-assert them as defining the limits to that which is being approached, and consequently its nature as an object of study.

Thus, if certain forms of ideological closure are implicit in the division of textual studies into disciplines, it is arguable that interdisciplinary studies may serve as much to perpetuate as to subvert these forms of closure. A discipline in the human sciences—to hazard a partial definition—might be termed an apparently self-authenticating, self-perpetuating social narrative which recounts a variously defined “us” to ourselves, in the process “disconcealing,” structuring and objectifying this collective identity (Lyotard 18 ff.; Gadamer 103). The material substratum of this meta-narrative is in every case a sequence of relationships, of authority and of submission, between doctor and discipulus—a banal fact which may, however, suggest a similarly close relationship between the derivative terms “doctrine” and “discipline.” Such a relationship is more clearly perceptible in the manner in which the subject-matter of the methodologies that apparently shape the meta-narrative of the discipline are themselves delimited by certain broad doctrinal or ideological commitments which the discipline in turn legitimizes.

English studies, for example, in their New Critical phase commonly took as axiomatic the autonomy and “organic unity” of the text, consequently imposing a severely reductive meaning upon the idea of “context,” which came to denote an inert background from which the individual canonized text had decisively separated itself, rather than something inextricably interwoven (contextus) with all texts as a condition of their textuality. At the same time, not surprisingly, New Critics tended to attribute an analogous autonomy both to the act of writing and to characters in the texts that they explored. The discipline thus both echoed and legitimized an ideology of individualism which, in attenuated form, is still routinely an object of devotion for liberal (and illiberal) political orators. After a period of conceptual “disorder” in which traditionalists have regularly lamented a lack of system and coherence (see for example Cain 93), a similar cycle of legitimation may now be developing in the “new new criticism”—which perhaps seeks less to complete the overthrow of its once-hegemonic namesake that (in a familiar deconstructive doublet) to supplant and supplement, replicating its ideological functions in a mood of ironic dispersal rather than of unification.

My primary concern in this essay, however, is to propose an ideologically-based analysis of the origins of the legend of Faustus—a legend in which, as every reader of Marlowe or Goethe knows, the inadequacy of the traditional academic disciplines is proclaimed at the outset. In mastering philosophy, medicine, law and theology, Goethe's Faust has learned only “dass wir nichts wissen können” (line 363). His gestures of dismissal echo those of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, who in summarizing his rejection of the principal academic disciplines of his day declares that “Philosophy is odious and obscure, / Both Law and Phisicke are for pettie wits”—and “Divinitie,” traditionally the queen of the sciences and the ideological matrix in which the others subsist, is “basest” of them all, “Unpleasant, harsh, contemptible and vilde...” (A: 139-42).1 Marlowe's Faustus has at this point already turned to the “Metaphysickes of Magicians” (A: 79), which hold out to him, not the dialectical skills of which he already boasts, nor the medical powers which, having mastered, he could respect only if they enabled him to raise the dead and to be more than human, nor the despicable trivialities of the law nor, finally, that promise of “everlasting death” (A: 76) which is all he can find in the New Testament—but rather a dominion that “Stretcheth as farre as doth the minde of man” (A: 91).

Yet in this play, as in other Renaissance versions of the story, the attempt to substitute for the orthodox disciplines a form of power/knowledge which would be immediately transitive in its effects both upon the knower and upon the world that it subjects to him, thus dislocating and transcending the hegemonic system of discourses, is wholly abortive. It is noteworthy that the play contains a powerful analogue to that grotesque compound image of a monstrous birth, or non-birth, with which I began. In the first scene Faustus sums up his desires in two resonant lines: “A sound Magician is a mighty god: / Here tire, my braines, to get a Deity” (A: 92, B: 89).2 He thus announces a project of a self-begotten rebirth into divine form which would deliver him into “a world of profit and delight, / Of power, of honor, of omnipotence,” at the same time giving him sway over the world itself: “All things that moove betweene the quiet poles / Shalbe at my commaund...” (A: 83-84, 86-87). This initial aspiration is inverted in Faustus's last soliloquy, where he wishes futilely that he might evade eternal punishment by being “changde /Unto some brutish beast” (A: 1490-91). Moreover, in what sounds perversely like a kind of prayer, he cries:

You starres that raignd at my nativitie,  
whose influence hath alotted death and hel, 
Now draw up Faustus like a foggy mist, 
Into the intrailes of yon laboring cloude, 
That when you vomite foorth into the ayre, 
My limbes may issue from your smoaky mouthes, 
So that my soule may but ascend to heaven.... (A: 1474-80)

Faustus is reduced to an abject attempt to surrender his bodily integrity in a disgusting reversal of birth; having aspired to “rend the cloudes” (A: 89), he now begs for physical dissolution in their entrails. The bargain proposed—of resorption into a dismembering womb, and of regurgitation and dispersal, in exchange for the salvation of his soul—is the most violent expression of despair in the play.

It is one of the many ironies of this play that Faustus's counter-disciplinary, undisciplined, demonic way to a species of power/knowledge itself quickly assumes the features of a parody discipline: what Faustus achieves with his sophistical critique of the ends and limits of the academic disciplines is, in Constance Brown Kuriyama's helpful portmanteau coinage, “omnimpotence” (95). Overtones of a conventional doctor-discipulus relationship are implicit in Faustus's desire to accelerate his study of magic through the “sage conference” of Valdes and Cornelius (A: 131). (Perhaps because this demonic counter-discipline is parasitic upon the forms of knowledge which he already possesses, the arrogant novice has little to learn: Valdes tells him, “First Ile instruct thee in the rudiments, / And then wilt thou be perfecter than I” [A: 194-95].) In the comic scene which immediately follows Faustus's conjuration of Mephostophilis, however, a doctor-discipulus, master-servant sequence becomes explicit.

Here Wagner, who is Faustus's servant, engages the beggarly clown as his own servant with the promise to “make [him] go like Qui mihi discipulus” (A: 375), with the inducement that (as he says) “I will teach thee to turne thyself ... to a dogge, or a catte, or a mouse, or a ratte, or anything” (A: 421-22), and also with the coercive assistance of two devils whose capacity to terrify the clown awakens the latter's interest in what he calls, in the 1616 quarto, “this conjuring Occupation” (B: 379). Shortly thereafter, Faustus is himself subjected to a similar coercion, and bullied by Lucifer, Belzebub and Mephostophilis into accepting constraints upon his very thoughts: “Thou art damn'd, think thou of hell” (B: 642); “Thou shouldst not thinke on God. Thinke on the devill” (B: 662-63). His surrender, with a vow “never to looke to heaven,” elicits from Lucifer the suave reply: “So shalt thou show thy selfe an obedient servant...” (B: 666-67). However, the reader or playgoer has already been made aware, in a lighter way, that this occupation or discipline involves strict constraints. Wagner, in his sternest manner, says to the clown: “Villaine, call me Master Wagner, and see that you walke attentively, and let your right eye be alwaies Diametrally fixt upon my left heele, that thou maist, Quasi vestigiis nostris insistere” (B: 384-87). “God forgive me,” says the clown, “he speaks Dutch fustian: well, Ile folow him, Ile serve him, thats flat” (A: 435-36).

Perhaps the most damning thing that can be said of the scholars who have studied the early forms of the legend of Faustus is that they would appear, with some notable exceptions, to have followed Wagner's instructions to the letter. Goethe specialists concerned to trace his footprints among a mass of source materials, or Marlovians getting up the obligatory background; folklorists working to identify sources and analogues to the motifs absorbed into the legend; practitioners of a sometimes more or less inert form of literary historiography; students of Renaissance occultism or, more rarely, of humanistic and Reformation controversies—they have for the most part adhered to the paths prescribed by their respective disciplines. It would be churlish to deny that these scholars have provided a basis for the understanding of something more than the disparate parts made visible by their studies. Yet, as may be suggested by the critical perspective upon disciplinary constraints which is built into the legend, at least in its Marlovian and Goethean forms, the origins and early development of the Faustus story cannot be adequately comprehended within the bounds of any single discipline. Although the legend is by common consent of major importance in that cultural manifold which is their shared, or rather partitioned, object of study, from the point of view of each separate discipline its early forms appear somehow peripheral. The reason for this, I would argue, is that the intelligibility of these early forms of the legend is inseparable from their ideological functions as polemical narrative—and it is these functions which the division of textual studies into disciplines serves to suppress and to make invisible.

“Polemical narrative,” I have said: let us be more precise. Whatever may be said about the motifs drawn into it from, for example, the patristic legend of Simon Magus and the medieval legends of Cyprian, Virgilius or Theophilus (see Butler 73ff.), the legend of Faustus arose in the early decades of the sixteenth century as a form of ideological assassination, as an abusive attack upon representatives of a current of thought which proposed to deconstruct and to transcend the orthodox categories of knowledge, which appropriated Christian doctrine in the service of a kind of gnosis, a radically heterodox power/knowledge, and in which, finally, the metaphor of rebirth that is parodied and inverted in Marlowe's play occupied a central place.

There is not space here to do more than name a few of the prominent early exponents of this Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition—Marsilio Ficino, philosopher and translator of Hermetic, Platonic and Neoplatonic texts; Giovanni Pico, polymath, philosopher, and Cabalist; Joannes Reuchlin, embattled Hebrew scholar and Cabalist; Joannes Trithemius, abbot, annalist and magician; Ludovico Lazzarelli, humanist poet and Hermetic enthusiast, Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples, an evangelical humanist, the prime reinterpreter of Aristotle for his generation; Cornelius Agrippa, encyclopedic occultist and skeptic.

Similarly, at this time one can only gesture at some of the works of modern scholarship which have restored this invasive tradition to view: the essays of Garin, Kristeller, Secret, and Walker; iconological studies by Wind and by Klibansky, Panofsky and Saxl; explorations by Zambelli, Zika, and Grafton of orthodox reactions to the legendary Hermes Trismegistus and to such Hermetists and Cabalists as Agrippa and Reuchlin; and Frances Yates's speculative historical reconstructions—which have themselves provided the occasion for cross-disciplinary warfare between intellectual historians and historians of science.3

The connections between this current of thought and the Faustus legend may intially seem far from obvious. In the first complete version of the legend to be printed, the Historia von D. Johann Fausten published by Spiess in 1587, there remain only traces of what I would call the originary polemic against the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition, while a broad current of anti-Catholic polemic is in evidence throughout the text. If the narrative exfoliation of the legend resulted in an occultation of the ideological polarity from which it sprang, however, Marlowe's Doctor Faustus might be said to constitute a return of the repressed. As I have argued in another essay (“Misreading”), the more authentic 1604 version of this play embodies an unbalanced dialectic between a Reformed theological orthodoxy which it simultaneously affirms as inescapable and exposes as intolerable, and that other ideology which is the basis of Faustus's unstable ambitions, and to the nature of which he offers an important clue when he aspires to be “as cunning as Agrippa was, / Whose shadowes made all Europe honor him” (A: 150-51).

The German humanist and magician Henricus Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535)—whose “shadowes” were the theatrical displays of necromancy with which this “abundant scholar” was popularly thought to have astonished his contemporaries, among them Erasmus, More, Luther's protector the Elector of Saxony, and the Emperor Charles V (Nashe 297-99)—can provide a focus for our inquiries. Of Agrippa's many books the best known was De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque excellentia verbi Dei declamatio, which anticipates Marlowe's Faustus in its rhetorical demolition of all orthodox forms of knowledge, from logic to courtly place-seeking, and from whore-mongering to scholastic theology. Despite the evangelical posture which gives shape to its satire, this book was suspected (by, for example, Thevet vol. 2, 544r-v) of being a kind of ground-clearing operation for the magical doctrines espoused in Agrippa's other major work, his De occulta philosophia, an encyclopedia of occultism in which appear rhapsodic flights (such as the “Epistola nuncupatoria” to Book III, and also III.vi) that would seem to underlie Faustus's praise of magic. The relationship seen by some sixteenth-century readers between these books is thus parodied by the pattern of Faustus's first soliloquy. Moreover, a Hermetic doctrine of spiritual rebirth which entails the acquisition of divine powers is the basis both of Christian faith as Agrippa understands it in De vanitate and of the highest forms of magic described in Book III of De occulta philosophia (see Keefer, “Dilemma”).

There are strong reasons for locating the historical Doctor Faustus on the radical fringe of that Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition of which Agrippa was one of the most notorious exponents.4 Georg of Helmstadt, or Georgius Sabellicus Faustus (as he came to call himself), first comes to light as a magician in a letter written in 1507 by Joannes Trithemius (to whom Agrippa three years later dedicated the first manuscript version of De occulta philosophia). From this letter is appears that Faustus claimed astonishing magical powers, boasting, for example, that if all the works of Plato and Aristotle were lost he could restore them—as Ezra did the writings of Moses—with increased beauty, and bragging in addition “that the miracles of Christ the Saviour were not so wonderful, that he himself could do all the things that Christ had done, as often and whenever he wishes.” Faustus's transgressions were not merely verbal for, according to Trithemius, he also disgraced himself as a sodomite (Palmer and More 83-86). Frank Baron's analysis of this letter has shown both that Faustus, drawing with wild eclecticism upon a variety of magical traditions, associated himself with Zoroaster and Numa Pompilius, among others; and also that Trithemius, himself struggling against accusations of black magic, took the occasion to denounce him as a means of displaying his own orthodoxy (23-29).

Nowhere, of course, does Trithemius associate Faustus with the Hermetic-Cabaistic tradition to which he himself adhered. One may suspect, however, that he knew more about Faustus than his letter reveals. In 1506, and again at greater length in 1514, Trithemius described a visit to the court of Louis XII of France made in 1501 by a similarly boastful magician, one Joannes Mercurius de Corigio (see Garin, Testi 45-46). Here again there are no direct indications of Hermetic or Cabalistic affiliations; but in this case, unlike that of Faustus, the man left writings which have survived, as have those of his disciple, the humanist Ludovico Lazzarelli (see McDaniel; Kristeller, “Lazzarelli”; Ruderman). From these it is clear that Joannes Mercurius was more than just a bizarre magician and prophet: he claimed, with something like the eclecticism of Faustus, to be at once Hermes, Enoch, Apollonius of Tyana, and Christ; and Lazzarelli's writings about him reveal a knowledge of the Cabala. Moreover, the wording of Trithemius's text lets slip the fact that he was aware of the man's true oddity: he writes that Joannes Mercurius scorned “almost all the ancients together, the philosophers as much as the theologians, since he might declare all of them, excepting only himself, to have been unlearned.”5 If we knew nothing else about this bizarre figure, the words “excepting only himself” would seem merely a clumsy turn of phrase. But as Trithemius undoubtedly realized, the man literally believed himself to be one of “the ancients”—or rather, several of them combined. There are then grounds for believing that in the case of Faustus, Trithemius also knew more than he was willing to commit to paper.

A further sampling of this learned abbot's correspondence reveals a fact that is of equal interest. Like Mercurius's disciple Lazzarelli, who seems, shortly before 1494, to have initiated the elderly King Ferdinand of Aragon into the mystery of Hermetic rebirth into divine form (D.P. Walker, Spiritual 64-72), and like Mercurius himself, who would appear to have had similar designs upon Louis XII of France in 1501, Trithemius attempted to disseminate magical beliefs and practices through the conversion of powerful princes. In 1503 he wrote to the Margrave of Brandenburg in the hope of enrolling him as a student of natural magic, of establishing for him a program of studies in this art, and (it would seem) of subsequently persuading other rulers to follow his example (Trithemius sig. G3-Hv). Trithemius's persuasions, which emphasize the political as well as spiritual advantages to be gained from a knowledge of magic, may seem staid in comparison with those of Mercurius, who made wild promises of good fortune and longevity to the King of France, or of Lazzarelli, whose conversion of Ferdinand involved a strongly heterodox appropriation of Christian doctrine. While Trithemius was playing the same game, however, it was obviously not in his interest to reveal how much his own magical doctrines were derived from the same sources as those of such embarrassingly indiscreet practitioners as Lazzarelli and Mercurius—or Georgius Faustus.

The association of the historical Faustus with the radical wing of the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition is reinforced by a letter of the humanist Mutianus Rufus, who encountered him in 1513, and scornfully proposed that the Dominican theologians who were trying to destroy “the philosopher Reuchlin” should take aim at this man instead (Palmer and More 87-88). Here again one may see an attempt to deflect hostile attention from a mainstream exponent of the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition to a figure on its radical periphery. Besides being a noted Hebrew scholar, Reuchlin was the author of De verbo mirifico (1494), a Cabalist exposition of the magical powers inherent in the name of Jesus. Agrippa borrowed heavily from this work in De occulta philosophia (see Zika, “De verbo” 138, “Reuchlin” 242-43), and also lectured on Reuchlin's book at the University of Dôle in 1509. (For this act he was denounced before the court of Margaret of Austria as a judaizing heretic, and lost his position at the university [Nauert 25-28]—another instance of orthodox reaction to this current of thought.)

The Reuchlin connection can take us farther still. In 1515 and 1517 Reuchlin's defenders struck out at the theologians with the famous Letters of Obscure Men. A riposte published by Ortwin Gratius in 1518, the Lamentationes obscurorum virorum, contains an intriguing exchange of letters about sinister demonic practices between “Agrippa Stygianus” and one “Georgius Subbunculator” (Zambelli, “Agrippa von Nettesheim,” 280, “Magic”). The latter name, if indeed it is a derisive modification of “Georgius Sabellicus,” is a telling one—for Faustus in his eclectic heterodoxy was in effect a subbunculator, a “botcher-up of old clothes.”

The names of Agrippa and Faustus (who died in 1535 and c. 1537 respectively) were subsequently paired with increasing frequency. Agrippa's brief service in the court of Charles V was absorbed, within several decades, into the legend of Faustus: both magicians were rumoured to have won victories for the emperor by magic (Palmer and More 103; Thevet, vol. 2, fol. 542v-543). In addition, the libel, first printed in 1546, that Agrippa's black dog was a devil, was echoed two years later by the claim that Faustus's dog, and his horse as well, were devils (Nauert 327; Palmer and More 98). It seems to have become almost a convention to associate Faustus, as Melanchthon did, with “iste nebulo qui scripsit De vanitate artium” (Palmer and More 102), with that “scoundrel” Agrippa.

Faustus, however, proved to be a more appropriate focus than Agrippa for the development of hostile legends. This “great sodomite and necromancer,” as the city records of Nuremberg called him in 1532 (Palmer and More 90), was a far more extreme transgressor of social and ideological codes; he also conveniently left no writings behind him. Agrippa, in contrast, was a famous (and in some circles well-respected) man of letters. His pupil Johannes Wier came to his defense in his widely-read De praestigiis daemonum (1563), a book which also attempts to redirect the attention of persecutors from the innocent women whom they were torturing as witches to the activities of learned magicians (Wier fol. 67-77, 206v-207, 368; cf. Baxter 57-62), and the fourth edition of which, printed in 1568, contains several anecdotes about the misdeeds and violent death of Faustus (Palmer and More 105-07).

The development of the central core of the Faustus legend (to which popular tales about, for example, Faustus devouring a load of hay could subsequently be added at will) thus forms part of the history of orthodox responses to heterodoxies associated with magical practices. Norman Cohn has argued persuasively that orthodox reactions to the medieval tradition of ceremonial magic during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries laid the foundation for the stereotype of the witch, which was fully elaborated only in the early fifteenth century (164-205). After the 1470s, however, the church found itself facing a new form of Hermetic and later also Cabalistic magic which claimed to be based upon the purest and most ancient religious traditions and to be in conformity with the true uncorrupted teachings of Christ. Medieval grimoires and pseudo-Solomonic texts could be easily enough condemned as sorcery and witchcraft—but what was one to say of the pious Hermes Trismegistus and the holy Cabalists? Were their modern interpreters—respected scholars and philosophers like Ficino, Pico, Trithemius and Reuchlin—also witches and sorcerers? The question did not initially take that form. Giovanni Pico was condemned in 1487 on theological rather than on demonological grounds—and then absolved in 1493 by Pope Alexander VI in terms that gave support to his theological claims for magic and cabala (Yates 113-14).

As social, political and ideological tensions increased in the early sixteenth century, however, the tone of the debate began to change. Shortly after the turn of the century Charles de Bouelles, who had visited Trithemius at his monastery of Spanheim and made use of his famous library, denounced him as having a pact with the devil (Wier fol. 75v). At about the same time, Gianfrancesco Pico, a nephew of the more famous Giovanni who shared neither his uncle's philosophical opinions nor his enthusiasm for magic, attacked in his De rerum praenotione (1506-07) any conflation of Christian and pagan traditions, denouncing Orpheus and Apollonius of Tyana as demonic magicians—and letting off Ficino, whose talismanic magic he linked with that of Apollonius, only because of his submissive attitude to the church (Walker, Spiritual 146-49). In this text the younger Pico also told stories, among them one about a magician who had promised to a curious and unwise prince “that he would present to him the siege of Troy as on a stage or in a theater, and would show him Achilles and Hector as they were when they fought.” This magician's pretended knowledge of future events let him down, however: he was promptly carried off by a devil (qtd. in Wier fol. 71r-v). A decade later, in 1515, Jerome Benivieni had to defend the reputations of Ficino and Giovanni Pico against the accusations of a preaching friar that they had attempted to unite their souls with God, perform miracles and prophesy by means of magical and cabalistic rites (Secret 77-78). The philosophers, it would seem, were being assimilated by the orthodox to the pattern of extreme Hermetists like Mercurius or Faustus, who actually claimed to be capable of such things.

Why, however, did the Faustus legend develop in Lutheran, rather than in Catholic or Calvinist circles? A tentative answer to this question may be sought in several facts. First, the Catholic church was less automatically predisposed than were the Reformers to identify any mention of magic as demonic sorcery (Thomas 27-89). Next, the reforming impulses of the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition, its claim to restore the pristine verities of the Christian religion, and its doctrines of illumination and rebirth all outflanked the teachings of the neo-Augustinian Reformers.6 No less significantly, certain late-patristic texts which Calvin rejected as “putrid fables” (vol. 48, viii) were used and transmitted at the University of Wittenberg under Luther and Melanchthon.

I refer in particular to the pseudo-Clementine Recognitions, and to the apocryphal Acts of the apostles Peter and Paul.7 These texts record a series of debates and magical contests between St. Peter and Simon Magus, the Gnostic heresiarch and magician whose teachings had been refuted by such orthodox polemicists as Irenaeus and Hippolytus in the second and third centuries A.D. (The name Faustus, it may be added, appears in association with Simon in the pseudo-Clementine texts; and heresies similar to those of Simon recur in the late fourth century in the mouth of Faustus the Manichee, who was refuted by St. Augustine [see Wentersdorf 215-19].) The heresies of Simonian Gnosticism, as presented in the Recognitions, resemble those of the major “gnosticizing” Hermetic texts, which date from the same period and which later formed the core of the Renaissance tradition espoused by Reuchlin, Trithemius, and Agrippa.8 The legend of Simon Magus, moreover, shows the same pattern of development—from doctrinal and demonological polemic to a narrative exfoliation resulting in the occultation of the Gnostic ideology—that I have shown to be traceable in the Faustus legend. Furthermore, in several important respects—the emphasis upon demonic flight, the episode of Helen of Troy, and the magician's irretrievable damnation—the later legend borrows from the earlier one. The Simon Magus legend is thus not merely the earliest of a large number of textual sources of the Faustus legend; it is also in a full sense its prototype and parallel.

To these ideological, etiological and structural parallels can be added a further, functional one. Melanchthon, whose statements about Faustus imply that he had encountered him, both in Wittenberg and perhaps also previously (Palmer and More 101-02)—although what he says about the man's Christian name and birthplace is contradicted by earlier sources (Baron 11-16)—repeatedly compares the sorcerer to Simon Magus. One may suspect that a kind of ratio is being constructed. The antichrist Simon Magus opposed, and yet by his very presence also testified to, the apostolic mission of St. Peter and St. Paul; Melanchthon's stories about Faustus imply a similar guarantee through demonic opposition of his own and Luther's quasi-apostolic role. A suspicion that such a ratio may underlie the Lutheran legend is strengthened by the curious response of one Augustine Lercheimer, a graduate of Wittenberg in the 1540s, to the publication of the Historia von D. Johann Fausten in 1587. Denouncing it angrily as “trivial, false, and nasty,” as a libel both upon the university with which it associates Faustus and also upon “Luther, Melanchthon, and others of sainted memory,” Lercheimer then proceeds, very oddly, to tell a story which links Faustus more intimately to the Lutheran leadership than does anything in the Faustbuch. It would appear that when Faustus was in Wittenberg, “he came at times to the house of Melanchthon,” of all people, where he received both hospitality and admonitions. Resenting the latter, he told his host one day as they descended to dinner that he would make all the pots in his kitchen fly up through the chimney. To which Melanchthon replied, with less than his usual eloquence, “Dass soltu wol lassen, ich schiesse dir in deine kunst”—and the magician, of course, was powerless to harm “the saintly man” (Palmer and More 121-22). This Kitchen Debate reproduces in miniature the rhetorical and magical contests between St. Peter and Simon Magus. The fact that Lercheimer evidently felt it to reflect credit upon his teacher speaks volumes.

* * * * 

The Faustus legend of the sixteenth century thus preserves, for those whose disciplinary commitments do not blind them to the evidence, traces of a vicious ideological struggle—one in which, to oversimplify matters somewhat, a radically relativistic current of thought which challenged religious and academic orthodoxies succumbed to the onslaught of an authoritarian, exclusivist biblical fundamentalism that had made its own compromises with the structures of political power. Such defeats are seldom absolute: thus, in 1619, the young René Descartes's dreams of a mathesis universalis and of a single method of inquiry which would reunify the scattered sciences were stimulated by his reading of Agrippa and of the Hermetic fantasies of the Rosicrucian manifestos (Descartes, vol. 10, 165, 167-68, 193-200, 214). Yet it was a defeat. However misleadingly, Joannes Reuchlin has most often been remembered by historians as the occasion of a violent ideological struggle between “humanists” and “scholastics” (the real issues, as Zika [“Reuchlin and Erasmus”] and Overfield have argued, were Reuchlin's courageous opposition to orthodox anti-semitism, in particular that of the Dominican order, and his propagation of Cabalistic magic). Cornelius Agrippa has survived, more dubiously, in the rhymes of the English translation of Struwwelpeter as “tall Agrippa,” who dips young racists into his enormous inkwell, from which they emerge as black as the child whom they have been tormenting. Despite their reputations as scholars, however, the comparatist, counter-disciplinary turn which Reuchlin and Agrippa represented had little if any impact upon university curricula in their century.

This fact may seem hard to regret, if one pauses to reflect upon the more wildly irrational elements in their writings, and upon their systematic failure to distinguish between the natural order and the order of words. However, something more fundamental was also at stake—quite literally so—in the ideological struggles whose traces I have been investigating.

One can scarcely speak of the legend of Faustus without remembering the central function in most of its versions of “das Ewigweibliche.” The “eternal feminine,” or the “eternal in woman”—whether figured by Goethe as “Una poenitentium ... sonst Gretchen genannt,” or by Marlowe as that glamourously demonic Helen whose lips suck forth Faustus's soul—draws the protagonist in the direction in which he was already going. It cannot have escaped attention that the central metaphor of this essay is derived from a different male image of the “eternal feminine,” one which registers quite precisely a male fear of the female body, and which uses it to symbolize the “monstrous” processes which escape masculine control. 

It may therefore be relevant to observe, in concluding, that one of Cornelius Agrippa's earliest writings was entitled De nobilitate et praecellentia foeminei sexus (1509). In this text he argues (I quote from the translation of 1542) that “betwene man and woman by substance of the soule, one hath no higher pre-emynence of nobylytye above the other, but both of them naturally have equall libertie of dignitie and worthynesse. But all other thynges, the which be in man, besydes the dyvyne substance of the soule, in those thynges the excellente and noble womanheed in a manner infynytely dothe excell the rude grosse kynd [i.e. nature] of men...” (sig. Aiiv-Aiii). In this text Agrippa subverts a long-established misogynist tradition with its own weapons of philological argument and the citation of scriptural and patristic authorities. The work is exuberantly playful, but that predominantly male scholarly tradition which has interpreted it as no more than an exercise in paradox is perhaps mistaken. For while Agrippa's arguments are in places deliberately frivolous, they also insistently call into question the established order both of gender relations and of ecclesiastical power (Wirth 609-13). In other writings Agrippa took a vigorous stand against the demonization of the feminine and of the female body which was under way in his lifetime. He mocked the theological faculty of the University of Cologne for having given its approval to that brutally misogynist text, the Malleus maleficarum (Opera, vol. 2, 1043; see Lea, vol. 2, 337-43). Moreover, in 1518 in Metz he put his career and his life on the line in his successful defense of a woman who had been accused of witchcraft and tortured by the local inquisitor (Nauert 59-61).

I conclude, then, with a question. Is it merely a coincidence that the period between 1560 and the late 1580s, during which the Faustus legend received its full narrative elaboration, also saw the first major outbreak of witch-hunts in Western Europe (Monter 35; Midelfort 32, 86-89; Macfarlane 26-27)—an outbreak in which, with the vehement approval of orthodox intellectuals, thousands of people, most of them women, were imprisoned, tortured and judicially murdered? One may be reminded of the image of Gretchen, the desired and the betrayed, which appeared to Goethe's Faust on Walpurgis Night, and of Faust's response to this apparition:

Welch eine Wonne! Welch ein Leiden! 
Ich kann von diesem Blick nicht scheiden. 
Wie sonderbar muss diesen schönen Hals
Ein einzig-rotes Schnürchen schmücken, 
Nicht breiter als ein Messerücken! (4201-05)

Or, in Barker Fairley's translation: “What joy, what suffering. I can't take my eyes off her. Strange how the red line round her lovely neck suits her. Not wider than the back of a knife” (73).

 

 

NOTES

1  My quotations from the Greg edition are identified by line numbers and by text (A refers to the edition of 1604 and its reprints of 1609 and 1611, B to the substantially revised and bowdlerized edition of 1616). U/v and i/j have been silently altered to conform with modern practice, and errors in Latin phrases are silently corrected. For the principles governing my use of the A and B texts, see Keefer, “Verbal Magic” and “History.”

2  These lines offer an interesting textual crux: the B-version of A: 92 contains what seems to be an ideologically-motivated softening of the meaning (“Demi-god” for “mighty god”), but the following line in A shows signs of memorial corruption (hypermetrical self-address, internal rhyme, suppression of the metaphor of begetting). I have given to B: 89 the punctuation of Jump's Revels Plays edition.

3  Yates's exaggerated claims about the formative role of the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition in the development of scientific mentalities have been challenged by Westman, by Vickers, and by Schmitt, who is criticizing Yates went so far as to propose that “Hermeticism never becomes a real driving force of any significant cultural movement during the Renaissance” (207)—a remark which may suggest that he, as much as Yates, would have done well to attend to Garin's warning against “troppo facili sintesi” (“Divagazioni” 466).

4  Baron's attempt to do so on the basis of Faustus's possible associations at Heidelberg University in the 1480s (20-22) is purely conjectural—although his discovery that Faustus studied there is of major importance. I have tried to show here that there are solid textual grounds for linking Faustus with the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition.

5  My translation. Trithemius wrote: “contemnens veteres pene cunctos, tam Philosophos, quam Theologos, cum prater se unum omnes diceret fuisse indoctos...” (Garin, Testi 46).

6  An early instance of the unstable relationship between the Hermetic-Cabalistic tradition and its near-opposite, predestinarian theology, is studied by D.P. Walker (Theology 42-62). In some cases the reforming impulses of this tradition were absorbed into orthodox evangelical movements (see for example Rice 19-29; Copenhaver 189-211). The concluding chapters of Agrippa's De vanitate, in which a quasi-Lutheran vocabulary is used to convey a thoroughly instrumental, Hermetic view of illumination and rebirth, exemplify an inverse process.

7  The Recognitions, first printed in 1504 by Lefèvre d'Étaples, is one of two surviving fourth-century recensions of a lost third-century work, itself a compilation of earlier Christian and Gnostic texts (Cullmann 63-131; Hennecke-Schneemelcher, vol. 2, 542-45). The Acts of Peter and Paul, which dates from the sixth or seventh century but incorporates parts of the second-century Acts of Peter (Hennecke-Schneemelcher, vol. 2, 575) was current in the Renaissance in a Latin translation dating from 1490 (A. Walker xiv).

8  These are the first, fourth, seventh and thirteenth tractates of the Corpus Hermeticum. For indications of their significance as a group, see Festugière 11; Nock, Corpus, vol. 1, 16, 61, 128n); Nock, Essays, vol. 1, 85. There are English translations of these texts in Grant (Anthology 211-33); the term “gnosticizing” is applied to them by Grant (Gnosticism 148).    

 

 

 

WORKS CITED

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Derrida, Jacques. “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” Writing and Difference. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.

Descartes, René. Oeuvres. Ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. 10 vols. Paris: Vrin, 1974.

Eagleton, Terry. Literary Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

Festugière, A,J. “L'Hermétisme.” Arsberättelse, Bulletin de la Société Royale des Lettres de Lund (1947-48): 1-58.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. Trans. P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

Garin, Eugenio. “Divagazioni ermetiche.” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia 31 (1976): 462-66.

----. Medioevo e Rinascimento. 1954. Bari: Laterza, 1966.

----, et al., ed. Testi umanistici su l'ermetismo. Rome: Bocca, 1955.

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. Faust: Eine Tragödie. Ed. Hanns W. Eppelsheimer. Munich: DTV, 1973.

----. Goethe's Faust. Trans. Barker Fairley. 1970. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Grafton, Anthony. “Protestant versus Prophet: Isaac Casaubon on Hermes Trismegistus.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 46 (1983): 78-93.

Grant, R.M., ed. Gnosticism: An Anthology. London: Collins, 1961.

----. Gnosticism and Early Christianity. 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Hennecke, E. New Testament Apocrypha. Ed. W. Schneemelcher. Trans. R. McL. Wilson et al. 2 vols. 1963-65. London: SCM, 1973-75.

Historia von D. Johann Fausten. Neudruck des Faustbuches von 1587. Ed. Hans Henning. Halle: Sprache und Literatur, 1963.

Keefer, Michael. “Agrippa's Dilemma: Hermetic 'Rebirth' and the Ambivalences of De vanitate and De occulta philosophia.” Renaissance Quarterly 41 (1988): 614-53.

----. “History and the Canon: The Case of Doctor Faustus.” University of Toronto Quarterly 56.4 (1987): 498-522.

----. “Misreading Faustus Misreading: The Question of Context.” Dalhousie Review 65.4 (1985-86): 511-33.

----. “Verbal Magic and the Problem of the A and B Texts of Doctor Faustus.” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 82 (1983): 324-46.

Klibansky, Raymond, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl. Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art. London: Nelson, 1964.

Kristeller, P.O. “Ludovico Lazzarelli e Giovanni da Correggio, due ermetici dal quattrocento....” Biblioteca degli Ardenti della citta di Viterbo. Ed. Augusto Pepponi. Viterbo: Agnesotti, 1960.

----. Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters. 1956. Rome Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1969.

Kuriyama, Constance Brown. Hammer or Anvil: Psychological Patterns in Christopher Marlowe's Plays. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980.

Lea, Henry Charles. Materials Toward a History of Witchcraft. Ed. A.C. Howland. 3 vols. 1939. New York: Yoseloff, 1957.

Lyotard, François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Macfarlane, Alan. Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and Comparative Study. London: Routledge, 1970.

Marlowe, Christopher Marlowe's Doctor Faustus 1604-1616: Parallel Texts. Ed. W.W. Greg. 1950. Oxford: Clarendon, 1968.

----. The Tragical History of the Life and Death of Doctor Faustus. Ed. John D. Jump. 1962. London: Methuen, 1974.

Marzani, Karl. The Promise of Eurocommunism. Westport, CT: Hill, 1980.

McDaniel, W.B. “An Hermetic Plague-Tract by Johannes Mercurius Corrigiensis.” Transactions and Studies of the College of Physicians of Philadelphia. 4th ser. 9 (1941-42): 96-111, 217-25.

Midelfort, H.C. Eric. Witch Hunting in Southwest Germany 1562-1684: the Social and Intellectual Foundations. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.

Monter, E.W., ed. European Witchcraft. New York: Wiley, 1969.

Nashe, Thomas. The Unfortunate Traveller and other works. Ed. J.B. Steane. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972.

Nauert, Charles G., Jr. Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965.

Nock, A.D., ed. Corpus Hermeticum. Trans. A.J. Festugière. 4 vols. Paris: Belles Lettres, 1960.

----. Essays on Religion and the Ancient World. Ed. Zeph Stewart. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1972.

Overfield, James H. “A New Look at the Reuchlin Affair.” Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 8 (1971): 167-207.

Palmer. P.M., and R.P. More. The Sources of the Faust Tradition from Simon Magus to Lessing. New York: Haskell, 1965.

Rice, Eugene F., Jr. “The De Magia Naturali of Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples.” Philosophy and Humanism. Ed. Edward P. Mahoney. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Rorty, Richard. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Ruderman, David B. “Giovanni Mercurio de Correggio's Appearance in Italy as Seen Through the Eyes of an Italian Jew.” Renaissance Quarterly 28.3 (1975): 309-22.

Schmitt, Charles B. “Reappraisals in Renaissance Science.” History of Science 16 (1978): 200-14.

Secret, François. Les kabbalistes chrétiens de la Renaissance. Paris: Dunod, 1964.

Thevet, André. Les vrais pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres. 2 vols. Paris, 1584.

Thomas, Keith. Religion and the Decline of Magic. 1971. Hardmondsworth: Penguin, 1973.

Trithemius, Joannes. Ioannis tritemii abbatis spanheymensis De septem secundeis, id est, intelligentiis, sive Spiritibus Orbes post Deum moventibus.... Adiectae sunt aliquot epistolae, ex opere Epistolarum Io. Tritemiis. Cologne, 1567.

Vickers, Brian. “Introduction.” Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance. Ed. Brian Vickers. 1984. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 1-55.

Walker, A., ed. Apocryphal Gospels, Acts and Revelations. Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. 16. Edinburgh: Clark, 1870.

Walker, D.P. The Ancient Theology: Studies in Christian Platonism from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century. London: Duckworth, 1972.

----. Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella. 1958. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975.

Wentersdorf, Karl P. “Some Observations on the Historical Faust.” Folklore 89 (1978): 201-23.

Westman, R.S. “Magical Reform and Astronomical Reform: The Yates Thesis Reconsidered.” Hermeticism and the Scientific Revolution. Ed. R.S. Westman and J.E. McGuire. Los Angeles: Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1977. 1-91.

Wier, Johann. Cinq livres de l'imposture des diables: des enchantements & sorcelleries: Pris du Latin de Jean Wier ... & faits François Par Jacques Grévin.... Paris, 1569.

Wind, Edgar. Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance. London: Faber, 1958.

Wirth, Jean. “'Libertins' et 'Epicuriens': Aspects de l'irréligion au XVIe siècle.” Bibliothèque d'humanisme et renaissance 39 (1977): 601-27.

Yates, Frances A. Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition. 1964. London: Routledge, 1978.

Zambelli, Paola. “Agrippa von Nettesheim in den neueren kritischen Studien und in den Handschriften.” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 51 (1969), Heft 2: 264-95.

----. Magic and Radical Reformation in Agrippa of Nettesheim.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 39 (1976): 69-103.

Zika, Charles. “Reuchlin and Erasmus: Humanism and Occult Philosophy.” Journal of Religious History 9 (1976-77): 223-46.

----. “Reuchlin's De Verbo Mirifico and the Magic Debate of the Late Fifteenth Century.” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 39 (1976): 104-38.

 

 

Agrippa's Dilemma: Hermetic 'Rebirth' and the Ambivalences of De vanitate and De occulta philosophia

Agrippa's Dilemma: Hermetic 'Rebirth' and the Ambivalences of De vanitate and De occulta philosophia

When in 1625 Gabriel Naudé wished to clear the name of Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535) from the pious slanders of the demonologists of the intervening century, he argued that this learned man, “a new Trismegistus in the three higher faculties of Theology, Law, and Medicine, [...] who [...] exercise[d] his mind on all sciences and disciplines,” deserved better than to be abused with stories “which would be much more appropriate in the magical tales of Merlin, Maugis, and of Doctor Faust....”

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History and the Canon: The Case of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus

[First published in University of Toronto Quarterly 56.4 (Summer 1987): 498-522. My second paragraph should perhaps have made more flattering mention of the “Beyond the Canon” conference that is named there: this paper was written for and first presented at that conference, the Atlantic University Teachers of English Conference held at Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax on 19-20 October 1984. In the present text, one or two typographical errors have been corrected, but the wording has not been updated or altered.]

I

The relationship between the two key words of my title is a curiously intricate one. Since the notion of canonicity implies a controlled transmission of the past into the future, to talk about literary canons is also, unavoidably, to invoke one or another view of history. Yet, paradoxically, some of the recently and currently most influential critical positions have encouraged understandings of canonicity that are thoroughly anti-historical. I shall be concerned in the first part of this essay with some of the implications of this paradox. In the second part, turning to Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, a play that is by common consent of some importance in our literary canon, I will consider certain practical consequences, both textual and interpretive, of attempts to lift the canon out of history.

Another less stolid title, that of a recent academic conference, may serve to introduce the issues that I wish to discuss. “Beyond the Canon: Literary Innovation and Integration”—these words, from one point of view, are no more than an elliptical summary of the inescapable process of canon revision. Any new text is “beyond the canon” in the banal sense of being not yet canonical—and sometimes also in the more interesting sense of being genuinely innovative, of embodying moves that extend beyond the limits implied by the current literary canon. Critical commentary, where it is not simply dismissive, serves to integrate the new text into the canon by discovering some degree of “conformity between the old and the new,” which also implies making adjustments to the “ideal order” formed by the “existing monuments” of literature.1 This is a familiar perspective, as the tags from T. S. Eliot's “Tradition and the Individual Talent” will already have signalled. And it is one that within certain limits can accommodate historically oriented canon revisions as well: witness Eliot's revisionary insistence that “the main current ... does not at all flow invariably through the most distinguished reputations.”2 But perhaps “Beyond the Canon” is meant to evoke something a little more exciting.

Taken in another sense, the words suggest, indeed invite, a kind of deliberate transgression. Since in other contexts a prepositional phrase of this kind might as easily be hortatory as descriptive, can one be blind in this case to its hidden persuasive force? “Down to the river! Into the street!” cried Allen Ginsberg in the second part of Howl.3 Why not then “Beyond the Canon!”? Yet as we surge forward, arm in arm, two doubts may assail us.

First, is it any more possible for university teachers of English to go collectively beyond the canon than it is for us to go beyond out own footprints? Barring leaps into the abyss, or the determined deviance of minority groups, the answer would seem to be no. For in so far as the literary canon is constituted by our collective activity as teachers, critics, editors, and reviewers, then so long as we remain within the bounds of what our American colleagues like to call “the profession,” we are rather more securely attached to it than Peter Pan was to his shadow: wherever we may stray as an interpretive community, the canon follows us about. One consequence of this would seem to be that the very notion of canonicity endures, if not a breach, yet an expansion—and this brings on the second doubt.

Going beyond the canon can, by definition, only be the act of a minority. But once this kind of transgression has become a regular feature of critical discourse—once it has been consecrated, so to speak, not merely by the annual meetings of the MLA, but by such distinguished organs of opinion as Critical Inquiry and the English Institute4—does the act not lose much of its original meaning? A radical challenge to the canon might, until recently, have been interpreted as a species of heresy, and have been met with that stony silence which is one of the academic substitutes for burning people at the stake. Yet if, as has been vigorously asserted, our interpretive act, our reading, is what produces, or constructs, or constitutes the literary text, then it would seem to follow that every interpretive community effectively generates its own canon. Is heresy still conceivable once the notion of canonicity has been “de-centred” in this manner? Can there be transgression where there is no law?

In sketching out the two preceding views of canon revision (that of Eliot, and a second one which may be recognizable as, in part, a caricature of the doctrines of Stanley Fish), I have at the same time been talking about two divergent ways of understanding canonicity. As the tone of my remarks may have suggested, I believe both to be inadequate. One reason for thinking so is that both Eliot's view and what I will call the pseudo-radical view of canonicity manage, in quite different ways, to conceal the historical forces which are at work in the reception, selection, and transmission of literary texts.

Eliot, to be sure, insisted on the importance of history, but he appeared to understand it as a primarily synchronic category. What he called “the historical sense” compels a recognition, in his words, “that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer ... has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order.”5 His sense of our relationship to this order is in some respects rather subtle. For while this order provides a standard of judgment and comparison, an innovative conformity to which is the essential (if oxymoronic) criterion for admission to the canon, a certain reciprocity is also involved. “It is a judgment, a comparison,” he says, “in which two things are measured by each other.”6 Yet although Eliot seems initially to understand tradition in its active sense as “handing down,”7 his understanding of reception, the other side of the process, is almost wholly passive. He says that to obtain tradition is laborious—but makes no acknowledgment of the active reshaping of the past that seems inevitable in such a labour of assimilation and appropriation.

Eliot's silence on this issue is explained by Frank Lentricchia when he writes that “In its most usual conception, tradition is a process of ideal, continuous texts, whose ideality and continuity (they are the same thing) are rooted in the absence of roots or, more precisely, in the desire for the absence of roots.” In contrast to this, Lentricchia insists that tradition, or rather “tradition-making,” is a willful process which “deploys three temporal modes: it is necessarily past-oriented...; it is at the same time acutely conscious of a present that needs to be controlled by a vision of the past; and last, in ironic generosity, it bestows a legacy by projecting and in part engendering a future similarly dominated.” Or again, in an ironically Lincolnesque formulation: “Tradition-making is a process of historical repression engineered not by the dead but by the living, for the living and those who shall live.”8

This last sentence invites an immediate revision to make it read “by some of the living, against others....” For one of the energy sources of feminist and Marxist criticism has been a recognition of who, and how many, have been excluded by tradition—whether it be a matter of Telemachus's rebuke to Penelope in Book I of the Odyssey: “Go back within the house and see to your daily duties, / ... for speech is man's matter, and mine above all others,” which effectively bars women from the realm of mythos, of discourse and story-telling;9 or whether it be the bland words of Aulus Gellius, the second-century canonist: “Classicus ... scriptor, non proletarius,” or the parallel formulation of a Renaissance writer, one H. Crosse: “Wisdome under a ragged coate is seldome canonicall.”10

Lentricchia does not make the absurd demand that we cast aside tradition; he asks rather that we take responsibility for our role as tradition-makers, and hence transmitters of a canon. The ideological nature of canon formation and transmission, as well as the authority (however limited) exercised by literary intellectuals, must be admitted and faced up to: gestures of abdication are not a solution, but part of the problem. One cannot step outside tradition; nor does it make sense “to condemn and dismiss the traditional text,” for this would be to efface rather than to understand our own cultural past. The point is rather “that the traditional text needs to be historically restored, all traditionalist desire to the contrary notwithstanding: its politically activist, materially textured substance (made well-nigh invisible by the humanist academy) brought to light in an act of reading that penetrates the idealist myths ... that have veiled the text's real involvement in human struggle.”11

Even in the hands of writers concerned to demystify the notion of canonicity, however, this kind of responsibility may drop out of sight. Once canons have been reductively analysed as being no more than hegemonic constructs by means of which one or another interest group projects its own selfish desires onto society as a whole, it becomes hard to maintain that one's own values—whether these be humanistic (and traceable to Pico, Erasmus, or the Marx of the 1844 manuscripts), anti-humanist (if that is the correct term for the tradition derived from Nietzsche and Heidegger), or something else less easily labelled—are anything but a mask for one's own class and professional interests. This seems fair enough: let the critic who perceives her tradition-making work as benefitting a larger portion of our species define that group. There may, however, be legitimate reasons for an abstention from any such explicit definition of interests. The silenced, the excluded, can be spoken for through an interstitial analysis of texts from the past which either repress certain groups (not necessarily minorities: women and manual workers are not minorities), or else have commonly been thought to do so. But this interpretive writing can only fully assume the form of canonizing criticism once such groups (black women, for instance) have found their own voice—and at that point it is arguable whether a line can be drawn, in an outsider's commentary on their texts, between sympathetic understanding and a ventriloquist's appropriation. The issue may be a delicate one, and yet it remains the case that a professedly disinterested demystification of canonicity leaves its author open to the charge of acting on behalf of narrowly professional interests. Frank Kermode may appear to get himself into just such a bind at the end of his fine essay on “Institutional Control of Interpretation.” Having implied throughout that the canon is a means of imposing a given set of closely defined social interests, he wishes nonetheless to maintain that it has a wider value in terms of the interpretive liberty granted to us by the institution which controls it, and to which we belong. But to this Charles Altieri has objected that Kermode has “no terms by which to explain his evaluation of the canon's importance except a banal insistence on the variety of interpretations its guarantees. Thousands of years of culture have come to this—a stimulus to subjectivity.”12

I have spoken in these last paragraphs of two kinds of partial amnesia. The first is analysed by Frank Lentricchia as a deliberate forgetting of one's own active presence in the shaping and transmitting of the past—a forgetting which, as the example of the Kabbalah may emphasize, is bound up with the passive sense of the idea of tradition. “Kabbalah” means tradition, in the sense of reception; and as Gershom Scholem has shown, Kabbalist mysticism was for centuries a means by which the Jewish people maintained a vital link between their sacred texts and the deepest aspects of their lived experience—though all the time the Kabbalists, those weird, brilliantly innovative interpreters, sheltered under the fiction that they were mere transmitters of the ancient secret of God's revelation to Adam and Moses.13

The second kind of forgetting is a risk involved in ideological demystifications of the canon. As the example of Kermode's essay may suggest, it is a forgetting of the future—and one which in effect devitalizes the past. To evade responsibility for the projection of one's values into the future is, in a sense, to let go of the future—and as Eliot observed in his essay “What is a Classic?”: “If we cease to believe in the future, the past would cease to be fully our past: it would become the past of a dead civilization.”14

I began by contrasting two views of canonicity, that of T.S. Eliot, and a second one which I termed “pseudo-radical” and associated with the name of Stanley Fish. This second view manages, I think, to combine both of the forms of forgetfulness which I have just defined. Fish's basic gambit is a displacement of authority from text to reader, and from the literary canon to “the profession.” He argues that what a critic has to learn in order to be admitted to the profession (he reduces this to a mastering of “interpretive strategies”) effectively governs “the operations of his consciousness.” And since in Fish's view texts have no status independent of the act of reading—“Interpretation,” he says, “is not the art of construing but the art of constructing”15—it follows that the meaning of a text is produced (rather than being interactively reassembled) by the interpretive strategy used by the critic. A consensus on textual strategies is what constitutes an “interpretive community,” and given that texts acquire meaning only through interpretation, this same consensus also provides the only possible validation of interpretations. To disagree with another critic is simply to define oneself as belonging to a different interpretive community. You have your Hamlet and I mine; they are the products of different communal interests and different structures of belief; and because Fish treats belief as a psychological absolute—our relation to our beliefs is pragmatic and apologetic, but never self-critical16—there is not much point in discussing our Hamlets together.

Fish defends his procedures as exposing the historicity of any act of interpretation.17 But what he is doing is rather to justify any possible appropriation of texts to serve present needs, whatever these may be, and however gross a distortion of the past they may insist on. The possibility that a text might resist such an appropriation is from his perspective simply unintelligible. As for the future: “the profession,” that aggregate of interpretive communities, and hence ultimate authority, may be counted on to serve its own interests.

T.S. Eliot's view of canonicity had at least the merit of being closely linked to most of the original meanings of the Greek word kanon: rule, measure, instruction, and standard. This word, in Hellenistic usage, referred primarily not to a corpus of texts (such as the canon of Greek authors organized by the Alexandrian grammarians and poets), but rather to the principles governing comparison, selection, and ordering. In its general usage, kanon had a strongly teleological or end-directed meaning: it denoted “the norm, the finished condition which represents the end, the standard or criterion which as regards their ends can be applied to all things.” The word thus expressed a fundamental Hellenistic notion, that of “the ideal, the perfection which is the standard by which the empirical world must be judged.”18

What Stanley Fish's displacement of authority from texts to “the profession” does away with is not the word “canon,” or any actual array of texts, but rather this end-directed sense of purpose which (however one struggles with the concept) is what gives canonicity a meaning. The claim might seem a rash one. For Fish does argue, with admirable clarity, that any communication, and hence any interpretation, must be contextual or situational—and “to be in a situation is already to be in possession of (or to be possessed by) a structure of assumptions, of practices understood to be relevant in relation to purposes and goals that are already in place.” With respect to interpretation, he observes that “we are never without canons of acceptability; we are always 'right to rule out at least some readings.'”19 It will be noticed that he speaks of canons only as interpretive rules—for if texts are constituted by the act of interpretation, the term can no longer intelligibly refer to a corpus of texts selected in accordance with some situational or institutional rule. The text is constituted by the interpretive community, and the literary canon, in consequence, by the ensemble of their readings.

Fish's observations, or some of them at least, may have the attraction of the empirically self-evident. But what is wrong with his theory as a whole is the assumption that interpretation, in “producing” a text, consumes the textual artifact so completely as to leave not a shred behind to testify to the interpreter (or against her) of what she has done to it. The result can only be a radical de-historicizing of interpretation. Fish may claim to recognize the importance of being aware of one's own ideological determinants. But this claim is empty in the mouth of a critic who can envisage with equanimity a world in which it would be possible to see Mr. Collins as the hero of Pride and Prejudice, or who can fail to see the workings of his own professorial authority in the class of students who construed a list of names on the blackboard as a metaphysical poem.20 To conjure away the literary text is to obliterate the historicity if interpretation—and also, by the way, of reflections upon the literary canon. For it is only through a dialectical awareness of two sets of determinants—the text's, as well as our own—that a genuinely historical understanding can emerge.

Fish's Berkeleyan account of reading has recently been refuted by W. Brock Macdonald, who deploys against it an argument derived from the one with which Wilfrid Sellars demolished the sense-data epistemology of Russell and Ayers.21 That argument will not be repeated here. I would prefer to suggest that Fish is also refuted, experientially is not logically, by what might be called, in deliberate contrast to his view of belief, the simple fact of interpretive bad faith. I mean by this not merely the awareness, frequently suppressed in critical discourse, that the literary text is other and more than our interpretations of it, but also one's sense, in working with a text, that different things might be made of this experience—and that some at least of these alternatives are present as actual rather than abstract possibilities.

One need not enrol as a disciple in the school of Jacques Derrida in order to be able to recognize how strongly deconstructive explorations of the ways in which literary and philosophical texts are riven and traversed by contradictions, irresolutions, and an uncontrollable surplus of meaning tell against Fish's understanding of belief. The Derridean ideal of free play may be an illusion: some at least of the ideological determinants operative in any text can be identified, and even our most complex language-games do seem to have rules (though in the case of texts like Glas, or La carte postale, or even Otobiographies I would not like to have to say what they are). This ludic ideal can nonetheless serve as a balance to the equally implausible fideism of Fish's psychology of interpretation. Textual indeterminacy, a surplus of meaning, implies a parallel surplus of interpretive choices. Fish's insistence, in a post-Derridean context, that all of these but one are in every case erased by prior methodological commitments is no more than a rather spectacular example of what I have termed interpretive bad faith. To which it may be added, reverting to the analogy of interpretation-as-consumption, that even so tidy a feeder as Stanley Fish can hardly claim, after finishing a text, to have left neither bones and gristle on the plate, nor grease-spots on the tablecloth.

I would propose that it is the aggregate of these remnants—or, to change the metaphor, of those textual features deflected by the terministic screens in use at a given time22—that in large part makes up what might be called, to misappropriate a phrase from St. Paul, “the measure of the rule” (to metron tou kanonos).23 The literary canon, and the institutional rule which is the compound of its principles of selection and exclusion, are measured by the conflicting voices which speak out of the texts—and which, even if some of them are dismissed, neglected, or scarcely audible to one generation or critical school, are still there to be recuperated, valorized, and misconstrued by the next. Only if we silence these voices, as Stanley Fish would have us do, by making them mere products of what we want them to say, do we join him in the sterile collective solipsism of those who, in Paul's words again, commend themselves, and “measuring themselves by themselves ... are without understanding.”24

 

II

The ideologies built into literary (and sacred) canons cannot, then, be wished away: they must be confronted. It is with this in mind that I turn now to Christopher Marlowe's best-known play, The Tragicall History of Doctor Faustus. The less than tragic history of this play's recent receptions will dramatize certain of the points I have been making.

After about the middle of the seventeenth century, Marlowe's writings almost disappeared from view for well over a century. He was remembered, when at all, as a kind of theatrical noisemaker—a judgment that may be subliminally present in Edward Phillips's remark, in 1675, that “Of all that he hath written to the stage his Dr. Faustus hath made the greatest noise with its Devils, and such like tragical sport.”25 The same play interested Thomas Warton in 1781 only as “A proof of the credulous ignorance which them prevailed, and a specimen of the subjects which were them thought not improper for tragedy.”26 When in the nineteenth century Marlowe was rediscovered, Edward II, the one play of his which seems to approach a Shakespearean norm, was usually held to be his masterpiece. But Doctor Faustus has since usurped that position. It has been more frequently edited in single-text editions than most of Shakespeare's plays and is a standard choice for inclusion in college anthologies; moreover, it has probably inspired a larger volume of critical commentary than any other play by a contemporary of Shakespeare. Yet only over the past seventy or so years, a period in which English studies have become professionalized as the almost exclusive domain of university teachers, has this tragedy of a university teacher risen from comparative obscurity to a position close to the centre of the literary canon. How did it get there?

I would like to suggest that there is a close temporal connection, which seems more than coincidental, between the rise of Doctor Faustus in the form in which it now usually read, and the reign of the New Criticism. It may be of passing interest to observe that the essay on Marlowe published in 1919 by T.S. Eliot, a father figure to the New Critics, was of some importance in diverting attention from Edward II to Doctor Faustus: the former is airily dismissed as having “never lacked consideration,” while the latter is both praised for its “new and important conversational tone” and the intensity of its last soliloquy, and also noted as the end-point of Marlowe's skilful remodellings of lines and tropes which figure in his earlier plays.27 However, it is to a slightly more recent period that I would like to point. One might say, more or less arbitrarily, that the full institutional dominance of the New Criticism began in the mid-1940s: the publication of Cleanth Brooks's The Well Wrought Urn in 1947 provides a convenient date. The publication of the Johns Hopkins symposium on structuralism in 1970, and of Paul de Man's Blindness and Insight in the following year, signalled the end of this dominance—or at the very least its translation into a different kind of vocabulary. The same approximate dates are of some importance in the reception history of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus.

This play survived the Elizabethan age in two substantive early versions, both very defective, which differ in length by some six hundred lines, and which in parallel passages offer a large number of variant readings. Most modern reading editions conflate the parallel passages, but with respect to their overall shape are necessarily based either on the quarto of 1604 (known as the A-text) or on the longer quarto of 1616 (the B-text). The 1604 version of the play was identified as more authoritative by C.F. Tucker Brooke, whose Oxford edition of 1910 served as the basis for most subsequent criticism. In 1946, however, Leo Kirschbaum overturned this judgment, arguing that the B-text was substantially faithful to Marlowe's intentions, while the A-text was a memorially corrupt version—or, in the jargon of textual scholarship, a “bad quarto.”28 Four years later, this opinion was overwhelmingly confirmed by the 267 pages of textual analysis and commentary contained in Sir Walter Greg's superb parallel-text edition, analysis which was deferred to by most subsequent editors of the play and accepted as authoritative by many critics.29 But in 1973 a careful re-examination of the evidence by Fredson Bowers showed that for a quarter-century the editors had been giving us, and most of the critics studying, a largely non-Marlovian version of the play.30

A related pattern is detectable if one turns to the criticism of Doctor Faustus. It is hardly the case that the Greg-Kirschbaum re-evaluation of the text was followed by a flood-tide of writing about this play, even though all but about a dozen of the eighty-odd articles and books surveyed by Max Bluestone in 1969 were written after the appearance of Kirschbaum's influential textual study.31 Indeed, during the 1950s the number of articles on Doctor Faustus and also the proportion of articles on Marlowe which were devoted to this play both declined noticeably; only in the 1960s did the play recover the clear primacy in the Marlowe canon which it had enjoyed during the 1940s. There is, of course, something more than slightly absurd about the activity of totting up annual rates of production in Faustus scholarship—and yet it may seem significant that within two years of the appearance of Bowers's article in 1973 a rate of interpretive activity which had risen steadily since the early 1960s abruptly declined to what it had been more than a decade earlier (it has since gradually returned to the level of the early 1970s).32 More important, the results of this critical activity, which in most cases involved a clear turn away from the labour of attempting to interpret the play in the light of its original historical and ideological contexts,33 were described by Bluestone in 1969 as thoroughly confusing: every major issue raised by the play appeared to be surrounded by a fog of ambiguities and contradictions.

One might think this to be a highly satisfactory situation from the point of view of young critics on the make. Yet although the volume of critical studies continued to increase, one may with hindsight discern certain signs of conceptual exhaustion. The continuing debate over the play's theological resonances provides one example of this. Even when critics moved beyond asserting as a self-evident proposition that Faustus has free will, to adducing sixteenth-century theological texts in support of this or the contrary opinion, they seldom proved able to integrate analyses of these texts into detailed interpretations of the play: the relation between play-text and context typically remained somehow inert.34 One might equally well take as symptomatic a remark by an editor of a symposium on Marlowe published in 1968: “Both the papers and the discussions frequently referred to the play, but no one who was approached felt he wanted to offer a special study of it. It may be that Greg's vast labours on the text, together with the critical accounts given in recent years by Bradbrook, Brockbank, Cole, Gill, Steane, and many others, have, for the moment, exhausted invention.”35

This conceptual exhaustion, if one can call it that, may have been related to a growing perception that the supposedly authoritative 1616 version, though longer, is also more inconsistent than the other version in terms of the stylistic, psychological, and conceptual lapses of its last three acts. A naïve reader who knew of that other version through older or unscholarly editions of the play might be forgiven for assuming that the actors whose faulty memories or deliberate meddling were responsible for its corruptions must have been better poets than Marlowe. More obviously, though, the majority view of the play's moral (or rather moralistic) meaning, a view that rested largely upon the last three acts of the 1616 version, seems to have prompted basic doubts about its literary value. Kirschbaum, followed by many later critics, defined Doctor Faustus as “a quasi-morality in which is clearly set forth the hierarchy of moral values which enforces and encloses the play, which the characters in the play accept, which the playwright advances and accepts in his prologue and epilogue, which—hence--the audience must understand and accept.”36 Paul Kocher, though less inclined to bully his readers, held similar views; and, like Kirschbaum, he insisted that “Faustus has free will, free capacity to repent. It is his own fault that he does not, and so he goes to a condign doom.”37

It might appear surprising that Marlowe, whose “table talk,” as preserved in the accusations of his contemporaries, consists entirely of such gross impieties as “That Christ was a bastard and his mother dishonest ... That St John the Evangelist was bedfellow to Christ ... that he used him as the sinners of Sodoma,” should have written such a play.38 But the moralist insisted, with New Critical obstinacy, that even if both Faustus and his creator died swearing, no connection could be admitted between the meanings generated by the “forme of Faustus fortunes” (A: 9) and what other texts might suggest about the poet's opinions.39 The readers of these critics were left, then, to admire a theological and philosophical drama whose protagonist, a theological incompetent and a sophist, is not a very dangerous sinner either—a play which offers to its audiences much the same ambiguous delight as that which certain medieval theologians accorded to the blessed in heaven: the satisfaction of witnessing, from a safe distance, the torments of the damned. Small wonder that in 1970 A.L. French, unable either to accept the unreservedly ironic view of Faustus required by this approach or to respect the play which resulted from it, denounced Doctor Faustus as “one of the most specious of all the false classics which clog our English literature courses.”40 One might feel tempted to turn this judgment back upon the heads of the scholars ands critics whose misreadings of the textual evidence made it possible. But it may prove more useful, if less cathartic, to ask what went wrong, and why.

Interpretation begins with the text: such at least is the prejudice dictated to us by a critical tradition whose ideal has been the self-effacement of the interpreter, to the point of a conventional invisibility. I hope I will not be thought to have suddenly succumbed to the theories of Stanley Fish if I insist that in this case the text, as a single discrete object, does not exist prior to interpretation. A play which comes down to us in as battered a condition as that in which Doctor Faustus has survived is, very largely, an indeterminate object ; the shape which it assumes in any conflated edition reflects the interpretive principle—or prejudices—brought to bear upon the evidence. The divergences of the 1604 and 1616 quartos in parallel passages were taken by Greg and Kirschbaum to reveal memorial corruption or revision in the A-text. But as has been repeatedly observed, the same evidence can just as easily support the conclusion that it is the B-text which is corrupt—or indeed, that both texts are corrupt.41 Must we then abandon attempts to arrive at a single text and admit, with Michael J. Warren, that what we are confronted with is “two quite separate and different plays, each presumably at some distance from an original, each attributed to Marlowe, each known as Doctor Faustus”?42 I think not. For if it can be said that neither Greg's nor Kirschbaum's textual studies were guided by more than a rudimentary concern for the play's historical context, the same, unfortunately, is true of Warren's otherwise excellent article.43 His scepticism is thus no more persuasive than the dogmatism which it helped to subvert.

The two substantive versions of Doctor Faustus are not “quite separate” plays; they share, with minor variants, upwards of one thousand lines (out of a total, in the shorter A-text, of just over fifteen hundred). Nor can they with equal validity be ascribed to Marlowe. The Marlovian original, if it makes sense to speak of such a thing,44 is lost beyond recovery. But unlike Quarto and Folio King Lear, the two surviving versions of the play do not have equal authority.

To take a minor point first: it is possible to identify ideologically motivated revisions in several important passages in the B-text. (These were presumably made to avoid the fines imposed for blasphemy under the 1606 Act of Abuses.) Consider, for example, Faustus's magnificent outcry in the A-text—

O Ile leape up to my God: who pulles me downe? 
See see where Christs blood streames in the firmament, 
One drop would save my soule, halfe a drop, ah my Christ    (A: 1462-64)

—which the B-text reduces to the barely intelligible

O I'le leape up to heaven: who puls me downe? 
One drop of bloud will save me; oh my Christ....    (B: 2048-49)

Another desperate plea in the same speech—

Oh God, if thou wilt not have mercy on my soule, 
Yet for Christs sake, whose bloud hath ransomd me, 
Impose some end to my incessant paine     (A: 1483-85)

—is transformed to something less vivid and more moralistic:

O, if my soule must suffer for my sinne, 
Impose some end to my incessant paine....     (B: 2067-68)

The alarming implication of a refusal of divine mercy has been neatly excised.

More importantly, there is ample evidence, external as well as stylistic and structural, to support the view that most of the non-parallel passages in the B-text—one thousand lines, at a conservative estimate—are the work of two writers to whom, in 1602, the theatrical manager Henslowe paid four pounds “for ther adicyones in doctor fostes.”45 One of these writers, Samuel Rowley, wrote another play in which many of the stylistic quirks of the unique B-text passages reappear, and which also (like Act III of the B-text) draws repeatedly upon Foxe's Book of Martyrs. To escape the obvious conclusion that Rowley wrote these B-text passages in 1602 (and thus wrote rather more of the B-text than Marlowe did), Greg was obliged to speculate that he must have been Marlowe's collaborator a decade earlier—and that his 1602 additions had somehow been lost.46 Gresham's Law—bad money drives out out good—is thus transplanted into the realm of textual criticism: historical evidence is supplanted by sheer speculation.

Only once the ideological bias which informed Greg's work upon this text is made evident is it possible to understand how a scholar of his capacities could have been driven to such extremities. I shall therefore show briefly how even his minutest textual judgments are pervaded by an ideologically based and thoroughly non-historical prejudice. I shall then conclude by suggesting ways in which an attention to historical contexts can help both to clarify certain textual problems in Doctor Faustus and also to make apparent aspects of the play which, if we keep in mind the inescapable end-directedness of canonicity, may induce us to describe it as not just a deservedly canonical, but a meta-canonical text.

Although the disturbing notion of a refusal of divine mercy was removed from Faustus's last speech in the 1616 text, it remains prominent elsewhere, most notably in Act II, where, encouraged by his Good Angel to repent, Faustus calls on Christ—only to be answered by the terrifying entrance of a demonic trinity” Lucifer, Belzebub, and Mephostophilis. Not surprisingly, in this passage also there are signs, though less obtrusive, of editorial revision in the B-text. To expose the workings of Greg's ideological prejudice, it will suffice to consider two textual variants of a single word each.

Faustus cried in his brief prayer: “Ah Christ my Saviour, / seeke [B: Helpe] to save distressed Faustus soule” (A: 711-12). Greg cited this variant as one of several in which—sure evidence of memorial corruption—the reading of A implies a definite misunderstanding of the theological situation. “To seek to do something,” he wrote, “implies a doubtful issue: but whereas it is heretical to question Christ's power to save, it is true belief that that power is only exercised in aid of the sinner's own endeavour” (p. 46). This bland sentence is in at least two respects curiously revealing. It implies, first, that theological orthodoxy can be used—in this of all plays—as a textual criterion. This naïvety is compounded by a strange disregard of historical context in Greg's definition of “true belief.” Given that the theology of the Anglican Church in the 1590s and for some decades previously was overwhelmingly Calvinistic in orientation, most educated Anglicans of Marlowe's time would have rejected this definition as arrant Pelagianism: to them it was axiomatic that a sinner was powerless to help himself until Christ's saving power was exercised on his behalf.47

Greg's words amount to saying that the reading of the 1616 text in this line is authentic because he agrees with its theological implications. But since there may be more objective reasons for preferring the reading of the 1604 text, it is worth lingering a moment longer over Faustus's prayer. Greg's perception of an undertone of doubt in the A-text's “seeke to save” is acute, but should if anything confirm the appropriateness of this expression in the mouth of one whose problem is precisely that he lacks faith. More obviously, though, “seeke” carries two other implications: first, that it is primarily up to Christ to save Faustus's soul; and second, that he has not previously been trying to. A simple cry for help—the B-text's “Helpe to save”—does not imply anything about the previous stance of the person to whom it is addressed, but the A-text's imploring “seeke” contains an element of persuasion which can only suggest that at some level Faustus thinks persuasion to be necessary. It takes no leap of the imagination to see how the censoring editor who in the final scene substituted Faustus's bland acknowledgment of sin for the A-text's refusal of divine mercy might have recognized these implications. On the other hand, none of the established mechanisms of memorial corruption give any reason for believing that an actor's faulty memory might have effected the reverse substitution.48

The words which I have quoted from Greg's commentary represent not a momentary aberration but rather the basic orientation of his approach to the play. I have remarked that Faustus's prayer in this scene was preceded by the Good Angel's encouragement to repent: but the precise nature of this encouragement needs closer examination. When, having broken angrily with Mephostophilis, Faustus wonders aloud whether it is not too late, his Good Angel reassures him with the words: “Never too late, if Faustus can [B: will] repent” (A: 708). Here again, Greg argues that the reading of A is corrupt: “A is wrong in making the Angel doubt Faustus' ability to repent if he has the will to do so” (p. 338). But this is not what the line means. The Angel does not oppose ability and will in this manner; rather, he is suggesting that Faustus is perhaps unable to will to repent. Greg writes: “It is not a question of the possibility of repentance—that is assumed—but of the will to repent” (p. 45). One must ask: assumed by whom?

Far from being a theological absurdity, as Greg's words seem to imply, the A-reading would have been immediately comprehensible to Marlowe's audiences: for the predicament of the reprobate, of those who have not been chosen by God for salvation, is quite simply that they cannot repent—or, more precisely, that they are unable to will to repent. To modern minds this is immediately paradoxical. The very notion of will to us implies freedom and autonomy. But as Calvin wrote, “if the fact that he must do good does not hinder God's free will in doing good; if the devil, who can only do evil, yet sins with his will—who shall say that man therefore sins less willingly because he is subject to the necessity of sinning? Augustine everywhere speaks of this necessity....” Greg's belief that the possibility of repentance and the will to repent are separate matters could only indicate to Elizabethan Anglicans that he had fallen into the error of Peter Lombard, who, in Calvin's words, “did not know how to distinguish necessity from compulsion.”49

The Good Angel's words in the 1604 text suggest a question that may already have occurred to members of the audience. Can Faustus repent? It would seem that Anglican theologians of the period, if consulted on the matter at this point in the play, would have responded with a unanimous negative. Even if, disregarding the stern Calvinists for whom a failure to persevere in grace would provide sure evidence of reprobation,50 One seeks instead the opinion of their opponent Richard Hooker, the answer is the same. Faustus, one remembers, abjured the Trinity in his invocation of Mephostophilis in the third scene of the play, thus denying the very foundation of the Christian faith.51 In Hooker's opinion, “if the justified err, as he may, and never come to understand his error, God doth save him through general repentance: but if he fall into heresy, he calleth him either at one time or other by actual repentance; but from infidelity, which is an inward direct denial of the foundation, preserveth him by special providence for ever.”52 Faustus has not been so preserved. He is therefore not one of the justified; he cannot repent. What then of the agonies which Faustus undergoes? For Calvin and his followers, at least, the answer is brutally simple: “It is improper to designate as 'conversion' and 'prayer' the bling torment that distracts the reprobate when they see that they must seek God in order to find a remedy for their misfortunes and yet flee at his approach.”53

These observations in no way demonstrate that the A-reading of the Good Angel's speech is Marlovian and the B-reading an editorial revision: as I have already remarked, it is naïve to think that theological orthodoxy can be used as a textual criterion. Yet any reader who compares the syllogism by means of which Faustus dismisses “Divinitie” in the first scene of the play with the arguments of Despaire in Book I, canto ix of The Faerie Queene, and then contrasts the Good Angel's intervention in that scene with Una's words to Red Crosse Knight, will have little difficulty in deciding which version of the Angel's later speech is more probably authentic. Una says:

In heavenly mercies hast thou not a part? 
Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art? 
Where justice growes, there grows eke greater grace....54

Divine mercy offers the only possible escape from the devil's syllogism which Faustus has propounded, yet his Good Angel, significantly, speaks only of “gods heavy wrath” (A: 104).55 Without “precious grace” (A: 1321)—of which Faustus is reminded by the Old Man only after the response to his prayer in Act II has confirmed the Evil Angel's claim that it is indeed too late—his repentance is not possible.

A different kind of desperation can be detected in the efforts of critics writing between the 1940s and the late 1960s to avoid the conclusion that this play deliberately confronts its readers with the cruel paradoxes of Calvinism. According to J.P. Brockbank, for example, “Marlowe allows no appeal to the Calvinist doctrine that some are for ever 'reprobate', but chooses rather to represent the will as incapable of redeeming itself”—which does not quite amount to a distinction without a difference, for it allows him to claim that while Doctor Faustus may be a Calvinist, Doctor Faustus is Augustinian. Yet in the following paragraph Brockbank can save his argument only by ascribing the alarming response to Faustus's prayer in Act II to Marlowe's “characteristic love of excess.”56 Of this attempt to separate the episode from the theological structure of the play one need only say that Calvinism is, quite precisely, Augustinianism run to excess.

The harsher, more darkly ironic play which emerges out of contextual analysis of the two texts of Doctor Faustus is in several respects more interesting than the play which Greg and Kirschbaum certified as authentic—and which A.L. French tried to dislodge from the canon. It is a play which throws into relief the most disquieting and repellent features of the theological orthodoxy of Elizabethan England. Its protagonist, who enunciates in the first scene the predicament of the reprobate, and then proceeds to live it out in a desperate alternation of self-delusion and vertiginous horror, may still be a fool. But the patronizing comments which may have been an appropriate response to the Faustus of the B-text are much less adequate in relation to this figure. For the play puts its audience into a position not unlike that of Faustus's fellow scholars, who in the final scene are torn between empathy and a self-absorbed fear:

FAUSTUS Talke not of me, but save your selves, and depart. 
3. SCH. God wil strengthen me, I wil stay with Faustus. 
1. SCH. Tempt not God, sweete friend, but let us into the next roome, and there pray for him.    (A: 1436-41)

In his last soliloquy, Faustus is addressing not only himself and the audience in the theatre, but also this formidable God. And in a sense he mediates between his two audiences, the visible and the invisible, as a kind of antichrist: this is the man who signed away his soul with the words “Consummatum est” (A: 515). When Faustus is carried off to hell, we are left to share the theatre with that other auditor, the God who has damned him.57 One may choose to withdraw from a dangerous empathy to the safety of moral judgment—as did the censoring editor of the 1616 text who substituted “O, if my soule must suffer for my sinne” (B: 2067) for “Oh God, if thou wilt not have mercy on my soule” (A: 1483). But the prudential contraction of one's experience of the play into moral categories (a contraction which the epilogue seems to invite)58 also involves a kind of censoring activity—a betrayal of human sympathies in the face of “heavenly power” (A: 1517).

What I have spoken of as contextual is in fact embedded in this play at the most intimate level of its rhetoric. Faustus may experiment with the third-person self-presentation practised by Marlowe's Tamburlaine. But his habitual, his characteristic mode of speech is second-person self-address: “Settle thy studies Faustus...” (A: 30); “Here tire, my braines, to get a Deity” (B: 89);59 “Now Faustus must thou needes be damned...” (A: 438); “what art thou Faustus but a man condemnd to die?” (A: 1169); “Accursed Faustus, where is mercie now?” (A: 1329); “Ah Faustus, / Now hast thou but one bare hower to live, / And then thou must be damnd perpetually...” (A: 1450-52). This mode of self-address is, very largely, what constitutes Faustus's dramatic identity—and it does so in terms of an increasingly powerful recognition of what is in store for him. At the same time as they enact a split between a perverse wilfulness and a strangely passive selfhood, his self-reflections construct a trap of self-authenticating predication. The despairing self-definitions of Faustus would cease to be true if he could only cease from making them; but conversely, he could only cease from making them if they were not true.

This rhetorical pattern is the precise equivalent of what Fulke Greville, in Caelica, XCIX, called a “fatal mirror of transgression”: the tormented self-image which it offers “bears the faithless down to desperation.”60 What Faustus simultaneously recognizes as his destiny, and struggles to escape, is gradually revealed as the true shape of what he has desired. An eschatological awareness burns up through even his most splendid effort at forgetfulness. Helen's “sweete imbracings” are to “extinguish cleane” (A: 1352) the motions of penitence and despair that have wracked him, but the very language of the escapist fantasy which he constructs around her expresses through a strange inversion his actual relation to this spirit:

Brighter art thou then flaming Jupiter
when he appeard to haplesse Semele....    (A: 1372-73)

Faustus began by “levell[ing] at the end of every Art” (A: 34)—that is, by challenging both the purposes and the limits of the disciplines which he has studied. When in the last scene of the play he begs God to “Impose some end to my incessant paine” (A: 1485), there is a horrible irony to his recognition: “O no end is limited to damned soules” (A: 1488). And at the very end, the resistance of his shriek, “Ugly hell gape not” (A: 1507), is undermined by his previous cry: “Earth gape, O no, it wil not harbour me” (A: 1473).

It is finally, perhaps, this obsessive concern with ends—in all of the different, yet related, senses of intention, reason for being, telos, finality, limit and eschatological termination which recur throughout the play—that constitutes the most persuasive reason for continuing to give Doctor Faustus an important place within our literary canon.61 In the first part of this paper I have argued for a view of canonicity which involves both a self-critical awareness of the active, ideological nature of the reception, selection, and transmission of texts, and also an acceptance of responsibility—both to the past and to the future—for the values which are thus reinterpreted and passed on. I have also protested against a form of pretended demystification which can only result in exposing texts to uncontrolled manipulation by their interpreters, according to whatever they perceive as their most urgent needs. And I have tried to show in the second part of this paper some of the ways in which contextual analysis can counterbalance the distortions that become inevitable once the canon-forming activities of textual scholars and critics begin to divorce themselves from the claims of history.

Our literary canon is, from this perspective, very much an expression of our own ends—which is to say, an expression not only of our conscious purposes, but also of the limitations of our sympathies and understanding, and of the hidden determinants operative in all our work as scholars and critics. Only the most strenuous effort of self-examination—which implies both a process of second-person self-definition and a determined scepticism as to its results—can make us critically aware of these limitations and these determinants. The continued prominence in our canon of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus, a play which is powerfully and insistently concerned with the idea of ends—whether as finis logices, as summum bonum (A: 37, 46), or as something insidious and alarming—may thus be taken as a piece of good fortune. Perhaps, as we continue to reflect on what we are doing and why, it may help to keep us honest.

 

 

NOTES

1  T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, 3rd edition (1951; rpt. London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 15.

2  Eliot, p. 16.

3  Allen Ginsberg, Howl and Other Poems (1956; rpt. San Francisco: City Lights, 1967), p. 18.

4  I am thinking of the issue of Critical Inquiry devoted to “Canons” (September 1983, 10.1), and reprinted, with additions, as Canons, ed. Robert von Hallberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and of Leslie A. Fiedler and Houston A. Baker, eds., English Literature: Opening Up the Canon (Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

5  Eliot, p. 14.

6  Eliot, p. 15.

7  Eliot, p. 14. In “Tradition and the Individual Talent,” a movement from tradition as “handing down” to tradition as “a simultaneous order” takes place within a single paragraph. Raymond Williams, in Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana, 1976), plays with a number of the root meanings of the word “tradition” when he comments on how easily the word can lose this sense of active process: “the word moves again and again towards age-old and towards ceremony, duty and respect. Considering only how much has been handed down to us, and how various it actually is, this, in its own way, is both a betrayal and a surrender” (p. 269).

8  Frank Lentricchia, Criticism and Social Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 125.

9  Odyssey, I, 356, 358, from Samuel Butler's translation, The Authoress of the Odyssey (1897; rpt. Chicago, 1967), p. 20, as cited by Lawrence Lipking, “Aristotle's Sister: A Poetics of Abandonment,” Critical Inquiry 10.1 (1983), 66. Lipking's article offers a fine analysis of the exclusion of women from the realm of mythos—but one which might fairly be accused of that problematic ventriloquism to which I allude two paragraphs below.

10  The words of Aulus Gellius (also quoted by Lipking and Lentricchia) are cited from Frank Kermode, The Classic: Literary Images of Permanence and Change (New York: Viking Press, 1975), p. 15. H. Crosse is cited in the OED entry for the word “canonical.”

11  Lentricchia, p. 142.

12  Charles Altieri, “An Idea and Ideal of a Literary Canon,” Critical Inquiry 10.1 (1983), 42. Kermode's essay first appeared in Salmagundi 43 (Winter 1979), 72-86, and is reprinted in his The Art of Telling: Essays on Fiction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983).

13  See Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism, 3rd edition (1961; rpt. New York: Schocken, 1974), pp. 20-22.

14  T. S. Eliot, On Poetry and Poets (1957; rpt. London: Faber and Faber, 1971), p. 65. On the question of taking responsibility for the transmission of values into the future, see Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” in Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (1968; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 173-96.

15  Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?: The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 14, 327.

16  I am indebted here to Walter A. Davis, “The Fisher King: Wille zur Macht in Baltimore,” Critical Inquiry 10.4 (1984), 668-94; his discussion of Fish's attitude to belief is on pp. 678-80. See also William Ray, Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), pp. 165-69.

17  Stanley Fish, “Fear of Fish: A Reply to Walter Davis,” Critical Inquiry 10.4 (1984), 695-705; especially 701, 703.

18  W. Schneemelcher, General Introduction, in E. Hennecke, New Testament Apocrypha, ed. W. Schneemelcher, trans. R. McL. Wilson et al. (2 vols., 1963-65; rpt. London: SCM Press, 1973-74), vol. 1, p. 21.

19  Fish, Is There a Text in This Class?, pp. 318, 349.

20  Ibid., pp. 347-48, 323-37.

21  W. Brock Macdonald, “How to Catch Fish with Words,” Texte 3 (1984), 29-41.

22  See Kenneth Burke, “Terministic Screens,” in Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 44-62.

23  2 Corinthians 10:13.

24  2 Corinthians 10:12: “alla autoi en eautous metrountes ... ou suniousin.”

25  Edward Phillips, Theatrum poetarum anglicanorum (1675); quoted from Marlowe: The Critical Heritage 1588-1896, ed. Millar Maclure (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 51.

26  Thomas Warton, The History of English Poetry (London, 1781), vol. 3, p. 437; quoted from Alexander Tille, Die Faustsplitter in der Literatur des sechzehnten bis achtzehnten Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Emil Felber, 1900), p. 771.

27  Eliot, Selected Essays, pp. 123, 121-22.

28  Leo Kirschbaum, “The Good and Bad Quartos of Doctor Faustus,The Library 26 (March 1946), 272-94. Kirschbaum's preference for the 1616 was anticipated by F.S. Boas, for whose edition of The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (London: Methuen, 1932) B provided the copy-text.

29  There were, of course, critics who opposed Greg's analysis—but without refuting it. See, for example, Warren D. Smith, “The Nature of Evil in Doctor Faustus,” Modern Language Review 60 (1965), 171; and Robert Ornstein, “Marlowe and God: The Tragic Theology of Dr. Faustus,” PMLA 83 (1968), 1378.

30  Fredson Bowers, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus: The 1602 Additions,” Studies in Bibliography 26 (1973), 1-18. See also Constance Brown Kuriyama, “Dr. Greg and Doctor Faustus: The Supposed Originality of the 1616 Text,” English Literary Renaissance 5 (1975), 171-97; and Michael H. Keefer, “Verbal Magic and the Problem of the A and B Texts of Doctor Faustus,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 82 (1983), 324-46. Bowers's curious decision to base his own edition of the play upon the 1616 version is criticized on p. 330 of the latter article. As Bowers himself recognized, the question of which version to use is distinct from that of whether to use the A- or the B-text as copy-text. See Bowers, ed., The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), vol. 2, p. 142. His view that an A-version edition is impracticable rests upon the unsupported assumption that the A-text's acts III and IV are non-Marlovian, and upon Greg's claim, which he nowhere re-examines, that A (but not B) is a memorial reconstruction. With respect to this claim, Bowers asserts that “facts are facts” (p. 143)—but in this case the “facts” are often quite clearly prejudiced speculations.

31  Max Bluestone, “Libido Speculandi: Doctrine and Dramaturgy in Contemporary Interpretations of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus,” in Reinterpretations of Elizabethan Drama, ed. Norman Rabkin (Selected Papers from the English Institute; New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 33-88.

32  A survey of the Modern Humanities Research Association bibliographies from 1921 to 1982 (supplemented by the MLA Bibliography from 1981 to 1984) indicates that the proportion of articles of five or more pages in length on Marlowe which were devoted to Doctor Faustus rose from about 15 per cent in the 1920s to over 20 per cent in the 1930s, and to more than 30 per cent in the 1940s. In the 1950s, attention tended to shift to Tamburlaine: the proportion of articles on Doctor Faustus dropped to less than 20 per cent of the total, and in absolute terms less than half as many articles were published about the play as in the 1940s. During the 1960s about one-third of the articles on Marlowe were devoted to Doctor Faustus; this proportion has since risen to an average of about 35 per cent. But in 1975, the number of articles published per year on Doctor Faustus (which had averaged almost five per year for the previous six years) dropped abruptly to two, and averaged between two and three for the rest of the decade; from 1975 to 1978, moreover, the proportion of articles devoted to Doctor Faustus remained, on average, below 30 per cent of the total.

33  Notable exceptions, of course, come to mind, among them C.L. Barber's article “'The form of Faustus' fortunes good or bad,'” Tulane Drama Review 8.4 (1964), 92-119; and chapters 11 and 12 of Wilbur Sanders's The Dramatist and the Received Idea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

34  See, for example, Leo Kirschbaum, “Marlowe's Faustus: A Reconsideration,” Review of English Studies 19 (1943), 234; Paul H. Kocher, Christopher Marlowe: A Study of His Thought, Learning, and Character (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), p. 104; Clifford Davidson, “Doctor Faustus of Wittenberg,” Studies in Philology 59 (1962), 517-19; Arieh Sachs, “The Religious Despair of Doctor Faustus,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 63 (1964), 625-47; Helen Gardner, “The Theme of Damnation in Doctor Faustus,” in Marlowe: Doctor Faustus, ed. John D. Jump (Casebook Series; London: Macmillan, 1969), p. 99; Robert Ornstein, “Marlowe and God,” 1380; Margaret Ann O'Brien, “Christian Belief in Doctor Faustus,” ELH 37.1 (1970), 5-6; Michael Hattaway, “The Theology of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus,” Renaissance Drama ns 3 (1970), 76-77; Gerard H. Cox, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and 'Sin against the Holy Ghost,'” Huntington Library Quarterly 36 (1972-73), 120-22; Paul Honderich, “John Calvin and Doctor Faustus,” Modern Language Review 68 (1973), 11. A movement out of this impasse is detectable in Richard Waswo, “Damnation, Protestant Style: Macbeth, Faustus, and Christian Tragedy,” Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4.1 (1974), 63-99; and is more evident in Robert G. Hunter, Shakespeare and the Mystery of God's Judgments (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1976), ch. 3; however, an interpretive inertness in relating play-text to theological context persists in Martha Tuck Rozett, The Doctrine of Election and the Emergence of Elizabethan Tragedy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), ch. 7. Recent attempts to deal with this problem include Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 83-119; and my article “Misreading Faustus Misreading: The Question of Context,” Dalhousie Review, forthcoming.

35  Brian Morris, ed., Christopher Marlowe (London: Benn, 1968), Introduction, pp. v-vi.

36  Kirschbaum, “Marlowe's Faustus: A Reconsideration,” 229.

37  Kocher, Christopher Marlowe, p. 108. A parallel to Kirschbaum's view of the play's closure is offered by his statement that “Like a crucible whose walls contain a seething liquid, the Christian structure of the play stands firm around the eruptions of blasphemy, and does not break: (p. 104). For a different opinion, based upon a consideration of audience response, see Michael Goldman, “Marlowe and the Histrionics of Ravishment,” in Two Renaissance Mythmakers: Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson, ed. Alvin Kernan (Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1975-6; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 39-40.

38  Maclure, ed., p. 37. The question of what credence should be given to the denunciation of Marlowe by Richard Baines from which I have quoted, or to the corroborative testimony of Thomas Kyd and (much later) of Henry Oxinden, is a vexed one. Kyd had been broken by torture, and one Richard Baines was hanged in 1594 (however, there are records of two other men bearing the same name). For a review of the evidence, see John Bakeless, The Tragicall history of Christopher Marlowe (2 vols., 1942; rpt. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), vol. 1, pp. 107-40—from which it is obvious that Marlowe's contemporaries regarded him as a highly unorthodox thinker. My inclination to accept the accusations of Baines and Kyd as reliable is supported by Paul H. Kocher, “Marlowe's Atheist Lecture,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 39 (1940), 98-106; and by Constance Brown Kuriyama, Hammer or Anvil: Psychological Patterns in Christopher Marlowe's Plays (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1980), pp 150-51, 221-27. See also Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning from More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 220-21.

39  Towards the end of the period under discussion, critics began with increasing frequency to make such a connection, but sometimes only to assert that if Marlowe had written an orthodox Christian play, that was because he was himself an orthodox Christian. See, for example, W. Moelwyn Merchant, “Marlowe the Orthodox,” in Christopher Marlowe, ed. Morris, pp. 179-92; and Margaret Ann O'Brien, “Christian Belief in Doctor Faustus,” 1-11. For the basis of the tradition that Marlowe died swearing, see Maclure, p. 42. All quotations from the play are from Marlowe's “Doctor Faustus” 1604-1616: Parallel Texts, ed. W.W. Greg (1950; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), and are identified according to the text from which they are taken and the lineation of this edition. U/v and i/j have been silently modernized, and errors in the Latin have been silently corrected.

40  A. L. French, “The Philosophy of Dr. Faustus,” Essays in Criticism 20 (1970), 123.

41  See Constance Brown Kuriyama, “Dr. Greg and Doctor Faustus,” and Michael J. Warren, “Doctor Faustus: The Old Man and the Text,” English Literary Renaissance 11.2 (1981), 111-47.

42  Warren, 147.

43  Warren argues forcefully that both versions of the play are, in their own terms, dramatically coherent (for a contrasting opinion, see my “Verbal Magic,” 33-46); and his re-examination of Greg's evidence for the memorial corruption of A shows that “The professed objectivity of investigation is quite spurious; each decision has been shown to be a consequence of a preconceived view of the play and its language” (124). However, in his remarks (123-24) on the two textual variants which I analyze below, Warren is unaware both of the theological issues involved and of the explicitly theological nature of Greg's prejudice (he takes Greg's assessments of what was orthodox in the 1590s at face value). Moreover, while he is “little concerned” (130) with the possibility that the play evokes or imposes a Calvinist view of providence and predestination, he is nonetheless able to declare, without troubling to consider any evidence to the contrary, that “If the B-text suggests that Faustus is damned irrevocably after the Helen incident, the A-text maintains by contrast the possibility of his salvation until the moment that the devils take him” (136). This may be correct—but Warren's analysis of the last scenes of the play cannot possibly prove the point. Warren's dismissal of historical context amounts to an assumption of the play's textual autonomy—and in this case, the assumption of textual autonomy and the assumption of Faustus's autonomy are closely related. To refuse the former assumption is also (given the nature of Elizabethan Anglican orthodoxy) to cast doubt upon the latter.

44  There is of course no evidence to show that Marlowe ever completed a draft of the play; and if the first text was a collaborative effort, the question of how much control he had over its details is a matter for speculation. See Jerome J. McGann, A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), for an incisive study of the larger question of whether a single-minded pursuit of authorial intentions (to the exclusion of other shaping factors) can be justified.

45  Henslowe's Diary, ed. R.A. Foakes and R.T. Rickert (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 206.

46  Greg, pp. 133-35. For a detailed discussion of the evidence for Rowley's authorship of most of the B-text additions, see Kuriyama, 191-96.

47  See Articles 9 to 13 of the Church of England, and A. D. Nuttall, Overheard by God: Fiction and Prayer in Herbert, Milton, Dante and St John (London: Methuen, 1980), pp. 21-30; also Alan Sinfield, Literature in Protestant England 1560-1660 (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 8-13.

48  For a survey of these mechanisms as supposedly revealed in the A-text of Doctor Faustus, see Greg, pp. 40-60.

49  Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (2 vols., 1960; rpt. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), II.iii.5, vol. 1, pp. 295-96.

50  For Calvin's view on perseverance in grace, see Institutes, III.xxii.7, III.xxiv.6-11. Article 16 of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England (which English Calvinists struggled in vain to have altered) presents a more lenient view of the matter.

51  It has been argued by Robert H. West, in “The Impatient Magic of Dr. Faustus,” English Literary Renaissance 4 (1974), 231, that Faustus's words “valeat numen triplex Iehovae” (A: 259-60) in his invocation of Mephostophilis are not an act of abjuration, but mean rather “The three-fold power of Jehovah aid me?” Yet while the verb valeo has a wide range of meanings, how many of them are possible in this context? Can the form valeat, used as here, be anything other than a forceful gesture of dismissal? Cicero's rejection of the gods of Epicurus offers a persuasive parallel: “Deinde si maxime talis est deus ut nulla gratia, nulla hominum caritate teneatur, valeat....” M. Tulli Ciceronis De natura deorum, ed. A.S. Pease (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955-58), I.124, vol. 1, p. 536. What is for Cicero merely granted for the sake of argument (“Deinde si maxime talis est deus”) is for Faustus a matter of subjective certainty: “I and Faustus wil turne to God againe. / To God? He loves thee not...” (A: 446-47).

52  Richard Hooker, “A Learned Discourse of Justification,” in Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, ed. Christopher Morris (2 vols.; London: Dent, 1954), vol. 1, pp. 49-50.

53  Calvin, Institutes, III.iii.24, vol. 1, p. 620.

54  The Faerie Queene, I.ix.53; quoted from Spenser: Poetical Works, ed. J.C. Smith and E. De Selincourt (1912; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 50.

55  On Faustus's use of the “devil's syllogism,” see Douglas Cole, Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe (1962, rpt. New York: Gordian Press, 1972), pp. 199-200; and Susan Snyder, “The Left Hand of God: Despair in Medieval and Renaissance Tradition,” Studies in the Renaissance 12 (1965), 18-59, esp. 30-33.

56  J. P. Brockbank, Marlowe: Dr. Faustus, Studies in English Literature, no. 6 (London: Arnold, 1962), pp. 41-42. Although Brockbank's attempt to separate this episode from the theological structure of the play is inadmissible, his analysis of that structure remains one of the best available. Other critics have often simply not understood what is at issue. Thus Paul Kocher, declaring that “Faustus is the only one of Marlowe's plays in which the pivotal issue is strictly religious and the whole design rests upon Protestant doctrines,” promptly contradicts his second clause: “This issue, stated simply, is whether Faustus shall choose God or the evil delights of witchcraft” (Christopher Marlowe, p. 104). The objection of some critics that a Calvinist structure would make superfluous the interventions of the Good Angel and the Old Man, as well as the threats of the devils (cf. Kocher, p. 108; Cole, p. 219; Michael Hattaway, “The Theology of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus,” 76), is sufficiently refuted by a reading of Calvin's Institutes, I.xiv.9, 19; II.v.4; and III.xx.46. Kocher's attempt to separate the Old Man's lines at A: 1319-23 from their dramatic context and use them as a theological proof-text is misguided: the Old Man episode in its entirety would appear, if anything, to make Faustus seem inexcusable (cf. Calvin, Institutes, II.v.4-5). Finally, the suggestions that a Calvinist structure would destroy suspense or alienate the sympathies of the audience (cf. Lily B. Campbell, “Doctor Faustus: A Case of Conscience,” PMLA 67 [1952], 219, 239; Arieh Sachs, “The Religious Despair of Doctor Faustus,” Journal of English and Germanic Philology 63 [1964], 638, 647; Pauline Honderich, “John Calvin and Doctor Faustus,” Modern Language Review 68 [1973], 2, 10) are no more relevant to the play than analogous suggestions would be to the Agamemnon of Aeschylus or to Sophocles' Oedipus Rex.

57  I do not mean to suggest by this that Faustus has not also damned himself. In a Calvinist context, the two statements amount to the same thing. Cf. Philippe Du Plessis-Mornay, A Woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian Religion, trans. Sir Philip Sidney and Arthur Golding (London, 1587), ch. Xiii; esp. p. 221 (sig. O7): “God therefore to shew his power in our freedome and libertie, hath left our willes to us; and to restreyne them from loosenesse, he hath so ordered them by his wisedome, that he worketh his owne will no lesse by them, than if we had no will at all.”

58  The degree to which this effect may be undermined by the syntactical ambiguity of the last four lines of the play has yet to be closely examined by critics.

59  I have added the commas in this line.

60  Selected Writings of Fulke Greville, ed. Joan Rees (London: Athlone Press, 1973), p. 44.

61  The “field of 'terministic' ambiguities” in which all the central issues of Doctor Faustus “are mutually implicated” has been analysed by Edward A. Snow in a brilliant article, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and the Ends of Desire,” in Two Renaissance Mythmakers, ed. Kernan, pp. 70-110.     

 

Misreading Faustus Misreading: The Question of Context

[First published in The Dalhousie Review 65.4 (Winter 1985-86): 511-33. I have made several small changes to the text, and have updated some of the notes to incorporate references to more recent scholarship.]

 

[Faustus]:   Now would I have a booke where I might see al characters and planets of the heavens, that I might knowe their motions and dispositions. 
[Mephastophilis]:   Heere they are too.                  Turne to them
Fau:   Nay let me have one booke more, and then I have done, wherein I might see al plants, hearbes and trees that grow upon the earth. 
Me:    Heere they be. 
Fau:    O thou art deceived. 
Me:    Tut I warrant thee.                      Turne to them               (A: 618-27)1

 

I

 

Marlowe’s Tragicall History of Doctor Faustus opens with the spectacle of a man bending his mind to a strange task of self-transformation. Struggling against the limits of humanity, Faustus aspires to be something more:

A sound Magician is a mighty god: 
Here tire, my braines, to get a Deity!   (A: 92, B: 89)2

A god, then, and self-begotten. The notion is at once magnificent (“All things that move betweene the quiet poles / Shalbe at my commaund” [A: 86-87]); desperate, in that it emerges as an alternative to the promise of everlasting death which Faustus finds in the New Testament; and faintly ridiculous. The intentions of this would-be god, once he descends to particulars, smell oddly of the study. He will overturn, for himself at least, that law of destiny concerning scholars that Marlowe enunciated in his Hero and Leander—“Grosse gold, from them runs headlong to the boore”;3 his servile spirits will

                         flye to India for gold, 
Ransacke the Ocean for orient pearle, 
And search all corners of the new found world
For pleasant fruites and princely delicates

—but not before they have resolved him “of all ambiguities” (A: 114-17, 112). The academic manifests himself again in the slide from thoughts of “straunge philosophie” into the musings of an armchair strategist who will have his spirits “wall all Germany with brasse” and will “levy souldiers with the coyne they bring, / And chase the Prince of Parma from our land”—musings which are interrupted by the slightly puerile notion of filling “the publike schooles with [silk] / Wherewith the students shalbe bravely clad” (A: 118-25). The indirectness of all this is curious: Faustus will be a god, but by proxy; a god, perhaps, in academic robes.

These oddly unfocussed desires presuppose a capacity for self-determination that is, however, utterly denied by the structure of spiritual forces within which Faustus lives and by which he is permeated. Faustus’s is a career in which the false-heroic, the fatuous, and farcical are mixed in approximately equal quantities with something that is less easily labeled, but which includes a pervasive fear of torture and of death, iridescent verbal barriers constructed to shut out that fear, and a corrosive self-awareness which dissolves them to re-state a debilitating terror in still stronger terms. At the end of this career, he is reduced to craving a different kind of transformation:

Ah Pythagoras metemsucossis were that true, 
This soule should flie from me, and I be changde
Unto some brutish beast….   (A: 1491-93)

But in a manner vaguely reminiscent of the paradoxes of Nicholas of Cusa’s docta ignorantia, a measure of dignity is extracted from its utter opposite. Thus for example, in his last hour Faustus’s desperate will to live finds voice in a line marvelously appropriated from the Amores of Ovid: “O lente lente currite noctis equi” (A: 1459).4 And, academic to the end, the last thing he can think of to abdicate is his necromantic scholarship: “Ugly hell gape not, come not Lucifer, / Ile burne my bookes, ah Mephastophilis” (A: 1507-08).

Over the past three quarters of a century or more—a period, coincidentally let us say, during which English studies have become professionalized as the almost exclusive domain of university teachers—this tragedy of a university teacher has risen from comparative obscurity to a position close to the centre of the literary canon. Edited and re-edited by modern scholars, mulled over by critics, reprinted in both the Norton and Oxford anthologies of English literature, Doctor Faustus has become one of a small number of almost inescapable objects in the humanities curricula of universities in the English-speaking world. Yet strangely enough, despite all this attention, despite a general conviction that it is laden with significance, Doctor Faustus is a play which tends to be remembered in the barest outline, or in terms of a few anthology pieces—among them the dangerously playful speech to Helen and the splendid last soliloquy. Is the play really no more than an obscure setting for such brilliant fragments? Or does our forgetfulness—which contrasts oddly with the play’s continued success on stage—suggest rather some defect in our understanding of the articulation of the whole? The principle of charity, together with whatever modesty one can muster, should incline us to the second alternative.

By what kind of scholarly necromancy of our own, then, can we re-animate this play with sufficient vigour to enable us to respond to it in its entirety? First, and most generally, how is one to receive this strange text which is apparently so simple in its dramatic action, yet so unforthcoming as to the meaning of that action? As an orthodox cautionary tale of one “Whose fiendful fortune may exhort the wise, / Onely to wonder at unlawful things, / whose deepenesse doth intise such forward wits, / To practise more then heavenly power permits” (A: 1514-17)? But a careful consideration of its syntactical ambiguity may suggest that this exhortation is subtly duplicitous.5 As a tragic outcry against the constricting force of this same orthodoxy, then, and a subversive exposure of its inhumanity? Or as a fool’s progress laced with bitter absurdities, a sardonic comedy in the Marlovian mixed style? “Marlovian,” one says—but how much of the mixture is Marlowe’s work, and to what extent must we admit that a play which survives in two distinct versions, one bowdlerized and revised, both textually corrupt, and both structurally defective, is an indeterminate object, a kind of palimpsest the final blurred shape of which is far removed from the design of its first shaper?6

Doctor Faustus, one may confess, is all of these: palimpsest, black comedy, tragedy, dramatic homily. And to the extent that its text is genuinely indeterminate it is many other things as well. But to speak more immediately of what it offers us, this play, in both versions or any combination of the two, is ideological in a peculiarly insistent and intimate manner. Of course, all fictive discourse is ideological in the broad sense that it contributes in a historically specific manner to a society’s self-representations. And the genre to which this play is traditionally attached is explicitly ideological to a high degree: Elizabethan tragedy typically reflects upon social codes and their natural, celestial and theological resonances through a many-voiced mimesis of power and erotic relations, of conflict, disorder and catastrophe. Yet “the dalliance of love, / In courts of Kings where state is overturnd, / …the pompe of prowd audacious deedes” (A: 4-6), assassination, incest, adultery, conquest and revenge—all these, the common stuff of Elizabethan tragedy, are largely if not wholly absent from Doctor Faustus. This play instead deals sensationally with the most private and insidious fear of Elizabethans: that of damnation, of unending torment in this life and next. The crucial decisions of its protagonist, which involve in the first place a rejection of all orthodox modes of thought, are made in isolation from any human community; and Faustus is again alone in his final suffering. Whatever social context the play provides for him is curiously peripheral to this private trajectory. For Faustus struggles not with other humans, but with heaven, hell, and his own obdurately fearful self—all of which are in a related way ideological constructs.

The ideological qualities of Doctor Faustus are further testified to by the early non-authorial deformations of its text, which in some instances were clearly prompted by a desire to limit the anxieties which it provokes—and also by the extraordinary diversity of the modern receptions of the play, many of which reveal a similar motivation. Accordingly, one might well ask whether any critical interpretation is likely to reveal as much about the play’s complex genesis as a product and reflection of the form and pressure of its age, or about the subsequent unfoldings of its meaning, as it does about the critic’s own ideological prejudices.

Or would it be more honest to aim this question in a different direction? What, then, are our motives, as readers, in returning to this play? Delight, most obviously, in its wit, its grotesque ironies, its uneven depths and resonant terrors. Who, after all, will turn with any eagerness to something that does not provoke delight? The question is St. Augustine’s—who also pertinently wondered what the hidden processes are that govern our erratic fixations of delight.7 To what in us, then, does this play respond? Perhaps, on the most naïve level (but one that is well represented in modern criticism), to a desire for reassurance as to certain certainties: among them our possession of free-will (does Faustus not wilfully choose his own damnation?) and the existence, for other ages if not for us, of objective powers of good and evil. And at the same time, possibly, to a desire to enjoy, without the effort of being saved, the most dubious of all the privileges of the blessed: that of witnessing from a safe distance the terrors of the damned. The large ironic inversions of Doctor Faustus can thus answer to its readers’ submission to ideological circumscription—or indeed, to a more complex attitude of skepticism as to the very possibility of escape from one or another form of such enclosure. But the play also responds, with equal if not greater directness, to the contrary experience of resistance. Those who are disinclined to approve the permeating orthodoxies of their own age (which, like Faustus, they will find it easier to reject than to expel) may see their difficulties prefigured in this play’s interrogation of a theological orthodoxy which it cannot openly challenge, but whose harsh outlines it can nevertheless expose.

The dominant rhetorical mode of the play, however, is self-interrogation and second-person self-predication. This peculiarity may make it of particular interest to readers engaged in the self-reflexive labyrinths of contemporary literary theory. It is his habitual mode of self-address—“Settle thy studies Faustus” (A: 30); “what art thou Faustus but a man condemned to die?” (A: 1169); “Accursed Faustus, where is mercie now?” (A: 1329)—which in large part constitutes the dramatic identity of Faustus, and which does so in terms of an increasingly powerful recognition of the end that is in store for him. At the same time as they enact a split between a perverse wilfulness and the strangely passive self which is addressed, his self-reflections construct a trap of self-authenticating predication, a dialogue of one voice in which the self identifies, and names as its own destiny, an eschatologically defined Other within the self. Whether this uncentred self that is constituted and betrayed by its own discourse be related to a Heraclitean equation of ethos and daimon, to its obvious context in sixteenth-century Protestant theology, or to the theories of Lacan, Foucault, or Derrida, its contemporary appeal is evident.8

But does Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus not also answer to a certain apocalyptic mood in late twentieth-century culture? To the degree that we accept, with whatever ironic reservations, one or another form of alignment with Faustus as a figure who carries meaning for our own age, are we not, almost unavoidably, remaking the play as an allegorical apocalypse, prophetic of some fatal imbalance in a culture which modern writers have with some frequency described as “Faustian”?9 And is this remaking perhaps one sign of a vertigo in our culture analogous to that which informs the “tragicall history” of Faustus—a vertigo which (as the conflation of obscene jargon and pious hopes in what are euphemistically termed ‘arms control’ negotiations may suggest) combines an unspeakable desire for the erasure of our own collective history with a shuddering recoil from that desire?10

Such motives for returning to Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus have in common a firm anchorage in present-day concerns. (The same would also be true of any more adequate list.) It might be an exaggeration to claim that the overlap, real or illusory, between these concerns and those of Marlowe’s play is what enables us to recuperate and reimagine it. But this overlap is certainly the basis of what makes us want to do so. In each instance, then, the play is being encountered not in isolation, but rather through the mediation of more recent texts. This mediation is obvious enough when these are works of interpretation—inflected, whether they are literary-historical, New Critical, poststructuralist, New Historicist, cultural materialist, or materialist-feminist, with one or another form of theory—or of literary theory proper. It is perhaps less easy to tell when one’s responses are being molded—when, that is, the play as one perceives it is being re-shaped—by prior readings in cultural and intellectual history, theology, or philosophy. Less obvious still is the mediating effect of post-Marlovian versions of the Faustus legend. One may suspect a certain unconscious Goethean influence in the work of a critic who consistently gives Goethe’s spelling (“Mephistopheles”) to the name of the attendant spirit in Marlowe’s play.11

It might then be asked how much of one’s own appreciation of the play’s lucid ironies and solipsistic overtones is perhaps due to an awareness of the dramatic fragments published by Paul Valéry under the title Mon Faust, or to what degree one’s perception of it as implicitly allegorical may be derived from a reading of Thomas Mann’s allegorical reworking of the legend, or from another superb Faustian novel published in the same year as Mann’s Doctor Faustus, Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano. The word “Faustian” itself has a curious history extending from nineteenth-century interpretations of Goethe’s Faust, through the vaguely Nietzschean allegories of Faust in Spengler’s Decline of the West, to an increasingly pessimistic modern usage that seems to refer less often to Goethe than to the Marlovian and pre-Marlovian versions of the legend.12 The confused history of this term may thus be emblematic of the more subtle conflation of critical, dramatic, novelistic—and perhaps also operatic and cinematic—reinterpretations of the Faustus legend which is arguably at work in our approaches to Marlowe’s play.

Finally, what of the actual editions through which we experience this play? Are their choices between textual alternatives (not to mention their introductions and annotations) so purely objective as to be uncontaminated by modern needs and prejudices? Are these edited texts, then, not also theory-laden forms of interpretive mediation? And even if, for critical purposes, we make use of facsimile or parallel-text editions, is our sense of the play’s shape not influenced by the conflated reading-texts in which we first encountered it?

Any modern reading of Doctor Faustus may therefore be expected to differ from the play as received by Marlowe’s contemporaries by at least as much as the Don Quixote of Pierre Menard, in Jorge Luis Borges’s story,13 differed from those textually identical chapters of the novel by Cervantes which it so painstakingly reconstituted—but with such a wealth of new meanings! If this amounts to saying that all readings of the play are misreadings—even the most careful and scholarly ones—it is a wholly appropriate result. For misreading, in one form or another, seems to be a recurrent feature of the legend of Faustus. Thus, for example, in the third scene of Goethe’s Faust, its protagonist, wrestling with the biblical Greek, concludes by rendering the first words of the Gospel of St. John as “Im Anfang war die Tat!”14 This eccentric translation has been taken as setting the thematic tone of the whole work, which might indeed be described as an epic comedy of translation, in all the manifold senses of that word.15 In a perhaps less complicated but equally instructive sense, Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus could be called a tragedy of misreading.

 

II

Faustus’s first gesture on stage, it would seem, is to take up a book—“Sweet Analitikes tis thou hast ravisht me”—and to read from it: “Bene disserere est finis logices” (A: 36-37). But this definition is not from “Aristotles workes” (A: 35); rather, as any university-educated Elizabethan would at once have recognized, it is the Ciceronian definition made famous by the innumerable editions of Peter Ramus’s works on dialectic.16 Faustus is not reading Aristotle at all, but rather Aristotle as distorted by Ramus—who, as Marlowe has that pedagogue say himself in The Massacre at Paris, had reduced Aristotle’s logic “into better forme.” A dissenting view as to this “better” is provided in the same scene of that play by the Duke of Guise, who in ordering the murder of Ramus, informs him that his offense lay

in having a smack in all, 
And yet didst never sound anything to the deapth. 
Was it not thou that scoftes the Organon, 
And said it was a heape of vanities? 
He that will be a flat dicotamest, 
And seen in nothing but Epitomies: 
Is in your judgment thought a learned man. 
And he forsooth must goe and preach in Germany….17

Faustus, who has clearly attended to this Ramist ‘preaching,’ is off to a rocky start in his own project of beginning “To sound the deapth of that thou wilt professe” (A: 32). His dismissal of logic—

Is to dispute well Logickes chiefest end? 
Affoords this Art no greater miracle? 
Then read no more, thou hast attain’d that end   (B: 37-39)

—is a transparent sophism. Fittingly enough, when he tells himself to “Bid Oncaymaeon farewell” (A: 42), the formula is again not Aristotelian: its author is the sophist Gorgias, who in the course of arguing that nothing exists, or if anything does it is inapprehensible, or if apprehensible it is incommunicable, maintained that both the existent and the non-existent (on kai me on) do not exist.18

The intertextual density of Faustus’s first misreading is surely surprising. Marlowe is of course recycling tags remembered from his six years of study at Cambridge, and one can only guess whether he is doing so carelessly or with an arrogant precision. But his deployment of them may suggest that the mildly satirical characterization of Faustus in these lines is more exact than the modern playgoer (or the vast majority of Elizabethans) would be likely to suspect. In quoting Ramus (who was controversial at Cambridge in the 1580s, and whom the author of The Massacre at Paris would hardly himself have confused with Aristotle), Faustus is alluding to a logic already subverted by rhetoric,19 and the manner in which he does so may provide a measure of his own unscrupulousness as a rhetorician. To offer a modern equivalent, it is as though one brandished what appeared to be a copy of one of Husserl’s works, and then, reading from it one of the deconstructive tropes of Jacques Derrida, rejected Husserl on the basis of that sample of ‘his’ thought. Faustus’s misreading can of course be taken as a simple error (and, given his pretensions, a most revealing one): however, it may also be read as one symptom of a more complicated and deliberate kind of folly.

Having dismissed medicine and law with equal facility, Faustus turns to the one remaining scholastic discipline, theology. His prompt misreading of two key New Testament passages is no longer merely an academic joke, however. It indicates with syllogistic clarity the form of his self-entrapment:

Jeromes Bible, Faustus, view it well. 
Stipendium peccati mors est: ha, Stipendium, &c
The reward of sinne is death: that’s hard. 
Si peccasse negamus, fallimur, & nulla est in nobis veritas
If we say that we have no sinne, 
We deceive our selves, and theres no truth in us. 
Why then belike we must sinne, 
And so consequently die. 
I, we must die an everlasting death….   (A: 68-76)

Faustus misreads the words of St. Paul (Romans 6: 23) and St. John (1 John 1: 8) because he has lifted them out of their contexts, failing in each case to notice that the words he quotes form only the first half of an antithetical construction. The second clause of Romans 6: 23—“Gratia autem Dei, vita aeterna in Christo Jesu Domino nostro” (“but the gifte of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord”)—and the next verse in the epistle of John—“Si confiteamur peccata nostra: fidelis est, et Justus, ut remittat nobis peccata nostra, et emundet nos ab omni iniquitate” (“If we acknowledge our sinnes, he is faithful and just, to forgive us our sinnes, & to clense us from all unrighteousnes”)—conditionally withdraw the condemnations which are all that Faustus sees.20

It will be observed that only by re-contextualizing these biblical passages can one begin to explain how Faustus has misread them. We are already embarked upon this process once we have identified and completed the passages which he quotes. It is only a small second step to suppose that a fair proportion of the people in any Elizabethan audience would have been able to do the same from memory (or, at the very least, to recognize the specific nature of Faustus’s error).21 How much further should we go in re-contextualizing Faustus’s misreading? Or rather, since some of the factors of interpretive prejudice which I have mentioned begin at this point to make themselves felt, how much further do we want to go? Faustus’s misreading of theology, like his dismissal of the other academic disciplines, is clearly motivated. His initial decision to ‘settle his studies’ includes the intention to “be a Divine in shew, / Yet levell at the end of every Art” (A: 33-34). He will profess theology only a hypocritical cover for what is quickly revealed as an aggressive project of taking aim at the end (which is also to say the final purpose and the corresponding limit) of every discipline.22 But are our readings—or misreadings—of his words not also motivated?

We need go no further in restoring the context of this passage if we wish to see this play as a morality, and Faustus as a proud incompetent, a fool in the line of Moros, the witless protagonist of W. Wager’s homiletic play The Longer Thou Livest The More Fool Thou Art (1569). Yet a contextual examination of Faustus’s first misreading has raised the possibility that his folly may be of a more interesting kind, more akin perhaps to the Moriae Encomium of Erasmus than to Wager’s Moros. And a further consideration of context may incite us to wonder how adequate a scoffing analysis of Faustus’s folly is as a response to the implications of this passage. It is indeed ironically appropriate that a scholar who has arrogantly dismissed logic and law should restrict himself, in Pauline terms, to the condemnation of the Law—and with a syllogism, too. But a more suitable reaction to this might be the proverbial “There, but for the grace of God, go I.”

Marlowe scholars have long been aware of two striking sixteenth-century parallels to Faustus’s syllogism. As Douglas Cole observed, ‘Faustus is blinded here by precisely the same flash of ‘logic’ which the devil in Thomas Becon’s Dialogue Between the Christian Knight and Satan (1564) employs (also in a syllogism) to tempt the knight to despair, and which in Spenser’s Faerie Queene Despair uses to tempt Red Cross to spiritual death.”23 Both knights, unlike Faustus, escape this diabolical logic in the only possible way, by transcending it through an appeal to grace. Becon’s knight is able to defend himself: he accuses Satan “of calumniating and depraving the scripture …. For where my God hath spoken and taught those things that do agree and ought to be joined together, these thou dost partly allege, and partly omit and leave out.” And he appeals from the Law to the Gospel, “that is to say, grace, favour, and remission of sins, promised in Christ.”24 But Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight is saved only by the intervention of Una:

Come, come away, fraile, feebler, fleshly wight, 
Ne let vaine words bewitch thy manly hart, 
Ne divelish thoughts dismay thy constant spright. 
In heavenly mercies hast thou not a part? 
Why shouldst thou then despeire, that chosen art? 
Where justice growes, there grows eke greater grace….25

Two crucial differences between these texts and Marlowe’s version of what Luther called “the devil’s syllogism”26 are immediately apparent. The first is that Faustus is tempted by no-one but himself. The parallels adduced by Douglas Cole may suggest that an Elizabethan audience could have identified Faustus’s syllogism as a diabolical temptation to despair. But where, in this case, is the demonic tempter? This question receives an alarming answer in lines which were very probably added to the play in 1602—and which therefore constitute the earliest interpretation of this scene which we possess. In the 1616 quarto, in his last words to Faustus, Mephostophilis claims:

’Twas I, that when thou wer’t i’ the way to heaven, 
Damb’d up thy passage, when thou took’st the booke, 
To view the Scriptures, then I turn’d the leaves
And led thine eye. 
What weep’st thou? ’tis too late, despaire, farewell, 
Fooles that will laugh on earth, most weepe in hell.   (B: 1989-94)

It appears to have been Marlowe’s heavy-handed revisers, not Marlowe himself, who chose to make inescapable—assuming that Mephostophilis is not lying—a possibility that is only implicit in the first scene of the play. (But the possibility is very definitely there.)

The second difference between Marlowe’s and his predecessors’ treatment of the devil’s syllogism resides in the fact that while Becon’s knight is able, “through the grace that [he has] received,”27 to appeal to God’s mercy, and while Una is there to remind Redcrosse of this same grace and mercy, the notion of divine mercy is no more than hinted at in Doctor Faustus until after Faustus has committed apostasy and signed his pact with the devil, and it is strikingly absent from this first scene. Faustus is reminded by his Good Angel of a quite different aspect of the divine nature:

O Faustus, lay that damned booke aside, 
And gaze not on it, lest it tempt thy soule, 
And heape Gods heavy wrath upon thy head, 
Reade, reade the scriptures, that is blasphemy. (A: 102-05)

This may seem very much the sort of thing that a Good Angel ought to say, but it certainly offers no escape from the syllogism that Faustus has just propounded. Indeed, these words, addressed to a man whose soul has evidently already been tempted by the necromantic book he is holding, are perhaps less akin to the intervention of Spenser’s Una than to the persuasions of Despaire:

Is not the measure of thy sinful hire
High heaped up with huge iniquitie, 
Against the day of wrath, to burden thee?28

Is it appropriate to wonder why the Good Angel neither suggests to Faustus the sort of question that George Herbert asks—“Art thou all justice, Lord? / Shows not thy word / More attributes?”—nor tries to prompt him to the request that follows from it: “Let not thy wrathfull power / Afflict my houre, / My inch of life…”?29

Liberal Christian readers who wish to understand this play in the light of their own convictions—who wish, that is, to think of Faustus as sharing the autonomy and free-will that they believe themselves to possess—may feel that this conjectural restoration of context has already gone too far for comfort. To which one can only reply that it is not evident that Marlowe wrote this play—or any of his plays—with the intention of providing solace for troubled minds. We are of course free to break off our inquiries at any point that pleases us, even to the point of receiving the play in the spirit of that reviser who altered Faustus’s cry in his last speech from

Oh God, if thou wilt not have mercy on my soule, 
Yet for Christs sake, whose bloud hath ransomd me, 
Impose some end to my incessant paine   (A: 1483-85)

to the safer, if less interesting

O, if my soule must suffer for my sinne, 
Impose some end to my incessant paine….   (B: 2067-68)

Yet it is only fair to ask that those who align themselves with censors of this kind—who choose, so to speak, to wear the tartan of Thomas Bowdler’s clan—should at the same time renounce any pretensions to critical open-mindedness.

 

III

The implications of unfreedom in Faustus’s syllogism and in his Good Angel’s failure to mention the essential notion of mercy may be further strengthened if one remembers the drift of St. Paul’s words in the passage from which Faustus lifted the major premise of his syllogism. The apostle, in contrasting a state of bondage to sin with one of bondage to God, speaks of freedom in a sense which seems to exclude any overtone either of autonomy or of free-will:

For when ye were the servants of sinne [douloi ite tis hamartias], ye were freed from righteousness. What frute had ye then in those things, whereof ye are now ashamed? For the end of those things is death. But now being freed from sinne, and made servants unto God [doulothentes de to theo], ye have your frute in holiness and the end, everlasting life. For the wages of sinne is death: but the gifte of God is eternal life…. (Romans 6: 20-23)

(I have interpolated St. Paul’s Greek as a reminder that “servant” has lost much of its sixteenth-century force: the Revised Standard Version [1952] translates these words as “slaves of sin” and “slaves of God.”)

Faustus’s misguided use of the words of St. Paul and of St. John results in a perverse response to Christian teachings: he concludes (to borrow the wording of Romans 6: 21) that “the end of those things is death.” And in reducing Christian theology to a doctrine of necessity, he goes one step further:

What doctrine call you this, Che sera, sera
What wil be, shall be? Divinitie, adieu….   (A: 77-78)

But is Faustus perverting Christianity, or is he rather recording the extent to which the Christianity he knows has itself been perverted by the acceptance of notions of an arbitrary divine sovereignty, whose condemnations to everlasting torment both precede and produce the offences which they punish?

In all but their gesture of dismissal, the lines in which Faustus quotes the familiar Italian proverb amount to a parodic reduction of the Calvinistic teachings on predestination that were the official doctrine of the Anglican Church throughout the reign of Elizabeth I (and that rested primarily upon the common Protestant understanding of Romans 8: 28-9: 24). The possibility is thus raised in the first scene of Marlowe’s play that Faustus may not be one of those chosen by the Calvinist God of the Anglican Church to have a part in heavenly mercies.30 Douglas Cole, in a passage from which I have already quoted, has suggested precisely this:

Faustus’ desperation will be a torment to him in the future; now it spurs him to indulge in his own dreams of power. His attitude and decision are exact replicas of the thoughts of the reprobate described by Wolfgang Musculus, whose theological works were read and esteemed in the schools of Reformation England: “Why shoulde I trouble and travell my selfe in vaine? and doe those things which doe like my mind, seeyng that I do know I am determined to destruction?”

But Cole seems not to have registered the meaning of this term “reprobate,” since he continues to urge that Faustus makes “his original choice by himself.”31 Alan Sinfield presents the issue with greater clarity when he writes that “Elizabethan orthodoxy would make Faustus’s damnation more challenging than most modern readers might expect, by denying that Faustus had a choice anyway: it would regard Faustus, not as damned because he makes a pact with the devil, but as making a pact with the devil because he is already damned.”32 Given this possibility, is there a sense in which Faustus’s handling of scriptural texts, in addition to being a gross misreading, may also be the appropriate, indeed inevitable response for someone in a state of bondage to sin?

The Bible came to sixteenth-century Protestants equipped with a theory of reading (and, significantly, of misreading). Thus Elizabethan Anglicans prayed to God for “grace to love thy holie word fervently, to search the Scriptures diligently, to reade them humblie, to understand them truly, to live after them effectually.” The operative word is “grace”—lacking which, scriptural study could only result in misinterpretation and mortal sin. For (to quote from another of the “Godly Prayers” printed with many editions of the Prayer Book), “the infirmitie and weaknesse of man” are such that we “can nothing doe without thy godly helpe. If man trust to himselfe, it cannot bee avoided, but that hee must headlong runne and fall into a thousand undoings and mischiefs.”33

But this insistence upon divine grace, and upon human weakness and perversity, would seem to have produced a tendency to separate, if only for purposes of emphasis, the two halves of the very texts from which Faustus quotes. Roma Gill has observed that Faustus’s English rendering of 1 John 1: 8 repeats the wording of The Boke of Common Praier (1559), where in the order for Morning Prayer this verse is quoted without the following one—the sense of which is fully conveyed, however, by the ensuing exhortation to general confession.34 A more radical truncation of this text occurs in Article XV of the Church of England, which ends with these words: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” Full stop. Nothing remotely like 1 John 1: 9 appears in the following articles, or indeed anywhere among the Thirty-Nine Articles. In Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion there occurs a similar truncation, this time of the words of St. Paul. Calvin is here fulminating against the Roman Catholic distinction between mortal and venial sins:

… if God has revealed his will in the law, whatever is contrary to the law displeases him. Do they fancy God’s wrath so feeble that the death penalty will not immediately follow? And he has clearly declared this …. He says: “The soul that sins shall surely die.” [Ezek. 18: 4, 20, Vg.] Likewise the passage just cited: “The wages of sin is death” [Rom. 6: 23]. What they confess to be sin because they cannot deny it they nevertheless contend is not mortal sin…. But if they persist in their ravings, we bid them farewell. Let the children of God hold that all sin is mortal. For it is rebellion against the will of God, which of necessity provokes God’s wrath, and it is a violation of the law, upon which God’s judgement is pronounced without exception. The sins of the saints are pardonable, not because of their nature as saints, but because they obtain pardon from God’s mercy.35

And so Calvin ends his chapter. The strong family resemblance between this argument and Faustus’s syllogism can hardly escape notice. Calvin does supply, in the last sentence of this passage, something that might be taken as a loose approximation of the meaning of the latter half of Romans 6: 23. This sentence, moreover, has scriptural authority: it echoes Romans 9: 15-16 (which in turn quotes Exodus 33: 19). But Calvin has chosen to emphasize the tautological nature of the Pauline doctrine: all sins without exception are mortal, he says, except those of the saints, which are forgiven not because they are saints but because they are forgiven. One can imagine a graceless reader asking, “What doctrine call you this, Che sera, sera?”

 

IV

I have suggested that when we read Doctor Faustus we are, inevitably, misreading it: the play has been effectively decontextualized by the passage of nearly four centuries; it comes to us mediated (which is also to say re-contextualized) by concepts of which its first shapers had no inkling; and we turn to it with motivations that differ in many respects from those of its Elizabethan audiences. In reading this first scene, then, we are also misreading Faustus misreading. Our act of misreading can be said to parallel the parodic enactment of scholarly misreading which is its object, and in which the same elements of decontextualizing, mediation, and motivation are more blatantly evident.

The parallel is not, perhaps, very exact. If only because of our situation in time, our readings of the play are always in some sense misreadings—yet they are not intentionally so. To take two prominent examples, the misreadings of Sir Walter Greg and Leo Kirschbaum were obviously motivated—in both cases by a desire to have the play reflect a mid twentieth-century Christian orthodoxy.36 Although the resulting contextual and interpretive distortions oblige us to define this aspect of their work as more ideological than critical, to call what we now identify as errors deliberate would be absurd. In contrast, Faustus’s misreadings do seem to be deliberate. He makes his hypocrisy clear when he sets out to “be a Divine in shew, / Yet levell at the end of every Art” (A: 33-34). And the aggressive intention suggested by “levell at” is fully realized in what follows. Aristotle, so stripped of context (and of content) as to be no more than a name, is mediated by Ramus and Gorgias; the tags lifted from St. Paul and St. John are filtered through a reprobate’s version of Eizabethan Anglicanism; and the whole rhetorical performance points towards the praise of magic into which it devolves.

Yet something appears to be missing—and this lack may restore the parallel between Faustus’s misreadings and our own. A deliberate misreading is, necessarily, a duplicitous, a double reading: the very notion implies some awareness of an authentic or subjectively correct interpretation which is overlain by a second, false one. But is such a structure present in Faustus’s speech? Its inadvertent ironies suggest otherwise. The question of eternal life is displaced into medicine—“Couldst thou make men to live eternally, / … Then this profession were to be esteem’d” (B: 51, 53)—while in its proper realm, theology, Faustus can find only the promise of “everlasting death” (A: 76). And he is deaf to the ominous theological overtones of the fragment he quotes from Justinian: “Exhereditari filium non potest pater, nisi—” (B: 58). Any authentic understanding which his words may convey is embedded in them at a level inaccessible to Faustus himself.

Clearly, it can still be said of him in this scene that he is foolish, or comically incompetent: there is no need for Marlowe critics to abandon one of their favourite judgments of his character.37 But the same reconstruction of context that makes this judgment possible also alters the terms in which it can meaningfully be pronounced. For if Faustus’s misreadings apparently lack the conscious duplicity that their deliberateness would imply, the manner in which he decontextualizes and recontextualizes scriptural passages, composing them into a recognizable “hard” doctrine (A: 70) that for him amounts to a necessary condemnation, seems to reveal the hidden presence in this scene of another will, external to him, and yet operating through him. Here already, is a first hint of that eschatologically defined Other within the self that becomes explicit in Faustus’s subsequent despairing self-definitions.

From a modern perspective, as I have suggested, there seems to be something odd about a univocal hypocrisy, a practice of misreading that appears deliberate, but not duplicitous.38 In sixteenth-century terms, however, this kind of hypocrisy, and the psychic overdetermination which it implies, are immediately intelligible. I am thinking, again, of Calvin’s Institutes. There the term “hypocrite” is reserved for those among the reprobate who, though condemned from all eternity by God’s inscrutable will, are given enough grace to have some insight into his Word—yet not enough to enable them faithfully to persevere in the truth.39 Faustus, though “grac’t with Doctors name, / Excelling all, whose sweete delight disputes / In heavenly matters of Theologie” (A: 18-20), has become blind to the obvious meaning of the scriptural text—but blind in a manner that reveals him as a hypocrite in precisely this sense.

The cause of the “blinding of the impious,” Calvin insists, is “not to be sought outside man’s will, from which the root of evil springs up….” But as he quickly goes on to show, man’s will, though culpable because it is a will, is permeated by external causes, and by one cause in particular: “Very often God is said to blind and harden the reprobate…. For after his light is removed, nothing but darkness and blindness remains. When his Spirit is taken away, our hearts harden into stones.”40 As Faustus himself confesses, after signing his blood-pact: “My hearts so hardned I cannot repent” (A: 647). What, then, of our response to his follies? The laughter which they provoke cannot, I think, be wholly light-hearted.

 

V

How does this recognition of a double misreading, operating both within the text and in our receptions of it, affect what we make of Doctor Faustus? My question, at the outset, as to what kind of scholarly necromancy might enable us to respond to this play in its entirety may have raised hopes (since moderated, no doubt) of a new interpretation of the whole. But I have not attempted here to offer a complete new (mis-)reading which the unwary reader, appropriating Faustus’s words, might expect would be “a greater helpe to me / Then all my labours, plodde I nere so fast” (A: 99-100). My concern has been rather to point out ways in which the play itself seems to guide us towards interpretive principles that may serve to limit the errors of our future misreadings.

From my claims about misreading it does not follow that there are no distinctions to be made between more and less competent misreadings, or that, as Harold Bloom has proposed, the difference between better and worse is simply a matter of “the strength of imposition.”41 This Panglossian neo-pragmatism—whatever imposes itself upon the tribe of critics, for whatever reasons—is ‘strong’—erases any distinction between the critic and the ideologue. And applied to this play, it would obscure the most important lesson of the parallel between our own and Faustus’s misreadings.42

That Faustus is misreading is quickly apparent. But it is only through a differential awareness of the ideological and historical distances between Aristotle, the system-builder, Gorgias, whose skeptical tropes he refuted, and Ramus, who dichotomized Aristotle—or between the New Testament writers, the Reformers, and Faustus’s own reprobate reductionism—that we are able to say how he is misreading, and what therefore the act may mean. A similar differential awareness of the distance between our own age and Marlowe’s is what shows us that our own readings are misreadings. (Modesty aside, is there anything else that prevents us from assuming that our own interpretations are, quite simply, right?)

Insofar as this second form of awareness remains abstract, it is useless. For unless cynicism is a virtue, there is no more merit in knowing one is wrong, without trying to remedy the error, than there would be in an obstinate persuasion that one’s critical intuitions were the gospel truth. But in this case the same factors that condition an awareness of both kinds of misreading, Faustus’s and ours, also expose a form of ideological closure that has distorted many of the recent interpretations of this play—and at the same time press us towards an interpretive methodology that could loosely be described (with a nod to Michel Foucault’s ghost) as archaeological.

It might seem rudimentary to suspect that a play as insistently ideological as Doctor Faustus must be reacting in a systematic way—whether sardonically, subversively, despairingly, or in some combination of these—to the Calvinist theological orthodoxy of the day. Yet this is an insight which critics have until very recently striven to repress.43 Can one do so, it must be asked, without pre-emptively closing off certain avenues of approach, or without radically de-historicizing the play, and thereby committing oneself in advance to a series of interpretive errors, of which an overflow from the dogma of textual autonomy to a dogmatic belief in Faustus’s psychological autonomy is only the most obvious?

As for interpretive principles or methodology, it might fairly be asked whether, having projected the issues of context, mediation, and motivation onto the play, I should be in any way surprised to find them reflected back at me. Yet there are indications within the play—which no-one but Marlowe can be suspected of having planted there—of the same kind of active awareness of ideological and historical differences that I have been proposing as a basis for our critical approaches to it. These indications of course include Marlowe’s use of Reformation theology, but they point in other directions as well.

It has seldom been remarked that the only sixteenth-century writer mentioned by name in Doctor Faustus is the German humanist and magician Henricus Cornelius Agrippa (1486-1535): Faustus aspires to be “as cunning as Agrippa was, / Whose shadowes made all Europe honor him” (A: 150-51). These “shadowes” are the necromantic displays with which, in Thomas Nashe’s The Unfortunate Traveller (1594), this “abundant scholar” Agrippa is said to have astonished his contemporaries, among them Erasmus, Sir Thomas More, the Duke of Saxony (Luther’s protector), and the Emperor Charles V.44 Faustus entertains the same emperor, and later his own colleagues at Wittenberg, with a similarly theatrical magic. But Marlowe’s interest in Agrippa ran deeper than did that of his friend Nashe.

There is no trace of Agrippa either in the German Faustbook or in the English translation, The Historie of the damnable life, and deserved death of Doctor John Faustus (first printed c. 1588, first surviving edition 1592), that was Marlowe’s primary source. But in some of the earliest incomplete versions of the legend, the name of Faustus is linked with that of his contemporary, Georgius Sabellicus Faustus (whom printed sources begin to call “Johann” only in the 1560s). As early as 1518, “Agrippa Stygianus” was represented by a hostile polemicist as exchanging sinister letters with one “Georgius Subbunculator.”45 This name, if it is indeed a derisive modification of “Sabellicus,” is a telling one—for Faustus was, in effect, a ‘botcher-up of old clothes’: he was already notorious for his wildly eclectic heterodoxy.46 Agrippa’s brief association with the court of Charles V was absorbed, within several decades, into the legend of Faustus: both magicians were remoured to have won victories for the emperor by magic.47 And the libel, first printed in 1546, that Agrippa’s black dog was a devil, was echoed two years later by the claim that Faustus’s dog, and his horse as well, were devils.48 It seems to have become almost a convention to associate Faustus, as Philipp Melanchthon did, with “iste nebulo qui scripsit De vanitate artium49—that “scoundrel” Agrippa whose De vanitate (1530) was widely read and translated into several languages, and whose other major work, De occulta philosophia (1533), made him the most notorious sixteenth-century exponent of Hermetic and Cabalistic magic.

Marlowe does more than just associate the two: his Faustus, in the first scene at least, is a close parody of the Agrippan magus. Agrippa’s brilliant deconstruction, in the declamatory invective of De vanitate,50 of all of the orthodox forms of knowledge—from logic to dicing, and from whore-mongering to scholastic theology—was widely believed, despite its evangelical orientation, to have been designed to clear the ground for his fusion of magic with Christianity in De occulta philosophia: though Agrippa (in the words of his English translator) was “Professinge Divinitee,” he was doing so hypocritically.51 This precisely the pattern of Faustus’s own declamatio invectiva, which concludes with a rhapsodic praise of magic for which there are close parallels in De occulta philosophia.

Behind Faustus’s misreadings, then, there lies another one: Marlowe’s misreading of Agrippa. Let us superimpose these misreadings: Marlowe’s parodic misconstrual of Agrippa, whom Calvin in his De scandalis (1550) denounced as an atheist;52 and Faustus’s parodic misreading of a Calvinistic theology, which is undertaken in the service of an Agrippan commitment to magic. The effect is not quite dialectical: the balance is not even. Yet neither can this pattern be reduced to a static structure of ironies. For Marlowe is not merely re-writing, with whatever increase in sophistication, the legend of Faustus; he is exploring its historical and ideological roots.

Where does this leave the modern interpreter, the perpetual third party in this dance of misreadings? Midway, perhaps, between the exasperated refusal of Faustus, in those lines from another scene of reading which I cited as an epigraph to this essay, to believe that the book he has been given has pre-empted the demands he wants to make of it—“O thou art deceived”—and the pat Mephastophilian reply: “Tut I warrant thee” (A: 626-27). Our thirst for knowledge, our continuing itch to write one more work of interpretation, will continue to result in parodies of what is there to be reconstructed and understood, just as those exchanges, in which Faustus pleads with Mephastophilis to “let me have one booke more, and then I have done” (A: 622), are themselves a parody of that resonant passage from the apocryphal Wisdom of Solomon which in the Vulgate text ends, after a catalogue of the wonders that Solomon has learned, with these words: “omnium enim artifex docuit me sapientia”—“for Wisdom, the artificer of all things, taught me.” 53

As though to point the moral, Agrippa quotes this passage in the peroration to De vanitate—but at the same time he misreads, or perhaps parodies it. Adding one letter, he writes “sapientiam”—and wisdom becomes, not his teacher and beloved, but rather the content of what he now knows; not a category of the sacred and an aspect of the divine, but an instrument of his own thirst for knowledge and for power.

More decisively than Agrippa or any of his contemporaries, we have turned away from the constricting notion of Wisdom as a hypostatized agent or artificer. But to transpose wisdom into the accusative case, to treat the text—any text—as endlessly vulnerable to whatever uncontrolled remakings our own needs may dictate, is to accept a different kind of ideological closure—one which an historically alert criticism will want to avoid.

 

 

NOTES

1  All quotations from the play are from W. W. Greg, ed., Marlowe’s “Doctor Faustus” 1604-1616: Parallel Texts (1950; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Quotations are identified by the text from which they are drawn (A refers to the edition of 1604 and its reprints in 1609 and 1611, B to the substantially revised edition of 1616), and by their line numbers in Greg’s parallel-text edition. Where the 1609 or 1611 editions correct misprints in the 1604 text, I have felt free to substitute their readings without comment. Words enclosed in square brackets are my emendations. U/v and i/j have been silently altered throughout to conform with modern practice, and errors in Latin are silently corrected.

2  The punctuation given to B: 89 here is that of John D. Jump’s Revel Plays edition (London: Methuen, 1962).

3  Hero and Leander, line 472, from Roma Gill, ed., The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe, vol. 1: All Ovids Elegies, Lucans First Booke, Dido Queene of Carthage, Hero and Leander (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 201.

4  Ovid, Amores, I. xiii. 40: “clamares: ‘lente currite, noctis equi!’”—a line rather flatly rendered by Marlowe in his translation of All Ovids Elegies as “Then wouldst thou cry, stay night and runne not thus” (Complete Works, vol. 1, ed. Gill, p. 32).

5  The reader or listener who initially attaches the second of these syntactically parallel clauses to the same subject as the first (to Faustus, that is, rather than to “things”) commits a momentary misconstruing of the sense which may seem scarcely possible for anyone who already knows the lines—but which, if made on first acquaintance with them, can only be corrected by the ensuing recognition that “such forward wits” are not to be identified with “the wise”. To conflate the two, even momentarily, would be to find oneself stumbling between the two poles which these lines emphatically distinguish—or, in terms of one’s response, between a dangerous empathy with one forward wit (encouraged, surely, by his final soliloquy) and the negation of that empathy in a complacent self-identification as one of the wise. The possibility of such a conflation, however remote it may seem, and however dependent upon such intangibles as the length of the actor’s pause at the line ending after the first clause, is nonetheless a risk built into the syntax of these lines, and thus, at whatever level, a part of what they mean.

6  On the two texts of Doctor Faustus, see my essay “The A and B Texts of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus Revisited,” The Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America 100. 2 (2006): 227-57; and the introduction to my edition, The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus: Christopher Marlowe: A Critical Edition of the 1604 Version and of the Censored and Revised 1616 Text (Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2008), pp. 17-48, 88-132.

7  Augustine, Ad Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus, I. qu. ii. 21; cf. Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (1967; rpt. London: Faber and Faber, 1975), p. 155.

8  The Heraclitean paradox ethos anthropo daimon equates selfhood with daimonic otherness (for the text, see G. S. Kirk and J. E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts [1957; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977], p. 213). According to Lutheran and Calvinist theologians especially, selfhood is in a similar manner permeated and hollowed out by external agencies both demonic and divine. Analogous effects are produced in poststructuralist thought by the recurrent emphasis on subjectivity as discursively constituted, and thus always secondary to discursive structures that can acquire a daimonic force.

9  This tendency comes close to the surface in Charles Marowitz’s literal remaking of the play, which opens with a “Conversation in Purgatory” between Faustus and J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist and director of the Manhattan Project. See The Marowitz Hamlet and The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970).

10  See Robert Jay Lifton, Imagining the Real, chapters 8 and 9 in Lifton and Richard Falk, Indefensible Weapons: The Political and Psychological Case Against Nuclearism (Toronto: CBC, 1982), pp. 66-99, for a suggestive analysis of various forms of vertigo induced by the threat of nuclear extinction.

11  See M. C. Bradbrook, Themes and Conventions of Elizabethan Tragedy (1935; rpt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), pp. 150-55. (On pp. 36 and 118 of the same book “Faustus” becomes, as in Goethe's play, “Faust.”) Although the A and B texts are inconsistent in their spellings of the devil's name, the most frequent form in A is “Mephastophilis,” and the normal form in B is “Mephostophilis.” The edition from which Bradbrook is quoting, that of F. S. Boas (London: Methuen, 1932), gives the spelling “Mephistophilis,” which also suggests some Goethean influence. Recent editors have gone whole-heartedly for the Goethean spelling: see David Bevington and Eric Rasmussen, eds., Doctor Faustus: A- and B-texts (1604, 1616) (The Revels Plays, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); Mark Thornton Burnett, ed., Christopher Marlowe: The Complete Plays (London: J. M. Dent, 1999); and Frank Romany and Robert Lindsey, eds., Christopher Marlowe: The Complete Plays (London: Penguin, 2003).

12  Symptomatic of this is the greater force of Marlovian than of Goethean echoes in Lowry’s novel, and the fact that Mann’s Doctor Faustus goes back to the Faustbook of 1587, an English translation of which was the principal source of Marlowe and his collaborators.

13  Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings, ed. D. A. Yates and J. E. Kirby (1964; rpt. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), pp. 62-71.

14  Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust: Eine Tragödie, ed. Hanns W. Eppelsheimer (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1962), line 1237, p. 40.

15  These include translations in time and space, of one culture and its forms of expression into another, and a translation, finally, into a higher realm of being. Some of these senses are analyzed by Marc Shell in “Money and the Mind: The Economics of Translation in Goethe’s Faust,” MLN 95 (1980): 516-62.

16  See Walter J. Ong, S.J., Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue (1958; rpt. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 160 (and 377-48, notes 41 and 42), 178 (and 350 n. 39). See also Peter Ramus, The Logike of the most excellent philosopher P. Ramus Martyr, Newly translated, and in divers places corrected, after the mynde of the Author, trans. Roll. Makylmenaeus Scotus (1574; facsimile rpt. Leeds: Scolar Press, 1966), p. 17: “Dialectic otherwise called Logic, is an art which teacheth to dispute well.”

17  The Massacre at Paris, lines 390-97, in The Works of Christopher Marlowe, ed. C. F. Tucker Brooke (1910; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), p. 457. Both in the Guise’s words and in Ramus’s defence of his teachings, Marlowe shows himself to be well informed about Ramus. Ramus did indeed “preach” in German and Swiss universities from 1568 to 1570 (see Ong, Ramus, p. 28), and the improbably named “Shekius” of line 410 is one Jacob Schegk (Schegkius, Shecius), author of De demonstratione libri XV (Basle, 1564), which contains an attack on Ramus (Ong, Ramus, pp. 15, 388).

18  The words come from a text of Gorgias, On Nature or that which is not (peri tou me ontos), a version of which is preserved by the skeptic Sextus Empiricus in his Adversus mathematicos VII. 65-86; see Sextus Empiricus, ed. and trans. R. G. Bury (4 vols.; Loeb Classical Library; London: Heinemann, and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933-1949), Adversus mathematicos VII. 66, vol. 2, p. 34. For more recent translations of Gorgias’s text, see Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed., The Older Sophists (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 42-46; and John Dillon and Tania Gergel, eds., The Greek Sophists (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 67-75. The phrase Faustus quotes may be Marlowe’s back-translation from the Latin translation of Sextus’s Adversus mathematicos published by Gentian Hervet in 1569, just as Faustus’s quotations from “Jerome’s Bible” appear to be a back-translation into Latin from an English version of the Bible. It is also possible that Marlowe had access to Greek manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus owned by Henry (subsequently Sir Henry) Savile and by the Oxford scholar John Wolley; the existence of these mss. is noted by William M. Hamlin in “A Lost Translation Found? An Edition of The Sceptick (c. 1590) Based on Extant Manuscripts [with text],” ELR 31 (2001): 38, and in “Casting Doubt in Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus,” SEL 41 (2001): 270 n. 8.

19  See Ong, Ramus, p. 49 (“The story of Ramism, in fact, is largely the story of unresolved tensions between the logical and the rhetorical traditions”), and p. 188; and for a reference to the Cambridge Ramist controversies, see Ramus, p. 91.

20  The English translation is that of the Geneva Bible of 1560. Although Faustus says he is quoting from the Vulgate text (“Jeromes Bible”), Marlowe’s Latin in fact deviates from the Vulgate text of these verses (“Stipendium enim peccati, mors”; “Si dixerimus quoniam peccatum non habemus, ipsi nos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est”). It may be significant that Marlowe’s re-translation into Latin of 1 John 1: 8 avoids any direct implication of responsibility: compare Faustus’s passive “fallimur” with the Vulgate’s “ipsi nos seducimus” and with the Greek heautous planomen.

21  These passages were regularly expounded in sermons, and also recur with some frequency in the daily readings prescribed for Anglican services during Elizabeth’s reign: Romans 6 on the day after Epiphany, on Easter morning, the seventh Sunday after Trinity Sunday, and again in early September; 1 John 1 in late April, late August, and in the third week of December. In the Order for Morning Prayer, 1 John 1: 8 is quoted immediately before the exhortation to general confession; the sense of 1 John 1: 9 is conveyed by the wording of the Commination against Sinners. See The Prayer-Book of Queen Elizabeth, 1559 (London, 1890), pp. 42, 144.

22  Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics with the statement that “Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim” (The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984], vol. 2, p. 1729 [1094a]). Faustus is both echoing and perverting this doctrine. One might initially think his meaning comparable to that of sentences cited by the OED from works printed in 1604 and 1626: “There can be no man, who works by right reason but … he aimeth at some end, he levels at some good”; “Every Christian is obliged to level at perfection” (OED, “level,” v1. 7). But it quickly becomes evident that “level at” here implies deliberate opposition, as in 2 Henry IV III. ii. 243-44: “the foeman may with as great aim level at the edge of a penknife,” and Antony and Cleopatra V. ii. 326: “She levelled at our purposes….”

23  Douglas Cole, Suffering and Evil in the Plays of Christopher Marlowe (1962; rpt. New York: Gordian, 1972), p. 199. The date which Cole gives for Becon’s Dialogue is probably that of a reprint; the work was written in the reign of Edward VI.

24  The Catechism of Thomas Becon, with other pieces written by him in the reign of King Edward the Sixth, ed. J. Ayre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1844), pp. 628-29.

25  The Faerie Queene I. ix. 53, in Spenser: Poetical Works, eds. J. C. Smith and E. de Selincourt (1912; rpt. London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 50.

26  See Susan Snyder, “The Left Hand of God: Despair in Medieval and Renaissance Tradition,” Studies in the Renaissance 12 (1965): 30-31.

27  Becon, p. 636.

28  The Faerie Queene I. ix. 46; Spenser: Poetical Works, p. 49.

29  The English Poems of George Herbert, ed. C. A. Patrides (1974; rpt. London: Dent, 1977), “Complaining,” lines 11-13, 16-18, p. 153.

30  For evidence that the God of late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Anglican orthodoxy was indeed the God of Calvin, see Alan Sinfield, Literature in Protestant England, 1550-1650 (London: Croom Helm; Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble, 1983); and John Stachniewski, The Persecutory Imagination: English Puritanism and the Literature of Religious Despair (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

31  Cole, pp. 199-201.

32  Alan Sinfield, Faultlines: Cultural Materialism and the Politics of Dissident Reading (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), p. 230.

33  The Prayer-Book of Queen Elizabeth, 1559, pp. 150, 148.

34  Roma Gill, “The Christian Ideology of Dr. Faustus,” in M. T. Jones-Davies, ed., Théatre et idéologies: Marlowe, Shakespeare (Paris: Jean Touzot, 1982), p. 186; see The Prayer-Book of Queen Elizabeth, p. 42.

35  Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. J. T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (2 vols.; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), II. viii. 59, vol. 1, pp. 422-23.

36  Kirschbaum is openly dogmatic, writing, for example, that “the viable eschatology of the play is so rigid that ambivalence in interpretation is ruled out. If the modern mind … sees Marlowe’s main character as the noble victim of a tyrannical Deity, it is simply being blind…. No, there is no ambiguity on the main issues in the play” (Kirschbaum, ed., The Plays of Christopher Marlowe [Cleveland and New York: Meridian, 1962], p. 103). See also his influential articles, “Marlowe’s Faustus: A Reconsideration,” Review of English Studies 19, no. 75 (1943): 225-41; and “The Good and Bad Quartos of Doctor Faustus,” The Library 26 (1946): 272-94. Greg’s much more interesting misreadings have been studied in my essay “History and the Canon: The Case of Doctor Faustus,” University of Toronto Quarterly 56.4 (1987): 498-522; and also by Constance Brown Kuriyama, “Dr. Greg and Doctor Faustus: The Supposed Originality of the 1616 Text,” ELR 5 (1975): 171-97; Michael J. Warren, “Doctor Faustus: The Old Man and the Text,” ELR 11 (1981): 111-47; and Laurie Maguire, Shakespearean suspect texts: The ‘bad’ quartos and their contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

37  See, for example, Gerald Morgan, “Harlequin Faustus: Marlowe’s Comedy of Hell,” Humanities Association Bulletin 18 (1967): 22-34; and A. N. Okerlund, “The Intellectual Folly of Dr. Faustus,” Studies in Philology 74 (1977): 258-78.

38  From a ‘postmodern’ perspective, one that takes into account recent developments in Marxist and poststructuralist literary theory, such a phenomenon may be less surprising. See, for example, Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977); David C. Hoy, The Critical Circle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982); and Robert Weimann, Structure and Society in Literary History (2nd ed.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984).

39  Calvin, Institutes III. ii. 10-12.

40  Institutes II. iv. 1, vol. 1, p. 310; II. iv. 3, vol. 1, pp. 311-12.

41  Harold Bloom, Kabbalah and Criticism (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 125.

42  My criticism here is directed not so much against the maps of misreading offered by Bloom in a series of his early books—his insights have been fruitfully applied by other scholars—as against his programmatic hostility to historical contextualizing of the kind attempted in this essay.

43  J. P. Brockbank, for example, tried to save his argument that while Doctor Faustus may be a Calvinist, Doctor Faustus is Augustinian in orientation, by ascribing the alarming response to Faustus’s prayer in Act II (he calls on Christ, but is answered by the appearance of a demonic trinity) to Marlowe’s “characteristic love of excess” (Brockbank, Marlowe: “Dr. Faustus” [London: Arnold, 1962], pp. 41-42). Other critics have often simply not understood what is at stake. Thus Paul Kocher, declaring that “Faustus is the only one of Marlowe’s plays in which the pivotal issue is strictly religious and the whole design rests upon Protestant doctrines,” promptly contradicts his second clause: “This issue, stated simply, is whether Faustus shall choose God or the evil delights of witchcraft” (Christopher Marlowe: A Study of His Thought, Learning, and Character [1946; rpt. New York: Russell and Russell, 1962], p. 104). The objection of some critics that a Calvinist context would make superfluous the interventions of the Good Angel and the Old Man, as well as the threats of the devils (for example, Michael Hattaway, “The Theology of Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus,” Renaissance Drama n.s. 3 [1970]: 76), is sufficiently refuted by a reading of Calvin’s Institutes I. xiv. 9, 19; II. v. 4; and III. xx. 46. The suggestion that a predestinarian structure would destroy suspense or alienate audience sympathies (cf. Pauline Honderich, “John Calvin and Doctor Faustus,” Modern Language Review 68 [1973]: 2, 10) is no more relevant to this play than it would be to the Agamemnon of Aeschylus. For evidence of continued opposition to Calvinist contextualizing, see T. McAlindon, “Doctor Faustus: The Predestination Theory,” English Studies 76 (1995): 215-20.

44  Thomas Nashe, The Unfortunate Traveller and Other Works, ed. J. B. Steane (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 297-99.

45  The text in question is Ortwin Gratius’s Lamentationes obscurorum virorum (1518); see Paola Zambelli, “Agrippa von Nettesheim in den neueren kritischen Studien und in den Handschristen,” Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 51 (1969): 280; and “Magic and Radical Reformation in Agrippa of Nettesheim,” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 39 (1976): 69-103.

46  A letter from the Abbot Johannes Trithemius to a friend who taught at Heidelberg (of which university both Trithemius and Faustus were graduates) records Faustus’s activities in Gelnhausen, Würzburg and Kreuznach in 1506-07: these include boasts that he could perform all the miracles of Christ whenever he wished and restore lost philosophical texts, claims of high skill in necromancy and other forms of divination, and the assumption of titles which suggest an eclectic awareness of several magical traditions. See Frank Baron, Doctor Faustus from History to Legend (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1978), pp. 11-39.

47  “Idem Faustus magus … vane gloriabatur de so omnes victorias, quas habuerunt Caesariani exercitus in Italia, esse partas per ipsum sua magia, idque fuit mendacium vanissimum” (Johannes Manlius, Locorum communium collectanea [1563], quoted in P. M. Palmer and R. P. More, The Sources of the Faust Tradition from Simon Magus to Lessing (1936; rpt. New York: Haskell House, 1965], p. 103). The story that Agrippa was responsible for the victories of Charles V was refuted by André Thevet, Les vrais pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres (2 vols.; Paris, 1584). fol. 542v-543.

48  The claim that Agrippa’s dog was a devil was first made by Paolo Giovio, Elogia doctorum virorum (1546); see Charles G. Nauert, Jr., Agrippa and the Crisis of Renaissance Thought (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965), p. 327. The expanded claim about Faustus was made by Johannes Gast in his Sermones conviviales (1548); see Palmer and More, The Sources of the Faust Tradition, p. 98.

49  Manlius, Locorum communium collectanea; in Palmer and More, p. 102.

50  The full title of the first edition of 1530 is De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque excelentia verbi dei declamatio; according to Barbara C. Bowen, “Cornelius Agrippa’s De vanitate: Polemic or Paradox?”, Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance 34 (1972): 250, this was expanded in the 1531 Cologne edition to “declamatio invectiva.”

51  Catherine M. Dunn, ed., Of the Vanitie and Uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences (Northridge: California State University Press, 1974), cap. 1, p. 12. This translation, first published in 1569, was reprinted in 1575. A suspicion that Agrippa’s evangelical claims were hypocritical is evident in André Thevet’s Les vrais pourtraits et vies, vol. 2, fol. 544r-v. I have explored the links between Agrippa’s two major works in “Agrippa’s Dilemma: Hermetic ‘Rebirth’ and the Ambivalences of De vanitate and De occulta philosophia,” Renaissance Quarterly 41 (1988): 614-53.

52  See Lucien Febvre, Le problème de l’incroyance au XVIe siècle (1942; rpt. Paris Éditions Albin Michel, 1968), p. 125; and Zambelli, “Magic and Radical Reformation,” 101.

53  Wisdom of Solomon 7: 17-21. Agrippa quotes this passage in De vanitate; see his Opera, ed. R. H. Popkin (2 vols.; c. 1600; facsimile rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970), vol. 2, p. 314. The first edition of 1530 also reads “sapientiam.” 

 

Verbal Magic and the Problem of the A and B Texts of Doctor Faustus

[First published in the Journal of English and Germanic Philology 82.3 (July 1983): 324-46.] In the present version, I have made several small corrections, one of them noted in a new footnote 6; the text has not otherwise been altered.]

 

Readers of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus find themselves, at present, in a very curious position. The play survived the Elizabethan age in two versions, which were first printed in 1604 (the “A-text”) and 1616 (the “B-text”). These two quartos, from which all subsequent editions are derived, offer variant readings in many parallel passages, and also differ very substantially from one another in the last three acts. While accepting many of the A-text's readings, recent editors have been unanimous in making the B-version of the play the basis of their editions. (The last major edition to use the A-version as its copy-text was that of Tucker Brooke, in 1910). There is now, however, a near-consensus among critics and editors alike that although the A-text shows clear signs of textual corruption, it presents the play in a form that is both aesthetically preferable to the B-version and more authentic, in the sense of being closer to what Marlowe actually wrote. What is anomalous about the present situation is that Fredson Bowers, the scholar whose arguments in 1973 established this opinion (thus overthrowing the view, dominant since the 1940's, that the B-text corresponded closely to Marlowe's intentions), at the same time based his edition of the play upon the 1616 quarto, and relegated the third and fourth acts of the A-text to an appendix. Readers are thus informed that the A-version is more authentic—and are given the B-version to read.1

 

I

My purpose in this article is to review the textual analyses of Doctor Faustus which have led us into this very peculiar situation, to present some new arguments which confirm the decisive critical superiority of the A-version of the play, and to demonstrate that in one important respect—its handling of verbal magic—the B-version is fundamentally incoherent. The great soliloquies of Acts One and Five (speeches which are preserved in substantially the same form in both versions of Doctor Faustus) show clearly that the reversal of Faustus' aspirations with respect to verbal magic is an essential art of the play's meaning. Faustus' gloating anticipation of near-omnipotence—“All things that moove betweene the quiet poles / Shalbe at my commaund” (A: 86-87)—finds a distorted echo at the end of the play in the desperate invocations with which he attempts to stave off the recognition of his utter helplessness:

Ah Faustus, 
Now hast thou but one bare hower to live, 
And then thou must be damnd perpetually: 
Stand stil you ever mooving spheres of heaven, 
That time may cease, and midnight never come: 
Faire natures eie, rise, rise againe....   (A: 1450-55)

In the A-version of the play a consistent authorial attitude toward this reversal is evident throughout. In the B-version, however—and in precisely those passages which have been identified, on other grounds, as later and non-Marlovian additions—a second, conflicting attitude toward verbal magic is developed, with the consequence that one of the central patterns of the play is disrupted. Close analysis will show that this disruption is part of a general relapse from the tragic ironies of the A-version in the direction of the more grotesque features of the Faustbook.

 

II

The relative merits of the two texts can be briefly summarized: the B-text, in parallel passages, is generally better and more authoritative—although since it was evidently subjected to a process of bowdlerizing, the A-readings are often to be preferred; the A-text, however, presents the play as a whole in a form that is both more authentic—that is, closer to its original form—and also aesthetically superior.

The arguments of Leo Kirschbaum and W.W. Greg2 have made it probable that in many passages where the two versions run parallel the A-text is a “bad quarto,” a reported text which lacks manuscript authority; and yet, as Fredson Bowers has remarked, this bad quarto is “unusual ... in the apparent closeness with which much of the verse of the tragic action is recalled.”3 In addition to the corruptions introduced by memorial transmission, the A-text shows in some places signs of revision—which may indicate that the text was adapted from its original state, at a time when the London theatres had been closed due to plague, in order to conform to the simpler conditions of provincial performance.4 The B-text, which is some six hundred lines longer, is at many points derived from the 1611 reprint of A (known as A3); there is evidence, however, that its compiler had access to the promptbook of the play (probably damaged or incomplete) which enabled him to correct many of the errors of the A-text.5 (At the same time, though, he cut or altered lines that struck him as being obscure or dangerously profane.)

The textual variants of the A- and B-texts are of course of great importance. Far more arresting, though, are the passages in which the two texts diverge completely from one another. The B-versions of the episodes in the papal court, the imperial court, and the court of the Duke of Vanholt are all very much longer than the corresponding passages in the A-text, and contain incidents and whole scenes of which the A-text gives no hint. The B-text contains, in the fifth act, an “infernal conclave” in which the devils assemble to witness Faustus' end, a sequence of farewell speeches to Faustus by Mephostophilis and the Good and Evil Angels, and also a final scene in which the scholars discover and comment on his “mangled limbs” (B: 2110): none of this is present in the A-text. Less significantly, the scenes of farcical clowning involving Robin and Rafe (or Dick, as he is called in the B-text) are only loosely parallel in the two versions of the play. In one instance, the A-text gives a passage that has evidently dropped out of the other text: the chorus to Act IV, though misplaced in A, is wholly missing from B. But in return, fourteen lines of the chorus to ACT III are known to us only from the B-text.

Editors like A.W. Ward and C.F. Tucker Brooke used the A-text6 of the play as their copy-text—for knowing that in 1602 Henslowe had paid the substantial sum of four pounds to Samuel Rowley and William Birde (or Borne) “for ther adicyones in doctor fostes,”7 they not unnaturally believed the B-text to embody these additions. But a shift in scholarly and critical opinion was initiated by the appearance in 1932 of F.S. Boas' edition, which was based upon the quarto of 1616. Dwelling upon the corrupt and disordered state of the A-text, Boas argued that the comic prose scenes in the 1616 version constituted part of the original text, and he suggested Rowley as their author—thus involving him in the initial composition of the play, as Marlowe's collaborator, as well as in the 1602 additions.8 This argument altered the status of two extended passages which had previously been taken to be additions (and by no means very interesting ones): the scene in which the clowns recount Faustus' grotesque tricks and plot revenge on him, and their intrusion into the scene at Vanholt, where Faustus, striking them dumb at last, could perhaps be said to earn the audience's gratitude more than its laughter. Boas also drew attention to external evidence—passages in the anonymous The Taming of a Shrew (printed in 1594) and in Shakespeare's The Merry Wives of Windsor (probably written in 1600 or 1601)—which seemed to make it difficult to assign the 1616 scenes in the papal and imperial courts and the abortive revenge of the “injurious knight” Benvolio (III.i-ii and IV.i-iv in Greg's parallel-text edition) to the additions of 1602.9

Boas did not attempt to draw conclusions from this evidence, and his arguments were largely disregarded by critics, who continued to show a strong preference for the A-version. Kirschbaum and Greg, who independently made the important discovery of the memorial nature of the A-text, were less cautious. They decided that the B-text as a whole must antedate the 1602 additions—which had presumably been lost. The 1616 quarto, then, provided a text very close to the intentions of Marlowe and his collaborators, whoever they may have been. And the 1604 quarto, being a reported text, possessed little or no authority except insofar as it preserved lines which had been tampered with by the editor who put the B-text through the press, or which perhaps represented earlier or later stages of the initial process of composition and revision.10 The immense skill and authoritative minuteness of Greg's arguments in particular made this the standard view of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus for nearly a quarter of a century. Editors and critics, by the mid-1960's, were beginning to express dissatisfaction with the resulting interpretations, but faced with a choice between an almost complete text dating from 1592-93 and a memorial abridgement dating, on Greg's estimate, from 1594-95, they confined themselves in most cases to mutinous mutterings.11

In 1973, however, Fredson Bowers demonstrated this analysis to be incorrect, and his arguments have since been supplemented by those of Constance Brown Kuriyama.12 The external evidence adduced by Greg and Kirschbaum proved, upon examination, to be surprisingly fragile. The passage in The Merry Wives of Windsor which was believed to show the existence before 1600 or 1601 of the attempted revenge of Benvolio (and consequently of the preceding B-text scenes in the papal and imperial courts) is in fact by no means a precise allusion. Moreover, this passage does not occur in the 1602 “bad quarto” of The Merry Wives—it is present only in the 1623 Folio text, which, as Bowers remarks, shows signs of having been revised.13 And the parallel between A Shrew and two lines from this same Benvolio episode—a parallel which in Greg's own words “cannot be taken by itself to prove anything at all”14—becomes almost meaningless in face of the probability that both passages were written by Samuel Rowley.15 This rather dubious evidence is outweighed by the fact that B: 1200, “He took his rouse with stopes of Rhennish wine,” seems to be derived from Hamlet, I.iv.8 ff.: “The King doth wake to night and takes his rowse. / Keepes wassell and the swaggring up-spring reeles: / And as he draines his drafts of Rennish downe, / The kettle drumme, and trumpet, thus bray out....” As Bowers writes, “This is, in fact, better evidence for date than the Merry Wives reference since it is a quotation and not a rather vague allusion of doubtful specific application. The only alternatives to line [B: 1200] as written in 1602 are to speculate that Shakespeare was drawing on his memory of Faustus or to place the I.iv lines in the Ur-Hamlet, both rather desperate expedients to avoid a straightforward conclusion.”16 Kuriyama's discussion of further parallels with A Shrew and with Robert Greene's A Looking-Glass for London and England (1591-92, printed 1594) makes a somewhat stronger case for the comparative originality of the comic prose scenes in the A-text than Boas, Kirschbaum, and Greg had been able to make for the contrary opinion.17

This external evidence is strongly supported by other indications. It is noteworthy that Greg's reconstruction of the play's textual history, which rests on his conviction that the B-text does not contain the 1602 additions, involves a large number of speculative assumptions, none of which are necessary if the unique B-text passages are identified with these additions.18 This complex structure of hypotheses creates some embarrassing problems. For example, to explain the presence of what appear to be Rowley's stylistic traits in most of the material peculiar to the B-text by the hypothesis that he collaborated with Marlowe in 1592 or 1593, and that the additions for which he was paid in 1602 are lost, is to substitute speculation for one of the few available pieces of historical information about the text of Doctor Faustus. And if this hypothesis were granted, it would become difficult to imagine what the 1602 additions—which earned their authors a sum equal to what Henslowe sometimes paid for new plays—could have consisted of. It is curious, moreover, that while the reported A-text is missing a scene (presumably a comic one) between the signing of Faustus' pact and the next scene, which begins “When I behold the heavens, then I repent” (A: 628), the supposedly original B-text has a gap in the same place. These problems disappear if one accepts the alternative hypothesis that “the more 'original' text is not original at all, but a revision and expansion of the 'debased' version, or of a text very similar to it.”19 As Bowers has argued in detail, the passages peculiar to the B-text appear to be superimposed upon the tragic action rather than integrated into it: editors like Bullen, Ward, and Tucker Brooke were right in thinking them revisions rather than part of a collaboration.20

The A-text, then, preserves the last three acts of Doctor Faustus in a form which, although probably corrupt and possibly abridged as well, is as close to Marlowe's original as we can expect to get. But how corrupt is the A-text? To what degree should its versions of the non-parallel scenes be allowed by critics and editors to supplant those of the B-text? Fredson Bowers has followed the path of compromise: while arguing that passages added in 1602 cannot legitimately be used to clarify the meaning of passages common to A and B, he took the 1616 quarto as the copy-text for his edition. Given the arguments of Greg that in many parallel passages the readings of the B-text have manuscript authority, this editorial decision can be defended. But it represents a sacrifice of critical integrity not so much to bibliographical principle as to speculation. For Bowers' belief (which in his view made acceptable the decision to base his text upon the B-version) that the A-text passages which were supplanted or cut in the 1602 revision were almost exclusively the work, not of Marlowe, but a collaborator, seems to me highly questionable.21 Judgments on delicate matters of this kind are notoriously difficult to sustain in the absence of such clear-cut stylistic divergences as those which distinguish the 1602 additions. And once the obvious displacements of the A-text's farcical scenes are remedied, its structural and aesthetic superiority over the B-text can be easily recognized.

 

III

The denigration of one or the other version of the play in terms of its more or less glaring textual inadequacies can degenerate rapidly into a form of literary-critical table-tennis. But when one deals with the last three acts only, and on the level of their continuity, tone, and decorum, the issue is more one-sided. Bowers and Kuriyama have noted several points at which the awkward splicing of the B-text additions into the text has resulted in repetition or inconsistencies.22 This fumbling is most evident at the beginning of the material relating to the anti-pope Bruno in Act III. The writer (probably Rowley),23 whose fondness for couplets is one distinguishing feature of his verse, tumbles immediately into confusion. The occasion of the papal celebration becomes, by the addition of a slovenly triplet, not only “holy Peters feast” (B: 855), as in A, but also “the Popes triumphant victory” (B: 858). This may be a minor incongruity; and yet there is further evidence of carelessness in the stuttering repetition of “this day” in these same lines: “... holy Peters feast, / The which this day with high solemnity, / This day is held through Rome and Italy” (B: 855-57). What follows, to avoid charges of partiality, is best described in Greg's words:

To Mephostophilis' invitation to wait and see the pope, Faustus replies with an irrelevant declaration that (862-63)

My foure and twenty years of liberty
I'le spend in pleasure and in daliance,

ending with another couplet. Very well, replies Mephostophilis, here they come. “Nay stay”, says Faustus, one thing “and then I go”—he has not been asked to go anywhere, but only to “stand by me”. And then amazingly he launches into a description of their cosmic flight, previously narrated by the Chorus, as a reason for being allowed to be an actor in the papal “shew”. So be it, replies the spirit, “but first stay”—for the third time—and “view their triumphs”, and whatever pranks you like to play, I will see to it that they take effect—and here really does come the procession.24

As Bowers observed, “It is difficult to argue that this series of contradictions and non sequiturs marked the original composition of the scene and that the simple and unified A-text action was its memorial reconstruction.”25 Some readers may find it equally difficult to see why an episode that begins in such an unpromising manner (the unintentional burlesque of this mindless cross-talk goes on for more than thirty lines) should be given preference by editors over the alternative in the A-text.

The remainder of the papal episode in the B-text is competently written, but displays a certain poverty of imagination, a willingness to make repeated use of the same material. Thus “Saxon Bruno,” the anti-pope elected by the emperor, is ordered to “stoope, / Whilst on thy backe his hollinesse ascends / Saint Peters Chaire and State Pontificall” (B: 896-98). These last two words represent a mannerism of this writer, a trick of inversion which he uses to add weight to his verse (and which helps to identify him as Samuel Rowley).26 “State Pontificall” is also padding—though in a sense functional, for it makes possible a further repetition: “Sound Trumpets then, for thus Saint Peters Heire, / From Bruno's backe, ascends Saint Peters Chaire” (B: 903-04). The writer evidently felt that he could get more mileage out of the passage from Foxe's Book of Martyrs that seems to have been his source,27 for some forty lines later the Pope returns to the subject of human footstools. He will depose the Emperor:

And as Pope Alexander our Progenitour, 
Trode on the neck of Germane Fredericke
Adding this golden sentence to our praise; 
That Peters heires should tread on Emperours, 
And walke upon the dreadfull Adders backe, 
Treading the Lyon, and the Dragon downe, 
And fearelesse spurne the killing Basiliske: 
So will we quell that haughty Schismatique....   (B: 945-52)

While such bombast may be appropriate to this Pope, the verse comes closer, perhaps, to the style of Ancient Pistol than to that of Marlowe.

A sense of rhetorical strain, of verse being stretched to the writer's capacity by material which could more suitably be handled at a lower pitch, is more evident still in the B-text scenes at the imperial court. Even the elaborate dumb-show which Faustus provides—a contrast to the simple stage directions of the A-text—is an inevitable anticlimax after his announcement that

if so your Grace be pleas'd, 
The Doctor stands prepar'd, by power of Art, 
To cast his Magicke charmes, that shall pierce through
The Ebon gates of ever-burning hell, 
And hale the stubborne Furies from their caves, 
To compasse whatsoere your grace commands.   (B: 1254-59)

This writing might best be described as opportunistic in its striving for local advantages and neglect of larger structural values: its rhetoric, aspiring in all directions to exaggerated effects, deadens any but the most superficial responses. The Emperor greets Faustus in hyperbolic terms: “Wonder of men, renown'd Magitian, / Thrice learned Faustus...” (B: 1237-38). And he responds with a display of boot-licking: “These gracious words, most royall Carolus, / Shall make poore Faustus to his utmost power, / Both love and serve the Germane Emperour, / And lay his life at holy Bruno's feet” (B: 1250-53)—which is followed by the rhodomontade that I have already quoted. The interruptions of the sceptical knight are reduced to the level of clowning: “...he looks as like [a] Conjurer as the Pope to a Costermonger” (B: 1261-62); “...zounds I could eate my selfe for anger, to thinke I have beene such an Asse all this while, to stand gaping after the divels Governor, and can see nothing” (B: 1275-78). And when he follows the Emperor's line, “Be it as Faustus please, we are content” (B: 1286), with “I, I, and I am content too...” (B: 1287), he drags the whole scene with him into farce. The words with which he vows retribution for his horning are at least amusing: “But an I be not reveng'd for this, would I might be turn'd to a gaping Oyster, and drink nothing but salt water” (B: 1365-66). And they come appropriately from this hung-over clown.

Much on the same level is Falstaff's threat: “and I have not Ballads made on [you] all, and sung to filthy tunes, let a Cup of Sacke be my poyson.”28 It is therefore incongruous, to say the least, when this self-proclaimed ass, Benvolio, appears in the next scene with high words and a sense of honour:

Away, you love me not, to urge me thus, 
Shall I let slip so great an injury, 
When every servile groome jeasts at my wrongs, 
And in their rusticke gambals proudly say, 
Benvolio's head was grac't with hornes to day? 
O may these eye-lids never close againe, 
Till with my sword I have that Conjurer slaine.   (B: 1375-81)

But the tendency toward farce seems irresistible. Benvolio and his accomplices, standing over Faustus' beheaded body, decide to nail horns on his head, sell his beard to a chimney-sweeper, and put out his eyes: “and they shall serve for buttons to his lips, to keepe his tongue from catching cold” (B: 1439-40). Faustus interrupts their contemplation of this “excellent policie” (B: 1441): “Zounds,” cries Benvolio, “the Divel's alive agen.” “Give him his head for Gods sake,” shouts one of his accomplices (B: 1443-44). Elements of farce, as Shakespeare knew, can heighten the effects of a tragedy. But here the farce is out of control, and seems to result primarily from the writer's inability, when he sees an opportunity for a comic quip, to resist putting it in.

Other aesthetic weaknesses of the B-text deserve mention: its repeated anticipations of the opening of Faustus' great speech to Helen,29 the abruptness with which its version of the horse-courser scene begins, the feebleness of the clown's last appearance,30 and the anticlimactic quality of the scholars' final speeches. The speeches of the spirits that precede Faustus' confession to the scholars and his last appearance are less obviously at odds with the tragic structure of the play. These added speeches have a definite energy; they emphasize and literalize Faustus' dread and his sense of loss. But their very conventionality detracts from the power of the play's conclusion. Hell, in particular, becomes disappointingly specific. After two impressive lines—“Now Faustus let thine eyes with horror stare / Into that vaste perpetuall torture-house” (B: 2018-19)—the Evil Angel offers an increasingly unimpressive sequence of torments which make one forcibly aware of the inappropriateness to the play of such a concretized material hell. To make these things so relentlessly—grotesquely—physical, or perhaps even to name them at all, is to rob them of much of their horror. The writer (to alter slightly the words of Shakespeare's Lafew) has made ancient, and familiar (and moralistic as well), “things supernaturall and causelesse”; he encourages us “[to] make trifles of terrours, ensconcing our selves into seeming knowledge, when we should submit our selves to an unknown feare.”31

With one notable exception—the Old Man's first speech, the B-version of which is in my opinion decisively superior—analysis confirms Greg's observation that “The passages peculiar to B are not in any way organic....”32 The B-text additions tend throughout to emphasize and augment the element of supernatural spectacle in the play, and the inflated rhetoric with which such spectacle is presented, in the fourth act especially, is clearly meant to inspire awe. But the detachment of this rhetoric from psychological plausibility33 and from dramatic consistency means that, in the third and fourth acts at least, the awe that is inspired is “safe.” Because the additions function only on the level of disconnected dramatic artifice, the audience can maintain a secure awareness of the insubstantiality of the show, and can indulge its appetite for marvels without discomfort. Marlowe's own writing in this play, however, has a very different tendency.

 

IV

The A-text is also not without weaknesses. Two of its comic scenes are displaced, and the second of these (Scene ix in Greg's parallel-text edition) has two distinct endings which follow one after the other: sure evidence of corruption and revision. Moreover, the scenes in the imperial court, with the horse-courser, and with the Duke of Vanholt (which together make up Act IV) are linked by what Greg calls dramatic enjambement: Faustus remains on stage throughout, and the shifts in scene are marked by the exits and entrances of secondary characters. Even with these weaknesses—and some might argue that this dramatic enjambement (which is a prominent feature of The Jew of Malta, occurring in II.iii, IV.i, and V.i) is actually quite effective—the A-text is decisively superior to the B-version of the play in its “aesthetic integrity.” As Kuriyama (whose expression this is) has observed, the A-text employs different levels of verse and prose in a consistent and significant manner.34 This is more than a matter of stylistic decorum, and the structural importance of these differentiations extends beyond Kuriyama's confessedly schematic statement that prose is generally used “to lay bare the unpleasant facts which are glossed over and gilded by the verse.”35 It touches, in fact, one of the basic patterns of meaning in the play.

Realist theories of language were common in the Renaissance, and in the hands of Hermetists and Neoplatonists usually involved claims about the magical power of words. Marlowe's interest in the dramatic potential of such claims is evident in his first work for the public stage: the words of Tamburlaine are “strong enchantments”; his vaunts substantiate themselves, words becoming things.36 But while Tamburlaine's verbal magic has a “transitive”37 effect on other characters within the play-world, a different pattern is developed in the A-text of Doctor Faustus: Faustus' incantations may have a transitive effect upon the audience, yet within the play they work only on his own self. In the following pages, after identifying the kind of magical approach to language that Marlowe in this play quite deliberately inverts, I shall attempt to show how important a feature of the A-text this structure of inversion is, and how seriously it is disrupted by the B-text additions.

In Act I the speeches of Faustus and his two friends both imply belief in the magical power of language and convey a sense of that power. Even by casting his words into the despised form of syllogistic logic, Faustus has (so he says) achieved quasi-magical effects, making “the flowring pride of Wittenberg / [Swarme] to my Problemes, as th'infernall spirits / On sweet Musaeus when he came to hell” (B: 136-38). But he wants to literalize this figure of speech, to put his words into forms that will give them, and the will from which they spring, a more coercive power. The appearance of Mephostophilis in response to his invocation seems to fulfil this desire: “I see there's vertue in my heavenly words” (B: 255), he says—the key word in this sentence conveying, like the Italian virtù, the meaning of “power” of “efficacy,” and only secondarily, as an ironic pun, the modern sense of “virtue.” Mephostophilis, however, is not at his command, but is “a servant to great Lucifer” (A: 285): the “conjuring speeches” (A: 290) of Faustus were only per accidens the cause of his appearance.

The language in which Faustus and his friends anticipate the ability to translate will directly into power, as C.L. Barber noted, is insistently blasphemous: Valdes and Cornelius will make Faustus “blest with [their] sage conference” (B: 126), and Valdes tells Faustus that “these bookes, thy wit, and our experience, / shall make all ations to Canonize us” (B: 141-42). Barber associated this tendency to blasphemy with the tension in Elizabethan religious thought between a Protestant rejection of the idea that power inheres in the physical and gestural aspects or the verbal formulas of the sacraments, and a residual impulse to give independent meaning to these very aspects of worship.38 I would suggest that it can also be linked, along with Faustus' more general tendency to ascribe magical power to language, to the tradition of Hermetic magic.

The fourth and thirteenth tractates of the Corpus Hermeticum have been described by A.D. Nock as “mysteries of the word, sacramental acts of baptism and regeneration described and explained.”39 And as recent scholarship has shown, Christian Hermetists like Ludovico Lazzarelli and Cornelius Agrippa attempted to make these Hermetic patterns—the central one of regeneration especially—into mysteries of the Word, the Christian Logos.40 Or—from another point of view—they tried to appropriate the language and doctrine of the scriptures to express and justify their own theories of magic. The Logos, which is both the Word of the Scriptures and Christ, the co-eternal creator of the world, is central to Agrippa's view of the magical power of language. In De occulta philosophia (I quote for convenience from the 1651 translation) he advances the opinion of the “Platonists ... that the power of the thing as it were some kind of life, lies under the form of the signification. First conceived in the mind as it were through certain seeds of things, then by voices or words, as a birth brought forth, and lastly kept in writings. Hence Magicians say, that proper names of things are certain rayes of things, every where present at all times, keeping the power of things....”41 His explanation of this is constructed on the level of natural causes:

the vertues of this terrene orb proceed from no other cause then Celestiall. Hence the Magician that will worke by them, useth a cunning invocation of the superiors, with mysterious words, and a certain kind of ingenious speech, drawing the one to the other, yet by a naturall force through a certain mutuall agreement betwixt them, whereby things follow of their own accord, or sometimes are drawn unwillingly.... Now the words of men are certain naturall things; and because the parts of the world mutually draw one the other, therefore a Magician invocating by words, works by powers fitted to nature, by leading some by the love of one to the other, or drawing others by reason of the following of one after the other, or by repelling by reason of the enmity of one to the other, from the contrariety, and difference of things, and multitude of vertues; which although they are contrary, and different, yet perfect one part; sometimes also he compels things by way of authority, by the Celestiall vertue, because he is not a stranger to the heaven.

The magician's knowledge enables him to manipulate the occult forces in nature. He can also compel things because his words are in fact (though Agrippa seems to resist this conclusion) supernatural as well as natural. Celestial “vertues” originate with

the word of God, which word the wise Chaldeans of Babylon call the cause of causes, because from it are produced all beings, ... and that by reason of the union of this word with the first author, from whom all things are truely produced; The word therefore is the image of God, the acting intellect the image of the word, the soul is an image of this intellect; and our word is the image of the soul, by which it acts upon naturall things naturally, because nature is the work thereof.42

Agrippa's return to an insistence on the natural quality of verbal magic cannot disguise the obvious implication of this passage, which is that the magician can get in at the top of the hierarchical structure of the world because his “mysterious words” and “ingenious speech” draw upon the power of the Word of God: Christ, the Logos, the holy scriptures.

This syncretism was attacked by orthodox Christians because it applied, to this-worldly magic, language which owes its special qualities to the fact that it has been used by the Holy Spirit to express the sacramental links established by Christ between God and man. This appropriation of the Word was blasphemy, just as surely as the use of a stolen Host for magical purposes was blasphemy.

It is, I think, to these blasphemous implications of Hermetic magic, as well as to the tensions defined by C. L. Barber, that Marlowe is alluding in the opening scenes of Doctor Faustus. But only in Faustus' anticipatory imaginings are words an instrument by which his will can dominate over the world. The blasphemous rhetoric which he uses is not a net to catch the world, but a web in which he himself becomes entangled. To gain the obedience of Mephostophilis, Faustus must “binde [his] soule” (A: 490) in a form of words, “in manner of a Deed of Gift” (B: 447). There may be slightly alarming as well as agreeable implications in Mephostophilis' promise to give him “more than thou hast wit to aske” (A: 487)—but the real importance of these words is that they reveal the notion of magicians that words constitute a causal link between will and the external world to be an illusion. Even with a devil at his command, Faustus will not get what he orders, but something “more”—whatever that may mean.

He seems in fact to get rather less: his first demand—for “a wife, the fairest Maid in Germany” (B: 532-33)—is met by a practical joke; and later, Mephostophilis' refusal to answer the provocative question “who made the world?” (B: 636) leads to Faustus' angry response: “Villaine, have not I bound thee to tell me any thing?” (B: 640). There is no trace of deference in the retort: “I, that is not against our Kingdome. / This is: Thou art damn'd, think thou of hell” (B: 641-42). The magician whose “servile spirits” (B: 124) were to be the instruments of his wildest whims is being ordered what to think. And Faustus is quickly terrified into compliance by the appearance of Lucifer and Belzebub: he vows “never to looke to heaven, / Never to name God,”—an intention that contradicts itself—“or to pray to him, / To burne his Scriptures, slay his Ministers, / And make my spirites pull his churches downe” (A: 725-28). There is a grave irony to the B-text version of Lucifer's reply: “So shalt thou showe thy selfe an obedient servant...” (B: 667).43

 

V

Marlowe is clearly redefining the sense in which words can be said to have magical power, and he is doing so in a manner that assimilates magic to witchcraft. Verbal magic appears to work for Faustus only in reverse: his imagination is captured by words, and then bound by them, with alarming consequences. There remains a sense in which blasphemy can achieve magical effects for him. His mocking use, in the flourish with which he signs away his soul, of Christ's last words on the cross—words which bear the whole weight of the mystery of redemption—has an immediate result:

Consummatum est, this Bill is ended, 
And Faustus hath bequeath'd his soule to Lucifer
But what is this inscription on mine arme? 
Homo fuge, whither should I flie? 
If unto God hee'le throwe thee downe to hell, 
My sences are deceiv'd, here's nothing writ, 
[O yes, I see it plaine, even heere is writ] 
Homo fuge, yet shall not Faustus flye.    (A: 515-20, B: 468, A: 522)

But although the writing on the wall that answered the blasphemies of Balshazar was visible to all, and proclaimed a sentence that was executed that same night, the hallucinatory inscription which his own blood forms on Faustus' arm has power only in his imagination; his death-warrant, though signed in that same blood, is post-dated. On a deeper level than that of verbal magic, Faustus' blasphemies do seem to have a kind of transitive power: he manages to strike a better bargain with hell than witches were supposed to be able to negotiate,44 and he does actually get his agreed twenty-four years of demonic service. The manner in which he sheds his own blood may perhaps explain what happens. Faustus performs what could be described as a symbolic suicide:

Loe Mephastophilus, for love of thee, 
I cut my arme, and with my proper blood
Assure my soule to be great Lucifers
Chiefe Lord and regent of perpetual night, 
View heere the blood that trickles from mine arme, 
And let it be propitious for my wish.    (A: 493-98)

By this act he becomes, in effect, his own ritual murderer: though he has killed someone closer to himself than a brother, he bears (one might say) the mark of Cain.

Faustus is set apart for a punishment greater than he can bear; at the same time—and in part because of his inability to stand up even to the threat of immediate punishment—he seems to enjoy for the period of his compact an immunity from bodily harm. Faustus' shedding of his own blood is both a deliberate self-exclusion from the number of those for whom Christ's blood was shed and also a kind of blasphemous anti-Christian sacrament by which he becomes an anomalous or mediating term between the present state of life on earth and the eternity in hell to which he vows himself. In mythical structures, mediating terms between incommensurable categories or states of being are commonly felt to have a numinous, daimonic, or sacred quality.45 To say that Faustus is protected from external harm by having entered a taboo or sacred realm would be to exaggerate; and yet it would appear that he could not die within the time he has bargained for, unless by his own hand, in a real, not symbolic suicide. In the B-version of Act IV, this aspect of he blood-pact is made grotesquely explicit, and in a manner that puts Faustus' human nature in doubt; but it is also implicit in the A-text. The devils seem to respect this deep blood-magic, and so perhaps do we: few readers, I believe, find it odd that Mephostophilis does not wring Faustus' neck at the earliest opportunity, or drop him from the air, in a state of damnable pride, on the first leg of their Grand Tour.

On the level of verbal magic, however, it is Faustus himself, not the spirits or the external world, that is influenced and swayed. He is able to make use of the incantatory power of language only in a subjective, not a transitive, manner. The “sweete pleasure” of words can, at least temporarily, conquer “deepe despaire”: “Have I not made blind Homer sing to me / Of Alexanders love, and Oenons death?” (B: 595-96). He has also distracted himself with the music of him “that built the walles of Thebes, / With ravishing sound of his meodious Harpe” (B: 597-98); but the reference to Amphion only brings out by contrast Faustus' lack of such power.

The transitive impotence of verbal magic is underlined in Act III by the ludicrous failure of the monks' attempt to exorcize Faustus and Mephostophilis, and in the following scene of the same act by the consequences of Robin's reciting an invocation from the book he has stolen from Faustus. If this was the book which Lucifer gave to Faustus to enable him to take on any shape (and which Faustus promised he would keep “as chary as my life” [B: 739]), then the transformation of the clowns into animal shapes is appropriate—as is the fact that in the A-text we do not encounter them again.46

In the fourth act of the A-text this pattern is continued: there is no direct link through words between the imagination and will and the transitive effects of magic. The Emperor tells Faustus, “I have heard strange report of thy knowledge in the blacke Arte, how that none in my Empire, nor in the whole world can compare with thee, for the rare effect of Magicke: they say thou hast a familiar spirit, by whome thou canst accomplish what thou list...” (A: 1040-44).47 And Faustus accepts, with a modest disclaimer, this assessment of his powers: “My gratious Soveraigne, though I must confesse my selfe farre inferior to the report men have published ..., yet ... I am content to do whatsoever your majesty shall command me” (A: 1051-55). Faustus does not lack confidence or pride; he “doubt[s] not” that the spirits' representation of Alexander and his paramour “shal sufficiently content your Imperiall majesty” (A: 1090). But he is not making things happen by the triumphant power of his imagination and his will, working through words; everything is done by his attendant: “Mephastophilis be gone” (A: 1097). The words with which he introduces this magic thus belong at the level of prose. Similarly, it is appropriate that the Emperor should speak in prose of Faustus' reputation—which he wants to see substantiated—but that his language should rise to verse when he reveals his desire to see

                                         Alexander the great, 
chiefe spectacle of the worldes prehemin[en]ce, 
The bright shining of whose glorious actes
Lightens the world with his reflecting beames, 
As when I heare but motion made of him, 
It grieves my soule I never saw the man....    (A: 1063-68)

The Emperor does indeed ask Faustus to use the “cunning of thine Art” (A: 1069); but Faustus' willingness to comply, “so farre forth as by art and power of my spirit I am able to performe” (A: 1078-79), provides an exact statement of the manner in which he operates: the power, and probably the art as well, is not his but his spirit's.

The B-text substitutes a wholly different pattern. We hear that “Faustus at the Court is late arriv'd, / And at his heeles a thousand furies waite, / To accomplish what soever the Doctor please” (B: 1209-11). And “The Emperour is at hand, who comes to see / What wonders by blacke spels may compast be” (B: 1225-26). His greeting, and Faustus' reply, try but fail to be more impressive and dignified than their prose counterparts in the A-text. Both speeches in the B-text emphasize a verbal incantatory magic in which words form a causal link between the ruling will and what it dominates—precisely that kind of magic that Marlowe has shown Faustus to be incapable of. The liberation of Bruno, says Carolus, “Shall adde more excellence unto thine Art, / Then if by powerfull Necromantick spels, / Thou couldst command the worlds obedience” (B: 1241-43). Faustus reassures the Emperor, by a display of abject humility, that he has no such political aims. But in lines which I have already quoted, he seems to imply that by “power of Art” and “Magicke charmes” he is capable of anything—though he puts this power at the Emperor's disposal.

The presence in the B-version of two quite incompatible views of Faustus' magic creates obvious inconsistencies. If Faustus after all possesses powers of a kind that the first two acts have shown him not to have, why then should the man who has anticipated, before discovering his limitations, that “The Emperour shall not live, but by my leave, / Nor any Potentate of Germany” (B: 335-36) now present himself to “most royall Carolus” as “poore Faustus” (B: 1250-51)? This is an unprofitable question—which the A-text does not tempt us to ask. For its fourth act does not clash with what we have been shown in Act II—a man who is deflected by despair from any sustained enterprise, and whose power over Mephostophilis is not a matter of command, but of permission.

More disturbingly, the B-text episodes of Benvolio's revenge and the horse-courser's leg-pulling and its consequences make Faustus no longer human, but a kind of monstrous amphibian—part demon, part animal—which can magically reconstitute its dismembered body and devour a whole load of hay. (“O monstrous” [B: 1608], say the clowns on hearing of this last feat.) Faustus is not interested in the return of his severed head—“Nay keepe it” (B: 1445)—for “had you cut my body with your swords, / Or hew'd this flesh and bones as small as sand, / Yet in a minute had my spirit return'd, / And I had breath'd a man made free from harme” (B: 1449-52). And the detachable leg, which in the A-text seems to be a demonic illusion48—though the audience's senses are deceived, as well as the horse-courser's—becomes in the B-text a part of Faustus' body. The horse-courser keeps it “at home in mine Hostry” (B: 1629), and for some thirty prose lines in the Vanholt scenes the clowns twit Faustus, on the assumption that he must now have a wooden leg; learning the truth they exclaim in chorus, “O horrible...” (B: 1755).

 

VI

This disruption in the B-text of the play's patterns of meaning and its rhetorical decorum has serious consequences. For if Faustus is going to become once more in the last act of the play a human being, a tragic figure, then a major re-adjustment of the audience's responses is necessary. The moralistic or mocking tone of much recent criticism based on the B-version of Doctor Faustus suggests that this adjustment is not an easy one to make.

The great speeches of Act V—in particular, Faustus' rhapsodic address to Helen and his last soliloquy—are permeated by a verbal magic which is transitive only in its effects upon the audience. We are not conjured to do Faustus' will; rather, we are drawn into empathy with his predicament. His expressed intentions in these speeches are defeated, and yet the glamour which his words cast tends to remove one's desire, and perhaps one's capacity, to make detached moral judgments of him. Consider the speech to Helen. Although Faustus has asked for her in the hope that her “sweet embraces may extinguish cleare, / Those thoughts that do disswade [him] from [his] vow ... to Lucifer” (B: 1867-69), the knowledge of his predicament burns up through the very words that are intended to repress it:

Brighter art thou then flaming Jupiter
When he appear'd to haplesse Semele....    (B: 1889-90)

But who in the audience remembers, by the end of this speech, that Faustus came to Helen direct from his betrayal of the Old Man, and with the visible stain of his cowardice still on him, in the form of the blood shed in the renewal of his pact with hell? The self-inflicted wound of Faustus' perverse atonement has been transmuted, through his blasphemous adoration of Helen, into an aspect of his playful chivalry:

And I will combat with weake Menelaus
And weare thy colours on my plumed crest. 
Yea, I will wound Achilles in the heele, 
And then returne to Hellen for a kisse.    (B: 1883-86)

In the last scene of the play, this audience-directed verbal magic is still stronger. The effect is paradoxical, for Marlowe's magic works on us through the utter failure of his protagonist's. Faustus cries out in his agony: the stars are not held back, nor the mountains moved; but the audience is riveted.

Yet can an audience that has arrived at these scenes by way of the cheap tricks of the B-text Act IV respond fully to this magic? I doubt it. There is all the more reason, then, to wait impatiently for a new edition of Doctor Faustus based upon the A-version of the play.

 

 

 

NOTES

1  All quotations from the play are from W.W. Greg, ed., Marlowe's Doctor Faustus 1604-1616 (1950; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). Quotations are identified by Greg's line numbers; u/v and i/j have been silently normalized. It will be noticed that my usage distinguishes between the terms “version” and “text”: “version” refers to the general shape of the play in its 1604 or 1616 form, and “text” to the actual texts themselves. My demonstration of the superiority of the A-version is based on an analysis of passages in which the two versions diverge. In parallel passages I have felt free to quote from the B-text whenever I felt its readings to be preferable.

2  Leo Kirschbaum, “The Good and Bad Quartos of Doctor Faustus,” The Library, n.s. 26 (1946): 272-94; Greg, pp. 1-150, 295-405.

3  Fredson Bowers, ed., The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe, 2 vols. (Cambridge University Press, 1973), II, p. 139.

4  Greg, pp. 60-62.

5  Greg, pp. 63-97. Greg's argument on this point is accepted by Bowers, II, p. 142.

6  My published text incorrectly reads “the A-version.” I have corrected this small error here.

7  Greg, p. 11.

8  F. S. Boas, ed., The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (1932; 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 1949), pp. 21-28.

9  Boas, p. 30, n.1.

10  Bowers writes: “It was particularly unfortunate that Kirschbaum felt the demonstration of the memorial nature of the A-text involved the hypothesis that it was a redaction of the whole of the present B-text so that one in effect proved the other and that this linking of two essentially discrete problems powerfully affected the thinking of Sir Walter Greg.... The two problems are in fact independent; and where the evidence appears to overlap in certain comic scenes, the hypothesis of B-text revision as synonymous with the 1602 additions is as satisfactory as A-text memorial corruption and shortening where this evidence concerns the identifiable revisions” (II, p. 127 n.).

11  Roma Gill objected to certain of Greg's hypotheses (Gill, ed., Doctor Faustus, New Mermaids [London: Benn, 1965], pp. Xv-xvi), and J.B. Steane argued that the A-version is “artistically stronger” (Steane, ed., Christopher Marlowe: The Complete Plays [Penguin, 1969], p. 261); both editors, however, based their editions upon the B-text and the B-version of the play.

12  Bowers, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus: The 1602 Additions,” Studies in Bibliography 26 (1973): 1-18; Bowers, Works, II, pp. 123-55; Constance Brown Kuriyama, “Dr. Greg and Doctor Faustus: The Supposed Originality of the 1616 Text,” ELR 5 (1975): 171-97.

13  Bowers, Works, II, pp. 136-37; cf. Greg, p. 28.

14  Greg, p. 28.

15  Kuriyama, 176, 191-96.

16  Bowers, Works, II, p. 138. (I have quoted the lines from Hamlet from the Second Quarto.) Greg, oddly enough, was well aware of this parallel: “...the only point that might make me suspect that any part of the B-text was as late as 1602 is a possible echo of Hamlet in l. 1200” (p. 29 n.). This can serve as a warning against the workings of prejudice in such delicate matters as the assessing of external evidence: had Greg quoted this parallel in his text, rather than relegating it to a footnote, he would have been unable to press his arguments for the priority of the unique B-text passages.

17  Kuriyama, 174-76, 181-95. The parallels with A Looking Glass would seem to indicate an early date (before 1592) for Doctor Faustus.

18  Bowers, Works, II, p. 138 n.: “Analysis suggests that every major difficulty in Greg's reconstruction of the history of the texts ultimately refers back to the denial of the evidence of revision as applying to the Rowley-Birde additions. Acceptance of these, for example, removes all need to argue that Marlowe must have reworked the play in the promptbook, that the passages peculiar to B in Act V are original drafts discarded in the final make-up for performance, that—contrary to the evidence of the A-text—Rowley was probably Marlowe's original collaborator, and so on.”

19  Kuriyama, 179.

20  Bowers, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus: The 1602 Additions,” 5-8.

21  As Bowers observes, the choice of a copy-text, and the question of whether the edited text should be based in its structure on the A- or the B-version of the play, are separate matters (Works, II, pp. 142-44). It is the latter decision that I am questioning. I have seen no adequate demonstration that such passages as A: 1057-76, 116-19, and 1134-42 were not written by Marlowe; indeed, I suspect that such a demonstration would be impossible. If the stylistic and structural integration of these passages makes the question of authorship difficult to resolve, that should itself serve as a guide to editors in their choice between the A- and B-versions of the play.

22  These consist of the lines which prepare for the Saxon Bruno material (discussed below), the horse-courser's repetition of the story of his dousing (compare A: 1175-89 with B: 1553-61 and 1611-22), and the repetition, though in different form, of Wagner's response to Faustus' bequests to him (compare A: 1267-71 with B: 1777-82 and 1915-19).

23  H. Dugdale Sykes, in The Authorship of “The Taming of a Shrew,” “The Famous Victories of Henry V,” and the additions to Marlowe's “Faustus” (London: Shakespeare Association, 1920), was the first to offer stylistic evidence for Samuel Rowley's authorship of the greater part of the B-text additions. Sykes' arguments, which are supported by L.M. Oliver's discovery that the Saxon Bruno episode in the B-text is derived, like parts of Rowley's When You See Me You Know Me, from Foxe's Book of Martyrs (cf. Oliver, “Rowley, Foxe, and the Faustus Additions,” MLN 60 [1945]: 391-94), were largely accepted by Greg (pp. 133-35). Kuriyama's observations (191-96) refine and strengthen this evidence. Rowley's mannerisms include a fondness for postpositive adjectives and an unusually frequent use of the oath “swouns” and of phrases like “I warrant you,” “I promise you,” “I can tell you,” and “trust me.” Kuriyama's remark that these phrases produce an effect of “vague emphasis” (192) can be applied with equal justice to Rowley's other mannerisms.

24  Greg, p. 114.

25  Bowers, Works, II, p. 134.

26  Cf. Greg, pp. 133-34. It should be noted that a similar postpositive construction (“demonstrations magicall”) occurs at A: 183 (B: 172) in the first scenes of the play, in a passage that is otherwise suspect: “some lustie grove” in A: 184 (B: 173: “some bushy Grove”) is possibly a reviser's awkward anticipation of “some solitary grove” (A: 186, B: 175). The four-line speech by Faustus which contains this postpositive adjective and this possible anticipation may be a 1602 revision by Rowley of an original speech that is now lost. See note 46 below for another instance of 1602 revisions finding their way into the A-text. Although such passages should prevent us from making extravagant claims about the integrity of the A-text, they do not affect my argument that the A-version of the play possesses a structural and thematic integrity that shows it to be closer to the original than the B-version and preferable to the B-version as the basis for a conflated text.

27  Greg (p. 352) quotes the source passage from John Foxe's Acts and Monuments of these Latter Days (i.e., The Book of Martyrs), 1563, sig. F3: “The proude Pope setting his foote upon the emperours necke, saide the verse of the Psalme: Super aspidem et basilicum ambulabis et cõcaltabis [sic for 'concalcabis'] Leonum et draconem: That is, Thou shalte walke upon the adder, & the Basiliske: And shalt treade downe the Lion and the dragon. &c. To whom the Emperour answering againe, saide: Non tibi, sed petro: that is: not to thee, but to Peter. The Pope again, Et mihi, et Petro. Bothe to me and to Peter.”

28  I Henry IV, II.ii.41-43 (First Folio).

29  A pair of such anticipations is produced by Frederick and Martino, the accomplices of Benvolio, when they have struck off Faustus' head:

     Fred.   Was this that sterne aspect, that awfull frowne, 
Made the grim monarch of infernall spirits, 
Tremble and quake at his commanding charmes? 
     Mar.   Was this that damned head, whose heart conspir'd
Benvolio's shame before the Emperour.    (B: 1422-26).

The second scholar responds to the sight of Helen with another anticipation of the same lines: “Was this faire Hellen, whose admired worth / Made Greece with ten yeares warres af[f]lict poore Troy?” (B: 1804-05). Frederick's anticipation is part of the B-text's disruption in Act IV of the play's treatment of verbal magic. The other anticipations are purely parasitical.

30  Boas' view that this episode is a “clever adaptation of Faustbook material,” and that it “forms an effective finale to the humorous episodes” (The Tragical History, “Introduction,” p. 26), has not been widely shared by other critics.

31  All's Well That Ends Well, II.iii.3-6 (First Folio).

32  Greg, p. 23.

33  See Frank Manley, “The Nature of Faustus,” MP 66 (1968-69): 218-31.

34  Kuriyama, 189-91.

35  Kuriyama, 190.

36  I Tamburlaine, I.ii.419 (“What stronge enchantements tice my yeelding soule?”), 407-408 (“Nor are Apollos Oracles more true, / Then thou shalt find my vaubts substantiall”); quoted from The Works of Christopher Marlowe, ed. C.F. Tucker Brooke (1910; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941), pp. 19-20.

37  My use of the word “transitive” follows D.P. Walker's important distinction, in his Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella (1958; rpt. South Bend, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975), pp. 76-82, between the “subjective” and the “transitive” effects that were attributed to different kinds of magic by Renaissance writers. Subjective effects “remain within the operator or those taking part in the operation,” while in transitive operations “the operator imposes an effect on someone else without undergoing it himself” (p. 82).

38  C. L. Barber, “'The form of Faustus' fortunes good or bad',” Tulane Drama Review 8 (1963-64): 96-97.

39  A. D. Nock, “Early Gentile Christianity and its Hellenistic Background,” in his Essays on Religion and the Ancient World, ed. Zeph Stewart, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), I, p. 61.

40  See, for example, E. Garin et al., ed., Testi umanistici su l'ermetismo (Rome: Fratelli Bocca, 1955), pp. 23-77, 107-62; P.O. Kristeller, “Marsilo Ficino e Lodovico Lazzarelli” and “Ancora per Giovanni Mercurio da Correggio,” in his Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters (1956; rpt. Rome: Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1969), pp. 221-57; D.P. Walker, Spiritual and Demonic Magic from Ficino to Campanella, pp. 64-72, 90-96.

41  Three Books of Occult Philosophy, written by Henry Cornelius Agrippa, of Nettesheim, tr. by J.F. (London, 1651), I.lxx, p. 153. Agrippa's text is as follows: “Dicunt iccirco Platonici in hac ipsa voce, sive verbo, sive nomine, iam suis articulis formato, ipsam vim rei sub significationis forma, quasi vitam aliquam latere: primò ab ipsa mente quasi per semina rerum conceptam, porrò per voces sive verba quasi partum editam, postremò etiam scriptis servatam. Hinc dicunt Magi, propria rerum nomina esse quosdam rerum radios ubique semper praesentes, rerumque vim servantes...” (quoted from R.H. Popkin, ed., Heinrich Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim: Opera, 2 vols. [c. 1600: facsimile rpt. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1970], I, p. 140, De occulta philosophia, I.lxx).

42  Three Books of Occult Philosophy, II.lx, pp. 337-39. Agrippa's words are as follows: “Non enim ab alia causa quàm à coelesti, terreni orbis virtutes proveniunt. Hinc Magus per illas operaturus, utitur invocatione astuta superiorum, verbis mysteriosis, & locutione quadam ingeniosa, trahens unum ad aliud: vitamen naturali per quandam convenientiam inter illas mutuam, qua res sponte sequuntur, sive quandoque trahuntur invitè.... Verba autem hominum, res quaedam sunt naturales: & quia partes mundi naturaliter se invicem trahunt, & in se mutuò agunt, idcirco magus invocans per verba, operatur per vires naturae aptas, quaedam amore unius ad aliam ducendo aut trahendo propter sequelam unius rei ad alteram: aut repellendo propter odium unius ad aliam, ex rerum contrarietate & differentia, virtutumque multitudine: quae licet sint contrariae aut differentes, perficiunt tamen partem unam: quandoque etiam dominio quodam cogit res virtute coelesti, quoniam non est alienus à coelo.... sed & virtute à Deo per verbum eius insita, quod verbum Chaldaei Babyloniae sapientes, vocant causam causarum: quoniam ab eo producuntur entia, etiam ipse intellectus agens ab eo secundus. Id autem propter unionem verbi huius cum autore primo, à quo omnia existentia verè producuntur. Verbum igitur, id est, simulacrum Dei: intellectus agens, est simulacrum verbi: anima est simulacrum intellectus: verbum autem nostrum est simulacrum animae, per quod agit in res naturales naturaliter, quoniam natura opus illius est.” Opera, I, pp. 302-304, De occulta philosophia, II.lx.

43  In both texts Faustus is told not only what to think, or not to think, but also what not to say: Lucifer responds to his amusingly naïve remark, “That sight will be as pleasant to me, as Paradise was to Adam the first day of his creation” (B: 672-73, cf. A: 733-34), with the stern admonition: “Talke not of Paradice or Creation, but marke the shew” (B: 674-75, cf. A: 735-36). The effect of this is weakened in the A-text when Lucifer goes on to tell Faustus what to say: “talke of the divel, and nothing else” (A: 736). Faustus' position is clear enough without this extra emphasis.

44  Reginald Scot's description of “such as are said to bee witches” includes many of the features of the witch stereotype: they “are women which be commonly old, lame, bleare-eied, pale, fowle, and full of wrinkles.... These go from house to house, and from doore to doore for a pot full of milke, yest, drinke, pottage, or some such releefe: without the which they could hardlie live: neither obtaining for their service and apines, nor by their art, nor yet at the divels hand (with whome they are said to make a perfect and visible bargaine) either beautie, monie, promotion, welth, worship, pleasure, honor, knowledge, learning, or anie other benefit whatsoever” (The Discoverie of Witchcraft, ed. Brinsley Nicholson [1886; rpt. East Ardsley: EP Publishing, 1973], I.iii. pp. 5-6). It is typical of Scot that he also identifies another category of 'witches'—the “couseners”—and that he emphasizes the paradoxical nature of this pact which offers nothing substantial to the witch.

45  See Edmund Leach, Genesis as Myth and Other Essays (1969; rpt. London: Jonathan Cape, 1971), pp. 9-15.

46  The A-text at this point shows signs of revision. It seems probable that the scene ended with Mephostophilis' entrance, with the terrified lines spoken to him by the Vintner, Rafe, and Robin (A: 1014-19), and with his command: “Vanish vilaines, th'one like an Ape, an other like a Beare, the third an Asse, for doing this enterprise” (A: 1021-22). There is no indication in these lines that Mephostophilis was compelled by Robin's conjuration; the clown's jumbled nonsense, like Faustus' invocation, is only efficacious per accidens. The stage direction “Enter to them Meph.” (A: 1020) is redundant in the text as it stands: he is already on stage. It also appears to be misplaced, for Mephostophilis' lines A: 1032-33 contain an alternate version of his transformation of the clowns (though not, in this case, the unoffending Vintner). The direction at A: 1020 was presumably written to precede the alternative ending of the scene, which begins with lines A: 1023-28:

Monarch of hel, under whose blacke survey
Great Potentates do kneele with awful feare, 
Upon whose altars thousand soules do lie, 
How am I vexed with these vilaines charmes? 
From Constantinople am I hither come, 
Onely for pleasure of these damned slaves.

The view of verbal magic contained in these lines is distinctly that of the 1602 additions: the devil as come not by Lucifer's command, or of his own accord (cf. A: 285-91), but because “these vilaines charmes” have compelled him. If these lines are in fact derived from the 1602 revision, it is curious that they are better preserved here than in the B-text, where (presumably to avoid the fines imposed for blasphemy under the 1606 Act of Abuses) lines A: 1023-25 are replaced by B: 1159 (“You Princely Legions of infernall Rule”).

47  This passage is very close to the wording of Ch. 29 of the English Faustbook.

48  The leg business seems, in the A-text, to be an example of the kind of demonic deception of the senses that was commonly attributed to those magicians known as praestigiatores. Johann Godelmann, in his Tractatus de magis, veneficis et lamiis (Frankfurt, 1591), discusses under this category the magicians of Pharaoh, Simon Magus, and “celebris Ioan. Faustus superiori seculo” (I.iii, pp. 25-28).    

 

Formal Closure and Catharsis in Marlowe's Doctor Faustus

[First published in the Revue de l'Université Sainte-Anne (1981): 12-15.]

 

 

Marlowe's Doctor Faustus is a play about boundless aspirations and the enclosing spiritual and theological structure that renders them tragically absurd. As Edward A. Snow has remarked, Faustus's desires are endless in the dual sense of being without limit and of lacking purpose.1 And there is a heavy irony to the final inversion of these desires. The rhetorician who has poured contempt upon all disciplines which promise anything short of deification, and has anticipated the possession of power stretching “as farre as doth the minde of man” (A: 91),2 cries at last:

O no end is limited to damned soules, 
Why wert thou not a creature wanting soule? 
Or, why is this immortall that thou hast? 
Ah, Pythagoras metem su cossis were that true, 
This soule should flie from me, and I be changde
Unto some brutish beast....    (A: 1488-93)

It would appear, then, that the prologue and epilogue of Doctor Faustus constitute a kind of formal correlative to its most basic pattern of meaning. They enclose the action of the play in a manner analogous to that in which the action encloses Faustus, though of course with a quite different effect. For while Faustus's enclosure is disturbing, the formal closure of the play is, in contrast, reassuring to the audience or to the reader. The prologue offers us a man who has already fallen “to a divelish exercise” (A: 24), and the epilogue moralizes his final “hellish fall” as an example which “may exhort the wise, / Onely to wonder at unlawful things...” (A: 1513-15). We have been guided into a dramatization of the deepest fears of sixteenth-century Protestants, and out of it again intact—or even “wise,” if we attend properly to the moralizing voice of the epilogue. But how secure is this formal closure? I would propose that the closure of the play is subverted by a characteristically Marlovian ambiguity in the epilogue itself.

This ambiguity can best be approached through a consideration of the kind of tragic experience that Doctor Faustus offers to its audience. “The forme of Faustus fortunes” (A: 9)—that is, of the play as a whole—is such as might suggest that the dramatic action can be safely isolated as fiction, or stage illusion. And yet immediately within the enclosure provided by the prologue and the epilogue we find, at either end of the play, an extended and powerful soliloquy: our intimacy with Faustus is instant and unavoidable. In his last soliloquy, Faustus is addressing not only himself and the audience in the theatre, but also God. And in a sense he mediates between his two audiences, the visible and the invisible, as a kind of antichrist: this is the man, we remember, who signed away his soul with the words “Consummatum est” (A: 515). Faustus is carried off to hell, and we are left alone in the theatre with that other auditor, the God who has damned him.3

I would suggest that the tragic emotions we feel are only barely compatible with an attitude of faith in that God—who is, until we step outside our experience of the play, the only God available. For the moment at least, Marlowe has constructed in us an attitude to the God who reigns over this play which may, in some respects, be comparable to that with which Faustus began.

The pity and fear of which Aristotle spoke in his Poetics assume in this context a quite definite meaning—perhaps, in fact, too definite a meaning. For there is bound to be an uncomfortable degree of self-absorption in the anxiety of any audience faced with a mysterious necessity that operates not through the fulfilment in an individual destiny of a pattern that is also at once social and divine, but rather through the simple, repeated inability of an isolated will to assent to its own salvation. “There, but for the grace of God, go I”: the proverb is literally applicable to the effect of this play. But does this effect permit catharsis in the proper Aristotelian sense?

Doctor Faustus is a tragedy of vertigo. The basic identity of its protagonist is constituted by his recognition, in his recurrent self-definitions, of the inevitability of his damnation: “what art thou Faustus but a man condemnd to die?” (A: 1169); “Damned art thou Faustus, damnd, dispaire and die” (A: 1315). These self-definitions are self-authenticating: they could only cease to be true if Faustus were able to cease from making them. And conversely, according to the dominant theology in Elizabethan England, Faustus could only cease from making them if they were not true. The reprobate's lack of faith, as much as the elect man's faith, is a sort of gnosis—for it amounts to an intuitive knowledge of an objective state of affairs, a knowledge that constitutes not only the knower's relation to the eternal realities of heaven or hell, but also his very nature, as one who is bound for one or the other place. This knowledge presses towards fulfilment. The man of faith says (in the penultimate verse of the apocalypse), “Even so, come, Lord Jesus.” Faustus cries, in words in which William Empson was the first to recognize the undertone of surrender, if not of consent, “Ugly hell gape not, come not Lucifer...” (A: 1507).

The pressure of this knowledge can be felt with increasing force throughout the play: “I, we must die an everlasting death” (A: 76); “Seeing Faustus hath incurrd eternall death, / By desprate thoughts against Joves deitie...” (A: 333-34); “hel, ah hel for ever, sweete friends, what shall become of Faustus, being in hel for ever?” (A: 1412-13). Faustus's eschatological knowledge takes on power in the reflecting mirror of his imagination; but the imagination is also his means of escaping or avoiding this knowledge.4 The resulting vertigo moves Faustus with loathing toward the pit of hell. Faustus, in this, seems to transcend St. Augustine's psychology; he is pulled by terror and disgust, as well as by delight—by the seven deadly sins, as well as by Helen.5 He is summoned, in each case, in the direction he was already going. His cry, “Earth gape, O no, it wil not harbour me” (A: 1473), undermines the resistance to his final shriek: “Ugly hell gape not...” (A: 1507).

To the degree that an audience shares in this vertigo, it is excluded from what S.H. Butcher (correctly, I believe) understood as the essential experience of catharsis:

What is purely personal and self-regarding drops away. The spectator who is brought face to face with grander sufferings than his own experiences a sympathetic ecstasy, or lifting out of himself. It is precisely in this transport of feeling, which carries a man beyond his individual self, that the distinctive tragic pleasure resides. Pity and fear are purged of the impure element which clings to them in life. In the glow of tragic excitement these feelings are so transformed that the net result is a noble emotional satisfaction.6

In Doctor Faustus there is no significant relation between the protagonist and his social context which might assist the audience in making that movement from an individually focussed pity and fear to a nobly impersonal contemplation which is implicit in catharsis (and which is characteristic of audience response to Shakespearean tragedy). If the example of the scholars in the last scene of the play is any indication, what little social context there is in Doctor Faustus tends rather to reinforce a self-absorbed fear:

Faustus Talke not of me, but save your selves, and depart. 
3. Sch. God wil strengthen me, I wil stay with Faustus. 
1. Sch. Tempt not God, sweete friend, but let us into the next roome, and there pray for him.   (A: 1436-41)

And that Marlowe's contemporaries felt a certain pressure to withdraw from a dangerous empathy to the safety of judgment is suggested by the editorial alteration of the line “Oh God, if thou wilt not have mercy on my soule” (A: 1483) to “Oh, if my soule must suffer for my sin” (B: 2067) in the quarto of 1616.

The epilogue quite obviously assists this drift to judgment. Catching our feelings of empathy and of a not wholly disinterested fear at their fullest flow, its first three lines appear to initiate an ennobling clarification of these emotions:

Cut is the branch that might have growne ful straight, 
And burned is Apolloes Laurel bough, 
That sometime grew within this learned man....    (A: 1510-12)

But the succeeding five lines which conclude the play prevent, I think, any properly cathartic tempering and reduction of these emotions “to just measure.”7 Instead, by prompting a prudential contraction of the audience's experience into moral categories, these lines seem to be encouraging a sub-cathartic expulsion of pity and fear:

Faustus is gone, regard his hellish fall, 
Whose fiendful fortune may exhort the wise, 
Onely to wonder at unlawful things, 
whose deepenesse doth intise such forward wits, 
To practise more than heavenly power permits.    (A: 1513-17)

We are invited to identify ourselves as wise, and thus to dissociate ourselves completely from the fate of this forward wit. I would suggest, however, that these lines are booby-trapped.

It is clear enough to any reader of the play that the second adjectival clause in these lines is subordinate to the first, that the antecedent of the second “whose” is “unlawful things.” But this play, one must remember, was written to be heard and seen, not read; and while a reader can verify an understanding of the grammatical relations of a word or phrase by an anticipatory scan of what is yet to come, an auditor can only fix the meaning of a passage once it has formed an intelligible whole, echoing within the mind.

This distinction is important, and leads me to ask by what means, and at what point precisely, a listener who had no previous knowledge of the play could determine whether the second of the two syntactically parallel clauses which make up the last four lines of the epilogue is subordinate to the first, or whether both attach themselves to the same antecedent. It is, surely, possible to hear “whose deepenesse...” as referring, like “whose fiendful fortune...,” to “Faustus”; the syntactical parallelism of the sentence encourages this error. The expression “forward wits” does not in itself provide a clue to the proper subordination of the second clause, since “forward” could have favourable as well as condemnatory connotations in this period: the sixteenth-century examples cited by the Oxford English Dictionary include “a forward will to folowe (God's word)” (1568) as well as “forward pride” (1561).

The wrong fork of this temporary ambiguity of course leads quickly to an impasse. For should a listener attach both subordinate clauses to “Faustus,” then “such forward wits” would be understood as amplifying “the wise”— with the interesting result that the two clauses become almost antithetical: Faustus's “fiendful fortune” restrains the wise from a dangerous curiosity, while his “deepenesse” leads them on. This is an embarrassing consequence, especially for any listener who, like the First Scholar, would not want to 'tempt God' by too close an association with Faustus; and it is clear that the misinterpretation which the grammatical parallelism of these lines invites could be no more than momentary.

However, this ambiguity, though quickly resolved, is not therefore trivial. It is true that the correct meaning of the passage is quite clear on the printed page, and some editors, notably Paul H. Kocher and Leo Kirschbaum, have removed even the possibility of ambiguity by printing line A: 1515 without punctuation.8 But when the passage is spoken aloud, with (or perhaps even without) the slight pause after A: 1515 that the punctuation of both quartos implies, a firm determination of the antecedent of “whose deepenesse” becomes possible for the audience only once it has assimilated the contrasts between exhortation and enticement, and between “forward wits” and “the wise,” and has recognized, in the silence which follows the last line of the play, that “such forward wits” refers to Faustus and to those like him.

The attribution of “deepenesse” to Faustus is not an unnatural response to his last agonies; this character does embody a psychological depth which was unprecedented on the Elizabethan stage, and which even now will fail to impress only those critics whose responses have been distorted by the inferior 1616 form of the play.9 And if, as I suspect, the temporary confusion which the epilogue may cause was intended by the author, then it is a characteristically Marlovian effect.

This, one remembers, is the playwright who in 1 and 2 Tamburlaine offers a convincingly naturalistic explanation of his hero's invincibility and eventual physical burn-out, and who yet (apparently as a sop to religious play-goers) has the onset of Tamburlaine's fatal illness follow by a mere sixteen lines his burning of the Koran and his challenge to its Prophet—so that those who would insist on a swift punishment for blasphemy are thrown into the arms of Mohammed. Equally to the point is the pious resolution provided by the last two lines of The Jew of Malta—which is, in context, the most blatant piece of Machiavellian hypocrisy in the whole play.

Because our primary familiarity is with the printed text of Doctor Faustus rather than with the play in performance, it is difficult to assess the possible impact in the theatre of the ambiguity to which I have drawn attention. If, however, we can concede that, as part of an audience which lacked previous knowledge of the play, we might ourselves have been momentarily led astray, then we will have to revise somewhat our previous assessment of the play's formal closure. For when a cross-over from the wrong meaning to the correct one occurs, the reassigning of the relative pronoun references catches one in mid-stride between a fearful empathy and moral judgment, and interrupts what I have called a sub-cathartic—“pseudo-cathartic” might be better—expulsion of pity and fear. We may have made only a momentary conflation of “the wise” with “forward wits.” Nonetheless, we must ask ourselves whether it is with confident assurance, or with a degree of presumption, that we accept the epilogue's flattering invitation to identify ourselves as wise, and to concur in the dreadful judgment which the play has passed upon one forward wit.

In this context, the stories which circulated in the 1590s and after about the “visible apparition” of an extra devil on stage during performances of Doctor Faustus acquire an added significance. Whatever polemical intentions there may have been behind the publication of these stories, their bland assumption of plausibility suggests that audiences of this play felt any distinction between dramatic illusion and the realities being represented to be in this case somewhat precarious.10 For if Marlowe's incantatory rhetoric has raised a real devil, then the ambiguity which subverts the comforting moral of the epilogue permits that spirit to escape from the play into the audience.

In the third scene of Goethe's Faust, one remembers, a small break in Faust's magic pentangle was all that Mephistopheles needed in order to escape from the scholar's study.11 In the last scene of Doctor Faustus, the stage is also, for all the cosmic dimensions that it acquires in Faustus's last soliloquy, still the scholar's study. And the last five lines of that scene provide less insulation from the terrors of that scene than might appear to be the case. 

 

 

NOTES

1  Edward A. Snow, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus and the Ends of Desire,” in Alvin Kernan, ed., Two Renaissance Mythmakers: Christopher Marlowe and Ben Jonson, Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1975-76 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hokins University Press, 1977), pp. 70-110.

2  All quotations from the play are from W W. Greg, ed., Marlowe's Doctor Faustus 1604-1616 (1950; rpt. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); u/v and i/j have been silently normalized. Quotations are identified by Greg's line numbers; the letters A and B refer respectively to the 1604 and 1616 texts.

3  Although it is also correct to say that Faustus damns himself, there are hints throughout the play (especially in the 1604 quarto or A text) that his wilfulness is subsumed by a larger controlling will.

4  The duality of Faustus's imagination is best illustrated by the words he addresses to Helen. He wants her, he tells Mephastophilis, in order that her “sweete imbracings may extinguish cleane / These thoughts that do disswade me from my vow...” (A: 1352-53). And he comes to her stained with his own blood, shed in the renewal of his pact with Lucifer (cf. A: 1340-41). Both this blood and the penitent thoughts inspired by the Old Man are quickly forgotten in the playful fantasy of his involvement as Paris in the Trojan War. But the fiery awareness of his predicament burns up through his imaginative attempt to escape from this knowledge: “Brighter art thou then flaming Jupiter, / When he appeared to haplesse Semele...” (A: 1372-73).

5  In Ad Simplicianum de diversis quaestionibus, Augustine came to the view that (in Peter Brown's words), “'Delight' is the only possible source of action, nothing else can move the will. Therefore a man can act only if he can mobilize his feelings, only if he is 'affected' by an object of delight” (Brown, Augustine of Hippo [1967; 2nd ed. London: Faber and Faber, 2000], p. 148, paraphrasing Ad Simplicianum I, qu. ii,13). But the fixations of delight can be erratic: “Who can embrace wholeheartedly what gives him no delight? But who can determine for himself that what will delight him should come his way, and, when it comes, that it should, in fact, delight him” (Ad Simplicianum, I, qu. Ii, 21; Brown's translation in Augustine of Hippo, p. 149).

6  S. H. Butcher, Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art (4th ed., 1911; rpt. New York: Dover, 1951), p. 267.

7  John Milton, preface to Samson Agonistes, in Complete Shorter Poems, ed. John Carey (London: Longman, 1971), p. 341.

8  Paul H. Kocher, ed., The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950), p. 61; Leo Kirschbaum, ed., The Plays of Christopher Marlowe (1962; rpt. Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, 1968), p. 393. Most modern editors (Dyce, Ward, Tucker Brooke, Boas, Jump, Steane, and Gill [1971]) have accepted the A-text punctuation of this line. The fact that editor of the 1616 quarto (the B text) changed the A text's comma to a colon—which shows clearly to the reader that “whose deepenesse” refers to “unlawful things”—might be taken to indicate that he recognized a possible ambiguity and wished to eliminate it.

9  Although the precise textual history of the 1604 and 1616 quartos remains a matter for conjecture, it seems clear that the 1604 quarto, while textually corrupt, is much closer to the original form of the play than is the 1616 quarto. See Fredson Bowers, “Marlowe's Doctor Faustus: The 1602 Additions,” Studies in Bibliography 26 (1973): 1-18; Bowers, ed., The Complete Works of Christopher Marlowe (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 123-55; Constance Brown Kuriyama, “Dr. Greg and Doctor Faustus: The Supposed Originality of the 1616 Text,” English Literary Renaissance 5 (1975): 171-97; and my own article “Verbal Magic and the A and B Texts of Doctor Faustus,” forthcoming in the Journal of English and American Philology.

10  For the stories in question see E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage (4 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), vol. 3, p. 424; and Millar Maclure, ed., Marlowe: The Critical Heritage 1588-1896 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 48.

11  Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Faust: Ein Tragödie, ed. Hanns W. Eppelsheimer (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1962), lines 1403 ff., pp. 45-47.   

 

Magic Circle and Celestial Macrocosm: The Structure of Marlowe's Doctor Faustus

This essay, which applied a formalist-structural analysis to Marlowe's play, dates from 1980. It has not previously been published. Except in note 16, where I have added in square brackets a reference to my 2008 edition of Doctor Faustus, and note 21, which is entirely new, the text and notes have not been updated.